This dissertation is centered around a set of apparently conflicting intuitions that we may have about mathematics. On the one hand, we are inclined to believe that the theorems of mathematics are true. Since many of these theorems are existence assertions, it seems that if we accept them as true, we also commit ourselves to the existence of mathematical objects. On the other hand, mathematical objects are usually thought of as abstract objects that are non-spatiotemporal and causally inert. This makes it difficult to understand how we can have knowledge of them and how they can have any relevance for our mathematical theories. I begin by characterizing a realist position in the philosophy of mathematics and discussing two of the most influential arguments for that kind of view. Next, after highlighting some of the difficulties that realism faces, I look at a few alternative approaches that attempt to account for our mathematical practice without making the assumption that there exist abstract mathematical entities. More specifically, I examine the fictionalist views developed by Hartry Field, Mark Balaguer, and Stephen Yablo, respectively. A common feature of these views is that they accept that mathematics interpreted at face value is committed to the existence of abstract objects. In order to avoid this commitment, they claim that mathematics, when taken at face value, is false. I argue that the fictionalist idea of mathematics as consisting of falsehoods is counter-intuitive and that we should aim for an account that can accommodate both the intuition that mathematics is true and the intuition that the causal inertness of abstract mathematical objects makes them irrelevant to mathematical practice and mathematical knowledge. The solution that I propose is based on Rudolf Carnap's distinction between an internal and an external perspective on existence. I argue that the most reasonable interpretation of the notions of mathematical truth and existence is that they are internal to mathematics and, hence, that mathematical truth cannot be used to draw the conclusion that mathematical objects exist in an external/ontological sense.

Submitted by Renato Lanna Fernandez (renatolfernandez@hotmail.com) on 2016-06-27T17:43:10Z No. of bitstreams: 1 tese - versão digital.pdf: 9231381 bytes, checksum: e0276461f9402371c845672274be0b36 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rafael Aguiar (rafael.aguiar@fgv.br) on 2016-06-27T18:03:41Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 tese - versão digital.pdf: 9231381 bytes, checksum: e0276461f9402371c845672274be0b36 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2016-06-29T14:46:56Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 tese - versão digital.pdf: 9231381 bytes, checksum: e0276461f9402371c845672274be0b36 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-29T14:47:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese - versão digital.pdf: 9231381 bytes, checksum: e0276461f9402371c845672274be0b36 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-04-29 / This work investigates the process of club identities formation during the Brazilian football amateur stage (1900 – 1933), focusing on the cases of C A Paulistano and Fluminense F. C.. This identity construction process usually gives these clubs the mark of elitization based on distinction and refinement. By deepening and qualifying this version consecrated by sport memorialism, it is hereby intended to analyze the history of these two clubs, during the initial years of development of football in Rio de Janeiro and in São Paulo, highlighting the relation between the sport and the development of the two cities. In order to demonstrate our central argument, we will bring up social, economic, political and cultural aspects that can be considered fundamental in the construction of the image of distinction attributed both to Fluminense and to Paulistano. Employing the comparative method, we will try to point the similarities and differences in the history of the clubs, assuming as theoretical basis the works of Bourdieu on distinction, of Hobsbawm and Ranger on the invention of traditions and of Halbwachs on collective memory. Together with the documental archives from both analyzed institutions, we will use as sources the documentation produced by the clubs and periodicals from the period. We seek to demonstrate, through the memorial reports produced by writers, managers and former athletes, the perpetration of a range of symbolic values and traditions that associated the Paulistano and the Fluminense to a space of distinction and refinement that reproduced throughout the generations and that remains in the sport imaginary until today. / Este trabalho investiga o processo de formação de identidades clubisticas durante a fase amadora do futebol brasileiro (1900 – 1933), tendo por foco os casos do C A Paulistano e do Fluminense F. C. Tal construção identitária costuma atribuir a estes clubes a marca da elitização calcada na distinção e no refinamento. Ao aprofundar e ao matizar essa versão consagrada pelo memorialismo esportivo, pretende-se analisar a história dessas duas agremiações, durante os anos iniciais do desenvolvimento do futebol na cidade do Rio de Janeiro e São Paulo, com destaque à relação do esporte com o desenvolvimento destas duas cidades. Para a demonstração de nosso argumento central, levantaremos os aspectos sociais, econômicos, políticos e culturais que podem ser considerados fundamentais na construção da imagem de distinção atribuída tanto ao Fluminense quanto ao Paulistano. Com o emprego do método comparativo, buscaremos apontar as semelhanças e diferenças na história desses clubes, tendo como pressupostos teóricos os trabalhos de Bourdieu sobre a distinção, de Hobsbawm e Ranger sobre a invenção das tradições e de Halbwachs sobre a memória coletiva. Junto aos acervos documentais das duas instituições examinadas, utilizaremos como fontes a documentação produzida pelos clubes no período e os periódicos da época. Procuraremos demonstrar, através dos relatos memoriais produzidos por escritores, dirigentes e ex-atletas, a perpetuação de uma série de valores simbólicos e de tradições que associaram o Paulistano e o Fluminense a um espaço de distinção e refinamento que se reproduziu ao longo das gerações e que permanece no imaginário esportivo até os dias atuais.

