Two different systems of corporate governance globally coexist - the concentrated ownership system and the dispersed ownership system. The dissertation focuses on the history of companies and large economic entities. Attention is also paid to the relationship between the state and corporations. The importance of the first regulation of joint stock companies is discussed as well. Governance of large corporations is described and analyzed. The presented non-legal reasons for the existence of two systems of corporate governance are also summarized. Particular attention is paid to the legal preconditions for the dispersed ownership. Common law and civil law are compared. The differences in law of corporations (company law) are extensively analyzed - co-determination, fiduciary duties, piercing of corporate veil, board and independent directors. Detailed attention is focused on executive pay (remuneration / compensation).

Bakgrund: Corporate Governance även kallad bolagsstyrning, är något som dagligen berör företag och utgör därmed en central del inom företagsorganisationer. Den teori som blivit mest uppmärksammad inom bolagsstyrning är agentteorin, som förklarar intressekonflikter mellan agent-principalen i ett bolag. Tidigare studier har visat på skillnader i länders bolagsstyrning, främst mellan de anglosaxiska och europeiska länderna gällande ägarstrukturen. För att motverka intressekonflikter som agentteorin uppmärksammar har olika riktlinjer för god bolagsstyrning, i form av koder, tillkommit som kompletterar lagstiftningen.   Syfte: Syftet med studien är att undersöka hur börsnoterade bolag på OMX30 Stockholmsbörsen förhåller sig till svensk kod för bolagsstyrning. Studien ämnar även att ta reda på om det finns något mönster mellan bolagens ägarstruktur och hur företagen väljer att följa Koden. Metod: För att kunna besvara studiens undersökningsfrågor avser studien att använda sig av en kvalitativ innehållsanalys med en deduktiv ansats. Undersökningen har genomförts genom att granska offentlig information i form av årsredovisningar, bolagsstyrningsrapporter samt företagshemsidor för studiens valda företag, som finns noterade på OMX30 Stockholmsbörsen mellan åren 2013-2017. Slutsatser: Den genomförda undersökningen visar på att samtliga bolag i studien väljer att följa svensk kod för bolagsstyrning utan avvikelser, där bolag med ett spritt ägande utgör en majoritet. Däremot visar undersökningen ingen signifikant trend på en minskad eller ökad avvikelse från Kodens riktlinjer från åren 2013–2017. Det finns ingen ägarstruktur som utgör en majoritet bland studiens undersökta bolag, utan fördelar sig någorlunda jämnt bland företagen. Studien visar även på att bolagen avviker mest från kodreglerna 2.4 och 9.2. / Background: Corporate Governance is something that concerns companies regularly and is forming a central part of corporate organizations. Agency-theory is the most attentive theory in Corporate Governance, which explains the differ goals and interests between the agents and principals in a company. Previous studies have shown differences between anglosaxisk and european countries, concerning the ownership structure.To prevent interest conflicts in companies several policies, presented as Codes have been presented in different countries.    Purpose: The purpose of this study is to analyze how companies on the OMX30 Stockholm Stock Exchange, apply the main principles of the Swedish Corporate Governance Code. The study also aims to review if there is any pattern regarding the companies ownership structure and how the companies choose to follow the Code. Method: In order to examine and answer the questions of this study, the study intends to use a qualitative content approach with a deductive approach. The study has been conducted by reviewing public information from annual reports, corporate governance reports and websites for the selected companies during the years 2013-2017. Conclusion: The findings of the study indicates that most of the companies apply the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance without any deviations, where companies with a dispersed ownership is a majority. The study does not show any significant trend of a decreased or increased deviation from the code during the years 2013-2017. There is no ownership structure constituting a majority of the study’s investigated companies. The most common deviations in this study are 2.4 and 9.2 from the Swedish Code.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:26:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Heloisa Belotti Bedicks.pdf: 1599271 bytes, checksum: f1fbf2bb10eaff82d22d57c4aae6203e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-08-07 / A company s ownership structure is a key aspect of the corporate governance discussion. This dissertation analyzes, through case studies, pioneering companies in Brazil which adopted dispersed control structures without any controlling shareholder individual or group. This study has two main aims: identifying the reasons that led those companies to adopt such ownership structures and the main changes that occurred after those changes, especially with respect to the companies governance practices. Since dispersed control is a very recent movement in Brazil, this dissertation is justified by the scarcity of similar studies in the country and in dispersed control companies in other emerging economies. The study analyzed