Through the life story narratives of Ethiopian women activists, this research explores the journey of Ethiopian women activists during three political and historical periods (1955–1974; 1974–1991; 1991–2015). Thus, the study proposes a new perspective on the forms of Ethiopian women’s activism and subsequently the different types of feminism emerging from their narratives. Through examination of how the activists reflect on, reconstruct and give meaning to their life stories, this research unravels that their activism is informed by feminist principles. It also exposes that it is shaped by a long history of resistance to patriarchy, which enabled women in traditional Ethiopia to negotiate a certain level of “autonomy and liberty”. Contrary to the general expectation, the research demonstrates that the process of modernization (read: westernization) came with its own structure based on western patriarchy, and reinforced local patriarchy. In this new, formalized patriarchy, the rights that women had negotiated through their resistance in earlier times were diminished. This study on women activists, categorized for the purpose of this research as pioneers, revolutionaries and negotiators, suggests that Ethiopian women activists have since adopted different forms of engagement that tend to improve the social, cultural, economic and political conditions of Ethiopian women. Consequently, I argue that, while Ethiopian women’s activism and feminism is firmly embedded in the history of resistance of previous generations of Ethiopian women, the form of activism varies according to the political and historical context in which the activists negotiate and adapt the way they act.

Although a great deal has been written over the past two decades on the armed struggle in South Africa and the role that the African National congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP)have played in it, virtually nothing of academic value has been written on the main vehicle of the struggle, namely Umkhonto we Sizwe or 'MK' as it is more commonly known. Besides the research undertaken by Edward Feit in the 1960's and the account left to us by Bruno Mtolo on the formation and activities of Umkhonto in Natal prior to the Rivonia events, most of the material that has been written on the subject of Umkhonto makes no meaningful contribution to the history and activities of the organisation. As a result a serious vacuum has been left in the history of the liberation movement but particularly the armed struggle in South Africa. There was therefore an urgent need for a systematic and detailed study of Umkhonto and the specific role it played in the liberation struggle since 1961. Identifying the need for this study vas however the easy part. Writing it on the other hand presented numerous complex problems, part of which was brought about by the lack of suitable source material, and the fact that the organisation vas proscribed by law. The problem was further compounded by the fact that although Umkhonto was created to be independent (initially at least) of the ANC and to fulfill a function that the ANC could not do in the 1960's, the two organisations became so closely associated with one another and with the SACP that most of the time it is very difficult if not nearly impossible, to always draw a clear distinction between the three of them. Of course the problem has not been made easier by the Press which, for the sake of simplicity and expediency, have chosen to equate the ANC and Umkhonto with one another. Virtually none of the newspapers which have reported on the armed struggle over the years have taken the trouble to draw any meaningful distinction between the organisation and activities of the ANC on the one hand and Umkhonto on the other. While it is true that the two organisations have very close ties and there is a strong degree of overlapping between both members and leaders, this research will show that the two organisations are nonetheless different from one another and have organisational structures and functions that support this. The main difference between the two organisations has always been the fact that while Umkhonto was specifically created as the military component of the ANC-SACP alliance, the ANC on the other hand has remained the main political instrument of the liberation movement. As such, members of the ANC were not supposed to undertake any direct military missions against apartheid targets in South Africa. At best they fulfilled a supportive role such as the distribution of propaganda, the provision of transport, the supply of weapons and the creation of weapons caches etc., to support Umkhonto's cadres in the field. The members of the ANC thus concerned themselves primarily with political and diplomatic work in the armed struggle. By the middle of the 1980's however, the relationship between the ANC and Umkhonto began to change when the political and military functions of the two organisations were brought together under the control of the newly created political-military-council (PMC)following the collapse of the ANC and Umkhonto's organizational structures in the frontline states of Mozambique and Swaziland, as a result of the South African government's persistant counter-insurgency operations. The new organisational structure that was set up by the beginning of 1983 to replace the defunct Regional Command and was sanctioned by the ANC and the SACP and accepted at the former's