<p>The paper explores theoretical shortcomings in the egalitarian theory by John Rawls and provides a complementary view on the problem of morally arbitrary contingencies. The conception of natural lottery, which Rawls presents to signify the starting range of morally arbitrary inequalities, falls short in philosophical grounding. According to critics, the notion of natural lottery appeals to the philosophical conception of moral luck which undermines ascription of moral responsibility. Since moral responsibility is a basic prerequisite for egalitarian justice, the appeal to morally arbitrary contingencies of the natural lottery may be self-defeating for the theory.</p><p>Criticizing Rawls’s approach to morally arbitrary contingencies Susan Hurley investigates philosophical groundings for judgment of moral responsibility. Philosophical inquiries into moral luck differentiate four categories of luck and expose the difficulties of ascription of moral responsibility for it. The conception of moral luck implies epistemological shortcomings in the rational judgment of moral responsibility. Hurley claims that ascription of moral responsibility requires another logical strategy.</p><p>The critical discussion by Norman Daniels refers to another egalitarian theory by Ronald Dworkin which suggests ascription of moral responsibility on a gradual scale. The theory divides the naturally contingent recourses into categories of brute luck and option luck. This strategy stratifies normative standards of responsibility by the criteria of individual choice and circumstances.</p><p>Considering the strategy of gradual ascription of responsibility, I suggest to apply a moral developmental perspective as an additional outlook on the moral responsibility in egalitarian theory. The theory of moral development by Lawrence Kohlberg provides an explanation of a gradual development of moral responsibility through a natural order of developmental stages. It stratifies the moral responsibility into a hierarchical model of measurement and systematizes the order of normative standards.</p>

In British Columbia (BC) foresters registered with the Association of BC Forest Professionals (ABCFP) have been given the exclusive right to practise professional forestry. As with all professions there is an expectation that Registered Professional Foresters (RPFs) conduct their activities in an ethical manner and are therefore obligated to act as an ethical agent on behalf of society regarding forest resources. If a certain level of ethical agency is desired of professionals we need to understand whether or not an RPF possesses the ability (defined as their discretion) to sufficiently fulfil this responsibility. Rule-based and principle-based standards of forest management, an RPF’s scope of practice, and the socio-political framework of public forest management in BC all come together to define an RPF’s discretionary context, which sets the limits to an RPF’s discretion. This context is highly idiosyncratic to a specific situation or decision and this makes the RPF’s discretion similarly idiosyncratic. This suggests that an RPF should not be accountable for a standard of ethical agency that does not reflect the context-dependent level of discretion they possess. Fifteen interviews of RPFs were conducted for this study to discuss their approach to ethical decision making. The analysis of the interviews revealed 12 major themes, several of which appear to be highly idiosyncratic to the situations described by the participants. The way these themes were perceived by the participants revealed the differences in the discretionary context of their situations. Several aspects of ethical deliberation emerged from the data that appear to be particular to broad employer categories, including delegated decision-making (government), economic and forest health considerations (industry), and the tension between personal and professional values (consultants).

This thesis addresses the historic debate between natural law theorists and positivists. After providing a foundation for the debate by discussing the thirteenth century natural law theory of St. Thomas Aquinas and the criticisms of it by positivist philosopher John Austin, this thesis turns to the theory of H.L.A. Hart. My primary aim is to outline a defense of the soft positivism of H.L.A. Hart in face of the criticisms of Ronald Dworkin by appealing to two nonexclusive roots of moral principles in the law: justice and criminal law.

The paper explores theoretical shortcomings in the egalitarian theory by John Rawls and provides a complementary view on the problem of morally arbitrary contingencies. The conception of natural lottery, which Rawls presents to signify the starting range of morally arbitrary inequalities, falls short in philosophical grounding. According to critics, the notion of natural lottery appeals to the philosophical conception of moral luck which undermines ascription of moral responsibility. Since moral responsibility is a basic prerequisite for egalitarian justice, the appeal to morally arbitrary contingencies of the natural lottery may be self-defeating for the theory. Criticizing Rawls’s approach to morally arbitrary contingencies Susan Hurley investigates philosophical groundings for judgment of moral responsibility. Philosophical inquiries into moral luck differentiate four categories of luck and expose the difficulties of ascription of moral responsibility for it. The conception of moral luck implies epistemological shortcomings in the rational judgment of moral responsibility. Hurley claims that ascription of moral responsibility requires another logical strategy. The critical discussion by Norman Daniels refers to another egalitarian theory by Ronald Dworkin which suggests ascription of moral responsibility on a gradual scale. The theory divides the naturally contingent recourses into categories of brute luck and option luck. This strategy stratifies normative standards of responsibility by the criteria of individual choice and circumstances. Considering the strategy of gradual ascription of responsibility, I suggest to apply a moral developmental perspective as an additional outlook on the moral responsibility in egalitarian theory. The theory of moral development by Lawrence Kohlberg provides an explanation of a gradual development of moral responsibility through a natural order of developmental stages. It stratifies the moral responsibility into a hierarchical model of measurement and systematizes the order of normative standards.