In the last decade, neuroscience and psychology alike have paid increasing attention to the study of affective touch, which refers to the emotional and motivational facets of tactile sensation. Some aspects of affective touch have been linked to a neurophysiologically specialised system, namely the C tactile (CT) system. While the role of this system for affiliation, social bonding and communication of emotions have been investigated, less is known about the potential role of affective touch in the awareness of the body as our own, i.e. as belonging to our psychological 'self'. This thesis attempted to contribute to the knowledge on affective touch and its relation to body awareness, by exploring the potential role of this modality to the way we perceive and make sense of our body as our own. Specifically, this work aimed to advance the current state of knowledge by investigating: 1) the effect of affective touch on the sense of body ownership, which is a fundamental aspect of body awareness; 2) the relation between interoceptive modalities, originating both internally (i.e. cardiac awareness) and peripherally (i.e. affective touch), and exteroception in body awareness; 3) the effect of intranasal oxytocin on the perception of affective touch and bodily awareness; 4) the perception and social modulation of affective touch in psychiatric patients who show difficulties in body awareness, namely patients with Anorexia Nervosa, and 5) the modulating role of self-other distinction and of self-other relation in the perception of affective touch and body awareness. In a first experiment (N = 52) the rubber hand illusion paradigm was used to investigate the role played by CT-optimal, affective touch in the sense of body ownership. The results showed that slow, pleasant touch enhanced the experience of embodiment in comparison to faster, neutral touch, suggesting that affective touch might uniquely contribute to the sense of body ownership. The following study (N = 75), used a similar methodology to test whether interoceptive sensitivity as measured by a heartbeat counting task would modulate the extent to which affective touch influences the multisensory process taking place during the rubber hand illusion. The results could not confirm a systematic relation between interoceptive sensitivity and the perception of affective touch, nor its influence on body ownership. The next study (N = 41) included a double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomised, cross-over design testing the effect of intranasal oxytocin on the perception of affective touch and body ownership, as measured by means of the rubber hand illusion. There was no evidence supporting the hypothesis that intranasal oxytocin could influence the CT system as tested in this study. The next study (N = 55) applied some of the above methodologies to investigate the perception of CT-optimal touch in patients with anorexia nervosa and its emotional modulation by top-down factors. The results confirmed the hypothesis that people with anorexia nervosa show a reduced perception of affective touch compared to healthy controls, but its perception was not influenced by top-down affective modulation, in the sense that both patients and healthy controls perceived touch as more pleasant when presented concurrently with positive facial expressions compared to neutral and negative faces. Finally, the last two studies (N = 76 and 35 healthy volunteers, respectively) focused on the relationship between affective touch and body awareness in the context of social cognition. These studies used both online and offline social modulation paradigms to investigate the role of self-other distinction and of self-other relation in the perception of affective touch. The results showed that positive top-down social information can enhance the perceived pleasure of tactile stimulation. Taken together, these studies point to the central role of affective touch in body awareness and social cognition. Finally, they also pave the way for future studies examining the role of disruptions of the CT system in the development of neuropsychiatric impairments of body awareness and social cognition.

