Executive pay research has traditionally focused on salary, severance payments and longterm incentives. A systematic rigorous empirical examination of short-term annual bonuses is lacking. To address this omission, this research empirically examines the relationship between short-term bonuses and firm performance (TSR and EPS), in the UK. It also considers the association between form of bonus payment (i.e. cash/shares), and type of performance target (i.e. hard/soft and simple/complex) with bonus and performance. Furthermore, firm size and particular corporate governance factors are included (i.e. NED ratio on remuneration committee, CEO presence on nominations committee, CEO/Chair duality, tenure, and power) to examine their relationship with bonus value. From a sample of 299 firms listed in the FTSE-350 (1,542 executives including 300 CEOs), this study uses two competing theories (i.e. agency and power theory) to provide a fuller explanation of the subtleties of the pay-performance relation. The main findings support the agency view, since bonus is positively and significantly associated with financial performance. As with previous studies on executive bonus pay this association remains weak. By implication, power theory is not supported. However, other findings indicate: (1) although firm size may change, the proportion of bonus pay relative to salary does not vary. This suggests that large and small firms pay out proportionally similar bonuses; (2) cash bonuses are not positively related with the total value of bonus pay, suggesting that they are not any more open to abuse than other methods of compensation, as agency theory would predict; (3) cash bonuses encourage short-term achievement, as predicted by power theory; (4) consistent with agency theory, share-based bonuses are positively related to bonus pay and performance (weak association), suggesting that share-based bonuses (rather than cash bonuses) may be more effective at aligning pay with performance; (5) in line with agency theory, transparency (i.e. hard (external/published) and simple bonus conditions) is positively associated with performance, providing support for the alignment between principals' and agents' interests; (6) detailed bonus scheme characteristics are generally insensitive to performance and are becoming increasingly softer (i.e. more internal/unspecified targets) and complex (i.e. multiple targets). On the power view, these may create opportunities for executives to mask weak performance and extract greater rents; (7) governance factors are insignificant, suggesting that efforts to improve this area may be wasted, since they mainly leave pay-performance sensitivities unaffected. However, based on power theory, weak governance may foster the rise of powerful executives and widen the pay-performance gap. Therefore, it is suggested that close monitoring of executive pay must continue and shareholders should remain vigilant.

Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucijos 48 straipsnyje įtvirtintos teisės gauti teisingą apmokėjimą už darbą valstybės tarnyboje realizavimą reguliuoja Lietuvos Respublikos valstybės tarnybos įstatymas. Kaip praktiškai veikia valstybės nustatyta karjeros valstybės tarnautojų darbo užmokesčio teisinio reguliavimo sistema, kokios iškyla problemos ir sunkumai, ką karjeros valstybės tarnautojai mano apie savo darbo užmokesti ir jo reguliavimą, ką reikėtų keisti yra analizuojama šiame magistro baigiamajame darbe Darbo užmokesčio karjeros valstybės tarnautojams teisinis reguliavimas. Darbą sudaro dvi dalys – teorinė ir praktinė. Teorinėje dalyje autorius išsamiai nagrinėja teisės aktų, reguliavusių valstybės tarnautojų darbo užmokestį raida Lietuvoje, pateikia požiūrį į valstybės tarnautojų darbo užmokesčio teisinio reguliavimo problemas Europos Sąjungos bei Ekonominio bendradarbiavimo ir plėtros organizacijos valstybėse, palygina kelių valstybių darbo užmokestį reguliuojančius teisės aktus su Lietuvos Respublikos valstybės tarnybos įstatymo pagrindinėmis darbo užmokestį reguliuojančiomis nuostatomis. Apžvelgiama karjeros valstybės tarnautojų pareiginės algos, priedų ir priemokų skyrimo tvarka bei nagrinėjamos jų darbo užmokesčio teisinio reguliavimo problemos ir pateikiamos išvados bei pasiūlymai. Darbo praktinėje dalyje pateikiama atlikto empirinio tyrimo atlikimo metodologija bei tyrimo metu nustatytų rezultatų apibendrinti duomenys. Siekta nustatyti darbo užmokesčio karjeros... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / In accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania realization of the rights to have proper pay of work at public service regulate Republic of Lithuania Law on Public Service. There is analysis of practical activity of the career of public servants remuneration legal regulation system, problems and difficulties, opinion of the career of public servants about the their remuneration and this law corrections in this Master’s paper “Legal regulation of career public servant remuneration”. Paper consists of two parts: theoretical and practical. Author of the paper analyses comprehensive law acts, development remuneration of public servants in Lithuania, opinion of public servant law regulation problems in European Union and economic cooperation and expansion organizations in other countries, compares several countries remuneration legal law acts with Lithuanian Republic Law on Public Service statues in theoretical part. Review remuneration of public servants basic salaries, bonuses and additional pays determination order and also investigates their remuneration law regulation problems and presents conclusions and offers. There are methodology of the fulfilled empirical analysis and also the ascertained sum up data in the practical part of the paper. Try to attain remuneration of public servants legal regulation practical relation with public servants needs, to investigate the view of the remuneration law regulation... [to full text]

