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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

A "Nova Retorica" : da "Regra de Justiça" ao "Ad Hominem"

Oliveira, Eduardo Chagas 09 August 2018 (has links)
Orientador: Arley Ramos Moreno / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-09T02:43:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Oliveira_EduardoChagas_D.pdf: 2498396 bytes, checksum: 41aa8de73a6f26be6cc9b6e78fa789b3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / Resumo: As interpretações que sucedem a publicação do Tratado da Argumentação: A Nova Retórica (1958), costumam centrar o foco da teoria de Perelman nos problemas de natureza jurídica. O nosso trabalho, entretanto, procura fundamentar a análise do seu pensamento sob uma perspectiva que privilegia as suas motivações filosóficas e a preocupação com a questão da linguagem. Nossa proposta visa a investigação do percurso intelectual de Chaïm Perelman, desde os seus primeiros escritos (1931) até a publicação do Tratado da Argumentação (1958), com o intuito de desvendar como a sua teoria constrói um processo de reabilitação acadêmica da Retórica. Neste comenos, a afirmação de que ¿toda argumentação é uma argumentação ad hominem¿ precisa ser analisada, porque traz elementos essenciais à compreensão da natureza do empreendimento filosófico erigido por Perelman. A questão perpassa a reestruturação de concepções que envolvem a Lógica dos juízos de valor, a teoria das noções confusas e, sobretudo, a distinção entre os modos de convencer e os modos de persuadir, procurando no pensamento argumentativo a sustentação para uma racionalidade específica que se exerce nas práticas humanas / Abstract: The study shows some reviews that Perelman made in his discursive concept of rationality. The work investigates the intellectual way of Chaïm Perelman since first writings (1931) until the publication of "The New Rhetoric: a treatise on argumentation" (1958) to discover as the theory of the argumentation constructs a Theory of Practical Reasoning behind the idea of Justice and the problem of argument. The New Rhetoric rejects structural validity as the measure of arguments because nonmathematical reasoning offers only probable conclusions. Perelman's theory emphasizes adherence of the audience as both the object and starting point of argumentation. To achieve persuasion the rhetor must utilize values and beliefs shared with the audience. As a result, that audience serves as an inventional tool that aids in the creation of the discourse. If formal logic and its language are not the model of argumentation, then Perelman and other rhetoricians must work within the ambiguities of natural language. Current linguistic theories are applied to persuasive discourse to provide a linguistic description of argumentation. Using script theory, pseudo-invariant and invariant assumptions as well as semantic recursion triggers are identified in texts to support Perelman's argument that 'quasi-logical' arguments gain strength because of their linguistic resemblance to formal logical structures. As Perelman views it, arguments gain strength by using language to achieve 'presence' in the mind of the audience, an act which involves creating an association between concepts which are accepted by the audience and those which are less readily accepted. This notion applies to Perelman's quasi-logical arguments, as well as techniques based on the structure of reality and techniques establishing the structure of reality. Thus, we analyze the affirmation: "all argument is an ad hominem argument" in order to understand the Perelman¿s philosophical proposal / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia
2

Il fattore personale dell'argomentazione: una prospettiva retorico-antropologica / Dimension personnelle de l'argumentation: une perspective rhétorique-anthropologique

