This thesis researches the world coffee and tea trade, especially their flows and trends in consumption and production and trade regulations that affect these flows. This paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter focuses on the world coffee and tea production, the economic benefits of these commodities for producing countries and the outlook for these markets. Another chapter deals with the coffee and tea market, the development of demand, supply and price is examined. This chapter is also dedicated to the concept of Fair Trade and to the forms of trading on examined markets. It is explained how the commodity exchange, tea auctions and trading on the basis of financial derivatives work. The last chapter investigates the forms of international regulations that have been requested by the global coffee and tea trade.

O objetivo deste trabalho foi analisar o mercado de concessões de prestação do serviço de transmissão de energia elétrica do Brasil. Essa concessão dura trinta anos e, se for considerado que houve muitos interessados em ganhar as concessões, para a maioria dos leilões realizados até 2005 o resultado dos leilões podem ser considerados um grande sucesso. Esses leilões são recentes, se iniciaram em 1999. Antes disso o setor passava por dificuldades de investimento. Após reformulação de algumas leis, o setor elétrico deixou de ser dependente de financiamentos governamentais. O setor privado começou a investir de forma controlada nesses projetos de grande porte e a obrigação do governo passou a ser o de fiscalizar e formular as leis do setor. Como houve muitos interessados em prestar o serviço público, os leilões foram a forma escolhida para decidir qual era a empresa mais eficiente. Os leilões são descendentes de primeiro preço em dois estágios em que o primeiro estágio é secreto em envelope fechado. Caso a diferença entre o menor valor e os outros lances seja menor do que 5%, o leilão passa para o segundo estágio que ocorre em viva-voz. Como o objeto leiloado é uma concessão, o valor que os participantes tem de decidir não é o preço a pagar, mas sim o valor da receita máxima que a concessionária aceitará receber para prestar o serviço. Uma das características da transmissão que determinou o tipo de regulação a ser utilizado foi o fato da transmissão de energia elétrica ser um monopólio natural, por isso o valor cobrado dos usuários deve ser controlado. O valor desse único lance contém as expectativas dos agentes sobre o valor dos custos estimados para prestar o serviço, contém também as expectativas de lucro possível, da probabilidade de vitória do leilão dada a concorrência etc. A análise deste trabalho se concentra nos leilões realizados no período de 1999 até 2005 em que ocorreram dez leilões com várias linhas sendo leiloadas em cada leilão. Para determinar o que tornou esse mercado tão interessante para as empresas privadas, foram consideradas as características de cada empresa. A característica mais importante é a interdependência. Essa interdependência permite custos menores quanto mais projetos de transmissão a empresa possui, por isso os resultados do leilão podem ser determinados por essa característica especial. Além dessa variável, foram consideradas a concorrência, a competitividade entre os participantes, o tipo de empresa, ou seja, em que setor a empresa possui especialidade na realização de projetos e o fato dos leilões serem seqüenciais. / This work analised the concession market of electricity transmission lines in Brazil. This market was recently created by a major restructuring in the regulation laws. The reason for this change was the investment crisis that the sector was going through before 1999. Those concessions are decided by an auction and lasts for thirty years. It has been considered a major success, due to the interest of many companies in acquiring this permits. The government no longer invested on it but instead decided de the laws to control the sector. One of the key changes in the diferent aspect of the regulation the participation of the private sector. Investments were no longer dependent on government for financial suport. This alteration made the market more competitive, eficient and lucrative. The auctions are classified as a descending first-price with two stages. The first stage is made with a sealed bid and in case the diference of the lowest bid and the other bids are less than 5%, the auction goes to the second stage with a oral auction. The object auctioned is a permit to provide a public service for a period o time, so this is the reason the auction is descending one. The bids made by the participants is the value of a maximum annual income permited by the regulator. The reason for this maximum is a result of the fact that this public service is a natural monopoly. It prevents the concessionare to take advantage over it´s clients by charging a high fee when they don´t have a choice of another provider of this service. When the participants of the auctions choose the value of the bid, this only bid contains all of their expectations of costs, profits, the probability of winning the auction when considering the competition etc. This work uses the data of all the auctions of transmission lines that happened between 1999 and 2005. in this period ocorred ten auctions, with many lines auctioned in each one. In order to determine what made this market so interesting for private companies some caracteristics of those companies were considered. The results of this study finds that the most important caracteristic is interdependencies. It allows lower costs the many concessions the company owns. This result is so powerful that sometimes it may determine the winner of the auction. Other variables analised were the competitiveness of this sequential auctions, the competitiveness of the participants, the kind of work the company is specialized in, as a real option when deciding what kind of company to participate, for exemple, in a joint venture, and the benefits of this decision.

「預測市場」以未來事件為交易標的，透過網路平台彙整即時資訊，運用價格來判斷未來事件的發展，此研究方法同時具有「適當獎懲」與「連續修正」兩項特性。 本研究以文獻分析途徑探究預測市場在不同交易機制下的運作方式與市場價格決定過程，並據此分析不同交易機制之間的差異與影響預測市場運作的因素；除此之外，本研究另以個案研究途徑來探討「連續雙向拍賣」與「市場計分法則」兩個交易機制在價格準確度、市場流動性、價格炒作、參與誘因與莊家風險之間的差異。 本研究發現：若交易機制是連續雙向拍賣，則「0-100型」合約價格的預測準確度較高；若交易機制是市場計分法則，則「落點預測型」合約價格的預測準確度較高。連續雙向拍賣機制具有市場流動性不足的問題；市場計分法則機制面臨莊家風險的危機且不適用於市場競爭度高的環境；而上述兩種交易機制皆會出現價格炒作的現象。 / “Prediction market” is a research method based on immediate information collecting and organizing on the internet platform. With future events as the object of transaction, variations of the price of each transaction thus immediately provide the prediction of the development of future events. Therefore, this method has two properties including “appropriate incentives” and “continuous correction”. In this study, document analysis is first conducted to review the operation modes of different trading mechanisms for prediction markets and the process of price making. Accordingly, differences between trading mechanisms and the factors that affect the operation of prediction market will also be analyzed. Furthermore, comparisons of the price accuracy, market liquidity, price speculation, incentives and maker risks between "continuous double auction" and "market scoring rule" are discussed in case study. The findings of this study: if the trading mechanism is “continuous double auction”, the price accuracy of “winner-take-all” contract is higher; if the trading mechanism is “market scoring rules”, the price accuracy of “index” contract is higher. There exists insufficient market liquidity in “continuous double auction;” while in “market scoring rule,” there exists maker risks and it is hard to be applied in highly competitive market. The phenomenon of price speculation exits in both trading mechanisms.

<p>Background: The origin of this study was the negotiations around a EU takeover directive, aimed at making the market for corporate control more open. One of the proposals was to neutralise shares carrying multiple rights in takeover situations when a potential acquirer obtains 75% of the total share capital. For many Swedish ownership groups, this would mean that the system of unequal voting rights, constituting an important defense to their control, would decrease in effectiveness. In the middle of writing this thesis, an EU agreement was finally reached, making the proposal voluntary to adopt. The imminent threat posed to the Swedish system faded, but has though not disappeared since the present rules anew will be brought under inspection in five years. </p><p>Purpose: To give examples on potential tactics to adopt if unequal voting rights would risk to become neutralised in takeover situations, these tactics dependent on two different scenarios: (1) Present Swedish ownership structure is considered advantageous for the country and thus to be remained or (2) A more open market for takeovers is desired. Course of action: Interviews have been conducted with parties within Swedish trade and industry, partly in order to assess the value and necessity of the content of this thesis. </p><p>Conclusion: The threat of an abolition of the unequal voting rights is not perceived as imminent by parties within Swedish trade and industry and few alternative resistance strategies are suggested. If current Swedish ownership structure is to be remained, the author proposes competition-reducing defenses, if a more open market for takeovers is aimed for, auction-inducing resistance strategies. The choice of how to proceed should depend on how afraid the Swedish Government and Swedish companies are of a change in present ownership structure.</p>

Background: The origin of this study was the negotiations around a EU takeover directive, aimed at making the market for corporate control more open. One of the proposals was to neutralise shares carrying multiple rights in takeover situations when a potential acquirer obtains 75% of the total share capital. For many Swedish ownership groups, this would mean that the system of unequal voting rights, constituting an important defense to their control, would decrease in effectiveness. In the middle of writing this thesis, an EU agreement was finally reached, making the proposal voluntary to adopt. The imminent threat posed to the Swedish system faded, but has though not disappeared since the present rules anew will be brought under inspection in five years. Purpose: To give examples on potential tactics to adopt if unequal voting rights would risk to become neutralised in takeover situations, these tactics dependent on two different scenarios: (1) Present Swedish ownership structure is considered advantageous for the country and thus to be remained or (2) A more open market for takeovers is desired. Course of action: Interviews have been conducted with parties within Swedish trade and industry, partly in order to assess the value and necessity of the content of this thesis. Conclusion: The threat of an abolition of the unequal voting rights is not perceived as imminent by parties within Swedish trade and industry and few alternative resistance strategies are suggested. If current Swedish ownership structure is to be remained, the author proposes competition-reducing defenses, if a more open market for takeovers is aimed for, auction-inducing resistance strategies. The choice of how to proceed should depend on how afraid the Swedish Government and Swedish companies are of a change in present ownership structure.

Game theory and mechanism design have emerged as an important tool to model, analyze,and solve decentralized design problems involving multiple agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. Some examples of these design problems include: auctions and markets in electronic commerce; network economics; dynamic pricing; routing protocols in wireless networks; resource allocation in computational grids; algorithms for selfish agents;etc. The motivation for this doctoral work springs from the high level of current interest indesigning innovative mechanisms for solving emerging game theoretic problems in the area of electronic commerce. In this thesis, we focus on three such problems and advance the current art in mechanism design while developing new, innovative mechanisms to solve the problems. The first problem we explore is the highly strategic problem of forming a high value E-business supply chain by choosing the best mix of supply chain partners. In our research, we formulate the supply chain formation problem as a mechanism design problem in a generic wayand show that the well known VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanisms provide an apt frame-work for solving this problem. We provide a compelling example of a three stage automotive distribution network to illustrate the power and e±cacy of the proposed methodology. The second problem we model and solve is that of designing a revenue maximizing sponsored search auction. This is a problem that is faced by every Internet search engine, such as Google,MSN, and Yahoo!, whenever it receives a search query. In our research, we take a comprehensivelook at existing auction mechanisms for this problem. Our work leads to an innovative new auction mechanism, which we call OPT (optimal mechanism), that exhibits a superior level ofperformance. The proposed mechanism extends, in a non-trivial way, the well known Myersonoptimal auction to the specific setting of sponsored search auctions. The proposed mechanism maximizes the revenue to the search engine and also satisfies two crucial properties, Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality. The third contribution is in respect of Stackelberg problems, which are game theoretic problems that involve hierarchical and sequential decision making. By focusing attention on an important subclass of these problems, namely the Single-Leader-Rest-Followers (SLRF) problems, we extend all relevant aspects of classical mechanism design theory to the case of SLRF problems. We derive many important results in respect of procurement auctions with reserve prices using the developed theory. The research carried out as part of this doctoral work, we believe, advances the current art in mechanism design while developing innovative mechanisms to solve those problems.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

We have entered the age of big data. Massive datasets are now common in science, government and enterprises. Yet, making sense of these data remains a fundamental challenge. Where do we start our analysis? Where to go next? How to visualize our findings? We answers these questions by bridging Data Mining and Human- Computer Interaction (HCI) to create tools for making sense of graphs with billions of nodes and edges, focusing on: (1) Attention Routing: we introduce this idea, based on anomaly detection, that automatically draws people’s attention to interesting areas of the graph to start their analyses. We present three examples: Polonium unearths malware from 37 billion machine-file relationships; NetProbe fingers bad guys who commit auction fraud. (2) Mixed-Initiative Sensemaking: we present two examples that combine machine inference and visualization to help users locate next areas of interest: Apolo guides users to explore large graphs by learning from few examples of user interest; Graphite finds interesting subgraphs, based on only fuzzy descriptions drawn graphically. (3) Scaling Up: we show how to enable interactive analytics of large graphs by leveraging Hadoop, staging of operations, and approximate computation. This thesis contributes to data mining, HCI, and importantly their intersection, including: interactive systems and algorithms that scale; theories that unify graph mining approaches; and paradigms that overcome fundamental challenges in visual analytics. Our work is making impact to academia and society: Polonium protects 120 million people worldwide from malware; NetProbe made headlines on CNN, WSJ and USA Today; Pegasus won an opensource software award; Apolo helps DARPA detect insider threats and prevent exfiltration. We hope our Big Data Mantra “Machine for Attention Routing, Human for Interaction” will inspire more innovations at the crossroad of data mining and HCI.

I have developed a multiagent system platform that provides a valuable complement to the alternative research methods. The platform facilitates the development of heterogeneous agents in complex environments. The first application of the multiagent system is to the study of sealed-bid auctions with two-dimensional value signals from pure private to pure common value. I find that several auction outcomes are significantly nonlinear across the two-dimensional value signals. As the common value percent increases, profit, revenue, and efficiency all decrease monotonically, but they decrease in different ways. Finally, I find that forcing revelation by the auction winner of the true common value may have beneficial revenue effects when the common-value percent is high and there is a high degree of uncertainty about the common value. The second application of the multiagent system is to the study of English auctions with two-dimensional value signals using agents that learn a signal-averaging factor. I find that signal averaging increases nonlinearly as the common value percent increases, decreases with the number of bidders, and decreases at high common value percents when the common value signal is more uncertain. Using signal averaging, agents increase their profit when the value is more uncertain. The most obvious effect of signal averaging is on reducing the percentage of auctions won by bidders with the highest common value signal. The third application of the multiagent system is to the study of the optimal payment rule in Treasury auctions using Canadian rules. The model encompasses the when-issued, auction, and secondary markets, as well as constraints for primary dealers. I find that the Spanish payment rule is revenue inferior to the Discriminatory payment rule across all market price spreads, but the Average rule is revenue superior. For most market-price spreads, Uniform payment results in less revenue than Discriminatory, but there are many cases in which Vickrey payment produces more revenue.