National Consultative Conference at Kabwe, Zambia, in 1985. This new direction in the armed struggle was further reflected in the decision to introduce compulsory military training for all members of the combined liberation movement. In theory thus, after 1985, all members of the ANC and the SACP were subjected to military training in Umkhonto's training camps in Angola and elsewhere. This move further helped to blur the lines between the ANC, the SACP and Umkhonto. Much of this will become clear in the course of this thesis. Where possible, interpretations will be attached to the facts to highlight certain developments in the armed struggle. Unfortunately, the facts pertaining to Umkhonto is not always volumous or conclusive enough to make statements that will withstand the test of time. The aim of this study is to examine the history of Umkhonto from its origins in 1961 to the end of 1988 when as a result of the New York Accord between South Africa, Cuba and Angola the ANC and Umkhonto were forced to remove all their military bases and personnel from Angola with immediate effect. Although this particular move severely crippled the ability of Umkhonto to continue with its armed struggle it vas not the only factor influencing its performance and status by the end of 1988. A host of other factors such as poor organisation, weak leadership, dissention, dissatisfaction with the role of the SACP in the liberation movement, and lack of sufficient funds among others also contributed to its weakened position by the end of the 1980's. These and other factors effecting the position and performance of Umkhonto are extensively dealt with in the second half of this study. Although increased cooperation between the military and political segments of the liberation movement became an important element in the armed struggle after 1985, the leadership of the ANC, the SACP and Umkhonto were not always in agreement on important issues. This became increasingly apparent towards the end of the 1980's when the combined effect of the South African government's counter-insurgency operations and the changes that were taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were beginning to have a direct affect on the position and future of the liberation alliance led by the ANC and the SACP. Although the ANC, like most political organisations, always had a fair share of dissention in its ranks the formation of Umkhonto in 1961, the destruction of the organisation's underground structures inside South Africa by the mid-1960'S and the growing hegemony of the SACP over both the ANC and Umkhonto's leadership since, have produced some serious dissention in the ranks of the liberation movement. The first came in 1975 with the expulsion of the African National Congress African nationalist faction from the ranks of the ANC. The second came with the isolation of the Okhela organisation which was reported to have been a predominantly white anti-communist organisation inside the ANC. The third attack was on the leadership of the liberation movement was averted with the expulsion of the dissident Marxist group known as the “Marxist Tendency within the ANC” in the early 1980's. Although the ANC and the SACP have always denied that the influence of these attacks on its combined leadership were in anyway serious, this study has shown that these developments in association with other developments had indeed a deep effect on the effectiveness of Umkhonto and the outcome of the armed struggle. The latter is particularly evident in the decision by Chris Hani, who was Chief of Staff of Umkhonto and his protégé, Steve Tshwete, to challenge the ANC's National Executive committee in 1981 to allow them to execute the decision taken at the Kabwe conference to extend Umkhonto's attacks to include white civilian targets inside South Africa. Although the ANC had accepted such action in principle at its Kabwe conference in 1985, it remained reluctant to fully implement it out of fear that such action could tarnish its image internationally and loose its much needed international support, particularly among the nations and people of Western Europe. Such considerations seemingly did not carry much support with Marxist radicals and militants such as Hani and others who preferred a military to a political or negotiated settlement in South Africa. With the support of the central Committee of the SACP (or rather. key elements of it) behind them, Hani and Tshwete issued a directive to all Umkhonto commanders in 1987 to extent their attacks to white civilian targets. The fact that the ANC did nothing to stop the directive or to counter Hani's actions is clear indication of the position that the military hardliners had come to occupy in the ANC-SACP alliance and Umkhonto by the latter part of the 1980's. Unfortunately for Hani and his followers, the signing of the New York Accord at the end of 1988 came as a severe setback to their plans and left them with a cause that was becoming increasingly difficult to execute successfully. This research will show that as a result of these developments and the changes that were taking place in the Soviet Union particularly with regards to Soviet Third World policy, the military hardliners in the ANC-SACP alliance and Umkhonto were increasingly forced to take a backseat to the views and activities of more moderate leaders such as Thabo Mbeki, who was the ANC's Chief of Foreign Affairs. In view of the above this study will show that the SACP since the early 1970'S has taken steadily control of the ANC and the liberation struggle in South Africa and that by the end of the 1980'S Umkhonto was more a fief of the SACP and its Central Committee than of the ANC and its National Executive Committee, which had a clear majority of communist members by 1988. Although some major developments have taken place since the signing of the New York Accord in December 1988, such as the unbanning of the ANC, the SACP and Umkhonto and the release of many political prisoners, these events and developments falls outside the scope of this study and are dealt with in the postscript. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2009. / Historical and Heritage Studies / unrestricted