Zagarella, Roberta 25 March 2014 (has links)
Dans le cadre d’une approche philosophique et épistémologique, qui privilège le point de vue rhétorique sur l’argumentation et la ligne de pensée Aristote-Vico-Perelman, la thèse essaye d’analyser la construction de la subjectivité dans le discours argumentatif. Je cherche à montrer qu’il est possible de tracer une théorie de l’argumentation dans laquelle subjective n’est pas synonyme de fallacieuse.<p>En général, la thèse analyse le rôle de celui qui parle et de celui qui écoute dans l’argumentation et dans tous les discours. Je vais soutenir est que la dimension personnelle n’est pas un élément qu’il faut supprimer mais, au contraire, un élément essentiel du discours argumentatif.<p><p>Une approche rhétorique au problème du sujet se base sur une intuition fondamentale de la rhétorique d’Aristote .Comme nous le savons, dans le premier livre de la Rhétorique, Aristote affirme que le discours (logos) est composé (synkeimai) de trois éléments :l’orateur, le sujet traité et l’auditoire .Au même temps la rhétorique est composée des trois éléments :Logos, Pathos et Ethos. La pratique linguistique inclut la dimension émotive, l’orateur et l’auditoire, qui sont des éléments discursifs. De même, l’ethos et le pathos ne sont pas des moyens de preuves irrationnelles ou des fallacies. On verra que cette idée implique un système philosophique et épistémologique assez différent du système normativiste des théories contemporaines :cela implique de revenir sur le concept de rationalité et sur le rapport entre la rationalité, la praxis et son incertitude essentielle.<p><p>Pour question de temps, la thèse ne parle pas de pathos. Elle s’occupe de l’ethos soit du point de vue de celui qui parle (Partie I) soit du point de vue de l’auditoire (Partie II).<p><p>Dans la première partie, on analyse la question de la rationalité rhétorique et des paralogismes et les définitions historiques de la dimension personnelle de l’argumentation (ethos, personne, ad hominem).<p><p>Dans la deuxième, on analyse le rapport entre la dimension personnelle, le sens commun, la vérité, la certitude et la fides.<p>En conclusion, on soutiendra que l’ethos est soit une pistis technique de la rhétorique, soit une des conditions préalables du discours même.<p> / Doctorat en Langues et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
3

Critical thinking on a logical fallacy

Shim, So Young, 1970- 10 June 2011 (has links)
Ad hominem argument is an argument that attacks the defender of a claim rather than the claim in dispute. The purpose of my dissertation is to answer the question of whether ad hominem argument is fallacious. I search for the answer by exploring several areas of philosophy and discussing ad hominem argument from historical, logical, epistemological, and linguistic perspectives. I reach the following conclusions: First, since the conclusion of an ad hominem argument does not appear explicitly in actual argumentation, how to formulate the conclusion plays a crucial role in judging the legitimacy of ad hominem argument; Second, there is no type of logical fallacy unified under the name of “ad hominem” because, at least, some instances of so-called ad hominem fallacy are epistemically justifiable arguments; Third, since an ad hominem argument is used to refute a person’s testimony by attacking his trustworthiness, an ad hominem argument playing a role of undercutting defeater of a speaker’s testimony is legitimate from the perspective of epistemology of testimony; Fourth, since ad hominem argument can be treated as a speech act of argumentation, an ad hominem argument that satisfies the felicity conditions for argumentation is legitimate from the perspective of speech act theory and an ad hominem argument can be legitimately used to reveal the infelicity of the opponent’s argument. / text
4

Oskick i svensk debatt : En studie om oskick i partiledardebatter mellan Annie Lööf (C) och Jimmie Åkesson (SD) valåret 2018

Lithner, Simon January 2021 (has links)
No description available.
5

A critical study of informal fallacies in some socio-political discourse in Ghana

Ansah, Richard January 2019 (has links)
The research undertakes a critical study of informal fallacies in some socio-political and religious discourses in Ghana. It clearly and aptly demonstrates that the aforementioned discourses are mostly, if not, always laced with fallacies which obscure and distort clear and critical thinking. The study shows that language, which is the fundamental means by which to engage in socio-political discourse, can be viewed as a complicated tool which is open to misuse and abuse. It shows that language used in socio-political discourses is more often than not utilized poorly, and as such assertions and appeals can be confused with factual/logical inaccuracies. Statements can be formulated in ways that make their content dangerously vague, ambiguous or generally misleading. The research shows that although fallacies can be committed intentionally or unintentionally, in discourses in general, they are mostly, if not always, committed intentionally in socio-political discourse so as to achieve political gains and agenda. Another area of discourse that is tackled in this work where fallacies frequently occur is the religious sector. The study notes that matters of religion are mostly matters that are delicate to handle as these matters are mostly, again if not always, based on faith. It is shown herein that many a time, religious personalities use fallacious as means to drive their religious agenda across. The research then looks at what these aforementioned fallacies imply in relation to socio-political and religious discourses. It proceeds to discuss the positive implications of fallacies before it progresses to the negative implications of same. It then asks how a fallacy will be beneficial to a person and or how it will disadvantage the same person. If fallacies often occur in socio-political and religious discourses, then one must have the ability to detect these fallacies and try to avoid them. The work discusses how to detect fallacies and how to avoid them. It makes bold claims that if one has knowledge about fallacies then one will be able to avoid them. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / Ph. D. (Philosophy)

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