In British Columbia (BC) foresters registered with the Association of BC Forest Professionals (ABCFP) have been given the exclusive right to practise professional forestry. As with all professions there is an expectation that Registered Professional Foresters (RPFs) conduct their activities in an ethical manner and are therefore obligated to act as an ethical agent on behalf of society regarding forest resources. If a certain level of ethical agency is desired of professionals we need to understand whether or not an RPF possesses the ability (defined as their discretion) to sufficiently fulfil this responsibility. Rule-based and principle-based standards of forest management, an RPF’s scope of practice, and the socio-political framework of public forest management in BC all come together to define an RPF’s discretionary context, which sets the limits to an RPF’s discretion. This context is highly idiosyncratic to a specific situation or decision and this makes the RPF’s discretion similarly idiosyncratic. This suggests that an RPF should not be accountable for a standard of ethical agency that does not reflect the context-dependent level of discretion they possess. Fifteen interviews of RPFs were conducted for this study to discuss their approach to ethical decision making. The analysis of the interviews revealed 12 major themes, several of which appear to be highly idiosyncratic to the situations described by the participants. The way these themes were perceived by the participants revealed the differences in the discretionary context of their situations. Several aspects of ethical deliberation emerged from the data that appear to be particular to broad employer categories, including delegated decision-making (government), economic and forest health considerations (industry), and the tension between personal and professional values (consultants).

Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales)

Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:48:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000410180-Texto+Parcial-0.pdf: 121592 bytes, checksum: e01ba0b7d2f79219d78c679fefe63ff8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / This work addresses some of the most important issues about judicial discretionary powers. Positivist perspectives are reviewed and it is suggested methods to surpass its doctrine, whose teachings have not been adequate enough to explain a plausible interpretation of Law. It is defended that the act of enforcing the law is unique and demands interpretation, comprehension and application of Law. Therefore, it is argued in this research that hermeneutical philosophy approach (GADAMER) is essential because the linguistic turning point has ceased traditional separation of subject and object, and it is understood that well-founded interpretation shall be present when both elements are put together. These issues have been framed from the debates between the law philosophers Herbert Hart and Ronald Dworkin. According to Herbert Hart, a soft positivist, it is allowed, in hard cases (based on problems of uncertainty about rights), to enforce rules in different manners, and the judge may use his creative power when facing the open texture of the rules. On the other hand, Ronald Dworkin denies discretionary powers to judges because they must give “the right answer” in all cases grounded on pre-existing moral principals. It is sustained in this research that the “right answer approach” (DWORKIN) is not compatible with democratic values in a constitutionally pluralistic community, and in every case the adjudicator must reach the “best answer” (JUAREZ FREITAS) among all possibilities. / Nesta dissertação questionamos alguns dos aspectos mais importantes da teoria da discricionariedade judicial. Criticamos e propomos a superação das posturas positivistas, as quais não se mostram adequadas para bem explicar o fenômeno da interpretação do direito. A idéia central é a defesa de que o ato aplicativo do direito é único e implica a interpretação, a compreensão e a aplicação do direito. Propomos, assim, que a abordagem da hermenêutica filosófica (GADAMER) é fundamental, pois a viragem lingüística rompeu com a tradicional separação entre o sujeito e o objeto, e se passou a entender que a boa interpretação somente ocorre na devida união entre ambos. A partir das discussões travadas pelos jusfilósofos Herbert Hart e Ronald Dworkin traçamos os contornos desta questão. Para Hart, um positivista brando, frente aos casos difíceis (baseados nos problemas da incerteza do direito), permite-se que as regras sejam aplicadas de diversas maneiras, e frente à textura aberta das regras o juiz irá dispor de seu poder de criação do direito. Por outro lado, Ronald Dworkin nega que o juiz tenha poder discricionário, pois em todo e qualquer caso tem a responsabilidade de encontrar a “resposta correta”, baseado nos princípios morais pré-existentes à decisão judicial. Defende-se, ao final, que a “única resposta correta” (DWORKIN) não corresponde aos ideais democráticos de uma sociedade constitucionalmente pluralista, e em todo caso o juiz deve procurar a “melhor resposta” (JUAREZ FREITAS) entre as possibilidades que estão à sua disposição.