A l’heure où la réforme du droit des obligations semble imminente, l'expansion de la responsabilité civile et l'identification des dangers qui lui sont attachés s'affiche comme un sujet récurrent en doctrine. La crainte d'un enrayement de notre système invite alors à réfléchir aux moyens propres à circonscrire l'étendue du droit de la réparation. L'intérêt protégé est parfois envisagé au titre de ces outils de rationalisation. Issu des droits étrangers, il suscite cependant autant d'enthousiasme que de méfiance en droit français. Les réticences s'estompent lorsqu'on observe que l'intérêt protégé pourrait constituer un instrument utile à la redéfinition des conditions de la responsabilité civile que sont la faute et le préjudice. Actuellement fuyantes, ces conditions ne permettent qu'un filtrage imparfait' des demandes en réparation. La précision de leur signification, par référence à la notion d'intérêt protégé, réhabiliterait la dimension sélective de telles exigences. L'attrait de l'intérêt protégé pourrait également se révéler au stade de l'analyse du mode de structuration de la responsabilité civile. Aujourd'hui organisé autour de la summa divisio des responsabilités contractuelle et délictuelle, notre droit laisse progressivement place à la mise en œuvre d'une protection différenciée des intérêts. Assumée, repensée, cette hiérarchisation des intérêts pourrait porter une rude concurrence à la distinction traditionnelle des ordres contractuel et délictuel, jusqu'à, peut-être, la faire disparaître. / The concept of "protected interests", which is well-known in many legal systems such as German or English law, is still widely ignored in French tort law. However, a recent concern has emerged in France, relating to the increasing scope of tortious liability. This is why it appears necessary to pay special attention to the tools which could help to reduce this scope of protection. Firstly, the concept of "protected interests" could be used as a way to clarify the definition of the conditions of liability, especially damage and fault. As French courts have sometimes suggested, the definition of damage could be specified by considering that it consists in the lesion of a protected interest, that is legitimate, personal and serious. The definition of fault could also be improved so as to include the concept of protected interests, through the implementation, in our legal system, of "la théorie de la relativité aquilienne" (scope of the rule theory). Thus, these two requirements could become a mean to "keep the floodgates shut". Secondly, the concept of protected interests could be used to reorganize the system of tort law. Indeed, it seems highly desirable to recognize the existence of a hierarchy between the various categories of protected interests, which is, for now, quite rudimentary. Should such a model be adopted, it could then challenge the summa divisio between tortious and contractual liabilities, on which the whole system currently rests.