Through the life story narratives of Ethiopian women activists, this research explores the journey of Ethiopian women activists during three political and historical periods (1955–1974; 1974–1991; 1991–2015). Thus, the study proposes a new perspective on the forms of Ethiopian women’s activism and subsequently the different types of feminism emerging from their narratives. Through examination of how the activists reflect on, reconstruct and give meaning to their life stories, this research unravels that their activism is informed by feminist principles. It also exposes that it is shaped by a long history of resistance to patriarchy, which enabled women in traditional Ethiopia to negotiate a certain level of “autonomy and liberty”. Contrary to the general expectation, the research demonstrates that the process of modernization (read: westernization) came with its own structure based on western patriarchy, and reinforced local patriarchy. In this new, formalized patriarchy, the rights that women had negotiated through their resistance in earlier times were diminished. This study on women activists, categorized for the purpose of this research as pioneers, revolutionaries and negotiators, suggests that Ethiopian women activists have since adopted different forms of engagement that tend to improve the social, cultural, economic and political conditions of Ethiopian women. Consequently, I argue that, while Ethiopian women’s activism and feminism is firmly embedded in the history of resistance of previous generations of Ethiopian women, the form of activism varies according to the political and historical context in which the activists negotiate and adapt the way they act.

La décennie des années 1970 est caractérisée en Italie par un « cycle de protestation » et des mobilisations politiques et sociales de grande ampleur, qui s'accompagne – sans s'y limiter – d'une vague de violences politiques de natures très diverses, des attentats à la bombe mis au point par l'extrême-droite aux attentats ciblés de la lutte armée d'inspiration marxiste-léniniste, en passant par les débordements occasionnés par des manifestations ou des agressions. Ces violences s'inscrivent dans des stratégies d’intimidation qu'il s'agit de replacer précisément dans des cultures politiques qui se donnent comme objectif d'utiliser, parfois explicitement, la peur comme outil d'intervention politique, occasion de replacer les différents « terrorismes » dans la perspective de trajectoires de radicalisation. Quels sont les résultats socio-politiques de ces manœuvres visant à généraliser la guerre psychologique ? Au fil de la décennie et en comparant, sans les confondre, les différentes formes de « terrorisme » et leurs effets, se dessine une géographie et une chronologie de l'imprégnation de la peur : au-delà de l'effet de terreur qui dure peu, la violence « terroriste » installe un climat de peur durable, un sentiment de menace qui devient, à partir de 1978, un fait incontournable et que nombre de sources contemporaines permettent de saisir. Se pose alors la question de la représentation de la peur dans l'espace public et politique, son instrumentalisation éventuelle dans des stratégies propres au gouvernement ou à l'opposition, et l'absolue nécessité de rassurer, y compris au prix d'une mise en tension des mesures de sécurité avec les valeurs de l'État de droit. / The 1970s in Italy are characterized by a new “cycle of protests” and a dramatic rise in social and political mobilization. These movements were accompanied by – although not limited to – a wave of political violence of various types, from right-wing bombings to targeted attacks by armed underground Marxist-Leninist organizations, and a great number of outbursts of collective violence during demonstrations and street fights. Not all of this violent activity falls under the heading of “terrorism”, rather it should be considered within the broader context of a political climate where intimidation tactics were on the increase and fear was, sometimes explicitly, used as a political tool. The political culture facilitated the use of violence in a process of radicalisation. What are the socio-political results of such a strategy of intimidation and psychological warfare? Analysis of the different strategies and their effects reveals a propagation of fear through the decade, resulting in a sustained climate of terror and the sense of a pressing threat, particularly from 1978 onwards. This raises the question of the effects of repetitive terrorist attacks, and the representation of fear in the public and political sphere: at the same time a destabilizing factor and a tool for legitimising political activities.