six Brazilian company cases, through detailed interviews based on a standard questionnaire, analysis of corporate reports, and other data. Two main reasons emerged from the study: a favorable market window coupled with the former controllers desire to leave, were found to be the main drivers for most companies analyzed. With regard to changes to corporate governance practices, a substantial impact was noticed on their relations with shareholders following the change in company control, particularly their general meeting attendance. Moreover, it was also determined that the stability in Brazil s macroeconomic scenario has enabled the capital market to play its role of financing the growth of new companies. In this context, this kind of company structure may become a new Brazilian corporate model, replacing the traditional concentrated structure. However, it is not clear whether this option has become feasible just for a short moment of excitement of the market. The feasibility of this structure, therefore, needs further time testing, especially during periods of depression at the stock market, and in assessing the evolution of these pioneering companies performance, as they will be facing critical moments when making important corporate decisions and replacing their leaders. / A estrutura de propriedade das empresas é um aspecto chave para a discussão da temática da governança corporativa. Esta dissertação analisa, por meio de estudos de casos, as empresas brasileiras pioneiras na adoção de estruturas societárias dispersas, sem a figura de um acionista controlador ou bloco de controle. O trabalho possui dois objetivos principais: identificar os fatores motivadores que levaram estas empresas a adotarem tal estrutura de propriedade e as principais alterações ocorridas pós-mudança societária, principalmente em relação às práticas de governança corporativa adotadas. Em função do movimento de pulverização de capital ainda ser muito recente no Brasil, o trabalho se justifica pela escassez de estudos similares no país e em empresas com estruturas pulverizadas de outras economias emergentes. O trabalho analisou casos de seis empresas nacionais, por meio de entrevistas em profundidade conduzidas com base em um questionário padrão, análise de relatórios corporativos e outros dados secundários. O trabalho apresenta dois resultados principais: em relação às motivações, observou-se que uma janela de mercado favorável, aliada ao desejo de saída dos antigos controladores, constituiu-se no fator motivador preponderante da maior parte das empresas analisadas. Em relação às mudanças nas práticas de governança corporativa, observou-se um impacto substancial no relacionamento com os acionistas após a reconfiguração societária, principalmente na participação destes nas assembléias das companhias. Além disso, como resultado geral constatou-se também que a estabilidade do cenário macro-econômico brasileiro está permitindo que o mercado de capitais cumpra o seu papel de financiar o crescimento de novas empresas. Nesse contexto, observa-se que essa forma de estrutura societária pode ser um novo modelo empresarial brasileiro, ao invés da tradicional estrutura concentrada. Entretanto, não fica claro se esta opção tornou-se viável apenas por um momento de certa "euforia" do mercado. Portanto, a viabilidade desta estrutura ainda precisará ser "testada" ao longo do tempo, o que deverá ocorrer em momentos de depressão do mercado acionário e em função da evolução do desempenho destas empresas pioneiras, que terão seus momentos críticos na tomada de grandes decisões empresariais e na substituição de suas lideranças.

本研究透過不同股權結構來探討傳統代理問題與核心代理問題對於研發支出投入程度之影響。 本研究將具有金字塔結構或交叉持股結構之企業分類為股權集中之企業，而將不具有金字塔結構或交叉持股結構之企業分類為股權分散之企業。實證分析顯示，在股權分散情況下，傳統代理問題的降低有助於研發支出之提升。其中，董事長兼任總經理、經理人持股比率、董監事持股比率、大股東持股比率、法人持股比率及獨立董事席次比率皆對研發支出之投入有正相關影響。在股權集中情況下，核心代理問題的降低也有助於研發支出之投入。 此外，相較於股權分散之企業，股權集中之企業有著較高的研發支出投入，代表股權集中之企業較有辦法投入較多資源於研發支出上。而透過交乘項之實證分析後，發現相對於股權集中之企業，若股權分散之企業的傳統代理問題能降低，那麼會更有效地提高研發支出以提升企業經營績效。同理也得知，在相對於股權分散之企業，股權集中之企業之核心代理問題若能降低，那麼會更有效地提高研發支出以提升公司價值。 / Based on ownership structures, this study investigates the effects of type I and type II agency problem on R&D expenses for innovation investments. This study classifies both pyramid ownership structure and cross-holding ownership structure as ownership-concentrated structure while others ownership-dispersed structure. The empirical results indicate that under ownership-dispersed structure, the reduction in type I agency problems increases research and development (R&D) expenses in innovation investments. The ways that reduce type I agency problem and boost innovation investments include CEO duality, executive ownership, corporate ownership, block ownership, institutional ownership, and the percentage of board seats held by independent directors. Under the case of ownership-concentrated structure, reduction in type II agency problems lead to increase in R&D expenses for innovation investments. Moreover, comparing with ownership dispersed firms, the ownership concentrated firms spend more in R&D expenses. However, if the dispersed ownership firms can decrease type I agency problems then they spend more in R&D relative to the ownership concentrated firms. By the same token, comparing with ownership-dispersed firms, the reduction in type II agency problems of ownership-concentrated firms will more effectively increase R&D expenses to raise the company value.

