Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: 1. The purpose of the first chapter was to give a short introduction to the study. Philosophy is the search for wisdom; to know what a virtuous life is and to know what the morally correct thing to do is. Our lifelong relationship with animals, our attitudes towards them and the ways we treat them are some of the issues that beg philosophers to think. An important question in this regard is if it is morally correct to eat meat or should humans become vegetarian. To answer this question the „Animal Liberation‟ argument, as presented by Peter Singer, was critically analyzed. Does this argument balance our concern for animals with human interests? 2. To understand our attitude towards animals, reviews of the Judeo-Christian and philosophical traditions were done in Chapter 2. The different views related to these traditions were also discussed. The Judeo-Christian view is based on the interpretation of Genesis and the idea of human dominion. Philosophical views on the moral status of animals and moral consideration of animals can be classified in three categories namely indirect theories, direct-but-unequal theories and equal moral status theories. 3. The nature and extent of the current beef production debate was discussed in Chapter 3. The most important issues were the environmental impact of beef production, socio-economic and human health concerns as well as ethical issues related to the inhumane treatment of animals. It was then concluded that most attacks on beef production were biased and did not take context into account. 4. The „Animal Liberation‟ argument was critically analyzed from a logical perspective in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 by using the so called FRISCO approach – with emphasis on the Focus of the argument, Reasons given for the conclusion, the quality of Inferences, the Situation or context of the argument as well as the Clarity of the argument. This argument lacks objectivity and rationality. It includes a number of fallacies, false statements and emotional language. Ideas, concepts and principles were not applied consistently. The argument was therefore found to be unsound. 5. In Chapter 7 the conclusion was stated namely that the “animal liberation” approach could not formulate a sound argument for a vegetarian diet. The „Animal Liberation‟ argument was also unable to balance our concern for animals with human interests, in the process compromising human dignity and freedom. However, human attitudes towards animals and the treatment of animals need to be improved. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: 1. Die doel van die eerste hoofstuk was om ʼn kort inleiding tot die studie te gee. Filosofie is die strewe en soeke na wysheid; om te weet wat ʼn deugsame lewe is, en om te weet wat moreel korrek en aanvaarbaar is. Ons verhouding met diere, ons ingesteldheid teenoor diere, asook die manier hoe ons diere behandel, is slegs enkele van die kwessies wat filosowe dwing om daaroor na te dink. ʼn Belangrike vraag in die verband is die volgende: Is dit moreel aanvaarbaar om vleis te eet, of moet die mens ʼn vegetariese dieet volg? Om hierdie vraag te beantwoord word die “Animal Liberation”-argument, soos aangebied deur Peter Singer, krities ontleed. Is hierdie argument in staat om ons kommer oor die behandeling van diere met menslike belange te balanseer? 2. Om die mens se houding en ingesteldheid teenoor diere beter te verstaan, word ʼn oorsig van die Joods-Christelike en filosofiese tradisies in Hoofstuk 2 gedoen. Die verskillende sienings, wat verband hou met hierdie tradisies, word ook kortliks bespreek. Die Joods-Christelike siening is gebaseer op ʼn spesifieke vertolking van Genesis en die idee van menslike heerskappy. Die filosofiese sienings van die morele status, en gevolglik ook die morele inagneming van diere, kan in drie kategorieë, naamlik indirekte teorieë, direk-maar-ongelyke teorieë en die gelyke-morele-status teorieë, opgedeel word. 3. Die aard en omvang van die beesvleisproduksie-debat word in Hoofstuk 3 bespreek. Die belangrikste kwessies, onderliggend aan hierdie debat, het betrekking op die omgewingsimpak van vleisproduksie, sosio-ekonomiese en menslike gesondheidskwessies, asook etiese kwessies wat verband hou met die onaanvaarbare behandeling van diere. Die gevolgtrekking is dat die meeste aanvalle op vleisproduksie eensydig is en ook nie konteks in ag neem nie. 4. Die “Animal Liberation”-argument word in Hoofstuk 4, 5 en 6 krities ontleed vanuit „n logiese perspektief met behulp van die sogenaamde FRISCO-metode – waarin die klem val op die Fokus van die argument, Redes wat aangevoer word vir die konklusie, die gehalte van die afleidings, die Situasie of konteks van die argument, en die helderheid van die argument. Die gevolgtrekking is dat die argument nie objektief en rasioneel is nie, en gebuk gaan onder denkfoute, vals stellings en emosionele taal. Idees, konsepte en beginsel word ook nie konsekwent toegepas nie. Die argument is dus nie betroubaar nie. 5. In Hoofstuk 7 word die bevinding van die tesis gestel, naamlik dat die “animal liberation” benadering nie „n betroubare argument vir ʼn vegetariese dieet kon formuleer nie. Die argument was ook nie in staat om ons kommer oor diere met menslike belange te balanseer nie, en het in die proses menslike waardigheid en vryheid gekompromitteer. Die mens se houding en behandeling van diere, moet egter verander.