Entre 1979 et 1989, la région des Antilles et de la Guyane, et plus particulièrement la Guadeloupe, ont connu une décennie de violence. 284 attentats à la bombe ont été commis dans ces pays, soit un peu plus de 10 % des 2616 attentats perpétrés sur le territoire français de 1973 à 1980. Ces actes de violence ont été revendiqués par deux organisations “terroristes“ successives : le Groupe de libération armée (G.L.A) et l’Alliance révolutionnaire caraïbe. Cette “lutte armée“ avait pour objectif de “pousser“ le gouvernement français à accorder l’indépendance nationale à ses dernières possessions des Antilles et de l’Amérique du Sud. Cette thèse intitulée : “le traitement, dans la presse écrite, de la violence politique en Guadeloupe de 1979 à 1989“ s’attache à interroger la stratégie discursive des journaux nationaux et régionaux pour rendre compte des violences dans un pays où est à l’œuvre une théorie politique de l’assimilation. En se fondant sur le schéma actanciel, ce travail, dans sa première partie, s’emploie à dégager les grandes étapes de la formule “départementalisation“ qui s’est imposée au fil du temps comme cadre politique de régulation de la vie publique des départements d’outre-mer. Dans sa deuxième partie, il s’attarde à mettre en lumière le long processus historique qui a conduit aux événements de violence précités. Ceux-ci sont analysés, dans la troisième partie, par la technique de mise en relation contrastive du quotidien de “référence“ le “Monde“ et du journal “nationaliste“ le “Journal Guadeloupéen“, et par celle de l’analyse de contenu. Les résultats de ce travail sont de deux ordres : 1) le phénomène de la violence politique est saisi dans son fonctionnement pratique et théorique ; les premières vérités, à la suite d’une enquête approfondie, apparaissent sur cette période troublée. 2) la mise en relation contrastive, les analyses lexicale et thématique révèlent avec quel substrat les journaux construisent leurs dires. / Between 1979 and 1989, the region covering the French West Indies and Guyana, and in particular Guadeloupe, experienced a decade of violence. 284 bomb attacks were committed in these countries, i.e. slightly more than 10% of the 2,616 attacks carried out throughout French territory between 1973 and 1980. Two “terrorist” organizations successively claimed responsibility for these acts of violence: the Liberation Army Group (G.L.A.) and the Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance. The aim of this “armed struggle” was to “incite” the French government to grant national independence to its last strongholds in the West Indies and South America. This dissertation, entitled “How the written press dealt with the political violence in Guadeloupe between 1979 and 1989”, focuses on questioning the discursive strategy implemented by national and regional newspapers for reporting the violence in a country where a political theory on assimilation was brought into play. In its first part, this work, which is based on the actantial model, concentrates on highlighting the major phases in the “departmentalization” formula, which imposed itself over time as the political framework that would be used to regulate public life in overseas departments. In its second part, it emphasizes in detail the long historic process which led to the aforementioned violent events. These are analyzed in the third part through a contrastive study of the reference daily – Le Monde, with the nationalistic newspaper – the Journal Guadeloupéen and by analyzing the content. The results of this work are twofold: 1) the phenomenon of political violence is addressed in its theoretical and practical functioning; following an in-depth enquiry, the basic truths are brought to the fore for this troubled period. 2) the contrastive relationship, the lexical and thematic analysis uncovers the “substance” used by the newspapers for establishing their claims.

