Thesis--Louvain.

Diss. / Filmed with: Walter, K. / Emendationum in Sophoclis fabulas specimen -- Wandinger, C. / Pomponiana Graecina : Tac. Ann. XIII. 32 -- Walther, G.H. / Observationum in C. Cornelii Taciti opera conscriptarum specimen alterum -- Warren, M. / On the enclitic ne in early Latin -- Wasmansdorff, E. / Luciani scripta ea, quae ad Menippum spectant, inter se comparantur et diiudicantur -- Zellmer, W. / De lege Plautia quae fuit de vi -- Waldfogl, C. / Ueber den Platonischen Dialog der Sophist oder vom Sein -- Waller, W. / Excursus criticus in P. Papinii Statii Silvas -- Wallinder, J. / De statu plebejorum Romanorum ante primam in montem sacrum secessionem quaestiones -- Wallrafen, W. / Einrichtung und kommunale Entwicklung der rm̲ischen Provinz Lusitanien -- Walther, E. / De dativi instrumentalis usu Homerico -- Walther, F. / Studien zu Tacitus und Curtius -- Widmann, H. / De Gaio Vettio Aquilino Iuvenco carminis evangelici poeta et Vergilii imitatore -- Werner, J. / Quaestiones Babrianae -- Wernicke, J.C. / De Pausaniae Periegetae studiis Herodoteis -- Wessig, H. / De aetate et auctore Philopatridis dialogi -- Wetzell, C. / De usu verbi substantivi Tacitino -- Werder, C.F. / De Platonis Parmenide -- Stamer, A. / Engkuklios paideia in dem Urteil der griechischen Philosophenschulen -- Sexauer, H. / Sprachgebrauch des Romanschriftstellers Achilles Tatius -- Stamkart, J.A. / Specimen litterarium inaugurale exhibens commentarium in Plauti Mostellarium -- Seibel, M. / Klage um Hektor im letzten Buche der Ilias -- Siegismund, A.J. / Quaestionum de metathesi Graeca particula I -- Tanzmann, J.J. / De C. Plinii Caecilii Secundi vita ingenio moribus quaestio -- Teetz, F. / Beitrg̃e zur Rhythmopoiie des Sophokles ... -- Siemering, F.O. / Quaestionum Lucretianarum particula I et II -- Thedinga, F. / De Numenio philosopho Platonico -- Theissen, W. / De Sallustii, Livii, Taciti digressionibus -- Schemann, L. / De legionum per alterum bellum Punicum historia quae investigari posse videantur -- Natorp, P. / Quos auctores in ultimis Belli Peloponnesiaci annis describendis secuti sint Diodorus Plutarchus Cornelius Iustinus -- Olsen, W. / Quaestionum Plautinarum de verbo substantivo specimen -- Partsch, J.F.M. / Darstellung Europa's in dem geographischen Werke des Agrippa. Includes bibliographical references.

Chrysippus faces two different objections as to whether Fate can acommodate praise, blame, honor or punishment: one, to the effect that if everything takes place by Fate, then praise and blame do not make a difference in the course of events, and therefore cannot effectively exhort one to virtue or dissuade one from vice; the other, to the effect that if everything takes place by Fate, then one is not the ultimate origin of one\'s actions, and therefore praise, blame, honor, or punishment for one\'s actions are not deserved. The first (preseved in Diogenianus\' testimony apud Eusebius\' Praeparatio Evangelica VI 8) is distinct from the Idle Argument in Origen (Contra Celsum II 20) and Cicero (De Fato 28-30) in that it pertains to the issue of moral responsibility, and derives instead from the digression in Book XXV of Epicurus\' treatise On Nature. The second (preserved in Cicero\'s De Fato 39-45 and Gellius\' Noctes Atticae VII 2) is not related to the issue of alternate possibilities, which belongs rather in a later appraisal of the original discussion, with which it is conflated in Cicero\'s testimony. Chrysippus\' reply to the latter, in that it is capable of establishing, beyond mere absence from external compulsion, that the perfect causes of our impulses are our assents and that our assents do not take place all by themselves, is capable of meeting conditions for desert of praise, blame, honor, or punishment qua therapeutic devices aimed at extirpating our passions, which is the sole notion of praise, blame, honor or punishment to have a claim on desert in the extant fragments of Chrysippus. / Crisipo responde a duas objeções sobre se o Destino pode acomodar louvores, reprimendas, honras ou punições: de acordo com a primeira, se tudo ocorre por Destino, louvores e reprimendas não fazem diferença no curso dos eventos e, por conseguinte, não podem exortar à virtude ou dissuadir do vício de modo efetivo; de acordo com a segunda, se tudo ocorre por Destino, ninguém é a origem última de suas ações e, por conseguinte, louvores, reprimendas, honras ou punições por suas ações não são merecidas. A primeira (preservada no testemunho de Diogeniano apud Eusébio, Praeparatio Evangelica VI 8) é distinta do Argumento Preguiçoso em Cícero (De Fato 28-30) e Orígenes (Contra Celsum II 20) por ser atinente à responsabilidade moral, e deriva da digressão no livro XXV do tratado de Epicuro Sobre a