This thesis expands on the model presented in Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s Zoopolis for how companion animals might be treated as co-citizens in a post-Animal Rights world. I will attempt to clarify the distinct political obligations owed to companion animals throughout their lifetimes by individual caregivers and by the state. In particular, I argue that there is nothing in the genetic make-up of most companion animals that precludes them from being “autonomous agents” in adulthood, meaning that if allowed to develop their agency, most animals would be able to lead flourishing lives independent of human companions. I suggest that, for young companion animals, guardians have political obligations to develop the autonomous agency of their dependents, with help from the state. That said, for adult animals which develop autonomous agency, I argue that both a human caregiver and the animal have a right to sever their relationship with each other, just as we give adult children the right to leave their parents’ care and also give parents the “right to kick out” adult children who are capable of supporting themselves. However, while advocating for human caregivers’ rights to sever relationships with autonomous pets, I nonetheless maintain that the state will always retain obligations to its citizens to provide them with a basic level of welfare, and these obligations extend to companion animals as well. Thus, the thesis will consider ways that companion animals can flourish without human companionship. Questions I am concerned with are: Can companion animals lead worthwhile lives without human caregivers? What obligations do caregivers and states have to raise animal young? When and how can these obligations be terminated? And lastly, how might we restructure our public and political institutions to accommodate animals who voluntarily or involuntarily leave relationships with caregivers? / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2013-11-15 09:18:40.613

The project underlying this dissertation aims at analyzing three pro-animal-rights theories, evaluating the theories, and outlining an alternative theoretical account of animal rights. The analytical categories are justification and function of animal rights, the definition of the right holder, and the resolution approach to rights conflict. The categories are applied to a naturalist, a theocentric, and a contractarian approach to defend animal rights. The evaluation is substantiated by the assumption that rights are meant to protect less powerful beings against more powerful aggressors. The constructive segment is an investigation into what extent identified disadvantages of the theories can be avoided by outlining a new model for animal rights. The analyses and evaluation suggest that all three theories are at risk of contradicting the proper function of rights-based theories. Tom Regan’s naturalist account of animal rights includes a logical possibility to sacrifice less capable beings for the sake of more capable beings. Andrew Linzey’s theocentric case for animal rights may sometimes mean that vulnerable human persons should be sacrificed for more powerful non-human beings. Mark Rowlands’ outlined contractarian model, further reconstructed in this work, fails to provide a way to resolve rights conflicts, making the function of rights inapplicable to conflicts. In conclusion, it is suggested that defining the right holder as a self-preservative being can be supported by, at least, the contractarian rationale. That would also conform to the proper function of rights-based theories. It is also suggested that this means that rights conflicts should be resolved by a voluntary sacrifice of the most powerful being. Practical circumstances should be created where such voluntarity is both genuine and rationally possible.