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T14:30:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Orandes Carlos da Rocha Junior.pdf: 434267 bytes, checksum: e26b0aba11bf5b07fa88c1ccad886db8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-05-04 / The performance bonus for teaching in public education is a state public policy adopted since 2000. It was born by the for neo-liberal government needing to create quality indicators that could be accountable to international funding agencies to improve education in the state. In the last 10 years the practice of giving a bonus payment to teachers and schools well-evaluated by external evaluation organized by the Secretaria da Educação do Estado de São Paulo (SEE / SP) was used by all the governors who succeeded one another in the State Government . What has changed on every government, are the criteria used to assess the quality and therefore rewarding teachers with bonuses. The latest version of the bonus, legally known as Bonuses for Results, is the use of criteria Index Development of Education in the State of São Paulo (IDESP), an indicator of quality established from two complementary criteria: student performance in official examination of the state system, called System Evaluation of Educational Achievement of São Paulo (SARESP) and student flow. This research aims to listen to what teachers think about the Bonuses for Results in an attempt to identify causes of successes and failures of schools in achieving the goals established for the IDESP these results and reflections on teaching practice. Data collection was based on the use of open-ended questionnaires to teachers of the 5th grade of elementary school, 9th´s grade mathematics and Portuguese Language teachers of basic education in three schools in the state of Sao Paulo. It´s possible to identify the teachers' discontent by pressure and requirement generated by the need to achieve the goals of IDESP beyond the failure of the subsidy by results in all its intentions: public policy evaluation, salary and curriculum / A bonificação por desempenho do docente no ensino público estadual paulista é uma política adotada desde o ano 2000. Ela nasceu da necessidade do governo de criar indicadores de qualidade que pudessem prestar contas aos organismos financiadores internacionais da melhoria da educação no Estado. Nestes últimos 10 anos, a prática de conferir um bônus salarial aos professores e às escolas bem avaliadas por meio de avaliação externa promovida pela Secretaria de Estado da Educação de São Paulo (SEE/SP) foi utilizada por todos os Governadores que se sucederam no Governo do Estado. A mais recente versão do bônus, legalmente denominada Bonificação por Resultado, tem como critérios a utilização do Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação no Estado de São Paulo (IDESP), um indicador de qualidade estabelecido a partir de dois critérios complementares: o desempenho dos alunos no exame oficial da rede estadual, denominado Sistema de Avaliação do Rendimento Escolar do Estado de São Paulo (SARESP) e o fluxo escolar. A presente pesquisa tem por objetivo ouvir o que pensam os professores sobre a Bonificação por Resultados na tentativa de identificar causas de sucessos e insucessos das escolas no cumprimento das metas estabelecidas para o IDESP e os reflexos destes resultados na prática docente. A coleta de informações baseou-se na utilização de questionários abertos e entrevistas complementares em três escolas do interior do Estado de São Paulo. Pode-se identificar o descontentamento dos professores pela pressão e cobrança gerada pela necessidade de atingir as metas do IDESP além do insucesso da Bonificação por Resultado em todas as suas intencionalidades: política pública de avaliação, de salário e curricular

