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<p>This study examines the effects of credit risk and information disclosure in the new bank regulating system Basel II on bank and bank customer. The effects are then discussed in a perspective of the economic man and information asymmetric theories. Furthermore is the Basel II effects on the capital adequacy of Andelsbanken för Åland examined.</p><p>The approach of the study is qualitative and several interviews with individuals on different levels of the examined bank, Andelsbanken för Åland, have been carried out during the collecting of empirical facts about the effects of the regulating change from the Basel I system to Basel II.</p><p>The research findings are as follows:</p><ul><li>Andelsbanken för Åland have increased its capital adequacy ratio from 12,7 percent to 14,4 percent, mostly due to lower risk weights on housing mortgages compared to Basel I. </li><li>Andelsbanken för Åland have started to use a completely new credit risk and customer assessment system which classifies every customer and gives them a credit rating. The system cause a much heavier information gathering of the customers profile as well as a much better assessment of risk than the previous system, which the bank finds positive. The new system also cause differentiated pricing on loans. Additionally it has contributed to a renovation of the bank. The bank has also started to publish more information about its risk-taking and management. </li><li>Bank customers have to release much more information about themselves and their life, economically as well as personally during a more extensive interview in the credit process. The differentiated pricing cause interest rates to differ based on the customers rating. As an effect of the higher disclosure of bank information, customers can better compare banks. This effect is of greater importance for the bank customers that have depositions in excess of the government deposit assurance. </li><li>The new credit risk and customer assessment system is a rational development due to the new Basel II-rules. Without these rules the development wouldn’t have been rational due to high costs and the traditional pricing of loans. The higher disclosure on risk taking and management cause incentives for the bank to handle these better. </li><li>Bank customers today have higher incentives to better mange the aspects that are included in their rating due to the differentiated pricing on loans. Furthermore they, especially them with depositions in excess of the government deposit assurance, have greater incentives to compare banks due to the higher disclosure of bank information. </li><li>The more extensive information gathering of the customers profile as well as the higher disclosure of bank information have lowered the level of asymmetric information in the banks process of credit granting and the customers choice of bank, making these two more effective. </li></ul>

This study examines the effects of credit risk and information disclosure in the new bank regulating system Basel II on bank and bank customer. The effects are then discussed in a perspective of the economic man and information asymmetric theories. Furthermore is the Basel II effects on the capital adequacy of Andelsbanken för Åland examined. The approach of the study is qualitative and several interviews with individuals on different levels of the examined bank, Andelsbanken för Åland, have been carried out during the collecting of empirical facts about the effects of the regulating change from the Basel I system to Basel II. The research findings are as follows: Andelsbanken för Åland have increased its capital adequacy ratio from 12,7 percent to 14,4 percent, mostly due to lower risk weights on housing mortgages compared to Basel I. Andelsbanken för Åland have started to use a completely new credit risk and customer assessment system which classifies every customer and gives them a credit rating. The system cause a much heavier information gathering of the customers profile as well as a much better assessment of risk than the previous system, which the bank finds positive. The new system also cause differentiated pricing on loans. Additionally it has contributed to a renovation of the bank. The bank has also started to publish more information about its risk-taking and management. Bank customers have to release much more information about themselves and their life, economically as well as personally during a more extensive interview in the credit process. The differentiated pricing cause interest rates to differ based on the customers rating. As an effect of the higher disclosure of bank information, customers can better compare banks. This effect is of greater importance for the bank customers that have depositions in excess of the government deposit assurance. The new credit risk and customer assessment system is a rational development due to the new Basel II-rules. Without these rules the development wouldn’t have been rational due to high costs and the traditional pricing of loans. The higher disclosure on risk taking and management cause incentives for the bank to handle these better. Bank customers today have higher incentives to better mange the aspects that are included in their rating due to the differentiated pricing on loans. Furthermore they, especially them with depositions in excess of the government deposit assurance, have greater incentives to compare banks due to the higher disclosure of bank information. The more extensive information gathering of the customers profile as well as the higher disclosure of bank information have lowered the level of asymmetric information in the banks process of credit granting and the customers choice of bank, making these two more effective.

<p>Syftet är att evaluera Baselramverkets riskreglering i en konjunkturcykel med hänsyn till Östersjöregionens storbankers systemviktiga funktion.</p><p>Studien antar främst en kvantitativ ansats i de två första delarna, nyckeltalsanalysen och buffertsimuleringen men även en kvalitativ ansats antas i den tredje delen, intervjuer.<strong> </strong></p><p>Studien utgår från teorierna om Basel I och Basel II, nyckeltalsteori samt från tidigare forskning.</p><p>Resultatet i studien består av nyckeltalanalys och simulering av åtta, i Östersjöregionen verksamma, bankers nyckeltal och buffert under 21 år samt sex djupintervjuer med representanter för såväl banker som regulatorer.</p><p><strong> </strong><strong>Slutsatser</strong></p><p>Att det inte finns något samband mellan Baselregleringens kapitaltäckning och bankernas risk eller konjunktur, att riskvägningen tenderar till att vara godtycklig och har större påverkan på buffert än Baselregleringens kapitaltäckning samt att mer transparens behövs i bankerna tyder på att Baselregleringens kapitaltäckningskrav i mycket liten utsträckning visar Östersjöregionens storbankers faktiska risk.</p> / <p>The purpose is to evaluate the Basel framework risk regulation in an economic cycle, in account to the systemic function of the large banks in the Baltic Sea region.</p><p>The study mainly adopts a quantitative approach in the two first parts, the key ratio analysis and the buffer simulation. A qualitative element is also implemented in the third part, interviews.</p><p>In a theoretical perspective the study is based on the Basel I and Basel II framework, key ratio theories and previously conducted research. </p><p>The result<strong> </strong>consists of key ratios analysis and buffer simulation for eight banks in the Baltic Sea region for a period of 21 years and interviews with six representatives of banks and regulatory institutions.</p><p> <strong>Conclusion                                   </strong></p><p>The absence of correlation between the Basel regulation capital adequacy and the bank risk nor economic cycle, that risk weighting tends to be arbitrary and have greater impact on bank buffer than capital adequacy regulation has, and that more transparency is needed in banking; suggests that the Basel capital adequacy to a small extent reflect actual risk.</p>

Syftet är att evaluera Baselramverkets riskreglering i en konjunkturcykel med hänsyn till Östersjöregionens storbankers systemviktiga funktion. Studien antar främst en kvantitativ ansats i de två första delarna, nyckeltalsanalysen och buffertsimuleringen men även en kvalitativ ansats antas i den tredje delen, intervjuer.  Studien utgår från teorierna om Basel I och Basel II, nyckeltalsteori samt från tidigare forskning. Resultatet i studien består av nyckeltalanalys och simulering av åtta, i Östersjöregionen verksamma, bankers nyckeltal och buffert under 21 år samt sex djupintervjuer med representanter för såväl banker som regulatorer.  Slutsatser Att det inte finns något samband mellan Baselregleringens kapitaltäckning och bankernas risk eller konjunktur, att riskvägningen tenderar till att vara godtycklig och har större påverkan på buffert än Baselregleringens kapitaltäckning samt att mer transparens behövs i bankerna tyder på att Baselregleringens kapitaltäckningskrav i mycket liten utsträckning visar Östersjöregionens storbankers faktiska risk. / The purpose is to evaluate the Basel framework risk regulation in an economic cycle, in account to the systemic function of the large banks in the Baltic Sea region. The study mainly adopts a quantitative approach in the two first parts, the key ratio analysis and the buffer simulation. A qualitative element is also implemented in the third part, interviews. In a theoretical perspective the study is based on the Basel I and Basel II framework, key ratio theories and previously conducted research.  The result consists of key ratios analysis and buffer simulation for eight banks in the Baltic Sea region for a period of 21 years and interviews with six representatives of banks and regulatory institutions.  Conclusion                                   The absence of correlation between the Basel regulation capital adequacy and the bank risk nor economic cycle, that risk weighting tends to be arbitrary and have greater impact on bank buffer than capital adequacy regulation has, and that more transparency is needed in banking; suggests that the Basel capital adequacy to a small extent reflect actual risk.