Barn är sårbara och de behöver därför särskilt stöd och skydd. Att barnets bästa är något som ska tas i beaktande vid alla beslut som rör barn finns därför tydligt stadgat i både nationell och internationell rätt. Ett barn kan enligt svensk rätt inte ha fler än två rättsliga föräldrar. De barn som växer upp med fler än två föräldrar har därför en begränsad rätt till sina sociala föräldrar. Barnets rätt till sina sociala föräldrar aktualiseras framförallt ifall den ena rättsliga föräldern avlider eller om den rättsliga föräldern och den sociala föräldern skiljer sig. Faran är att barnet riskerar att tappa kontakten med en social förälder som betytt mycket under uppväxten. Med begreppet social förälder avses i denna uppsats en person som inte har ett genetiskt eller biologiskt band till barnet, men vars avsikt var att bli barnets förälder redan innan barnet föddes. Personen ska ha fullgjort föräldrafunktionen, det vill säga utövat vårdnadsansvar, under­hålls­­skyldighet och förmyndar­ansvar, allt sedan barnet kom till världen utan att ha några rättsliga förpliktelser. Utifrån nuvarande familjerättsliga reglering kan fyra möjliga alternativ urskönjas för att skydda barnets rätt till sina sociala föräldrar. De lösningar som lagstiftningen erbjuder för att skydda barnets rätt till sina sociala föräldrar är en möjlighet till umgänge, att utse en social förälder till ny vårdnadshavare ifall ordinarie vårdnadshavare avlider, att genomföra adoption samt att reglera vissa frågor genom avtal. Barn och sociala föräldrar har dock få och föga verkningsfulla juridiska lösningar att använda sig av om problem uppstår. Det finns all­varliga risker för barnet om det skiljs från sin sociala förälder och barnets bästa borde därför vara att ge barnet rätt till alla sina föräldrar. De lösningar som lag­stiftningen tillhandahåller är inte till­räckliga för att skydda barnets rätt till sina sociala föräldrar och svensk lagstiftning tillgodoser därför inte barnets bästa på ett tillfreds­ställande vis. Rätten består av en variation av rättsliga normer. Bland de rättsliga normerna återfinns såväl rättsregler som rättsprinciper. Dworkin analyserar i boken ”Taking rights seriously” från 1977 olika rätts­filosofiska problem. Han klassificerar rättsnormer i regler och principer för att sedan bland annat föra fram ”den mest välgrundade teorin”. Enligt Dworkin är en regel en antingen-eller-norm som antingen är tillämplig eller inte tillämplig och en ­princip en mer-eller-mindre-norm vars utmärkande egenskap är att den besitter en dimension av vikt. En fråga som återkommande diskuteras är om barnets bästa ska ses som en regel eller en princip. Barnet bästa är en rättsnorm med en mer-eller-mindre-funktion som besitter en dimen­sion av vikt och ska därför betraktas som en rättsprincip. Principer bygger på värderingar och återfinns på ett djupare plan i rättens struktur och är därmed inte lika föränderliga som regler. Dom­stolar har, enligt Dworkin, möjlighet att tillämpa principer trots att reglerna i ett fall kan vara entydiga. De principer som kan tillämpas av dom­stolarna är de principer som är en del av ”den mest välgrundade rättsteorin”. Vid en avvägnings­situation kan rättsregler underkastas rätts­principer. I dessa fall är det regelns underbyggande principer som får viktas mot andra principer i det aktuella fallet. Det är vid svåra fall som dom­stolarna ska göra denna principavvägning. Frågan om möjlighet till fler än två föräldrar har aktualiserats i en kanadensisk domstol. Domaren resonerade utifrån barnets bästa och menade att barnets bästa måste gå före lag­stiftningens ordalydelse. Domaren anlade ett barnperspektiv i domen och tog sin utgångs­punkt i det enskilda barnets förut­sättningar. Domen var en avvägning mellan olika principer. Prin­cipen om att behandla alla barn lik­värdigt och principen om barnet bästa vägde tyngre än under­byggande principer till de rätts­regler som begränsade antalet rättsliga föräldrar till två stycken. Med stöd av Dworkins teorier om domstolars möjlighet till skönsmässiga avgöranden finns det en öppning för svenska domstolar att besluta om fler än två rättsliga föräldrar om det är för barnets bästa. Om svenska domstolar gör en viktning mellan olika principer och låter principen om barnets bästa ligga till grund för sina beslut om vårdnad och umgänge kan barnets rätt till sina sociala föräldrar skyddas. Sammanfattningsvis har regleringen av barnets rätt till sina sociala föräldrar stora brister. Enligt oss skulle barn kunna få ett bättre skydd genom att domstolar låter principen om barnets bästa väga tyngst för att ge barn rätt till fler än två rättsliga föräldrar. / Children are vulnerable and need special support and protection. Therefore, both national, and international law clearly state that decisions concerning children should be made with respect to the best interest of the child. According to Swedish law, a child may not have more than two legal parents and may therefore have only limited legal right to a social parent. The legal right of a child to its social parent is primarily of concern in the event of death of one legal parent or if the legal parent and the social parent are divorced. There is a risk that the child loses contact with the social parent. The term social parent in this paper is a person without a genetic or biological tie to the child, but whose intention was to become the child's parent even before the birth. The person has completed the expected parental function ever since the birth without any legal obligations. Based on current family law, it is possible to identify four feasible options to protect the child's right to its social parent. These options are the opportunity to attend, to appoint a social parent to a new custodian in the event of death of an ordinary custodian, to conduct adoption and to regulate certain issues by agreement. However, children and their social parents lack effective solutions in case of legal issues. This poses a risks to the child if separated from its social parent and the best interests of the child would be to give the child a right to all of his or her parents. Swedish legislation is, as of today not designed to protect the child's right to its social parent, and does not adequately satisfy the best interests of the child. The laws consists of legal norms such as rules and legal principles. In 1977, Dworkin analyzed different legal-philosophical problems in the book "Taking Rights Seriously". He classifies legal norms as rules or principles in order to advance "a constitutional theory". According to Dworkin, rules are all-or-nothing-norms that are, or are not applicable, and prin­ciples are more-or-less-norms whose characteristic feature is the dimension of weight or impor­tance. In the light of Dworkin, the best interests of the child should be regarded as a legal norm with a more-or-less-function that has a dimension of weight or importance and therefore should be regarded as a legal principle. Principles are value based ​​and therefore on a deeper level in the legal structure with lesser mobility than rules. Judges have, according to Dworkin, the possibility to apply principles in cases even when the rules are seemingly unambiguous. In these hard cases, legal rules may be overruled by weighing the underlying principles of the rule against other principles relevant for the case. The issue of giving a child more than two legal parents has been settled by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Canada. The judge argued that the best interests of the child was superior to the wording of the legal rule. The judge assumed a child's perspective based on the individual child's prerequisites and argued that the principle of treating all children equally and the best interest of the child had greater importance than the supporting principles of the legal rules limiting the number of legal parents to two. Based on Dworkin's theories on courts' discretion, there is a possibility for Swedish courts to make a ruling on more than two legal parents if it is for the best interests of the child. If Swedish courts, when accounting for different principles, allow the principle of the best inte­rests of the child to be the basis for their decisions on custody and rights of access, the child's right to his social parents can be safeguarded. In conclusion, the regulation regarding the child's right to its social parents has major shortcomings. According to us, children could be protected in court by claiming superiority to the principle of the best interests of the child, thus giving children the right to more than two legal parents.