En väl fungerande offentlig upphandling är avgörande för att klara de förändringar som vår omvärld står inför. Konkurrensen och effektiviteten inom bygg- och anläggningsbranschen beskrivs ofta som lägre än i andra branscher. Studier inom svensk byggbransch har därför lyft betydelsen av ökad effektivitet genom utveckling av teknik och kunskap i bygg- och anläggningsprojekt. Den offentliga upphandlingen i Sverige uppmäts till cirka 634 miljarder kronor per år vilket motsvarar en femtedel av Sveriges bruttonationalprodukt. En stor del av de bygg- och anläggningsarbeten som utförs i Sverige upphandlas av offentliga beställare vilket medför att de har möjlighet att påverka branschens utveckling. För att främja ett önskat beteende och drivkrafter hos leverantörer kan offentliga beställare använda leverantörsuppföljning samt ekonomiska incitament i upphandling. Studiens syfte har varit att öka förståelsen för hur incitament ska användas i upphandling för att främja effektivare leveranser och skapa drivkraft för leverantörer att utföra, och helst överträffa, det resultat som önskas av beställaren. För att uppnå ett trovärdigt resultat valdes metoden fallstudie. Trafikverket som är en renodlad beställarorganisation med en bred leverantörsbas använder leverantörsuppföljning och incitament i upphandlingar och ansågs därför som ett lämpligt företag att undersöka för att uppnå studiens syfte. För den kvalitativa datainsamlingen har åtta projekt med incitament studerats där totalt 20 stycken intervjuer genomförts. I respektive projekt, förutom i två, har inköparen, projektledaren och leverantören intervjuats för att få en objektiv bild för hur bonus som incitament fungerat i projekten. För att underlätta analysarbetet sammanfattades alla projekt och analysmetoden ”Pattern Matching” användes för att finna likheter och olikheter mellan de studerade projekteten. Utifrån resultat och analys har slutsatser kunnat dras om hur tidigare användning av bonus har fungerat följt av förbättringsförslag. Slutsatsen var att bonus bidragit till att projektet gått smidigare och att det ökade samarbetet men inte att själva slutprodukten förbättras. Det framgick även att arbetssättet för bonus varierat mycket mellan projekten och att kontinuerlig leverantörsuppföljning under projektets gång är viktigt och en kritisk faktor för att bonus ska fungera som incitament och för att främja leverantörsutveckling. Vidare var slutsatsen att incitamentmodellen och formeln för uträkning av incitament bör standardiseras och integreras i systemet för leverantörsuppföljning. Ytterligare en slutsats var att bedömningsgrunderna upplevs som otydliga i dagsläget och att det är svårt att göra en objektiv bedömning. I studien har förbättringsförslagen sammanfattas i tre huvudområden där det första utgjordes av att standardisera arbetssättet kring hur bonus används i projekten sett till aktiviteterna: benämningar, leverantörsuppföljning, fokusområden och bonusnivå. Rekommendationen var att införa riktlinjer att leverantörsuppföljningen bör ske kontinuerligt under projektets gång vid minst fyra tillfällen per år samt att inte alla fokusområden bör viktas lika högt utan ett fåtal områden bör väljas ut som är kritiska för projektet. De områden som har en högre vikt är de områden som leverantören fokuserat på och som sedan utgjort ett mervärde i projektet. Studien visade även att bonusens storlek är betydande där en höjd bonusnivå från dagens föreslogs för att leverantörerna ska se det som incitament. Nästa förbättringsförslag utgjordes av att integrera incitamentmodellen i leverantörsuppföljningssystemet UppLev vilket säkerställer att arbetet utförs på liknande sätt samt medför att leverantörer har lika förutsättningar oberoende vem genomför leverantörsuppföljningen. Tredje förbättringsförslaget var att förbättra bedömningsgrunderna utifrån fem områden vilka var subjektivitet, checklista, kontraktsenlig nivå samt att det ska vara möjligt för leverantören att uppnå högsta poäng vid bedömning.

The resource curse is a defining feature of the African content. Despite vast resource wealth, Africa remains the poorest and most underdeveloped continent in the world. The aim of this study is to conduct a comparative analysis of the primary laws regulating of oil and gas exploration and product activities in Angola, Nigeria and South Africa in order to determine their effectiveness in protecting the continent's depleting petroleum resources. Different regulatory models apply to Angola, following the Norwegian carried-interest model, Nigeria, where a British discretionary model has been retained, an a South africa, where a unique model has been developed. The comparison is conducted by analysing and comparing these different regulatory systems in terms of legal frameworks; the legal nature of the regulatory systems; ownership of the oil and gas resources; legal nature of licenses; organisational or institutional structures; fiscal systems; local communities benefits from these proceeds of oil and gas resources; local content; state/government participation arrangements; and environmental challenges. The study evaluates the effectiveness of these regimes by examining the extent to which they recognise and enforce state ownership of he oil and gas resourcs in situ; recognise and enforce the doctrine of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR); protect the environment; how they provide for institutional capacities for the management of resources; and the protection of local communities from exploitation and abuse by recognising their rights to benefit from revenues derived from these resources. An overall assessment of the three systems reveals that there is no ideal model for oil and gas regulation in Africa. The Norwegian model might well be considered an ideal model if it was applied with care and correctly in Angola. The study hopes to gain practical importance for the proper regulationof the oil and gas industries' upstream activities in Africa and assist governments of the selected jurisdictions in their policy revisions, as some recommendations are made. / Economics / LLD.

The resource curse is a defining feature of the African content. Despite vast resource wealth, Africa remains the poorest and most underdeveloped continent in the world. The aim of this study is to conduct a comparative analysis of the primary laws regulating of oil and gas exploration and product activities in Angola, Nigeria and South Africa in order to determine their effectiveness in protecting the continent's depleting petroleum resources. Different regulatory models apply to Angola, following the Norwegian carried-interest model, Nigeria, where a British discretionary model has been retained, an a South africa, where a unique model has been developed. The comparison is conducted by analysing and comparing these different regulatory systems in terms of legal frameworks; the legal nature of the regulatory systems; ownership of the oil and gas resources; legal nature of licenses; organisational or institutional structures; fiscal systems; local communities benefits from these proceeds of oil and gas resources; local content; state/government participation arrangements; and environmental challenges. The study evaluates the effectiveness of these regimes by examining the extent to which they recognise and enforce state ownership of he oil and gas resourcs in situ; recognise and enforce the doctrine of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR); protect the environment; how they provide for institutional capacities for the management of resources; and the protection of local communities from exploitation and abuse by recognising their rights to benefit from revenues derived from these resources. An overall assessment of the three systems reveals that there is no ideal model for oil and gas regulation in Africa. The Norwegian model might well be considered an ideal model if it was applied with care and correctly in Angola. The study hopes to gain practical importance for the proper regulationof the oil and gas industries' upstream activities in Africa and assist governments of the selected jurisdictions in their policy revisions, as some recommendations are made. / Public, Constitutional and International Law / LL. D.