natureza. A segunda (preservada em Cicero, De Fato 39-45 e Gélio, Noctes Atticae VII 2) não tem relação com a questão das possibilidades alternativas, a qual pertence a uma apreciação posterior da discussão original com a qual vem mesclada no testemunho de Cícero. A resposta de Crisipo à segunda objeção, na medida em que é capaz de estabelecer, para além da mera ausência de força exterior, que as causas perfeitas de nossos impulsos são os nossos assentimentos e que os nossos assentimentos não ocorrem a despeito de nós, é capaz de cumprir os requisitos para o merecimento de louvores, reprimendas, honras ou punições enquanto instrumentos terapêuticos que visam à cura de nossas paixões, a qual é a única noção de louvores, reprimendas, honras ou punições que pode aspirar a merecimento nos fragmentos supérstites de Crisipo.

Chrysippus faces two different objections as to whether Fate can acommodate praise, blame, honor or punishment: one, to the effect that if everything takes place by Fate, then praise and blame do not make a difference in the course of events, and therefore cannot effectively exhort one to virtue or dissuade one from vice; the other, to the effect that if everything takes place by Fate, then one is not the ultimate origin of one\'s actions, and therefore praise, blame, honor, or punishment for one\'s actions are not deserved. The first (preseved in Diogenianus\' testimony apud Eusebius\' Praeparatio Evangelica VI 8) is distinct from the Idle Argument in Origen (Contra Celsum II 20) and Cicero (De Fato 28-30) in that it pertains to the issue of moral responsibility, and derives instead from the digression in Book XXV of Epicurus\' treatise On Nature. The second (preserved in Cicero\'s De Fato 39-45 and Gellius\' Noctes Atticae VII 2) is not related to the issue of alternate possibilities, which belongs rather in a later appraisal of the original discussion, with which it is conflated in Cicero\'s testimony. Chrysippus\' reply to the latter, in that it is capable of establishing, beyond mere absence from external compulsion, that the perfect causes of our impulses are our assents and that our assents do not take place all by themselves, is capable of meeting conditions for desert of praise, blame, honor, or punishment qua therapeutic devices aimed at extirpating our passions, which is the sole notion of praise, blame, honor or punishment to have a claim on desert in the extant fragments of Chrysippus. / Crisipo responde a duas objeções sobre se o Destino pode acomodar louvores, reprimendas, honras ou punições: de acordo com a primeira, se tudo ocorre por Destino, louvores e reprimendas não fazem diferença no curso dos eventos e, por conseguinte, não podem exortar à virtude ou dissuadir do vício de modo efetivo; de acordo com a segunda, se tudo ocorre por Destino, ninguém é a origem última de suas ações e, por conseguinte, louvores, reprimendas, honras ou punições por suas ações não são merecidas. A primeira (preservada no testemunho de Diogeniano apud Eusébio, Praeparatio Evangelica VI 8) é distinta do Argumento Preguiçoso em Cícero (De Fato 28-30) e Orígenes (Contra Celsum II 20) por ser atinente à responsabilidade moral, e deriva da digressão no livro XXV do tratado de Epicuro Sobre a natureza. A segunda (preservada em Cicero, De Fato 39-45 e Gélio, Noctes Atticae VII 2) não tem relação com a questão das possibilidades alternativas, a qual pertence a uma apreciação posterior da discussão original com a qual vem mesclada no testemunho de Cícero. A resposta de Crisipo à segunda objeção, na medida em que é capaz de estabelecer, para além da mera ausência de força exterior, que as causas perfeitas de nossos impulsos são os nossos assentimentos e que os nossos assentimentos não ocorrem a despeito de nós, é capaz de cumprir os requisitos para o merecimento de louvores, reprimendas, honras ou punições enquanto instrumentos terapêuticos que visam à cura de nossas paixões, a qual é a única noção de louvores, reprimendas, honras ou punições que pode aspirar a merecimento nos fragmentos supérstites de Crisipo.