On n’entre pas dans le champ de la philosophie comme on entre dans un lieu clos et bien délimité. Toutes les questions philosophiques font signe vers un ailleurs, une terre inconnue qui reste à découvrir et que personne n’a encore foulée. Plus encore que toutes les autres, la question du "moi" dérange la tentative visant à intégrer toutes les réponses dans un champ strictement balisé et fermé. Comme Bergson l’avait bien souligné, on ne domine intellectuellement que ce qui est inerte et statique, et on n’explique que ce qui a déjà eu lieu. Or, si c’est à l’extérieur du moi que se donne à voir l’inerte et le statique, c’est précisément parce que le moi apparaît et surgit dans le monde comme un mouvement d’arrachement et de dépassement de tout ce qui est. Parce qu’il n’est pas seulement le corrélat de l’objet et qu’il ne peut pas ignorer ce qu’il doit à un déracinement originaire, le sujet constitue en conséquence l’ultime problème de la philosophie. La solution serait de dévoiler ou d’instaurer dans le monde un ordre des choses suffisamment admirable pour permettre au moi de ne plus éprouver le sentiment d’y être de trop. Il y aurait donc au moins deux manières d’aborder la question « Devenir soi-même » : soit en allant dans la direction d’un apaisement par la médiation d’un consentement à un ordre, soit, au contraire, en insistant sur la rupture et l’idée d’un exil irréparable. L’ambiguïté de la question tient cependant au fait qu’il n’est pas possible d’éliminer l’une des deux perspectives. S’il y a eu déchirement, c’est sur fond d’unité ; on a donc commencé par consentir. Mais si la question de savoir ce que nous allons faire de nous-mêmes se pose, c’est parce que nous avons été arrachés à nous-mêmes. L’arrachement à soi désigne l’état d’inadéquation et de division du moi. L’expérience montre néanmoins que cette inadéquation, qui engendre le désir de se fonder soi-même, est le plus souvent occultée par le moi. La pression sociale, l’imitation, les habitudes, le goût du bonheur ont raison de ce désir. Nous aspirons à devenir nous-mêmes, mais nous n’en prenons pas le risque ; nous mettons nos pas dans ceux de nos prédécesseurs, nous jouons les rôles que l’on attend de nous. La question « Devenir soi-même » ne s’impose ainsi dans sa radicalité qu’à ceux que hante le souvenir d’une rupture à laquelle ils accordent le sens d’une « expérience-première ». Plutôt que de s’abandonner au cours des choses, celle-ci les incite à se reprendre et à tenter d’inaugurer leur propre voie. Il y a un au-delà de la « dynamique de la vie » ; à partir de celle-ci, une autre est en effet possible : la « dynamique de l’existence » qui relève de la responsabilité de chacun. On ne devient soi-même qu’en se jetant à ses risques et périls dans la seconde, c'est-à-dire en s’efforçant d’être cause de soi. Pour cela, il est besoin de s’éloigner. Mais s’éloigner ne signifie pas se perdre. La volonté d’errer qui anime le moi désireux de se fonder lui-même n’est pas suicidaire. Le moi est ainsi confronté à deux difficultés majeures. Sur le plan intellectuel : il doit rester accessible ; autrement-dit, si ce qu’il entreprend n’est pas à la portée de tous, la figure qu’il dessine doit néanmoins avoir du sens et être en mesure de séduire d’autres hommes. Sur le plan moral : il doit résister à l’opinion commune qui veut que l’individu se comprenne en termes de « partie » et non en termes de « personne séparée ». Le projet consistant à tenter de « devenir soi-même » traduit l’ambiguïté du surgissement de la subjectivité humaine dans le monde. Il s’agit au moins autant de s’exposer à l’Altérité sous toutes ses formes que de la vaincre et de la soumettre. Son but n’a pas de visée pragmatique. Que l’humanité s’en trouve renforcée ou mieux préparée à affronter l’avenir n’est pas l’essentiel. Toujours différente, chaque tentative incarne une figure qui, à la manière d’une étoile, brille simplement dans le silence de la nuit. / Philosophy is not a clearly bounded and closed field. All philosophical questions point towards an elsewhere, an unknown land that remains to be discovered and where no one has yet set foot. More than any other question, the question of the “self” upsets attempts to integrate all answers in a rigorously defined and closed space. As Bergson clearly emphasised, it is only possible to master intellectually that which is inert and static, and only what has already taken place can be explained. Now, if it is outside the self that the inert and the static are to be found, it is precisely because the self appears and arises in the world as a process of uprooting and going beyond all that is. Because it is not just an objective correlative and because it cannot ignore what it owes to a primary uprooting, the self constitutes, as a consequence, the ultimate problem of philosophy.The solution to the problem of the self would be to reveal or establish in the world an order of things sufficiently admirable as to allow it to do away with the feeling of being superfluous. There would therefore be at least two ways of approaching the question of “becoming oneself” : either by moving towards a pacification through accepting an order, or conversely by insisting on the idea of a split and an irreversible exile. However the ambiguity of the question is due to the impossibility of getting rid of one of the two competing viewpoints. If there has been a split, it is from an initial unity ; one has begun then with acceptance. But if the question arises of knowing what we are going to do with ourselves, it is because we have become uprooted from our selves. The uprooting of the self refers to the state of inadequacy and splitting of the self. Nevertheless experience shows that this state, which engenders the desire to rely on oneself alone, is most frequently concealed by the self. Social pressure, imitation, habit, the search for happiness overcome this desire. We aspire to become ourselves, but choose not to take the risk ; we follow in the footsteps of our forebears; we act out the roles that are expected of us.The question of “becoming one’self” only imposes itself so starkly in those who are haunted by the memory of a split that they interpret as a “self transforming primary experience”. Rather than going with the flow of things, this split goads them to react and try to set their own course. Beyond the “dynamics of life”; there is another : the “dynamics of existence”, which depends on individual responsibility. On can only become oneself through taking the risk of plunging into the latter, that is by striving to be the cause of oneself. To do so, it is necessary to withdraw. But withdrawing doesn’t mean losing oneself. The will to wander, which drives the self that wishes to forge itself, is not suicidal. The self is thereby faced with two major difficulties. On the intellectual level, it must remain “readable”; in other words, even if what it undertakes is not accessible to everyone, the figure that it draws must nevertheless make sense and be able to entice others. On the moral level, it must withstand the common opinion that the individual be understood as a “part” and not as a “separate person”.The project of trying to “become oneself” expresses the ambiguity of the sudden irruption of human subjectivity into the world. It is as much a question of exposing oneself to Otherness in all its forms as of vanquishing and subduing it. Its aim has no pragmatic goal. That the human race finds itself strengthened or better prepared to face future challenges is not what is essential. Always different, each new attempt embodies a figure which, like a star, shines simply in the silence of the night.