Prior to the streetcar lines being electrified in the late 1800s, equines pulled the cars. The quadrupeds that pulled the horsecars in New Orleans, Louisiana, were area specific: New Orleans had mules, not horses. The mule in the South is typically associated with the rural South; however, in nineteenth century urban New Orleans the mule played an integral part in daily commerce and society. New Orleanians admiration for the animals turned into concern when the rigors of work became apparent to the public, as mules suffered from the abuses of drivers, the seedy practices of street railway companies, malnutrition, and exhaustion. As a direct result, the Louisiana Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was established and many New Orleanians took to defending the voiceless laborers. Animal rights, not the drive for more modernity, was the central factor to convince the city to electrify the street railway

The title of this thesis is a reference to Spivak’s famous essay: Can the Subaltern Speak?2 By introducing the concept of the nonhuman in the context of this question, this action seeks to highlight the characteristic silence surrounding the inclusion of nature and animals in mainstream socio-political discussions. In the East Asian context this rings true due to the relatively limited scholarship on animal advocacy dynamics in the region. Taiwan is one such example where in spite of its increasing visibility and effectiveness, the animal protection movement has received little attention in relation to its growing influence in the eco-political landscape of the country. This thesis examines the emergence of animal protection rationales in Taiwan as an example of a ‘New Social Movement’ (NSM), and explores the mobilization dynamics employed by animal advocacy groups engaged in the transformation of socio-natural relationships. For this purpose, this thesis applies Jürgen Habermas’ ‘system-lifeworld’ framework as advanced in his work on NSMs based on The Theory of Communicative Action. The findings indicate that animal protection consciousness in Taiwan arose from a new area of conflicts in the socio-natural space due to economic industrialization. At the same time, the convergence of Buddhist Modernism and Animal Ethics has resulted in the emergence of distinctive identities based on animal protection, and more recently the spread of veganism in the country. Counter institutions established from these processes of communicative action play a central role in advancing new discourses to address human-nonhuman interests. Therefore, the Animal Protection Movement in Taiwan is an increasingly prominent element in the eco-political landscape of the country. Future inquiry should pay closer attention to such developments in the East Asian context. Here, insights from the case of Taiwan’s animal advocacy provide a relevant starting point.

The purpose of this essay is to critically examine the current legal status of animals in the United States and offer possible alternatives to the current legal rights for animals. This essay examines the failures of the legal system in protecting animals that have abilities very similar to our own. With an examination of these types of animals, this essay will explain why some animals merit the status of legal personhood to protect them from being carelessly used by others. Ultimately, this essay is an attempt to open the field of legal protection for many animals starting with a few through legal personhood.

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / Este trabalho pretende mostrar que o debate sobre os Direitos Animais possui relevÃncia filosÃfica. Ele destaca o fato de que questÃes concernentes aos animais remetem tambÃm ao homem. Trata-se de um esforÃo para mostrar que restringir aos seres humanos a condiÃÃo de detentores de direitos morais consiste num equÃvoco e, portanto, hà a necessidade de uma Ãtica nÃo antropocÃntrica. O foco principal à a contribuiÃÃo de Tom Regan, o autor afirma que por serem sencientes, os animais sÃo sujeitos de uma vida e possuem o que ele chama de valor inerente, ou seja, suas vidas tÃm um valor e fim em si. Tais afirmaÃÃes sÃo fundamentadas em pesquisas cientÃficas sobre a consciÃncia animal e estudos de etologia. à tambÃm objeto desta investigaÃÃo a abordagem de Peter Singer, que defende o Bem-estarismo animal tendo a senciÃncia como um princÃpio moral. Ressaltamos ainda que, uma vez que a expressÃo âdireitos dos animaisâ comumente se refere à concessÃo de respeito pelos seres humanos aos animais a partir de determinados critÃrios sem que lhes caibam direitos especÃficos, a noÃÃo de âdireitos animaisâ parte do pressuposto de que possuem direitos e que devemos reconhecÃ-los a despeito de nossa vontade; tentaremos corroborar a segunda tese. / This work is intended to show that the debate concerning animal rights is philosophically relevant. It points out the fact that animal issues are related to human beings as well. Therefore, this dissertation is an effort to demonstrate that it is wrong to attribute only to human beings the status of holders of moral rights and that it is necessary to conceive an ethical framework grounded on a non-anthropocentric view. Particular attention is devoted here to the contribution of Tom Reagan who asserts animals are subjects of life and possess what is called inherent value, i.e., animalsâ lives are not means to accomplish ends external to themselves. These affirmations are grounded on scientific studies of animal consciousness and on ethology. Peter Singerâs defense of the well-being of animals based on the fact that they are sentient beings will be also investigated. The expression rights of animals is not used in the context of this demarche because it relates to the respect humans beings should have to non-human animals without the recognition of them as holders of specific moral rights. The expression animal rights is purported to corroborate the notion that such rights are a reality to be accepted regardless the will of human beings.