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Cette recherche prend pour objet d’étude la conception stoïcienne de la responsabilité, éclairée par la thématique contemporaine de l’engagement. Les différents niveaux du discours – ontologique, physique, psychologique, moral et politique – réinterrogent également, par leur articulation problématique, l’unité des stoïciens. On résume traditionnellement leur fatalisme à un «compatibilisme», dans la mesure où ils conjuguaient liberté et déterminisme. Cette compatibilité est au principe même de la notion de responsabilité, dont il s’agit de comprendre comment, de la physique à la morale, mais aussi, du stoïcisme hellénistique au stoïcien impérial, elle reçoit un traitement autant inédit qu’équivoque. On s’interrogera ainsi sur l’articulation du concept de «cause» (αἴτιον) avec celui de «ἐφ' ἡμῖν» (ce qui dépend de nous), concepts qui mettent en jeu la problématique de l’imputation – où il s’agit de fonder la responsabilité humaine – dans son lien avec celle de l’assomption, où il s’agit de la reprendre à son propre compte en accomplissant son rôle et ses devoirs. Ces deux versants de la responsabilité mobilisent toutes les branches du système stoïcien, et leur caractère organique. On montre que la responsabilité reçoit une extension maximale, parce que son analyse est synthétique. Le passage de la responsivité ontologique à l’assomption morale, qui ouvre, de Chrysippe à Épictète et Marc Aurèle, à une éthique de la responsabilité et à un engagement philosophique, qui fait fond sur l’idée d’acceptation et de renversement, constituera le point de mire de notre questionnement. / This research studies the Stoic conception of responsibility, informed by the contemporary theme of commitment. Different levels of the discourse - ontological, physical, psychological, moral and political - will also question anew, by their problematic articulation, the unity of the Stoics. Traditionally, their fatalism is summarized by a "compatibilism", insofar as they associate freedom and determinism. This compatibility is at the very principle of the concept of responsibility, which we should understand by how it receives a treatment as unique as equivocal, from its physics to its morals, but also from the Hellenistic to the Imperial stoicism. We will thus wonder about the articulation of the concept of "cause" (αἴτιον) with that of "ἐφ' ἡμῖν" (that which is up to us), concepts that involve the issues of attribution - where it comes to build up human responsibility - and assumption, where it comes to seize it again by performing one's role and duties. Those both sides of responsibility mobilize all the branches of the Stoic system and their organic character. We show that responsibility receives a maximal extension, because its analysis is synthetic. The shift from ontological responsiveness to moral assumption that leads, from Chrysippus to Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, towards an ethics of the responsibility and a philosophical commitment, which builds on the idea of acceptance and overthrow, will be the focus of our inquiry.

No description available.

Cotutelle entre l'Université de Montréal et Sorbonne Université / Zénon de Kition, le fondateur du stoïcisme, a reçu une partie de sa formation philosophique chez le cynique Cratès de Thèbes. Ce contact a laissé une empreinte durable sur l’école stoïcienne, qui a continué d’entretenir des liens étroits avec le cynisme. Ma thèse propose une contribution à notre connaissance de ce rapport entre les deux courants philosophiques en analysant toutes les références au cynisme dans les écrits stoïciens, de Zénon à Marc Aurèle. La première partie de ma thèse recense tous les textes du corpus, cités en grec ou en latin, avec une traduction française. Chaque texte est accompagné d’un commentaire philologique et philosophique. La complexité du rapport que les stoïciens entretiennent avec le cynisme se manifeste particulièrement chez ceux dont les écrits sont bien conservés. C’est le cas de Sénèque, qui offre dans son œuvre philosophique des portraits élaborés de deux cyniques, Diogène et Démétrius, tout en critiquant certains aspects du cynisme. La contribution d’Épictète est encore plus importante, puisqu’il consacre un entretien complet à la vie et au rôle du cynique, et réserve à Diogène une place de premier choix dans son enseignement. Son admiration pour les véritables cyniques contraste avec le jugement sévère qu’il porte sur les faux cyniques de son temps. La deuxième partie de ma thèse analyse en détail trois textes qui font état d’un débat stoïcien sur la possibilité que le sage « cynicise » (D.L., VII 121 ; Cic., Fin. III 68 ; Arius Didyme apud Stob., II 7, 11s). Certains stoïciens refusent que le sage cynicise, d’autres l’acceptent dans certaines circonstances, et d’autres encore, comme Apollodore de Séleucie, considèrent que le cynisme est une voie d’accès à la vertu rapide mais difficile. En établissant un lien entre les portraits du sage et la doctrine des actions convenables, j’analyse le débat à travers la classification morale des actions dans l’éthique stoïcienne. Pour éclairer davantage la position d’Apollodore, je m’intéresse au lien qui l’unit à la doxographie cynique générale (D.L., VI 103-105) et j’examine la signification de l’image de la voie vers la vertu à travers sa genèse et sa postérité. Il en ressort trois caractéristiques fondamentales du cynisme : le rejet des devoirs sociaux, le choix de la pauvreté et le refus des longues études. Pour approuver ce mode de vie, dont les traits sont contraires aux recommandations stoïciennes habituelles, les stoïciens pro-cyniques adoptent une posture de compromis et fixent des limites étroites à l’intérieur desquelles la pratique du cynisme devient légitime. / Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism, received part of his philosophical instruction from the Cynic Crates of Thebes. This connection left a lasting imprint on the Stoic school, which continued to maintain strong ties with Cynicism. My dissertation proposes a contribution to our knowledge of the relationship between the two philosophical movements by analyzing all the references to Cynicism in Stoic writings, from Zeno to Marcus Aurelius. The first part of my dissertation lists all the texts composing the corpus, cited in Greek or Latin, with a French translation. Each text is accompanied by a philological and philosophical commentary. The complexity of the Stoics’ perspective on Cynicism is made evident in those whose writings are well preserved. This is the case of Seneca, who offers in his philosophical works elaborate portraits of two Cynics, Diogenes and Demetrius, while criticizing some aspects of Cynicism. The contribution of Epictetus is even more important, since he devotes an entire discourse to the life and role of the Cynic, and gives Diogenes a prominent place in his teaching. His admiration for true Cynics contrasts with his harsh judgment on the fake Cynics of his time. The second part of my dissertation analyzes at length three texts that report a Stoic debate on the possibility for the sage to “cynicize” (D.L., VII 121; Cic., Fin. III 68; Arius Didymus apud Stob., II 7, 11s). Some Stoics refuse to allow the sage to cynicize, while some accept it under certain circumstances and others, such as Apollodorus of Seleucia, consider Cynicism to be a quick but difficult path to virtue. By establishing a link between the portraits of the sage and the doctrine of proper actions, I analyze the debate through the moral classification of actions in Stoic ethics. To shed further light on Apollodorus’ position, I explore his connection to the Cynic doxography (D.L., VI 103-105) and examine the meaning of the image of the path to virtue through its genesis and posterity. Three fundamental characteristics of Cynicism emerge: the rejection of social duties, the choice of poverty, and the refusal of extended studies. To endorse this lifestyle, whose features are contrary to customary Stoic advice, pro-Cynic Stoics adopt a posture of compromise and set narrow limits within which the practice of Cynicism becomes legitimate.

Rubens is known as a painter; he should also be defined as an art theorist. Following Robert Williams’ theory that Early Modern art became philosophical, I believe that style can connote art theoretical interests and philosophical models, and that in Rubens’s case, these included the classical Stoic. While it would be possible to trace Rubens’s commitment to Stoicism in his subject matter, I investigate it in his style, taking a Baxandalian approach to inferential criticism. I focus on Rubens’s formal choices, his varied brushwork, and his ability to create a vibrant picture plane. My study is divided into chapters on Ethics, Logic, and Physics. In Chapter One I treat Stoic moral philosophy as an influence in the design of Rubens’s paintings, consider similarities between classical and Early Modern interest in viewer/reader response, and argue that Baroque artists could use style to avoid dogma while targeting viewers’ personal transformation. In Chapter Two I focus on Rhetoric, a section of the Stoic philosophy of Logic. Stoic Logic privileged truth: that is, it centred on investigating existing reality. As such, Stoic rhetorical theory and the classical literature influenced by it promoted a style that is complex and nuanced. I relate this to the Early Modern interest in copia, arguing that this includes Rubens’s painterly style which, apropos copia, should be better termed the Abundant Style. In Chapter Three I explore similarities between Stoic Natural Philosophy and the Early Modern artistic interest in the unified visual field. The Stoics defined the natural world as eternally moving and mixing; with force fields, energy, and elements in constant relationships of cause/effect. The Stoic concept of natural sympathy was a notion of material/energetic interrelatedness in which the world was seen as a living body, and the divine inhered in matter. I consider ways that these classical Stoic concepts of transformation, realism, and vivified matter might be discerned in Rubens’s style. / Graduate / 2023-12-14