Unter Respektierung eines Finitismus bezüglich der möglichen Welten wird der Begriff des wahrscheinlichkeitstheoretisch Vernünftigen entwickelt. Wahrscheinlichkeiten werden als Hilfsmittel zum Umgang mit Unwissen eingeführt, insbesondere sollen sie Handlungen empfehlen können. Als begleitende epistemologische Anschauung wird der Bayesianismus verteidigt. Im Hinblick auf die Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie wird insbesondere das Wechselspiel von Interpretation und formalen Eigenschaften untersucht. Das führt zur Aufstellung des „Reinheitsprinzips“, welches schließlich hilft, kontraintuitive Voraussagen, die sich aus einer Anwendung der Self-Sampling-Assumption ergeben, endgültig zu entkräften. Weiterhin werden die Safety-based Approaches zur Charakterisierung von Wissen mittels eines bayesianischen Vorschlags vorangetrieben. Die Themenstellung wird ganzheitlich bearbeitet, was bedeutet, dass auch die Beziehungen zur Entscheidungstheorie, zur Informationsdarstellung zu Zwecken der Künstlichen Intelligenz und zum erkenntnistheoretischen Problem der Induktion dargestellt werden.

The law too often avoids or misuses statistical evidence. This problem is partially explained by the absence of a shared normative framework for working with such evidence. There is considerable disagreement within the legal community about how statistical evidence relates to legal inquiry. It is proposed that the first step to addressing the problem is to accept Bayesianism as a normative framework that leads to outcomes that largely align with legal intuitions. It is only once this has been accepted that we can proceed to encourage education about common conceptual errors involving statistical evidence as well as techniques to limit their occurrence. Objections to using Bayesianism in the legal context are addressed. It is argued that the objection based on the irrelevance of statistical evidence is fundamentally incoherent in its failure to identify most evidence as statistical. Second, objections to the incompleteness of a Bayesian approach in accounting for non-truth-related values do place legitimate limits on the use of Bayesianism in the law but in no way undermine its normative usefulness. Lastly, many criticisms of the role of Bayesianism in the law rest on misunderstandings of the meaning and manipulation of statistical evidence and are best addressed by presenting statistical evidence in ways that encourage correct understanding. Once it is accepted that, put in its proper place, a Bayesian approach to understanding statistical evidence can align with most fundamental legal intuitions, a less fearful approach to the use of statistical evidence in the law can emerge.

The law too often avoids or misuses statistical evidence. This problem is partially explained by the absence of a shared normative framework for working with such evidence. There is considerable disagreement within the legal community about how statistical evidence relates to legal inquiry. It is proposed that the first step to addressing the problem is to accept Bayesianism as a normative framework that leads to outcomes that largely align with legal intuitions. It is only once this has been accepted that we can proceed to encourage education about common conceptual errors involving statistical evidence as well as techniques to limit their occurrence. Objections to using Bayesianism in the legal context are addressed. It is argued that the objection based on the irrelevance of statistical evidence is fundamentally incoherent in its failure to identify most evidence as statistical. Second, objections to the incompleteness of a Bayesian approach in accounting for non-truth-related values do place legitimate limits on the use of Bayesianism in the law but in no way undermine its normative usefulness. Lastly, many criticisms of the role of Bayesianism in the law rest on misunderstandings of the meaning and manipulation of statistical evidence and are best addressed by presenting statistical evidence in ways that encourage correct understanding. Once it is accepted that, put in its proper place, a Bayesian approach to understanding statistical evidence can align with most fundamental legal intuitions, a less fearful approach to the use of statistical evidence in the law can emerge.

Unter Respektierung eines Finitismus bezüglich der möglichen Welten wird der Begriff des wahrscheinlichkeitstheoretisch Vernünftigen entwickelt. Wahrscheinlichkeiten werden als Hilfsmittel zum Umgang mit Unwissen eingeführt, insbesondere sollen sie Handlungen empfehlen können. Als begleitende epistemologische Anschauung wird der Bayesianismus verteidigt. Im Hinblick auf die Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie wird insbesondere das Wechselspiel von Interpretation und formalen Eigenschaften untersucht. Das führt zur Aufstellung des „Reinheitsprinzips“, welches schließlich hilft, kontraintuitive Voraussagen, die sich aus einer Anwendung der Self-Sampling-Assumption ergeben, endgültig zu entkräften. Weiterhin werden die Safety-based Approaches zur Charakterisierung von Wissen mittels eines bayesianischen Vorschlags vorangetrieben. Die Themenstellung wird ganzheitlich bearbeitet, was bedeutet, dass auch die Beziehungen zur Entscheidungstheorie, zur Informationsdarstellung zu Zwecken der Künstlichen Intelligenz und zum erkenntnistheoretischen Problem der Induktion dargestellt werden.:Kapitel 1: Vorüberlegungen Kapitel 2: Von prototheoretischer Intuition zu formalen Regeln Kapitel 3: Von formalen Eigenschaften zu möglichen Interpretationen Kapitel 4: Bayesianismus Kapitel 5: Entscheidungstheorie Kapitel 6: Induktion