Longtemps considéré comme un sujet secondaire de la protection sociale, l’ancien combattantest une conception originale du XIXe siècle qui recense des difficultés de définition. A la foisun et multiple, sa place au sein de la cité s’inscrit dans les pratiques traditionnelles de charitéet d’assistance publique. Le contexte particulier de la perte des provinces de l’Alsace et d’unepartie de la Lorraine en fait pourtant un acteur exceptionnel.Avec le déclenchement de la Première Guerre mondiale et l’hécatombe humaine qu’elleentraîne, la perception de l’ancien combattant se concrétise et trouve une expression juridiquequi fait de lui un héros et un citoyen responsable et pacifiste. Entouré de puissantesassociations, il concourt à donner une impulsion morale à la société.Le cadre girondin est à ce titre intéressant pour une analyse de la notion d’ancien combattant,car ce nouveau sujet de droit active des mécanismes locaux de réinsertion sociale innovante. / Regarded as a secondary holder of social protection for a long time, the Veteran is an originalnotion of the nineteenth century which is difficult to define because it can refer to both orindividual and a group of individuals. His place in the town depends on traditional practicesof charity and state care.The particular context of the loss of Alsace provinces and a part of Lorraine made him,nevertheless, an exceptional actor. With the sparking off World War the first and its slaughter,the notion of veteran becomes more precise and gets as a juridical definition which wakes hima hero and a responsible and pacifist citizen. With the help of powerful associations, hecontributes to giving a moral impetus to society.The analysis of the notion of veteran in the girondist context is therefore interesting becausethis new holder of rights set going innovative local mechanisms of social rehabilitation.

Parfois occultée, longtemps étouffée, l’interrogation sur l’identité juridique de la subvention s’avère indispensable dans un contexte de confusion de celle-ci avec la notion de commande publique. Pour l’isoler de ce « genre » voisin et lui fournir une identité propre, un seul trait distinctif paraît opératoire : sa qualité de don public ou, pour emprunter un vocabulaire plus civiliste, son titre gratuit. La recherche des deux éléments utilisés en droit privé pour identifier un tel acte s’avère concluante, et plus encore, révèle la spécificité de cet objet en droit public. L’intention libérale s’articule de manière originale avec l’intérêt général, et dresse la subvention en véritable donation avec charges de droit public. Le don public, avec son lot de spécificités, vient ensuite façonner les règles applicables à la subvention, pour lui offrir un véritable régime juridique, cohérent et compréhensible. L’octroi de la subvention s’avère régulé par l’intérêt général, et la mise en œuvre de cet acte, gouvernée par sa nature conditionnelle. La subvention est un don public, et se trouve régie comme telle. C’est à la faveur d’une rencontre de la valeur heuristique du don qu’elle a pu être saisie / The issue of the legal definition of grant has long been blotted out and constrained. Nowadays, in a context of confusion between this notion with the closely related notion of public procurement, it is more than necessary to tackle it. A single distinctive feature seems efficient to isolate itself from this nearby type: its very nature of public gift or, to employ the French “civil law” terminology, its quality of “gratuitous act”. The research for the two elements used in French private law to identify such an act proves to be conclusive. Furthermore, it reveals the specificity of this item in public law. Animus donandi can originally be combined with general interest, and this raises grant as a real gift with charges of public law. Public gift, as specific as it is, fashions the rules applied to grants. It provides this notion with a genuine legal status, which turns out to be consistent and intelligible. The funding mechanism is ruled by the concept of general interest, and its implementation is governed by its conditional quality. Grants proves to be a public gift, and it is ruled as such. This conclusion couldn’t have been reached without meeting with the heuristic value of the concept of public gift

The diploma thesis deals with evaluation of the financial situation of the company Geoindustrie s.r.o. during the years 2006 – 2009. Using selected methods of financial analysis evaluates financial health of the company. On the basis of these methods formulates possible proposals to improvement of its financial situation.

This diploma thesis focuses on the evaluation of the financial situation of the company ProMedica spol. s r.o., which is achieved through the tools of situational and financial analysis, and on the basis of this evaluation, proposals are further formulated to improve financial health and increase competitiveness.

This thesis describes the financial situation of company fortell s.r.o. in the years of 2008–2012 and identifies the weaknesses. The financial and strategic analysis was used. The company values are compared with the recommended results and averages in the same area. Included in the thesis are suggestions and recommendations which could lead to better financial health of the company.