Esta dissertação analisa a trajetória política e intelectual do marxista brasileiro Jacob Gorender (1923-2013). O recorte temporal adotado detém-se no ano de sua prisão, em 1970, por motivo de suas atividades políticas, não obstante Gorender tenha uma rica militância e, especialmente, uma produção teórica muito vasta nos anos posteriores à sua experiência prisional. Esta escolha analítica decorre do fato deste período permitir acompanhar o seu itinerário militante em duas organizações políticas, o Partido Comunista do Brasil, renomeado em 1961 Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB), e o Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionário (PCBR). Por meio deste procedimento o objetivo foi compreender o processo de desenvolvimento do marxismo no Brasil, com as continuidades e rupturas que o caracterizaram, entre as décadas de 1940 e 1970, a partir de uma abordagem biográfica. / This thesis is on the political and intellectual trajectory of the Brazilian Marxist Jacob Gorender (1923-2013). The adopted time frame is held until his prison, in 1970, due to his political activities, regardless Gorender had a rich militancy and, specially, theoretical production in the years after his prison experience. This analytical choice results that this period allows to follow his militant itinerary in two political organizations, Communist Party of Brazil, renamed in 1961 Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), and Brazilian Revolutionary Communist Party (PCBR). Through this procedure the goal was to understand the development process of Marxism in Brazil, with the continuities and raptures that characterized it, between the 1940s and the 1970s, from a biographical approach.

Esta tese tem por objeto o Partido Operário Comunista (POC). Trata-se de uma organização da esquerda radical brasileira, atuante durante os chamados anos de chumbo da ditadura civil-militar brasileira (1968-1971) sobre a qual não há nenhum estudo acadêmico mais pormenorizado. O POC foi oficialmente fundado em um Congresso realizado em abril de 1968, na cidade de São Paulo, com a fusão de duas organizações anteriormente existentes, a Organização Revolucionária Marxista-Política Operária (POLOP) e a Dissidência Leninista do Partido Comunista Brasileiro do Rio Grande do Sul (DI-RS). A linha política adotada pelo novo partido foi estabelecida pelo Programa Socialista para o Brasil, para o qual a revolução brasileira deveria ser socialista, e conduzida por um partido de vanguarda da classe operária, que estaria à frente de uma aliança operário-camponesa, engrossada por elementos revolucionários da pequena-burguesia. Inicialmente resistente ao engajamento nas ações de guerrilha urbana, o POC procurou canalizar seus esforços para os movimentos de massa que estavam ascensão quando da sua fundação. Neste sentido, dirigiu a militância para o movimento operário de Contagem (MG) e Osasco (SP), onde ocorreram importantes mobilizações nesse período. A organização também procurou influenciar o movimento estudantil e, para isso criou o Movimento Universidade Crítica, MUC, também em 1968. No início de 1969, com o descenso desses movimentos devido também ao AI-5, o POC reconheceu ter colhido poucos frutos desses esforços, sobretudo no movimento operário, onde sua presença continuou esparsa. Neste ínterim, várias organizações da esquerda já estavam francamente engajadas em ações armadas, o que motivava uma dupla crítica no interior do POC: ineficácia nas ações de massa, e inexistência de ações de guerrilha. Ácidos debates internos passaram a ocorrer no seu interior, corroendo sua coesão. Este processo de luta política interna se prolongou por todo o ano de 1969, polarizando os militaristas contra os massistas. Trocas mútuas de acusações levaram este grupo a romper com o POC em março de 1970 e a recriar a antiga POLOP. Dentre os militantes remanescentes do POC ainda se manteve um caloroso debate em torno das duas idéias-força: militarismo versus massismo. Há de se dizer que, de forma esparsa, e sempre em associação a outras organizações, o POC já havia praticado algumas ações armadas, dirigidas para a obtenção de recursos financeiros. a partir de meados de 1970, na sequência de prisões de militantes das organizações militaristas, a polícia política atingiria em cheio o POC, levando ao seu desmantelamento no Brasil em junho de 1971. Nesta tese procurei compreender os pormenores internos de uma organização leninista, bem como a rotina da militância em meio a um contexto repressivo, apoiando na noção de cultura política de Serge Bernstein. Por essa razão busquei os relatos de ex-membros do partido, através dos quais pude conhecer suas memórias sobre esse período. / This thesis is engaged in the Communist Workers Party (POC). It is an organization of the Brazilian radical left active during the so-called \"years of lead\" the Brazilian civil-military dictatorship (1968-1971) on which there is no more detailed academic study. The POC was officially founded at a congress held in April 1968 in São Paulo, with the merger of two previously existing organizations, the Organization Revolutionary Workers Marxist-Policy (POLOP) and the Brazilian Communist Party\'s Leninist Dissent Rio Grande South (DI-RS). The political line adopted by the new party was established by the \"Socialist Program for Brazil\", for which the Brazilian revolution should be socialist, and led by a vanguard party of the working class, who would be the head of a worker-peasant alliance, thickened