Measures of epistemic utility are used by formal epistemologists to make determinations of epistemic betterness among cognitive states. The Brier rule is the most popular choice (by far) among formal epistemologists for such a measure. In this paper, however, we show that the Brier rule is sometimes seriously wrong about whether one cognitive state is epistemically better than another. In particular, there are cases where an agent gets evidence that definitively eliminates a false hypothesis (and the probabilities assigned to the other hypotheses stay in the same ratios), but where the Brier rule says that things have become epistemically worse. Along the way to this 'elimination experiment' counter-example to the Brier rule as a measure of epistemic utility, we identify several useful monotonicity principles for epistemic betterness. We also reply to several potential objections to this counter-example.

Bayesian epistemology provides a promising framework for a theory of epistemic rationality. But the way in which this framework has been built upon thus far yields an unfortunately mechanical picture of rationality, on which rational agents are mere data crunchers who receive evidential input and spit out numeric credal output. This picture is rightly criticized, most prominently by Bas van Fraassen, for being too narrow and restrictive and thus failing to account for certain features which rationality plausibly has, such as a degree of permissiveness, and for certain unconventional rational phenomena, such as conversions. Unfortunately, van Fraassen’s apt criticism of mechanistic rationality overshoots its mark in seeking to topple the entire Bayesian framework. Bayesian epistemology suffers a guilt by association with the robotic picture. This dissertation aims to restore Bayesianism from the mechanistic but often implicit assumptions which corrode it, and to rebuild, from the Bayesian foundation, an alternative picture of rationality as a property of sentient agents who are capable of understanding and mentally engaging with the objects of their credences. Along the way I account for some basic Bayesian objects such as credence and evidential input. I also accord a central role to the ability of representational experiences, largely sidelined in many Bayesian discussions, to give rise to surprising evidence. On these building blocks I develop theory of rationality, Expansive Bayesianism, which evades the criticisms launched at the robotic picture and shows that Bayesianism itself is a fruitful and powerful framework for a theory of rationality.

<p>This essay discusses and criticizes Richard Swinburne's inductive argument for the existence of God. In his The Existence of God, Swinburne aims at showing that the existence of God is more probable than not. This is an argument taking into consideration the premises of all traditional arguments for the existence of God. Swinburne uses the phenomena and events that constitute the premises of these arguments as evidence in an attempt to show that his hypothesis is more probably true than nor. Swinburne pursues this task by way of applying Bayes' theorem. The aim of this essay is normative - to judge the strength of Swinburne's argument for the existence of God. My primary objections towards Swinburne is that he professes a subjective concept of probability, that he relies too heavily on simplicity as a virtue of plausible and probable hypotheses and that his concept of God involves an incoherent picture of God's nature. I question not only the actual success of Swinburne's project but what his argument, if it had been successful, would have been able to establish.</p> / <p>Denna uppsats diskuterar och kritiserar Richard Swinburne's induktiva argument för Guds existens. I sin The Existence of God, försöker Swinburne visa att Guds existens är mer trolig än inte. Detta argument tar alla traditionella argument för Guds existens i beräknande.. Swinburne  använder de fenomen och händelser som utgör premisser för dessa argument som bevis i ett försök att visa att hans hypotes är mer trolig än inte.  Han genomför detta genom att använda sig av Bayes teorem. Syftet med denna uppsats är normativt - att bedöma styrkan I Swinburnes argument för Guds existens.  Mina primära invändningar mot Swinburne är att han  använder sig av ett subjektivt sannolikhetsbegrepp, att han förlitar sig allt för starkt på enkelhet som en förklaringsmässig dygd och att hans Gudsbegrepp inbegriper en inkoherent bild av Guds natur. Jag ifrågasätter den faktiska framgången i Swinburnes  projekt, och även vad Swinburne hade kunnat fastställa om hans projekt hade varit framgångsrikt.</p>