Författare: Robin Castor och André Rosenqvist  Handledare: Elias Bengtsson  Examinator: Andreas Jansson  Titel: Anti Money Laundering – Förhindra eller undvika? – En studie om svenska AML-chefers inställning till penningtvättsregelverken.  Sökord: AML, Anti-Money Laundering, Penningtvätt, Bankreglering, Compliance, KYC, Kundkännedom, Riskbedömning, Riskbaserat förhållningssätt, Rapportering, Resursallokering  Bakgrund: Penningtvätt är ett växande problem som skadar samhället. För att hantera detta problem utfärdar EU kontinuerligt nya direktiv för medlemsländerna att implementera. Den aktör som hamnat mest i fokus är banker, där skandaler visat på brister i arbetet mot penningtvätt bland svenska banker. Regelverken ställer hårda krav samtidigt som ett riskbaserat förhållningssätt låter banker tolka och implementera arbetet olika. Genom att studera AML-chefers inställning till regelverken bidrar denna studie med en synvinkel som inte tidigare beaktats i Sverige.  Syfte: Denna studie syftar att öka förståelsen kring attityder mot AML och dess regelverk inom svenska banker, om det skiljer sig mellan olika banker samt vad det kan innebära för alla berörda parter.  Metod: En kvalitativ studie med abduktiv forskningsansats har genomförts. Studien har hämtat empiri genom semistrukturerade intervjuer med fem olika AML-chefer på den svenska bankmarknaden.  Resultat/Slutsatser: Studiens resultat visar hur AML-chefer i Sverige har en kritisk syn på penningtvätts-regelverken. Regelverken upplevs ställa höga, men rimliga, krav på bankerna. Flera fördelar med det riskbaserade förhållningssättet lyfts upp, där riskbedömning och kundkännedom ger en god överblick av verksamheten i ett bolagsstyrnings-perspektiv. Regelverken låter bankerna stänga ute de kunder som inte vill samarbeta. Tyvärr kan dessa kunder gå vidare till nästa bank och fortsätta sitt misstänksamma beteende. Detta problem grundar sig i banksekretessen som gör det omöjligt för banker att dela information och samarbeta i arbetet mot penningtvätt. Studien visar därmed hur incitamenten bakom efterföljandet av regelverket till stor del bygger på rädslan av att skada bankens eget rykte eller ådra sig stora bötesbelopp. Fokus har skiftat från att faktiskt försöka stoppa penningtvätt, till att endast undvika att själv bli utsatt för penningtvätt. / Authors: Robin Castor and André Rosenqvist  Supervisor: Elias Bengtsson  Examiner: Andreas Jansson  Title: Anti Money Laundering - Prevent or Avoid? A study of attitudes towards money laundering regulations among Swedish AML-managers.  Keywords: AML, Anti-money laundering, Money laundering, Banking regulation, Compliance, KYC, Know your customer, Risk assessment, Risk-based approach, Legal reporting, Resource allocation  Background: Money laundering is a growing problem that harms society. To address this issue, the EU is continuously issuing new directives for member states to implement. The banking sector has come to be the most affected industry, where scandals have shown deficiency in the work against money laundering among Swedish banks. These regulations set strict requirements at the same time as the risk- based approach allows banks to interpret and implement the regulations in various degrees. By studying how Swedish AML-managers experience these regulations, this study contributes with a point of view that has not been considered in Sweden previously.  Purpose: This study aims to increase the understanding of attitudes and experience towards AML and its regulations within Swedish banks, if it differs between banks and what it could signify for involved parties.  Method: A qualitative study with an abductive research approach has been conducted. The study has gained empirical data through semi-structured interviews with five different AML managers in the Swedish banking market.  Results/Conclusions: The results of the study show how AML managers in Sweden have a critical view of the money laundering regulations. The regulations are perceived to put high, but appropriate, requirements in the banks. Various advantages of the risk-based approach are highlighted, where risk assessment and customer awareness (KYC) provide a good overview of the business from a corporate governance perspective. The regulations allow banks to end their business relationship with customers who do not want to cooperate. Unfortunately, these customers are able continue their suspicious behavior throughout different banks. This problem is based on the bank secrecy, which makes it impossible for banks to share information and cooperate in the work against money laundering. The study shows how the incentives behind compliance with the regulations are largely based on the fear of damaging reputation or receiving heavy fines. The focus has shifted from actually trying to stop money laundering, to only avoiding being subjected to money laundering themselves.