This paper used the constant comparative method to examine the 12 animated features released by Disney between 2000 and 2010 for: (1) their representation of nonhuman animals (NHAs) and the portrayal of race, class, gender, and speciesism within this representation, (2) the ways they describe the relationship between humans and NHAs, and (3) whether they promote an animal rights perspective. Three major themes were identified: NHAs as stereotypes, family, and human/NHA dichotomy. Analysis of these themes revealed that Disney’s animated features promote speciesism and celebrate humanity’s superiority by justifying the subordination of NHAs to human agency. Furthermore, while Disney’s representation of NHAs remains largely anthropocentric, most of its animated features do not reflect the tenets of animal rights.

There are several ways in which people can relate to eating or not eating animals. This essay is focussing two main strategies: Making distances and drawing borders. Today, there are several reasons for not eating meat, including environmental reasons, individual and public health reasons, ethical reasons and more. Yet, people eat more meat than ever. According to the UN, this is a major problem. In 2006 the report Livestock’s long shadow pointed out that meat consumption was a bigger problem from an environmental point of view, than global transports, including air-traffic. At the same time, western societies are becoming both more animal friendly (when it comes to companion animals) and more animal abusive (when it comes to production animals). There seems to be a lot of empathy for animals, yet people choose to hurt them, kill them and eat them. This essay, with a feministic approach, tries to reveal what mechanisms are behind this ambigous behaviour. The findings suggest that the border line between humans and animals is blurred due to several reasons. / Att äta eller inte äta djur är en fråga som det går att förhålla sig till på olika sätt. Den här uppsatsen fokuserar på två huvudstrategier: Avståndstagande och gränsdragningar. I dag finns många anledningar till att inte äta kött, till exempel miljöskäl, hälsoskäl (såväl individuella som folkhälsomässiga), etiska skäl med flera. Ändå äter jordens befolkning mer kött än någonsin. Enligt FN är det ett stort problem. Rapporten "Livestock's long shadow" som kom ut 2006, pekar ut köttkonsumtionen som ett större miljöproblem än världens samlade transporter, inklusive flygtransporter. Samtidigt, håller västerländska samhällen på att bli allt mer djurvänliga (när det handlar om sällskapsdjur) och allt mer djurfientliga (när det handlar om så kallade produktionsdjur). Det finns uppenbarligen mycket empati för djuren, ändå väljer människor att göra dem illa,  döda dem och äta dem. Den här uppsatsen försöker ur ett feministiskt perspektiv undersöka de mekanismer som ligger bakom detta ambivalenta beteende. Resultatet tyder på att gränsen mellan människa och djur är en kulturell konstruktion som håller på att suddas ut, av flera skäl.

<p>"Citizen Canine" explores the sacrificial underpinnings of politics via a critique of the boundary between human and animal in Homer, Aeschylus, and Plato. I argue that the concept "animal" serves a functional rather than descriptive role: it is born of a sacrificial worldview that sees violence as a necessary foundation for human life, and which therefore tries to localize and contain this violence as much as possible through a system of sacrifice. I begin the dissertation with Martha Nussbaum's recent work on the "frontiers of justice," but argue that she is insufficiently attentive to the roles that animality and the rhetoric of sacrifice play in her discourse. I then examine the concept of sacrifice more thematically - using Jacques Derrida and Rene Girard among others - which justifies the move back to the Greeks to understand the specific manner in which sacrifice, human, and animal are intertwined at a crucial moment in Western history. In the Greeks we see an inception of this sacrificial concept of the political, and the movement from Homer to Aeschylus to Plato presents us with three successive attempts to understand and control cosmic violence through a sacrificial order. I contend that a similar logic continues to inform the exclusions (native/foreigner, masculine/feminine, human/nature) that mark the borders of the contemporary political community - hence my dissertation is directed both at the specific animal/human dichotomy as well as the larger question of how political identity is generated by the production, sacrifice and exclusion of marginalized communities.</p> / Dissertation