Esta dissertação tem como tema a guinada pragmática do juiz norte-americano Richard A. Posner e a aplicação de sua teoria da adjudicação pragmática aos casos difíceis. Para identificar o contexto em que se deu esta virada, apresentaremos em breve síntese a origem do pragmatismo nos Estados Unidos da América, suas implicações filosóficas e jurídicas para os paradigmas duais modernos, e sua influência no realismo jurídico. A virada linguística e da pós-modernidade darão forma a um neopragmatismo, cuja tônica será uma espécie de antifundacionalismo e antiteoria que será adotada por juristas a partir do final da década de 1980. Apresentado este cenário, adentrar-se-á ao trabalho de Richard Posner, destacando-se sua ascensão no movimento da Análise Econômica do Direito até que, influenciado por fragmentos das teorias enunciadas no primeiro capítulo e pelas críticas lançadas à redução do direito ao formalismo econômico, proporá uma releitura das possibilidades e dos limites da aplicação da economia ao direito, adotando uma abordagem mais abrangente e interdisciplinar, próxima ao pragmatismo jurídico. O pragmatismo de Posner terá como pilares a rejeição à autonomia do direito e a problemática da objetividade jurídica, fundamentada no consenso e na indeterminação mitigada do direito, que o levará a defender a impossibilidade de respostas certas aos casos difíceis e a incapacidade da filosofia moral auxiliar o direito. Posner oferecerá daí, uma visão própria de pragmatismo e razão prática, que constituirá o pragmatismo cotidiano e à teoria da adjudicação pragmática, sua relação com os métodos de outras áreas do conhecimento, com o formalismo e a concepção de razoabilidade, bem como a sua aplicação a um caso difícil. No terceiro e último capítulo deste trabalho, serão examinadas as dificuldades da proposta pragmática de Posner apontadas na crítica de Ronald Dworkin, sobretudo sobre o papel da objetividade no direito, a importância da filosofia moral na definição dos fins jurídicos e o perigo da transformação do empreendimento jurídico em um consequencialismo de regras. / This work proposes de analysis of the pragmatic turn of the American judge, Richard A. Posner and application of his theory of pragmatic adjudication to difficult cases. To identify the context in which this turn is given, we present in brief outline the origins of pragmatism in the United States of America, its philosophical implications and legal paradigms for modern dualisms, and its influence on legal realism. The linguistic turn and postmodernism will form a neo-pragmatism, whose keynote will be a kind of antifoundationalism and anti-theory that will be adopted by jurists from the late 1980\'s. Presented this scenario, we will enter into the work of Richard Posner, highlighting its emergence as a pioneer of the movement of Economic Analysis of Law until, influenced by fragments of the theories set out in the first chapter and reviews posted by the reduction of the right to economic formalism, propose a review of the possibilities and limits of application of economics, law, adopting a more comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach, the next legal pragmatism. The pillars of Posner\'s pragmatism will be the rejection of the autonomy of law and legal issues of objectivity, based on consensus and mitigated indeterminacy of law, which will lead to the adoption of the no-right answers thesis to difficult cases and the inability of moral theory to provide a solid basis for legal judgments. Posner then, offer a particular vision of pragmatism and practical reason, which constitute the everyday pragmatism and the theory of pragmatic adjudication, its relation with the methods of other areas of knowledge, with legal formalism and the concept of reasonableness, and its application to a difficult case. In the third and final chapter of this study will examine the difficulties of Posner\'s pragmatic proposal outlined in the critique of Ronald Dworkin, especially on the role of objectivity in the law, the importance of moral philosophy in defining the legal purposes and the danger of transformation of the enterprise legal in a rule-consequentialism.