主管機關於發照機制之選擇及其執照核發決定，不僅是滲透到無線廣電產業管制架構的每一處縫隙，也反映出社會價值之優先序位。 從上個世紀以來，解除管制、數位科技與匯流現象高度衝擊了過去以執照為核心的無線廣電管制體系，也引發了一波管制革新之需求。形式上，無線廣電服務與電台執照是一系列權利義務與一套法律程序之化身，但從其功能面來看，執照之核發寓含至少有「註冊登記，分類管理」、「資源分配」、「限制市場參進與競爭」、「費用徵納」及「行為監管」等多元之目標功能。在英美，無線廣電執照之核發反映出該國無線廣電體系之社會角色定位，也反應出不同廣電體系下執照釋出及其頻率核配方式與結果之影響；管制革新也同樣令其重新認知了傳統執照制度中課予廣電業者公益義務之價格問題。 拍賣法在廣電頻譜及經營特許之應用上，除有先例可循外，亦被認為將可以矯正過去傳統以命令與控制模式支配下之執照核發制度之缺失，並將因此增加頻譜使用效率、提升全體福祉。本文因此透過英美等國之制度規範與經驗之分析，來檢驗此一說法。期待藉由瞭解拍賣法及其相關特殊背景下運作之優劣得失，及晚近崛起之相關替選方案，能提供未來政策制訂者在商業廣電執照管理之改革議題上有更豐富的視野。 儘管拍賣法在無線通訊領域應用上，現階段看來有相當誘人的成果，但本文認為，無線廣電事業有其特殊性，傳統頻率指配結合營業特許之執照體系，在使用拍賣法上，將可能產生近用、市場競爭、使用效率、內容多元等目標上無一討好之結果。再者，要達成自由市場或市場模式追求之效率目標，也並非單純使用拍賣法即可；相關配套措施之施行，同樣不可或缺。再者，我國無線廣電體制與英美更有不同，因此如何避免出現主管機關缺乏落實政策目標之能力，至關重要。 目前我國無線商業廣電執照核發制度之問題，可說在頻譜與內容管制雙重目標間迷失；問題焦點並不在於拍賣或審議制的二選一習題上，而應是致力於明確化分配標準、公開透明的競爭程序。此外，在引入市場機制於執照制度、期能促進效率與效能之同時，如何平衡執照管理中的私益與公益問題，仍是數位匯流時代無線廣電執照管理議題之核心。 / The authority's choice of a licensing mechanism and decisions thereof not only permeate nearly the entire regulatory fabric of our broadcast industries, but reflect our society's priorities. Licensing, nominally, is a mutual promise by the legal procedure; moreover, it is also about the registration, limited competition, distribution of resourses, charges, and the code of conduct. Since last century, broadcast laws and regulations have been bombarded with deregulation, digitization, and convergence, and that is conglomerated to push the reform of broadcast licensing. Simultaneously, the communications revolution, like U.K. or U.S., has thrown into question the value of imposing public interest obligations on radio and television broadcasters. Broadcast licensing seems to be so daunting that some people anoint a few constituencies with very pressing appeals, give them special leverage, and throw everything else back on the market. The auction apologists would argue that the government should set clear and definite standards and tough performance requirements to ensure that good systems and service will result, whoever is the highest bidder. In a pure auction era, where dollars are equated with public worth and maximizing dollars will be the most important criterion, there will be strong pressure to also base allocation and allotment decisions on this standard. The merit of auctions in wireless communications licensing may be conspicuous, but the broadcast industry is unique and more complicated so that the change of a licensing mechanism, from the marketplace approach, could be made that a revised public interest standard and obligations failed to address the fundamental challenge--to reassess the power of the regulator when implementing the public interest obligations. Auctions of radio spectrum or broadcasting concession, in other words, will generate their own serious problems that should not be underestimated or denied. On broadcast licensing of Taiwan, auctions will not be the life buoy to predicaments of broadcast industries; on the contrary, a top priority is to enhance the clearness and definition, transparency, and fair competition, whether the authority prefers imitating an auction to innovating the traditional selection procedure, beauty contest, through a more competitive approach or not. Besides, we shall inspecting the key point of whether or not competition and the public interest are compatible in the ongoing dialectic still, continuing to struggle toward a balance between private initiative and public oversight.