by revolutionary elements of the petty bourgeoisie. Initially resistant engagement in urban guerrilla actions, the POC sought to channel their efforts to the mass movements that were rising at the time of its foundation. In this sense, he directed militancy to the labor movement of Contagem (MG) and Osasco (SP), where there were important mobilizations that period. The organization also sought to influence the student movement and to this end has created the \"Movement University Critical,\" MUC, also in 1968. In early 1969, with the decline of these movements also due to AI-5, POC acknowledged harvested little fruit of these efforts, especially in the labor movement, where his presence remained sparse. Meanwhile, several organizations of the left were already openly engaged in armed actions, which motivated a double criticism within the POC: ineffectiveness in mass actions, and lack of guerrilla actions. Acids internal discussions began to take place inside, eroding its cohesion. This political infighting process lasted throughout the year 1969, polarizing the \"militarists\" against \"massistas\". mutual exchange of accusations led this group to break with the POC in March 1970 and re-create the old POLOP. Among the remaining militants POC still remained a heated debate around the two key ideas: militarism \"versus\" massismo. One has to say that, sparsely, and always in association with other organizations, the POC had practiced some armed actions aimed at obtaining financial resources. from the mid-1970s, following arrests of militants from militarist organizations, the political police would reach full POC, leading to their being dismantled in Brazil in June 1971. This thesis tried to understand the internal details of a Leninist organization, as well as the routine of militancy amid a repressive environment, supporting the political culture\'s notion of Serge Bernstein. Therefore sought the reports of former party members, through which I got to know his memories of that period.

Nessa dissertação, realizou-se um estudo sobre a história organizativa e política do Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB), de 1922 a 1935. Durante o período analisado, o Partido passou por duas mudanças no conjunto tático adotado. No entanto, passou por quatro linhas estratégicas diferentes. De 1922 a 1929, adotou um conjunto tático de estilo subcultural. Buscou se tornar o representante máximo do proletariado e das massas trabalhadoras, adotando formas de lutas pacíficas. De 1930 a 1934, o PCB passou por um período de luta interna acirrado, abandonando o estilo subcultural. Ao final de 1934 e até o início de 1936, foi adotado pela organização o estilo da luta direta pelo poder. No entanto, de 1922 a 1925, o PCB teve como linha estratégica a autoconstrução como ferramenta de luta. Era mais importante organizar o Partido do que combater um inimigo específico. De 1926 a 1929, foi adotada a linha estratégica de Frente Única, mas negando-se a realização de coalisões. De 1930 a 1933, foi adotada a linha denominada classe contra classe, que negava a possibilidade de qualquer aliança com a pequena burguesia radicalizada. De 1934 a 1935, foi adotada a linha da Frente Popular, que significou a atuação através da Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL). Durante os treze anos que vão de 1922 a 1935, houve debilidade na capacidade organizativa. Os membros do partido eram frequentemente presos e as direções nacionais sempre tiveram dificuldades em manter contatos com as direções regionais e essas com os órgãos de base. Na prática, tratou-se de uma organização que não possuía quadros revolucionários formados. A ausência de quadros é o que explica a incapacidade de formular táticas eficazes. E mesmo as táticas formuladas eram, em geral, mal aplicadas, como observavam os próprios militantes à época. / In this dissertation, it was carried out a study on the organizational and political history of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), 1922-1935. During the analyzed period, the Party went through two tactical changes. However, it went through four different strategic lines. From 1922 to 1929, it adopted the subcultural tactical style. It sought to become the highest representative of the proletariat and the working masses, adopting forms of peaceful struggle. From 1930 to 1934, the PCB has gone through a period of internal fighting, abandoning the subcultural style. At the end of 1934 and by early 1936, it adopted the style of direct struggle. However, from 1922 to 1925, the PCB had as a strategic line the self-construction. It was more important to organize the party then to fight a specific enemy. From 1926 to 1929, it adopted the strategic line of the United Front, but denying the realization of coalitions. From 1930 to 1933, it adopted the line \"class against class\", which denied the possibility of any alliance with the radicalized small bourgeoisie. From 1934 to 1935, it adopted the line of the Popular Front, which meant acting through the Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL). During the thirteen years from 1922 to 1935, there were problems at its leaderships have always had difficulty maintaining contact with regional leaderships and militants. In practice, it was an organization that had no revolutionary cadres formed. The absence of revolutionary cadres is what explains the inability to build effective tactics. And even if the tactics were formulated, it was generally misapplied.

