This dissertation comprises three essays revisiting the classical topic of quality provision in a duopoly. Two essays consider a situation in which consumers cannot identify the origin of an individual product but observe or infer the average quality of the units brought to the market: Chapter 2 studies the case where the two producers bargain over a minimum quality standard before deciding about their own quality level, while Chapter 3 deals with the case where qualities are (exogenously) fixed and producers have to decide about the quantity they will offer for sale. The final essay (Chapter 4) switches to a perfect-information environment and asks whether the producer of an inferior variety is able to deter the entry of a superior product by having retailers sign onto exclusivity contracts. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2006

重商主義時期“獎勵出口重課進口”的對外貿政策，及產業革命後生產力的擴張，使世界範圍內的傾銷大規模形成；二十世紀七○年代以來，「傾銷」已普遍存在於國際貿易之中，而對於「反傾銷」立法和實踐亦進展迅速，從關稅暨貿易總協定成立以來，對於「反傾銷」的立法、修訂一直是談判內容的主要議題。 本文的目的在探討在產品不完全替代下，面對國外持續性傾銷時，若廠商分別從事Cournot數量及Bertrand價格競爭時，如何課徴反傾銷稅？結果發現若廠商進行數量競爭時則：當本國與外國傾銷品相互替代率相同及本國產品對國外傾銷品之替代率大於國外傾銷品對本國產品之替代率時，本國政府可在社會福利最大化下制定反傾銷稅率。若進行價格競爭時則：本國政府無法依社會福利最大之反傾銷稅率制定反傾銷稅率。 / The mercantilist emphasis on expanding exports while restricting imports, coupled with the expansion of productivity seen following the industrial revolution, led to the proliferation of dumping trade practices around the world. “Dumping” has been a formally-recognized and widespread phenomenon in global trade since the 1970s. Against this, national governments have also been quick to implement countervailing laws and legislation. Anti-dumping legislation has been at the fore of international trade discussions since the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was established. This paper addresses the issue of how countervailing duties may be most effectively assessed in situations where a national product that is not completely substitutable by import competitors suffers sustained competition from imports dumped on the market. To achieve this objective, our research examines the effects on competition that result from the manufacturer of the national product adopting, respectively, Cournot volume and Bertrand pricing strategies. The result shows that, when a volume strategy is adopted, home government imposition of countervailing duties will be able to maximize social benefit when either domestic and imported (dumped) products share a similar substitutability ratio or the substitutability ratio of the domestic product is greater than that of the imported competition. When a pricing strategy is adopted, the government is, conversely, not in a position to impose a countervailing duty that will maximize social benefit.

A recent highly disputed subject of regulating energy markets in Europe is the unbundling of vertically integrated down- and upstream firms. While legal unbundling is already implemented in most countries and indisputable in its necessity for approaching regulatory aims, continuative models as ownership unbundling or the alternative of an independent system operator are still ambiguous. Hence, this article contributes to the economic analyses of identifying the differences of separate types of unbundling. Via simulation, we find that legal unbundling brings about the lowest prices in a market under Cournot competition. Moreover, under Bertrand competition, no differences between legal unbundling and ownership unbundling can be identified. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

L'ouvrage publié en 1838 par Antoine-Augustin Cournot (1801-1877), les Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses, est considéré comme un ouvrage précurseur de l'économie moderne, notamment au travers de l'influence qu'il exerça sur les économistes marginalistes à partir de la fin du 19ème siècle. Néanmoins la démarche entreprise par Cournot en 1838 ne saurait être comprise indépendamment du contexte intellectuel de son apparition. L'objet de la thèse est d'éclairer les conditions de l'utilisation des mathématiques dans les Recherches, en replaçant cette démarche dans le cadre de questions théoriques propre à l'économie politique classique et en apportant également un éclairage épistémologique.<br />Cette thèse montre que, loin de constituer une rupture avec la théorie économique dominante, la démarche des Recherches traduit au contraire l'attachement de Cournot au concept classique de valeur, caractérisé par la coexistence de plusieurs registres d'évaluation, hiérarchisés et articulés entre eux. Cette thèse montre en outre l'originalité de la posture épistémologique de Cournot et la manière dont il conçoit l'intervention des mathématiques dans la connaissance.

This diploma thesis deals with conict economic situations based on game theory. In the beginning, basic models of conict situations and current popular software tools are dened not only for the general support of student education or for science, but also for solving economic problems in game theory. Based on this analysis, the conicting situation of two competing rms is being solved. Gradually, work goes deeper into areas of delay dierential equations that better show the behavior of two players on the market. Subsequently, these delayed dierential equations are projected into the Cournot model, for which a critical value is identied that switches the stability of two rms on the market due to the delayed realization of their outputs.

This Master’s thesis deals with the application of cooperative game theory for solving the problems of Cournot's oligopolies. The knowledge of oligopoly theory and game theory has been elaborated to build a model describing the behavior of companies at a market that meets the preconditions of Cournot's oligopoly. The definition of cooperative game is based on the -characteristic function, which takes into account, compared to classical methods, that companies which are not in the coalition are pursuing their own profits, not suppressing coalition positions. The properties of the resulting cooperative games are examined in detail, focusing on monotony and convexity. Several theorems about these properties have been derived and their economic interpretations are given. Also, the question of calculation of the -characteristic function using the best-reply dynamics algorithm is being solved, and its convergence for a given type of games is justified. The model is applied to data from the oil market, which is further characterized by the results of the cooperative game.

This study investigates Game theory including economic theories related to agricultural production. Model creation simulating economical system is built upon theoretic starting points. Commodity production is simulated using game theory with searching for Nash equilibria. Commodity demand function is grounded on concept of Cournot game. System includes land trading based on sealed-bid auctions with second-price. This model is using external Gambit software which is freeware library for game theory computations. Model evaluation is located in Experiments section where model structure and truthfulness is tested.

Abstract The aim of this thesis is to devise new paradigms on radio resource sharing including cache-enabled virtualized large cellular networks for mobile network operators (MNOs). Also, self-organizing resource allocation for small cell networks is considered. In such networks, the MNOs rent radio resources from the infrastructure provider (InP) to support their subscribers. In order to reduce the operational costs, while at the same time to significantly increase the usage of the existing network resources, it leads to a paradigm where the MNOs share their infrastructure, i.e., base stations (BSs), antennas, spectrum and edge cache among themselves. In this regard, we integrate the theoretical insights provided by stochastic geometrical approaches to model the spectrum and infrastructure sharing for large cellular networks. In the first part of the thesis, we study the non-orthogonal multi-MNO spectrum allocation problem for small cell networks with the goal of maximizing the overall network throughput, defined as the expected weighted sum rate of the MNOs. Each MNO is assumed to serve multiple small cell BSs (SBSs). We adopt the many-to-one stable matching game framework to tackle this problem. We also investigate the role of power allocation schemes for SBSs using Q-learning. In the second part, we model and analyze the infrastructure sharing system considering a single buyer MNO and multiple seller MNOs. The MNOs are assumed to operate over their own licensed spectrum bands while sharing BSs. We assume that multiple seller MNOs compete with each other to sell their infrastructure to a potential buyer MNO. The optimal strategy for the seller MNOs in terms of the fraction of infrastructure to be shared and the price of the infrastructure, is obtained by computing the equilibrium of a Cournot-Nash oligopoly game. Finally, we develop a game-theoretic framework to model and analyze a cache-enabled virtualized cellular networks where the network infrastructure, e.g., BSs and cache storage, owned by an InP, is rented and shared among multiple MNOs. We formulate a Stackelberg game model with the InP as the leader and the MNOs as the followers. The InP tries to maximize its profit by optimizing its infrastructure rental fee. The MNO aims to minimize the cost of infrastructure by minimizing the cache intensity under probabilistic delay constraint of the user (UE). Since the MNOs share their rented infrastructure, we apply a cooperative game concept, namely, the Shapley value, to divide the cost among the MNOs. / Tiivistelmä Tämän väitöskirjan tavoitteena on tuottaa uusia paradigmoja radioresurssien jakoon, mukaan lukien virtualisoidut välimuisti-kykenevät suuret matkapuhelinverkot matkapuhelinoperaattoreille. Näiden kaltaisissa verkoissa operaattorit vuokraavat radioresursseja infrastruktuuritoimittajalta (InP, infrastructure provider) asiakkaiden tarpeisiin. Toimintakulujen karsiminen ja samanaikainen olemassa olevien verkkoresurssien hyötykäytön huomattava kasvattaminen johtaa paradigmaan, jossa operaattorit jakavat infrastruktuurinsa keskenään. Tämän vuoksi työssä tutkitaan teoreettisia stokastiseen geometriaan perustuvia malleja spektrin ja infrastruktuurin jakamiseksi suurissa soluverkoissa. Työn ensimmäisessä osassa tutkitaan ei-ortogonaalista monioperaattori-allokaatioongelmaa pienissä soluverkoissa tavoitteena maksimoida verkon yleistä läpisyöttöä, joka määritellään operaattoreiden painotettuna summaläpisyötön odotusarvona. Jokaisen operaattorin oletetaan palvelevan useampaa piensolutukiasemaa (SBS, small cell base station). Työssä käytetään monelta yhdelle -vakaata sovituspeli-viitekehystä SBS:lle käyttäen Q-oppimista. Työn toisessa osassa mallinnetaan ja analysoidaan infrastruktuurin jakamista yhden ostaja-operaattorin ja monen myyjä-operaattorin tapauksessa. Operaattorien oletetaan toimivan omilla lisensoiduilla taajuuksillaan jakaen tukiasemat keskenään. Myyjän optimaalinen strategia infrastruktuurin myytävän osan suuruuden ja hinnan suhteen saavutetaan laskemalla Cournot-Nash -olipologipelin tasapainotila. Lopuksi, työssä kehitetään peli-teoreettinen viitekehys virtualisoitujen välimuistikykenevien soluverkkojen mallintamiseen ja analysointiin, missä InP:n omistama verkkoinfrastruktuuri vuokrataan ja jaetaan monen operaattorin kesken. Työssä muodostetaan Stackelberg-pelimalli, jossa InP toimii johtajana ja operaattorit seuraajina. InP pyrkii maksimoimaan voittonsa optimoimalla infrastruktuurin vuokrahintaa. Operaattori pyrkii minimoimaan infrastruktuurin hinnan minimoimalla välimuistin tiheyttä satunnaisen käyttäjän viive-ehtojen mukaisesti. Koska operaattorit jakavat vuokratun infrastruktuurin, työssä käytetään yhteistyöpeli-ajatusta, nimellisesti, Shapleyn arvoa, jakamaan kustannuksia operaatoreiden kesken.