Dentre os atuais desafios do direito societário brasileiro, a estrutura da propriedade acionária das sociedades por ações de capital aberto e a identificação daqueles que as comandam merecem destaque. O aquecimento das transações realizadas via mercado de capitais e a consolidação dos segmentos especiais de governança corporativa no Brasil resultaram no chamado fenômeno de dispersão acionária, que evidenciou certa ruptura na tradicional estrutura de propriedade acionária exclusivamente concentrada, até então predominante nas companhias brasileiras. Diante desse cenário contrastante, de mudanças no perfil do poder de controle sobre as companhias brasileiras, o presente trabalho apresentará em seu capítulo terceiro, após breve análise das estruturas de capital identificadas em diferentes economias e de retrospectiva sobre a propriedade acionária das companhias brasileiras (a serem apresentadas em seu segundo capítulo), extensa pesquisa empírica realizada com o propósito de identificar a atual estrutura de propriedade acionária predominante entre as companhias brasileiras listadas no segmento especial do Novo Mercado da BMF&BOVESPA (Novo Mercado), e com o objetivo de averiguar a existência do chamado controle societário minoritário entre tais companhias, conforme detalhado nos apêndices desta dissertação. Referida pesquisa empírica representa, ainda, rico processamento da base de dados e informações divulgadas à Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM) pelas companhias listadas no Novo Mercado, e serve de base para a avaliação da necessidade de eventuais mudanças nos conceitos adotados pelo Direito Societário pátrio, tendo em vista entendimento divergente identificado na doutrina e em julgados da CVM no âmbito da possibilidade de existência de um controle societário exercido por acionista ou grupo de acionistas não detentores da maioria do capital social votante, conforme detalhado no quarto capítulo deste estudo. Por fim, serão apresentadas, no quinto e último capítulo, as considerações finais à análise proposta, com destaque para as principais conclusões obtidas na elaboração dos capítulos terceiro e quarto descritos acima, dentre elas a existência do controle societário interno não majoritário (controle minoritário) entre companhias listadas no Novo Mercado, bem como os reflexos dessa constatação no âmbito da prática do Direito Societário. / Among the current challenges of the Brazilian Corporate Law, the structure of the capital ownership of the corporations and the identification of those who exercises control over it remains an important aspect to be taken into consideration when analyzing the main aspects of the Brazilian capital market. The heat up of the transactions carried out through the capital market, and the consolidation of the special corporate governance segments in Brazil resulted in the so called phenomenon of the dispersed ownership, which revealed a rupture from the traditional structure of extremely concentrated ownership, that was prevailing until now among the Brazilian corporations. Given such contrasting scenario of changes in the profile of corporate power over Brazilian corporations, these thesis, after describing, over its first two chapters, the structures of capital ownership existent in different economies and providing a retrospective on the capital ownership of Brazilian corporations, presents, in its third chapter, an extensive empirical research performed with the purposes of identifying the current structure of capital ownership prevailing among the Brazilian companies listed in the Novo Mercado, special segment of the Brazilian Exchange BMF&BOVESPA (the New Market), as well as ascertaining the existence of minority corporate control among such companies, as detailed in the appendixes hereto. The referred empirical research presents, furthermore, detailed data processing in connection with the information disclosed by such companies to the Brazilian Stock Exchange Commission, the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM), and is also used as basis for reviewing the need of eventual changes in the concepts embodied by the Brazilian Corporate Law, in view of the divergent understanding identified in the Brazilian doctrine and judgments issued by the CVM in connection with the existence of a corporate control exercised by a shareholder or group of shareholders owner of shareholding not representative of the majority of the voting capital stock, as detailed in the fourth chapter of these thesis. Finally, the fifth and last chapter of these study presents the final considerations in connection with the review proposed hereto, highlighting the main conclusions obtained through the elaboration of the third and fourth chapters described above, among them the existence of a not majority internal control (minority control) in companies listed in the New Market, as well as the effects of such conclusion in the light of the practice of corporate law.