O presente trabalho pretende narrar a história da Ala Vermelha, organização que surgiu como dissidência do Partido Comunista do Brasil (PC do B) e se transformou em partido autônomo em 1966, momento em que se inseriu nas lutas sociais brasileiras, chegando, inclusive, a realizar ações armadas de expropriação de fundos e de propaganda revolucionária entre 1968 e 1971. A Ala Vermelha apresenta um aspecto singular, que viria a distingui-la dos demais grupos guerrilheiros que atuavam naquela época no Brasil. Na plenitude do processo de luta armada, esta organização iniciou um procedimento autocrítico com relação à própria luta armada, procedimento este que se iniciou em 1969 para culminar em 1974, quando avaliou seu equívoco ao optar pelas ações armadas de forma imediata / The purpose of this work is to tell the story of the Red Wing, an organization that appeared originally as a dissidence inside the Brazilian Communist Party (PC do B) and became an autonomous party in 1966. From 1968 to 1971, it became actively involved in the Brazilian social struggle and even carried out armed actions to expropriate funds and disseminate revolutionary propaganda. The Red Wing had an unique trait that would distinguish it from other guerrilla groups operating at that time: in the heat of the armed struggle, this organization set off a self-criticism procedure focused on the very fight it was engaged on. This procedure was started in 1969 and culminated in 1974, when the organization concluded that its option for immediate armed reaction had been a mistake

O presente trabalho pretende narrar a história da Ala Vermelha, organização que surgiu como dissidência do Partido Comunista do Brasil (PC do B) e se transformou em partido autônomo em 1966, momento em que se inseriu nas lutas sociais brasileiras, chegando, inclusive, a realizar ações armadas de expropriação de fundos e de propaganda revolucionária entre 1968 e 1971. A Ala Vermelha apresenta um aspecto singular, que viria a distingui-la dos demais grupos guerrilheiros que atuavam naquela época no Brasil. Na plenitude do processo de luta armada, esta organização iniciou um procedimento autocrítico com relação à própria luta armada, procedimento este que se iniciou em 1969 para culminar em 1974, quando avaliou seu equívoco ao optar pelas ações armadas de forma imediata / The purpose of this work is to tell the story of the Red Wing, an organization that appeared originally as a dissidence inside the Brazilian Communist Party (PC do B) and became an autonomous party in 1966. From 1968 to 1971, it became actively involved in the Brazilian social struggle and even carried out armed actions to expropriate funds and disseminate revolutionary propaganda. The Red Wing had an unique trait that would distinguish it from other guerrilla groups operating at that time: in the heat of the armed struggle, this organization set off a self-criticism procedure focused on the very fight it was engaged on. This procedure was started in 1969 and culminated in 1974, when the organization concluded that its option for immediate armed reaction had been a mistake

<p>The objective of this thesis is to analyse whether Sri Lanka could have avoided the civil war, if changes in the constitution, from 1948 to 1978, offered a political structure guaranteeing the minority rights. Furthermore, the thesis intends to study if the Swiss and Lebanese political models could offer any guidelines for the Sri Lankan conflict.</p><p>The stated purpose of the thesis is studied by analysing official documents, literatures and articles. The finding of the study is that Sri Lanka might have prevented the civil war if the constitutional arrangements had guaranteed the minority rights.</p><p>The Sri Lankan conflict is a unique case, which probably requires its own resolution model. The Swiss and Lebanese models may be applicable in the Sri Lankan case to some extent. However, a possible solution that could prevent the current political and ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, by avoiding another fatal civil war, is to establish power-sharing political arrangements, under a federal state. Whether or not Sri Lanka can achieve a sustainable peace is a question of political willingness.</p>

Resumo: Com o objetivo de dilucidar o processo de exaurição da esquerda comunista no Brasil, esta dissertação analisa o construto acerca da teoria da revolução social na esquerda derrotada pela ditadura bonapartista, colocando em relevo a última fase do pensamento de Carlos Marighella. Perdendo pela primeira vez e definitivamente a hegemonia na esquerda comunista após a instauração, em 1964, da ditadura militar, o Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB) congregou a última esquerda comunista organizada - objetivando a revolução social - que ainda mantinha substantiva inserção sindical, apoio das classes subalternas e posição de centro gravitacional dos movimentos sociais. Ao entrar em processo de depleção após a exacerbação da repressão, o PCB se diluiu numa constelação de agremiações que intempestivamente se desvincularam do interlocutor racional do trabalho, provocando nos movimentos sociais uma ablação do partido. Coordenando a imersão geral da esquerda comunista na luta armada, Carlos Marighella estruturou a Ação Libertadora Nacional (ALN), a mais substantiva facção oriunda da fratura pecebista. Por influência da então recente Revolução Cubana e por imposição violenta da ditadura, a ruptura tática efetuada por Marighella teve como princípio seu descrédito diante das organizações partidárias, motivando a sua convicção de que a guerra de guerrilhas nutriria a vanguarda da revolução brasileira. A análise imanente da integralidade dos escritos de Carlos Marighella desvela que sua inflexão que rumou em oposição à matriz tática pecebista - tática que o partido seguia pelo menos desde sua Declaração de Março de 1958, ancorada na orientação soviética da revolução pacífica e do binômio proletariado-burguesia - não experimentara um rompimento de aporte estratégico, retendo intacto o núcleo teórico pecebista mais infesto: a quimérica... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: With the objective of explaining the drainage of the communist left in Brazil, this thesis analyzes the construct around the social revolution theory of defeated left by the military dictatorship, raising the last phase of Carlos Marighella's thoughts in prominence. Loosing the supremacy of the communist left for the first and final time after the instauration of Bonapartist military dictatorship in 1964, the Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB) rallied the last communist left members around the revolution, wich had substantially maintained for unionist insertions in support of the working classes, and the gravitational center of the social movements. At the start of process of prostration after the amplification of persecution, the PCB became diluted into a constellation of groupings, which rapidly became detached from the rational interlocutor work causing the emptying of the party in the social movements. Carlos Marighella at the head of the general immersion of the communist left in the armed struggle, formed the Ação Libertadora Nacional (ALN), the most significant branch originating from the PCB breakup. Due to the influence of the recent Cuban Revolution and due to the violent imposition of the military dictatorship the tactical rupture caused by Marighella counted as discredit within the party organizations, giving rise to the conviction that the war of guerrilla were nurturing the Brazilian revolution's vanguard. The ontological critical on the writings by Carlos Marighella reveals its breakup with the PCB's tactical matrix - tactical which the party had been following since its Declaration in March of 1958, the Soviet orientation of a pacific revolution and the binomial bourgeoisie-proletariat - does not contain a disruption of strategic contribuition, but maintain the PCB's theoretical more negative: the chimerical two stage theory / Orientador: Marcos Del Roio / Coorientador: Antonio Carlos Mazzeo / Banca: Antonio Rago Filho / Banca: Jair Pinheiro / Mestre

Nesta tese apresentamos a contribuição da população Yao no contexto da luta armada de independência de Moçambique que teve lugar de 25 de setembro de 1964 a 7 de setembro de 1974. Nesta luta os Yao integraram-se ao movimento armado dirigido pela FRENTE DE LIBERTAÇÃO DE MOÇAMBIQUE (FRELIMO), organização nacionalista moçambicana, contra o governo colonial português, tendo se destacado no desenvolvimento dos setores oriental e sul do Niassa e no que este governo designou de Estrada de Mataca. A participação Yao, documentada em fontes coloniais portuguesas, esteve diretamente ligada na importância geoestratégica que este corredor desempenhava ao interligar a Tanzânia, onde estava sediada a FRELIMO, as frentes militares do Niassa e o território do Malawi, pelo interior do Niassa, e os situou no interior do processo efetivo - político e militar - da disseminação do discurso nacionalista moçambicano. A análise da historiografia dos séculos XVIII, XIX e XX sobre os Yao permitiu observar a dinâmica do seu imaginário político que a despeito de suas experiências de poderio económico e militar e de dominação administrativa portuguesa demonstraram sua integração (não isenta de tensões e contradições) na luta armada de independência nacional do país. A pesquisa se baseou na documentação consultada no Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, em Maputo, no Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (ANTT) e no Arquivo Histórico Militar, ambos em Lisboa. / In this thesis, we present the contribution of the Yao population in the context of the armed struggle for independence of Mozambique that took place from September 25, 1964 to September 7, 1974. In this struggle, the Yao joined the armed movement led by the FRONT OF LIBERATION OF MOZAMBIQUE (FRELIMO), a Mozambican nationalist organization, against the Portuguese colonial government, having distinguished itself in the development of the eastern and southern sectors of Niassa and what this government has designated as the \"Mataca Road\". The Yao participation, documented in Portuguese colonial sources, was directly linked to the geostrategic importance that this corridor played in interconnecting Tanzania (where FRELIMO was based), the Niassa military fronts and the Malawian territory, through the interior of Niassa, which placed them within the effective process - political and military - of the dissemination of the Mozambican nationalist discourse. The analysis of the historiography of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries on the Yao made it possible to observe the dynamics of his political imagination which, despite his experiences of economic and military power and Portuguese administrative domination, demonstrated his integration (not free of tensions and contradictions) in Armed struggle of the country\'s national independence. The research was based on the documentation consulted in the Mozambican Historical Archive in Maputo, in the National Archive of the Torre do Tombo (ANTT) and in the Historical Military Archive, both in Lisbon.