This essay discusses and criticizes Richard Swinburne's inductive argument for the existence of God. In his The Existence of God, Swinburne aims at showing that the existence of God is more probable than not. This is an argument taking into consideration the premises of all traditional arguments for the existence of God. Swinburne uses the phenomena and events that constitute the premises of these arguments as evidence in an attempt to show that his hypothesis is more probably true than nor. Swinburne pursues this task by way of applying Bayes' theorem. The aim of this essay is normative - to judge the strength of Swinburne's argument for the existence of God. My primary objections towards Swinburne is that he professes a subjective concept of probability, that he relies too heavily on simplicity as a virtue of plausible and probable hypotheses and that his concept of God involves an incoherent picture of God's nature. I question not only the actual success of Swinburne's project but what his argument, if it had been successful, would have been able to establish. / Denna uppsats diskuterar och kritiserar Richard Swinburne's induktiva argument för Guds existens. I sin The Existence of God, försöker Swinburne visa att Guds existens är mer trolig än inte. Detta argument tar alla traditionella argument för Guds existens i beräknande.. Swinburne  använder de fenomen och händelser som utgör premisser för dessa argument som bevis i ett försök att visa att hans hypotes är mer trolig än inte.  Han genomför detta genom att använda sig av Bayes teorem. Syftet med denna uppsats är normativt - att bedöma styrkan I Swinburnes argument för Guds existens.  Mina primära invändningar mot Swinburne är att han  använder sig av ett subjektivt sannolikhetsbegrepp, att han förlitar sig allt för starkt på enkelhet som en förklaringsmässig dygd och att hans Gudsbegrepp inbegriper en inkoherent bild av Guds natur. Jag ifrågasätter den faktiska framgången i Swinburnes  projekt, och även vad Swinburne hade kunnat fastställa om hans projekt hade varit framgångsrikt.

<p>This thesis looks at one example of a Bayesian argument for the existence of God in order to evaluate the quality of such arguments. It begins by explicating a general trend in philosophical apologetics towards probabilistic arguments for God's existence, most notably represented in Richard Swinburne's 2004 book, <em>The Existence of God</em>. Swinburne's arguments are presented as the pinnacle of the probabilistic movement. In order to judge the worth of such arguments, I carefully lay out the principles and assumptions upon which Swinburne's case is based. I show that his argument requires both the truth of substance dualism and the valid application of the simplicity principle to a set of possible hypotheses which purport to explain the existence of the Universe. Swinburne depends on the willingness of philosophers to accede to these points. I proceed to show that no agreement exists on the topic of dualism, concluding that Swinburne has a lot of work ahead of him if he wants this assumption to firmly support his argument. I then show that, while the simplicity principle is generally agreed to be a good tool for real-world situations, there are important differences when attempting to use it to adjudicate between hypotheses to explain the universe. The simplicity principle requires both background knowledge and a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive set of hypotheses in order to be properly applied, both of which are here lacking. If I am right, then we will be unable to reasonably assign several values necessary in order to utilize Bayes' Theorem. Thus the Bayesian approach cannot be used for the problem of the existence of God. Finally, I show that Swinburne's own assumptions can be used to generate a different conclusion, which casts further doubt on his methodology.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

De récents développements en théorie de la decision ont largement enrichi notre connaissance de la notion d'incertitude knightienne, usuellement appelée ambiguïté. Néanmoins ces dévelopement tardent à être intégrés au coeur de la théorie économique. Nous suggérons que l'analyse de phénonèmes économiques tel que l'innovation et la Recherche et Développement gagnerait à intégrer les modèles de décision en situation d'ambiguïté. Nous étayons notre propos en analysant l'allocation des droits de propriété d'une découverte. Les deux premières parties de la présentation s'inspire d'un modèle d'Aghion et de Tirole, The Management of Innovation, portant sur l'allocation des droits de propriété entre une unité de recherche et un investisseur. Il est démontré qu'un désaccord entre les agents sur la technologie de recherche affecte leur niveau d'effort, l'allocation des droits de propriété et l'allocation des revenus subséquents. Finalement, nous examinons une situation où plusieurs chercheurs sont en compétition en s'inspirant du traitement de l'incertitude de Savage. La présence d'ambuïgité affecte le comportement des agents et l'allocation des droits de propriétés de manière qui n'est pas captée en assumant l'hypothèse de risque. / Recent developments in decision-theory have shed light on the concept of Knightian Uncertainty, or Ambiguity. However, this apparatus is still not fully integrated in economic theory. This presentation argue that the analysis of innovation and Research and Developments will gain substantial insights by modelling these activities as decision-making under Ambiguity. The main subject of of interest of this paper is the allocation of the property rights of a discovery. The first part of the analysis draws on a paper of Aghion and Tirole, The Management of Innovation, where they look at the optimal allocation of the property rights between a Research Unit and its financier. Allowing for heterogeneous beliefs affects the level of effort of the two agents, the sharing rule of the revenue of a discovery and the allocation of property rights. The second part follows Savage's framework to model an innovation competition between multiple researchers. The presence of Ambiguity impacts the behaviour of the agents and the allocation of the property rights in a way that could not be captured assuming Risk.