Orientador: Roberto Romano da Silva / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-12T21:51:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DaweJunior_FrankTessier_M.pdf: 573061 bytes, checksum: c730e42f831cb4bdd67b40f7f0a3bc74 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Resumo: O presente trabalho se propõe a realizar uma análise da tese contida na obra O império do direito, de Ronald Dworkin, em que esse autor desenvolve uma teoria do direito baseada nas premissas da interpretação construtiva dos textos e práticas legais, e da integridade tanto moral quanto político-social, propondo-a como a melhor solução para o debate sobre o aperfeiçoamento das doutrinas jurídicas. A análise infere que há incompletude na primeira premissa e inconsistência na segunda, apresentando-se portanto a teoria elaborada pelo autor como não suficiente para seu propósito de servir de referência para as decisões jurídicas. Verifica-se, portanto, a existência de uma propensão ao engano tanto nas doutrinas jurídicas correntes quanto na própria tese de Dworkin, e o 'Gênio Maligno' do título refere-se à personagem fictícia e metafórica criada por Descartes, cuja função é justamente a de induzir-nos ao erro, numa clara referência aos equívocos conceituais que genericamente ocorrem na área da Justiça e do Direito / Abstract: This paper is designed to analyze the thesis produced by Ronald Dworkin in his book Law's Empire, where the author develops a theory of law that is based on the premises of (i) constructive interpretation of law texts and practices and (ii) moral, political and social integrity, and proposes that they are the best solution for the debate on the improvement of law doctrines. After an analysis, one can perceive that the first premise lacks completeness and the second consistency. Therefore, the theory set forth by the author is regarded as not sufficient to fulfill its purpose to be used as a reference for juridical decisions. One can identify that there is a tendency for inaccurate explanation of both current law doctrines and Dworkin's own thesis, while the Evil Genius in the title refers to a metaphor and fictitious character created by Descartes whose role is to induce readers to conceptual misconstructions as a reference to misinterpretations that usually take place in the areas of Justice and Law / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia