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Kantův kategorický imperativ a jeho kritika u myslitelů 19. století / Kant's Categorical Imperativ and its Critique by Nineteenth Century PhilosophersVašků, Kateřina January 2011 (has links)
Diploma thesis "Kant's Categorical Imperative and Its Critique by Nineteenth Century Philosophers" deals with a question of Kant's fundamental principle known as the Categorical Imperative or Moral Law. The aim of this work is at first to discuss two other moral principles because of their great impact on Kant seeking the moral principle. These are Hume's moral code called Moral sense and Rousseau' moral views relating to the freedom of individuals. Secondly, to find out how both moral theories did inspire Immanuel Kant. It is necessary to explain strengths of Kant's Formula of the Categorical Imperative especially to emphasise its objectivity and universality. Then the purpose is to show Kant's influence on moral thinking in the nineteenth century. It is necessary to mention philosophers such as Johan Gottlieb Fichte and Bernard Bolzano who focused on critique of the Categorical Imperative.
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Absent Characters as Proximate Cause in Twentieth Century American DramaMorrow, Sarah Emily 21 April 2009 (has links)
This thesis explores the status of a specific subset of absent characters within twentieth century American drama. By borrowing the term “proximate cause” from tort law and illuminating its intricacies through David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, this thesis re-appropriates proximate cause for literary studies. Rather than focus on characters whose existence remains the subject of critical debate, this set of absent characters presumably exists but never appear onstage. Despite their non-appearance onstage, however, these absent characters nonetheless have a profound effect upon the action that occurs during their respective plays. Highlighting the various ways in which these characters serve as the proximate cause for the onstage action of a given play will expand the realm of drama and literary studies in myriad ways.
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L’ontologie de la causalité adoptée par David Hume : un new Hume debate de peu de conséquence pour le mondeRaymond-Robidoux, Jordan 12 1900 (has links)
No description available.
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Sensibilidade moral e normatividade em HumeLunardi, Giovani Mendonça January 2009 (has links)
A filosofia moral de David Hume é interpretada, predominantemente, como representante de um ceticismo normativo ou de uma moralidade psicologizada. Tais interpretações privilegiam um determinado hábito de leitura dos textos humeanos, influenciadas pelas denominadas "teorias da razão prática", afirmando que seu sistema filosófico não contempla a estrutura de racionalidade necessária para a fundamentação da normatividade da moralidade. De forma contrária, a presente investigação sustenta que a filosofia moral humeana permite uma interpretação normativa através do exame da "dinâmica dos sentimentos" presentes na natureza humana. A normatividade da moral é estabelecida, de acordo com o filósofo escocês, a partir do conteúdo valorativo dos sentimentos naturais de "dor" e "prazer" que "sentimos" de forma imediata. No entanto, isso não implica que sua filosofia moral possa ser reduzida a um puro hedonismo, subjetivismo ou relativismo moral. Defendemos que a sensibilidade moral, segundo Hume, providencia a discriminação das ações humanas com conteúdo valorativo através da comunicação dos sentimentos (simpatia) avaliados de um ponto de vista imparcial (espectador judicioso). Essa "dinâmica dos sentimentos" é o que denominamos de normatividade como reflexividade, ou seja, a sucessiva reflexividade produz um resultado normativo. Nossa tese conclui que, na visão do filósofo escocês, o problema da normatividade da moralidade pode ser respondido a partir das seguintes perspectivas: do conteúdo valorativo de sentimentos naturais, não de valores impostos por uma razão prática; da comunicação de sentimentos entre os agentes, não da deliberação solipsista do agente moral; do ponto de vista imparcial de um espectador judicioso, não dos interesses dos agentes envolvidos; da dinâmica de sentimentos com uma sucessiva reflexividade, não da reflexão de uma "pura razão". / David Hume's moral philosophy is mainly understood as a representative of a normative scepticism and also as a psychologised morality. Such conceptions privilege a reading habit of humeans texts influenced by the so called "theories of the practical reason'" stating that his philosophical system does not contemplate the rationality structure necessary for the grounds of normativity of morality. As opposed to this, the present investigation supports the idea that humean moral philosophy allows a normative interpretation by examining "dynamic of feelings" present in human nature. The normativity of moral is established, according to the Scottish philosopher, from the evaluative contents of natural feelings of "pain" and "pleasure" in which, we immediately "feel". However, that does not mean that his moral philosophy can be reduced to pure hedonism, subjectivism or moral relativism. We support the idea that moral sensibility, according to Hume, provides discrimination of worthy human actions through communication of the feelings (sympathy) evaluative from an impartial point of view (judicious spectator). Such "dynamic of feelings" is what we call normativity as reflexivity, in other words, successful reflexivity producing normative outcome. Our thesis concludes that according to the Scottish philosopher's view, the normativity of morality question can be answered from the following perspectives: from natural feelings' worth rather than from the worth imposed by practical reason; from communication of feelings between agents, rather than from the solipsist deliberation of moral agent; from the impartial point of view of a judicious spectator, rather than from the interests of the involved agents; from the dynamic of feelings with successive reflexivity, rather than from the reflexion of a "pure reason".
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Sensibilidade moral e normatividade em HumeLunardi, Giovani Mendonça January 2009 (has links)
A filosofia moral de David Hume é interpretada, predominantemente, como representante de um ceticismo normativo ou de uma moralidade psicologizada. Tais interpretações privilegiam um determinado hábito de leitura dos textos humeanos, influenciadas pelas denominadas "teorias da razão prática", afirmando que seu sistema filosófico não contempla a estrutura de racionalidade necessária para a fundamentação da normatividade da moralidade. De forma contrária, a presente investigação sustenta que a filosofia moral humeana permite uma interpretação normativa através do exame da "dinâmica dos sentimentos" presentes na natureza humana. A normatividade da moral é estabelecida, de acordo com o filósofo escocês, a partir do conteúdo valorativo dos sentimentos naturais de "dor" e "prazer" que "sentimos" de forma imediata. No entanto, isso não implica que sua filosofia moral possa ser reduzida a um puro hedonismo, subjetivismo ou relativismo moral. Defendemos que a sensibilidade moral, segundo Hume, providencia a discriminação das ações humanas com conteúdo valorativo através da comunicação dos sentimentos (simpatia) avaliados de um ponto de vista imparcial (espectador judicioso). Essa "dinâmica dos sentimentos" é o que denominamos de normatividade como reflexividade, ou seja, a sucessiva reflexividade produz um resultado normativo. Nossa tese conclui que, na visão do filósofo escocês, o problema da normatividade da moralidade pode ser respondido a partir das seguintes perspectivas: do conteúdo valorativo de sentimentos naturais, não de valores impostos por uma razão prática; da comunicação de sentimentos entre os agentes, não da deliberação solipsista do agente moral; do ponto de vista imparcial de um espectador judicioso, não dos interesses dos agentes envolvidos; da dinâmica de sentimentos com uma sucessiva reflexividade, não da reflexão de uma "pura razão". / David Hume's moral philosophy is mainly understood as a representative of a normative scepticism and also as a psychologised morality. Such conceptions privilege a reading habit of humeans texts influenced by the so called "theories of the practical reason'" stating that his philosophical system does not contemplate the rationality structure necessary for the grounds of normativity of morality. As opposed to this, the present investigation supports the idea that humean moral philosophy allows a normative interpretation by examining "dynamic of feelings" present in human nature. The normativity of moral is established, according to the Scottish philosopher, from the evaluative contents of natural feelings of "pain" and "pleasure" in which, we immediately "feel". However, that does not mean that his moral philosophy can be reduced to pure hedonism, subjectivism or moral relativism. We support the idea that moral sensibility, according to Hume, provides discrimination of worthy human actions through communication of the feelings (sympathy) evaluative from an impartial point of view (judicious spectator). Such "dynamic of feelings" is what we call normativity as reflexivity, in other words, successful reflexivity producing normative outcome. Our thesis concludes that according to the Scottish philosopher's view, the normativity of morality question can be answered from the following perspectives: from natural feelings' worth rather than from the worth imposed by practical reason; from communication of feelings between agents, rather than from the solipsist deliberation of moral agent; from the impartial point of view of a judicious spectator, rather than from the interests of the involved agents; from the dynamic of feelings with successive reflexivity, rather than from the reflexion of a "pure reason".
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Sensibilidade moral e normatividade em HumeLunardi, Giovani Mendonça January 2009 (has links)
A filosofia moral de David Hume é interpretada, predominantemente, como representante de um ceticismo normativo ou de uma moralidade psicologizada. Tais interpretações privilegiam um determinado hábito de leitura dos textos humeanos, influenciadas pelas denominadas "teorias da razão prática", afirmando que seu sistema filosófico não contempla a estrutura de racionalidade necessária para a fundamentação da normatividade da moralidade. De forma contrária, a presente investigação sustenta que a filosofia moral humeana permite uma interpretação normativa através do exame da "dinâmica dos sentimentos" presentes na natureza humana. A normatividade da moral é estabelecida, de acordo com o filósofo escocês, a partir do conteúdo valorativo dos sentimentos naturais de "dor" e "prazer" que "sentimos" de forma imediata. No entanto, isso não implica que sua filosofia moral possa ser reduzida a um puro hedonismo, subjetivismo ou relativismo moral. Defendemos que a sensibilidade moral, segundo Hume, providencia a discriminação das ações humanas com conteúdo valorativo através da comunicação dos sentimentos (simpatia) avaliados de um ponto de vista imparcial (espectador judicioso). Essa "dinâmica dos sentimentos" é o que denominamos de normatividade como reflexividade, ou seja, a sucessiva reflexividade produz um resultado normativo. Nossa tese conclui que, na visão do filósofo escocês, o problema da normatividade da moralidade pode ser respondido a partir das seguintes perspectivas: do conteúdo valorativo de sentimentos naturais, não de valores impostos por uma razão prática; da comunicação de sentimentos entre os agentes, não da deliberação solipsista do agente moral; do ponto de vista imparcial de um espectador judicioso, não dos interesses dos agentes envolvidos; da dinâmica de sentimentos com uma sucessiva reflexividade, não da reflexão de uma "pura razão". / David Hume's moral philosophy is mainly understood as a representative of a normative scepticism and also as a psychologised morality. Such conceptions privilege a reading habit of humeans texts influenced by the so called "theories of the practical reason'" stating that his philosophical system does not contemplate the rationality structure necessary for the grounds of normativity of morality. As opposed to this, the present investigation supports the idea that humean moral philosophy allows a normative interpretation by examining "dynamic of feelings" present in human nature. The normativity of moral is established, according to the Scottish philosopher, from the evaluative contents of natural feelings of "pain" and "pleasure" in which, we immediately "feel". However, that does not mean that his moral philosophy can be reduced to pure hedonism, subjectivism or moral relativism. We support the idea that moral sensibility, according to Hume, provides discrimination of worthy human actions through communication of the feelings (sympathy) evaluative from an impartial point of view (judicious spectator). Such "dynamic of feelings" is what we call normativity as reflexivity, in other words, successful reflexivity producing normative outcome. Our thesis concludes that according to the Scottish philosopher's view, the normativity of morality question can be answered from the following perspectives: from natural feelings' worth rather than from the worth imposed by practical reason; from communication of feelings between agents, rather than from the solipsist deliberation of moral agent; from the impartial point of view of a judicious spectator, rather than from the interests of the involved agents; from the dynamic of feelings with successive reflexivity, rather than from the reflexion of a "pure reason".
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"Reading Custom as Illative Sense": A Theological Account of John Henry Newman's Appropriation of a Realist Interpretation of David HumeMartin, Sean Swain 27 August 2015 (has links)
No description available.