Dentre os atuais desafios do direito societário brasileiro, a estrutura da propriedade acionária das sociedades por ações de capital aberto e a identificação daqueles que as comandam merecem destaque. O aquecimento das transações realizadas via mercado de capitais e a consolidação dos segmentos especiais de governança corporativa no Brasil resultaram no chamado fenômeno de dispersão acionária, que evidenciou certa ruptura na tradicional estrutura de propriedade acionária exclusivamente concentrada, até então predominante nas companhias brasileiras. Diante desse cenário contrastante, de mudanças no perfil do poder de controle sobre as companhias brasileiras, o presente trabalho apresentará em seu capítulo terceiro, após breve análise das estruturas de capital identificadas em diferentes economias e de retrospectiva sobre a propriedade acionária das companhias brasileiras (a serem apresentadas em seu segundo capítulo), extensa pesquisa empírica realizada com o propósito de identificar a atual estrutura de propriedade acionária predominante entre as companhias brasileiras listadas no segmento especial do Novo Mercado da BMF&BOVESPA (Novo Mercado), e com o objetivo de averiguar a existência do chamado controle societário minoritário entre tais companhias, conforme detalhado nos apêndices desta dissertação. Referida pesquisa empírica representa, ainda, rico processamento da base de dados e informações divulgadas à Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM) pelas companhias listadas no Novo Mercado, e serve de base para a avaliação da necessidade de eventuais mudanças nos conceitos adotados pelo Direito Societário pátrio, tendo em vista entendimento divergente identificado na doutrina e em julgados da CVM no âmbito da possibilidade de existência de um controle societário exercido por acionista ou grupo de acionistas não detentores da maioria do capital social votante, conforme detalhado no quarto capítulo deste estudo. Por fim, serão apresentadas, no quinto e último capítulo, as considerações finais à análise proposta, com destaque para as principais conclusões obtidas na elaboração dos capítulos terceiro e quarto descritos acima, dentre elas a existência do controle societário interno não majoritário (controle minoritário) entre companhias listadas no Novo Mercado, bem como os reflexos dessa constatação no âmbito da prática do Direito Societário. / Among the current challenges of the Brazilian Corporate Law, the structure of the capital ownership of the corporations and the identification of those who exercises control over it remains an important aspect to be taken into consideration when analyzing the main aspects of the Brazilian capital market. The heat up of the transactions carried out through the capital market, and the consolidation of the special corporate governance segments in Brazil resulted in the so called phenomenon of the dispersed ownership, which revealed a rupture from the traditional structure of extremely concentrated ownership, that was prevailing until now among the Brazilian corporations. Given such contrasting scenario of changes in the profile of corporate power over Brazilian corporations, these thesis, after describing, over its first two chapters, the structures of capital ownership existent in different economies and providing a retrospective on the capital ownership of Brazilian corporations, presents, in its third chapter, an extensive empirical research performed with the purposes of identifying the current structure of capital ownership prevailing among the Brazilian companies listed in the Novo Mercado, special segment of the Brazilian Exchange BMF&BOVESPA (the New Market), as well as ascertaining the existence of minority corporate control among such companies, as detailed in the appendixes hereto. The referred empirical research presents, furthermore, detailed data processing in connection with the information disclosed by such companies to the Brazilian Stock Exchange Commission, the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM), and is also used as basis for reviewing the need of eventual changes in the concepts embodied by the Brazilian Corporate Law, in view of the divergent understanding identified in the Brazilian doctrine and judgments issued by the CVM in connection with the existence of a corporate control exercised by a shareholder or group of shareholders owner of shareholding not representative of the majority of the voting capital stock, as detailed in the fourth chapter of these thesis. Finally, the fifth and last chapter of these study presents the final considerations in connection with the review proposed hereto, highlighting the main conclusions obtained through the elaboration of the third and fourth chapters described above, among them the existence of a not majority internal control (minority control) in companies listed in the New Market, as well as the effects of such conclusion in the light of the practice of corporate law.