L’objectif de cette thèse est d’établir une ethnographie des formes de la mémoire de l’interdiction de l’avortement dans le régime totalitaire de Ceausescu. Entre 1966 et 1989, le régime communiste roumain a imposé des politiques pronatalistes, au nom du : binele natiunii socialiste (« le bien de la nation socialiste »). Une construction de la maternité comme « tradition roumaine » a été ainsi développée, en parallèle d’une stricte interdiction de l’IVG, et de la mise à l’écart des moyens contraceptifs modernes. La remémoration sociale de ce passé difficile reste encore un tabou dans la société roumaine d’aujourd’hui. Il semblerait qu’en Roumanie actuelle cette remémoration-faible joue un rôle important dans la santé reproductive, et qu’elle est déterminée par des relations d’intersubjectivité entre les différentes formes de la mémoire du pronatalisme, c'est-à-dire la mémoire officielle, la mémoire culturelle (publique) et la mémoire sociale-partagée. L’analyse développée sur ces formes et leurs relations d’intersubjectivité a pour base un terrain anthropologique (2004-2009) sur la mémoire de l’avortement en Roumanie communiste, et fut réalisée dans le domaine interdisciplinaire des Études mémorielles. / Taking the pronatalism of Ceausescu’s regime as a case study, this thesis is an an ethnography of the memory-formes of a recent delicat past, such as the banning of abortion in a totalitarist regime. From 1966 to 1989, the communist regime imposed extreme policies of controlled demography in Romania, as it was imputed, for ‘the good of the socialist nation’. A construction of maternity as ‘Romanian tradition’ was developed in parallel to the banning of abortion on request and the making of contraception almost inaccessible. The social remembering of such a difficult past is still a taboo in contemporary Romanian society. This law-remembering, which is maybe playing an important role in the current situation of Romania’s reproductive health, is influenced by the intersubjectivities devellopped between the different forms of pronatalist memory, i.e. its official memory, its cultural memory and its social memory. The analysis of those memory-formes and their intersubjectivities is based on an anthropological fieldwork (2004-2009) on the memory of abortion in Communist Romania, and is theoretically informed by the interdisciplinary field of Memory Studies.

The Vietnamese people have always harboured an extraordinarily strong patriotic drive. But the government formed by Ho Chi Minh (1890-1969) after the Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) on the 2nd September 1945, the group that was to represent majority Vietnamese opinion until and after 1975, was spearheaded by the Vietminh (League for Vietnam's Independence) - a movement that did not define itself as Nationalist, but rather as an expressly Communist group. When the people of Vietnam looked for leadership, this was the obvious group to choose - the only movement prepared and willing to step in (other, more nationalist resistance groups had prematurely flourished and failed, as shall be discussed). In the Vietnam that found itself suddenly free at the close of the Second World War, no other lobby was ready, no group presented itself nationally as the Communists were and did. The Liberation Army that seized control of town after town was the military arm of the Viet Minh, formed in 1944 under Vo Nguyen Giap (b. 1912), an element of a movement that published its manifesto in February 1930, that had begun preparation and ideological training in the late 1920's in Guangzhou under Ho Chi Minh. Given the long preparation carried out by the Vietminh, the progression to the declaration of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a Communist nation with Ho at its head was a natural one. Whilst that development seems logical given the conditions of the day, the manner in which those conditions were reached (or manipulated) has been the subject of intense debate. Was that natural progression one in which the ideologists of Communist revolution 'captured' the Nationalist movement, exploited a nationalistic fervour to produce the desired revolt, using the front of the Viet Minh to blend their esoteric dogmas with the more easily understood nationalist cause of resistance? This is a perception held by many modern historians - that, in effect, Communists are the parasites of the modernization process. This attitude was and is encouraged by examination of advice given to Asian revolutionaries by their Soviet counterparts; Grigori Zinoviev (1833-1936) - later to die by Stalin's order - argued in 1922 that Communists should co-operate with the rising nationalists in Asia, gain the leadership of their movement, and then cast aside the genuine national leaders. For by itself, the tiny Indochina Communist Party could never have hoped to attract the support of politically engaged Vietnamese, let alone the hearts and minds of the nation at large. This is the essence of the currently accepted analysis of the revolutionary Vietnamese setting - that the Communist lobby exploited a majority furious with the abuses of French rule, sliding Communism into a dominant role in Vietnamese life. The majority of people had not fought for a communist government, but to be rid of the colonial occupying power. Such a perception, as shall be discussed, is representative of the Western reading of the whole Southeast Asian region of the day. The Vietnamese people were accustomed to the use of violence to protect their independence; perennial opposition to expansionist China meant that few peoples in Asia had been compelled to fight longer and harder to retain their identity as a separate and independent state than the Vietnamese. Whilst the ability and commitment of the Vietcong in resistance to outside power has been recognised, the strong sense of Vietnamese identity in and of itself has never really been acknowledged beyond the most simplistic of terms by external observers, perhaps because of the difficulty of comprehending how such an emotion can form when looking at the odd shape of the nation on a map. Such a lack of awareness allows supposed Vietnam specialists to assert that the dominant Vietnamese self-assessment is the extent to which the country is not Chinese (and, to a lesser extent, not French) rather than entering into a more significant analysis of how a national identity formed: how, whilst certainly influenced by feelings of encirclement and domination, Vietnam also developed a separate, distinct sense of self. This, whilst a sense that has only relatively recently manifested itself in territorial demands, is a longstanding emotion and sense, in and of itself. Given an understanding of that sense or merely an awareness of its existence, the willingness of the Vietnamese to combat the most powerful nation on Earth, though certainly impressive, needs little explanation; this work has attempted to explore a more difficult question - why they chose the dogma that served them. The idea that the majority of the Vietnamese people had not fought for a communist government, but to be rid of the colonial occupying power is in truth the presentation of a false dichotomy. The fact that a group within a broad movement participates for different reasons from another group does not necessarily imply exploitation or pretense. Neither does the fact that one has a strong political ideology such as socialism forbid the possession of any other political inclination, such as patriotism. The concept of a socialist exploitation of Vietnamese nationalism will be opposed here: a discussion of the disputed importance of nationalism to the Vietnamese Communist movement in resistance, and of Communism to the nationalist movement, will form the subject of this essay. The unity of Vietnam under Communist government in 1975 seems a fitting end to the period to be considered. Much of interest - the politics behind partition, or the Communist-led conduct of war with America, for example - can be considered only briefly; fortunately, these are issues considered in great depth elsewhere. The central issue to this work shall be the development of the Communist movement in French Indochina, and the thesis herein shall be that nationalism and Marxist-Leninism occupied a symbiotic relationship in the motivation of the Communist movement and its chief practitioners in the nation once again known as Vietnam.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the announcement by the leader of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), Achille Occhetto, that the time had come to shed its communist name and identity inaugurated a decade of uncertainty and change for the party. As the Party of the Democratic Left (PDS), it faced the challenge of developing its post-communist identity amid the upheaval in the Italian political system that followed the Tangentopoli (Bribesville) scandal. The transition to the 'Second Republic', spurred by widespread anti-party sentiment, brought new electoral systems and forms of coalition-making, a changed array of allies and opponents, a personalisation of certain political roles, and changed relationships between the national and local dimensions of politics. In 2000, now called the Left Democrats (DS), the party was the largest component in the nationally governing coalition and even provided the prime minister. Yet the rise to the pinnacle of power had been accompanied by decreasing electoral support. In over ten years of post-communist life, the party had failed to achieve the real breakthrough hoped for by Occhetto: to unite the Italian left in a single party that dominated government or opposition, as in other Western European countries. The primary aim of this thesis is to contribute to understanding the party's fortunes through a case study of the way the turbulent years from 1989 to 2000 were experienced in the Venetian provincial federation. This decade of change has so far not been examined from a local perspective, yet local studies were particularly fruitful in the analysis of the PCI, as they allowed exploration of the ways party debates were perceived, and decisions made at national level were implemented, 'on the ground' in specific contexts. I have not chosen the Venetian federation as a microcosm of the experience in the periphery as a whole but as an interesting and relevant component of the full picture. The Venetian party enjoyed greatly increased responsibilities in government at sub-national levels in the second half of the 1990s, due to successful alliance strategies, but decreasing electoral support. I seek to explain the local party's electoral and power outcomes in terms of a combination of external and internal factors: on one hand, the opportunities and constraints presented by the changing environment; and, on the other, internal dynamics that hampered the party in responding to those challenges. In particular I stress the significance of the crisis precipitated by Occhetto's proposal to transform the party in 1989 and the constraints on the local party's legitimacy and visibility in the competitive environment that developed in the Second Republic. I attribute these constraints to the mixed electoral systems operating at sub-national levels, intra-coalition rivalry, and a striking case of an individual enjoying personal power and influence in the local political system. As a secondary theme, I analyse change in the party type that accompanied these outcomes, in light of theories on general trends in party transformations in Western Europe. I identify rapid changes in the local party's aims, functions and organisational roles and relationships, and in its relationship with the national leadership. I argue that this process of change, consistent with the transformation of a mass party into an electorally focused party, was accelerated at local level by the changing competitive environment and the sudden increase in government responsibilities. The introduction in chapter 1 sets the party's story in context and outlines the aims and argument of the thesis. Chapter 2 introduces the local case study in light of existing analyses of the party's development, the tradition of local studies of the PCI, and theories on party types and transformations. The central chapters are dedicated to the case study, which is based largely on interviews with members of the federation's leadership groups in various periods. The organisation of the material reflects my division of the federation's story into distinct phases, each reflecting a stage in the development of both the party's alliance strategy and the local political system. In the concluding chapter, I discuss the implications of the case study findings for the party as a whole and make a claim for the continuing validity of local studies of Italian political parties.

Falun Gong protesters, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the spy plane incident and a series of mine accidents are just some of the events over the past decade that involved the Internet. In each incident the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was caught off guard by the circumvention of informational flows as a consequence of the Internet. This is in some ways indicative of the impact the medium is having on the ability of the CCP to manage political discourse within the confines of the country. This thesis examines the way that political discourse in contemporary China is managed in response to the development of the Internet, using the concepts of time and space as conceived by Harold A. Innis. This historical study considers the strategies used in the management of time and space in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) across a broad range of ways in which the medium is used by particular groups, such as online gamers, bloggers, hackers, and activists. I have also looked at the way information flows are managed during a crisis or disaster using critical textual analysis of Internet sources, and specific examples. These sources are both official and unofficial including Chinese government sites, journalistic sources both Chinese and Western and Chinese legal databases that appear on the World Wide Web (WWW). The study finds that there is an emerging shift from propaganda based media manipulation and suppression to a style of stage managed spin. The CCP have used three strategies to contain and maintain their hold over central power, including the rule of law, investment in the development of content and technological means. The development of the Internet in China is marked by a dialect of desire for the technology for economic purposes and the perceived need to control the technology for political purposes. The Internet has also enabled the central government in Beijing to reassert its position as a central authority over local and provincial governments. This study contributes to the existing knowledge about Chinese media policy and the Internet, and will shed light on the ways in which the tehcnology influences the production and consumption of media and the impact that the development of this medium has upon media policy in China. Furthermore, this study will contribute to a greater understanding of CCP's ability to manage information and the impact that this medium will have on the operations of Chinese politics within the space of the Internet, as well as the impact of the technology on politics, and China's interaction with the international community.

本論文分為七章十九節，約十四萬字。第一章為本文的導論，文中分為四節，分別就研究動機與目的、研究途徑與架構、研究範圍與限制及資料來源與名詞解釋做一簡單扼要的說明。第二章探討影響中共外交深鉅的矛循世界觀，然後，再論述和平共處五原則與統一戰線兩項外交基本策略第三章為冷戰時期中共東北亞外交政策的回顧。文中從政治、經濟及軍事三個層面，依時間序列分別探討中共與美國、前蘇聯、日本及南北韓在冷戰時期的互動關係。第四章為後冷戰時期的東北亞國際關係結構。文中分為兩部份，第一節結構層次探討區域的四角關係權力結構、區域安全整合的困境及區域經濟合作的趨勢；第二節單元層次，分別探討美國東北亞角色的調整、俄羅斯對外政策的轉變、日本的政治大國理想、中共的軍備擴張及朝鮮半島的緩和與變遷。第五章為後冷戰時期中共東北亞外交政策。第一節首先論述影響中共東北亞外交政策的因素；第二節探討獨立自主及睦鄰友好兩項外交取向；第三節則探討反霸權主義的國家角色；第四節探討保障國家安全及實現四個現代化兩項政策目標。第六章為後冷戰時期中共與東北亞各國的互動關係。第一節探討中共與美國的人權與最惠國待遇爭議及中共與俄羅斯夥伴關係的建立；第二節探討中共與日本、南韓及俄羅斯的經貿合作關係；第三節則探討中共與俄羅斯軍事交流及中共在北韓核武危機中的角色與目標。第七章為本文的結論。文中將擷取歸納本論文各章的精華，對後冷戰時期中共東北亞外交政策，作一整體性的評估與展望。

一九九六年一月廿日，尼克森在他的總統就職演說中，即已宣稱：「在經 歷一段衝突敵對的時期之後，我們正進入一個談判的紀元。」而台海兩岸 在目前日益頻繁交流的互動關係下，基於雙方逐漸發展出的共識和整個國 際後冷戰大環境，「談判」必然是雙方樂於作為採取處理事務的方式。但 中共長期以馬列主義為宗師，其「國家」目標、思維邏輯和行為方式，自 然與一般民主國家作風顯有不同。因此，必事先剖析中共一貫的談判，才 能在談判過程中，掌握有利的主導地位。香港與台灣是完全不同的政治實 體，中共對待雙方的政策也不盡相同，但對中共而言，能經由和平談判手 段達到實現中國領土統一的目標，乃其最高利益和價值所在。因此，筆者 以中共與英國談判香港領土主權問題為研究主題，從香港問題的由來，我 國、中共及英國的處理態度，以至中（共）英雙方的談判接觸，完成簽訂 一九八四年《聯合聲明》的過程為止，從中整理論析中共的談判本質、一 般作風及在香港問題個案上的談判策 以期對中共的談判行為有一深入的 了解。如果我方與中共進行相關談判工作之前，能先仔細研究中共與英國 談判香港前途的經驗，相信將有助於我方的因應作為。本文內容十萬字， 註釋及圖表約二萬字，共分為七章。第一章導言。第二章為中共談判的概 說。第三章敘述香港問題的由來。第四章探討論析影響中共處理香港問題 的四大因素。第五章是中共與英國談判香港問題的經過，迄完成《聯合聲 明》為止。第六章係運用「結構法」和「歷史研究法」，研析中共的談判 策略，為本文重點所在。第七章結論。筆者在研究過程中，對中共唯物辯 証法的談判策略和統戰手法、堅持「國家」主權的強硬立埸、「一國兩制 」的策略性政治理論、高恣態「你有求於我」的談判身段，均留下深刻印 象。台海兩岸多次事務性談判以來，中共頑固的主權觀念和另有企圖的談 判動機，阻礙了雙方更進一步的交流，這些事實經驗都可在中共與英國談 判香港問題過程中，找到例證。談判技術策略是中立的，每個人都可使用 。在兩岸談判中，雖有優弱勢之分，但如能多加一些「誠信」和「互動」 的共識，相信談判的結果，是能達到「雙贏」的期望，對整個中華民族前 途是有益的。

「國家統一」與「現代化」是清季以來中國人最關心的兩項議題，事實上 ，這兩項問題是互為因果。遠溯民初，國共兩黨因對中國現代化發展路線 的看法分歧，竟發展成意識型態的對立，最終且導致國家分裂迄今。國共 對峙，所付出的代價不僅是骨肉相殘，百姓流離；也阻礙了中國現代化進 一步發展的契機。由於人口、資源的對比懸殊，中共顯然是兩岸分合發展 的主導因素，故本文針對中共的統一立場與對臺策略， 行探討分析。中 共的統一策略歷經了幾個階段的演變，為因應冷戰結 國際現勢，以及追 求穩定環境發展經濟的戰略需要，現階段中共並無意急迫解決其所謂的「 臺灣問題」，而提出和平統一的口號，試圖以「一國兩制」的架構兼併臺 灣。作者首先參考了二次大戰國際現象中「分裂國家」雙方關係演變發展 的過程，以及德國和平統一的歷史經驗；觀察一九七九年以來臺海兩岸關 係的發展。諸如兩岸官方政策的互動、民間社經往來、接觸談判等各項交 流指標。其結論是：在中共採取由經濟到政治統一的迂迴策略效應下，兩 岸關係已逐漸和緩。但是，作者並不認為中共會達到其和平統一的目標， 事實上，作者認為中共一直否認臺灣為一政治實體的立場，已為中國統一 投下一個不可知的變數。