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Thomas Reid: o senso comum como matriz filosófica do presbiterianismoLadeia, Donizeti Rodrigues 14 December 2006 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2006-12-14 / Instituto Presbiteriano Mackenzie / This research introduces the Thomas Reid philosophy, as a philosophical matrix, through the north american presbyterianism, represented by the North American
Presbyterian Church, and how the Igreja Presbiteriana do Brasil, received the influencies of that philosophy through foreign mission. The environment of this analysis was the crisis period, that the Scotish Philosophy appeared. The analysed factors in that environment was, the crisis that influenced the philosophical thinking, specialy in knowledge field in a time starts from Middle Age English School inquiring up to epistemologics crisis context of Reid s thinking. After that, the Reid s formulation of thinking was studied, the common sense. At this point we have the study about how
Reid faced the ceticism based in David Hume s conception. The final part shows how the common sense philosophy became de philosophical matrix of protestanism through North American Presbyterian Church, and subsequently by the Princeton missionaries actions in Brazil. / Esta pesquisa introduz o estudo da filosofia de Thomas Reid, como matriz filosófica, através do presbiterianismo norte americano, representado pela denominação da Igreja, Presbiteriana Norte Americana, e de como a Igreja Presbiteriana do Brasil recebeu as influências desta filosofia, através das missões estrangeiras. Analisou-se o período de
crise, no qual eclodiu a filosofia escocesa. Os fatores analisados neste ambiente foram a crise que atinge o pensamento filosófico principalmente na área do conhecimento em um período que vai dos questionamentos da Escola Inglesa na Idade Média até o contexto epistemológico do período vivido por Thomas Reid. Posteriormente, estudou-se
a formulação do pensamento de Reid, o senso comum. Nesta parte temos o estudo sobre como Reid enfrentou o ceticismo formulado nas concepções de David Hume. A parte final mostra como a filosofia do senso comum se tornou a matriz filosófica do protestantismo através da Igreja Presbiteriana da América do Norte, e depois pela atuação dos missionários formados em Princeton no Brasil.
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Skrytá podstata skutečnosti - Humovské pojetí / Secret nature of reality - Humean approachFršlínek, Jan January 2019 (has links)
This thesis enquires into the question of the hidden nature of things and reality in the context of David Hume's philosophy. In the context of a Humean approach to reality, it discusses whether the things which we perceive and which are considered to be perceptions can have some sort of non-empirical correlation that lies beneath them and whether it can be called the hidden nature of these things. The first half of the thesis is focused on the philosophy of David Hume. In the second half of the thesis two original considerations about the hidden nature and its characteristics are presented. The thesis starts with three selected theories of substance as presented in A Treatise of Human Nature. The theory of John Locke and the theory of the peripatetics are presented from Hume's critical perspective. Consequently is presented an interpretation called the New Hume. In the context of this interpretation, Hume presumes that there are hidden entities lying beneath empirical reality. Then, there are two considerations focused on the hidden nature of things and its characteristics which are presented. These characteristics are consequently being described in an indirect manner. And finally an original suggestion of how to understand the hidden nature is presented. It has the character of mere...
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"This, too, was myself": Empathic Unsettlement and the Victim/Perpetrator Binary in Robert Louis Stevenson's <em>Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde</em>Bruner, Brittany 01 March 2017 (has links)
At first glance, Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde is a tale that reinforces binaries. One of these is the self/other binary that is central to David Hume's and Adam Smith's theories of sympathy that conceive of a self imaginatively identifying and experiencing fellow-feeling for an other. However, this notion is complicated because Jekyll and Hyde are the same person. Further, many critics argue that Stevenson actually challenges binary thinking. While Hume and Smith do not challenge the self/other binary in connection with sympathy, trauma theory critics do challenge a self/other binary that lies at the heart of sympathy: the victim/perpetrator binary. Noted trauma theorist Dominick LaCapra develops a method of empathizing called empathic unsettlement where a secondary witness listens with empathy to a victim's traumatic witness while recognizing the difference of his or her position as a witness. He argues that perpetrators may also warrant understanding, but this understanding does not come through empathy. However, one of the hallmarks of empathic unsettlement is that it does not neatly resolve or replace traumatic narratives. Therefore, I argue that empathic unsettlement could also be a useful method for allowing a perpetrator to witness. While practicing empathic unsettlement for a perpetrator may not be worth the risk in real life, performing a thought experiment in literature can test how using empathy might provide a better way to theorize perpetration. Using two witnesses who attempt to practice empathic unsettlement for Jekyll and Hyde, Dr. Hastie Lanyon (who fails), and Mr. Gabriel John Utterson (who succeeds), I will show how empathic unsettlement could be used for both a victim and perpetrator to tease out the complexities of assessing a traumatic situation.
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