Dans cette thèse, notre but est de donner un cadre numérique général pour approcher les solutions des problèmes du transport optimal (TO). L’idée générale est d’introduire une régularisation entropique du problème initial. Le problème régularisé correspond à minimiser une entropie relative par rapport à une mesure de référence donnée. En effet, cela équivaut à trouver la projection d’un couplage par rapport à la divergence de Kullback-Leibler. Cela nous permet d’utiliser l’algorithme de Bregman/Dykstra et de résoudre plusieurs problèmes variationnels liés au TO. Nous nous intéressons particulièrement à la résolution des problèmes du transport optimal multi-marges (TOMM) qui apparaissent dans le cadre de la dynamique des fluides (équations d’Euler incompressible à la Brenier) et de la physique quantique (la théorie de fonctionnelle de la densité ). Dans ces cas, nous montrons que la régularisation entropique joue un rôle plus important que de la simple stabilisation numérique. De plus, nous donnons des résultats concernant l’existence des transports optimaux (par exemple des transports fractals) pour le problème TOMM. / In this thesis we aim at giving a general numerical framework to approximate solutions to optimal transport (OT) problems. The general idea is to introduce an entropic regularization of the initialproblems. The regularized problem corresponds to the minimization of a relative entropy with respect a given reference measure. Indeed, this is equivalent to find the projection of the joint coupling with respect the Kullback-Leibler divergence. This allows us to make use the Bregman/Dykstra’s algorithm and solve several variational problems related to OT. We are especially interested in solving multi-marginal optimal transport problems (MMOT) arising in Physics such as in Fluid Dynamics (e.g. incompressible Euler equations à la Brenier) and in Quantum Physics (e.g. Density Functional Theory). In these cases we show that the entropic regularization plays a more important role than a simple numerical stabilization. Moreover, we also give some important results concerning existence and characterization of optimal transport maps (e.g. fractal maps) for MMOT .

This dissertation seeks to contribute to the policy discussion on how to design efficient and sustainable energy policies. In three self-contained chapters, it applies microeconomic theory and empirical analysis to identify three market failures in European energy markets and to evaluate specific policy measures that strive to overcome these failures in order to increase market efficiency and to enhance environmental or societal sustainability. Chapter 1 and 2 study European electricity markets, which play an important role in the transition towards a carbon-neutral energy future. Overcoming barriers to efficient electricity markets is a crucial step to keep the costs of this transition as low as possible to society. Both chapters focus on obstacles to electricity market efficiency that have recently been highlighted by the European Commission. On the supply side, subsidies for renewable electricity may distort production incentives and competition in wholesale electricity markets. Chapter 1 applies a theoretical model to study the effect of different subsidies on producer strategies and competition in wholesale electricity markets. On the demand side, the European Commission seeks to overcome the reluctance of residential electricity consumers to switch electricity supplier in order to ensure effective competition in the retail electricity market. Chapter 2 empirically quantifies different reasons for switching inertia using a structural discrete choice model and performs counterfactual analysis to study the effect of different policy measures that seek to overcome switching inertia. Chapter 3 looks at the building sector, which accounts for 40% of final energy consumption in Europe and is a major emitter of carbon emissions. In the residential housing market information asymmetries hamper incentives to invest in energy efficiency improvements of rental property. This chapter empirically analyzes the effect of a European policy that mandates the use of energy performance certificates aiming at establishing an efficient market for energy efficient dwellings. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished