The role of biraderi kinship networks has recently gained attention in U.K. elections. Biraderis are patriarchal and hierarchical kinship networks that are led by male elders and originate from Pakistan and Bangladesh. These networks have been accused of influencing selections and elections through bloc votes. Existing research into the actions and implications of biraderi in U.K. politics has examined these networks in isolation. To further understand and contextualise the actions and implications of biraderi networks in U.K. politics, I compare them to trade union networks. Trade unions are paid membership networks in which groups of employees take collective action to maintain and improve employment conditions. Using my two case studies, I focus on the Labour Party and ask two questions. Firstly, what are the implications of network influence for electoral choice? Secondly, are the actions of biraderi networks, and the implications of these actions, different to other networks? And if so, why? I use a combination of qualitative and quantitative data in the process of this inquiry. In chapter three, I use the analysis of 37 interviews with political and community activists to introduce biraderi networks and present their role in the selection and election of political representatives. In chapter four I use the same data to contextualise the role of biraderi and examine the relationship between biraderi networks and the Labour Party. In chapter five, I introduce trade union networks and use the analysis of 16 interviews with MPs, political activists and trade unionists to outline three aspects of the role that trade unions take in the selection and election processes: the legitimate aspect, the controversial aspect and the idealised aspect. In chapter six, the final empirical chapter, I ask which candidates receive support from trade unions. I build upon an existing dataset to analyse financial and in-kind trade union donations to the Labour Party. I find that biraderi and trade union networks both, to some extent, carry out five actions in the selection and election of political representatives: providing political education; providing financial and in-kind support; providing campaigners in selections and elections; selecting candidates; supporting the under-represented. I find that the implications of these five actions for voter choice are two-fold. On the one hand, networks can increase voter choice by providing political education and support to candidates who might not otherwise be able to stand for election. On the other hand, I find that networks can reduce electoral choice. Through a combination of legal and illegal actions, when elders control votes biraderi networks can at best restrict electoral choice and at worst remove it entirely. Although these networks carry out the same five actions, I do find that they differ in the way that they carry out some of these actions. I ague that there are three reasons for this: differing network structures; differing network motivations; and access to different resources to influence selections and elections. I argue that networks are motivated to influence selections and elections by instrumental desires to increase their political influence and power as well as ideological motivations to support the party. I find that political parties need networks to help to campaign and deliver political education. Networks can work alongside parties to do this but they can also takeover as political parties abdicate their responsibilities, effectively becoming the party on the ground in a constituency.

O presente estudo tem como objetivo verificar a participação e a influência de Rui Barbosa na reforma eleitoral para introdução do voto direto no Brasil que, resultando na Lei Saraiva (1881), acabou por excluir os analfabetos do direito de voto. Esta pesquisa também busca: investigar qual era o liberalismo que Rui Barbosa representava e qual a posição assumida por ele no contexto da reforma eleitoral; examinar por que, para o governo e as elites, até mesmo para a grande maioria dos parlamentares liberais, especialmente no que se refere a Rui Barbosa, que se posicionou fortemente pela “exclusão” dos analfabetos do direito de voto, o voto dos analfabetos passou a ser um problema, o que não era até então; e, constatar qual o entendimento de classe social que norteava o pensamento de Rui Barbosa no momento em que ele afirmou que a reforma eleitoral, ao excluir o analfabeto do direito de voto, não estaria constituindo uma exclusão de classe. O presente estudo realiza uma interface entre a História Social e a História Política. Pois, essa pesquisa procura relacionar questões políticas com as suas correlativas questões sociais. Assim, apesar de minha atenção estar voltada continuamente para uma figura de destaque da política nacional, o então deputado Rui Barbosa, essa dissertação busca não se limitar somente às suas ações isoladas, mas sim, verificar como que posições e decisões dos políticos nacionais se refletiram e afetaram a vida das grandes massas. Mais especificamente, como que as ações tomadas por políticos brasileiros, em um dado momento da nossa história, decidiram quem poderia e quem não poderia, daí em diante, ter o direito de participar da vida política do país. / The present study aims to verify the participation and influence of Rui Barbosa in the electoral reform to introduce direct voting in Brazil that, resulting in the Saraiva Law (1881), turned out excluding the illiterate of the right to vote. This research also seeks to investigate what was the liberalism that Rui Barbosa represented and what position had been taken by him in the electoral reform; to examine why, to the Government and the elites, even for the vast majority of liberal parliamentarians, particularly in relation to Rui Barbosa, who strongly had positioned himself in favor of "excluding" the illiterate of the right to vote, the vote of the illiterate became a problem, which was not until then; and to see what had been the understanding of social class that had been Rui Barbosa’s guidance at the time when he said that the electoral reform’s disenfranchising the illiterates of voting rights, would not be an exclusion of class. The present study provides an interface between the Social History and Political History. Therefore, this research seeks to link political issues with its correlative social issues. So, despite my attention be continuously focused on a prominent figure of the national politics, the Congressman Rui Barbosa, this dissertation will not be limited only to their actions, but rather, verify how national politicians' decisions and positions reflected and affected the lives of the lower class. More specifically, how the actions taken by Brazilian politicians, at any given moment in our history, decided who could and who could not, thereafter, be entitled to participate in the political life of the country.

A teoria do ciclo político orçamentário tradicional sugere que os governantes são tentados a manipular os instrumentos de política fiscal aumentando o gasto público ao seguirem o calendário eleitoral. A percepção, por parte do eleitorado, de que o governante mais capaz corresponde àquele que provê o maior número de bens públicos através das funções governamentais, apresenta a evolução recente da teoria. O presente estudo objetiva testar a hipótese de ocorrência do ciclo político orçamentário tradicional nas variáveis representantes de bens públicos, identificando aquelas onde parece haver evidência de manipulação eleitoral, nos municípios brasileiros, entre os anos de 2002 e 2015. Foram utilizados métodos econométricos de regressão de dados em painel nos anos que precedem às eleições, nos anos eleitorais e nos pós-pleitos. Os resultados não descartam a hipótese de que o ciclo político orçamentário no gasto ocorreria e que se privilegiariam algumas funções, possivelmente, alterando a percepção do eleitorado sobre a competência dos prefeitos. / The theory of the traditional budgetary policy cycle suggests that rulers are tempted to manipulate fiscal policy instruments by increasing public spending by following the electoral calendar. The perception by the electorate that the most capable ruler corresponds to the one who provides the greatest number of public goods through governmental functions, presents the recent evolution of the theory. The present study aims to test the hypothesis of the occurrence of the traditional budget political cycle in the variables representing public goods, identifying those where there seems to be evidence of electoral manipulation in Brazilian municipalities between 2002 and 2015. Econometric regression Panel Data Models were used in the years leading up to the elections, electoral years and post-election. The results shows the hypothesis that the political budget cycle in spending would occur and that some functions would be privileged, possibly changing the perception of the electorate on the competence of mayors.

O objetivo desta tese é apresentar um modelo formal para a análise das alianças eleitorais com base na abordagem da teoria da escolha racional. Enfatiza-se as estratégias utilizadas pelos partidos na formação das alianças, e a forma pela qual uma decisão tomada em uma eleição pode afetar nas alianças da eleição seguinte. Por aliança eleitoral entende-se os pares de partidos que compõe uma coligação eleitoral. Considerando uma estrutura simples de três partidos, em que nenhum deles possui, de maneira isolada, número de votos suficientes para ganhar as eleições, constatou-se que o grau de favoritismo e o quanto os partidos valorizam estar no poder são determinantes da decisão do partido menor. Embora apresente hipóteses simplificadoras, acredita-se que este modelo é suficientemente robusto para gerar insights sobre o fenômeno das coligações, em particular no Brasil, onde as abordagens recorrentes nesta literatura parecem não serem suficientes. / This thesis aims to present a rational choice model of electoral alliances. We focus on the strategies used by political parties in their forming of alliances, and how certain decisions may affect the prospects for maintaining or disrupting the alliance in the subsequent election. By party alliance we mean the pair of parties that compose an electoral alliance. Departing from a three-party structure, where no single party holds enough votes to win the election, the model’s main finding is that the degree of favoritism and of a party’s preference for being in power are determined by the decision of the smallest party. Despite its simplifying assumptions, we believe the model is sufficiently robust in terms of its outcomes, providing invaluable insights about electoral alliances, particularly in the Brazilian context, where classical approaches to this phenomenon seem to be insufficient.

A presente pesquisa analisou o perfil e a atuação da bancada mineira na Câmara dos Deputados entre 1853 e 1863, com o intuito de compreender a inserção dos representantes mineiros nos debates que culminaram na adoção de duas das mais importantes legislações eleitorais do Império. Além de fazer apontamentos sobre os interesses representados pelos membros da bancada mineira, proponho comparar três legislaturas diferentes no que se refere ao sistema eleitoral em vigor. A hipótese investigada foi a de que o sistema de eleição provincial favorecia a formação de uma bancada comprometida com os interesses centralizados na capital da província (Ouro Preto), além de favorecer a formação de câmaras unânimes. Por outro lado, o sistema de eleição distrital propiciou a formação de uma bancada diversa do ponto de vista partidário e mais comprometida com interesses das localidades mineiras, uma vez que eram eleitos unicamente pelos distritos mais diretamente vinculados a eles. As fontes selecionadas para realizar este estudo foram os Anais da Câmara dos Deputados, os Anais do Senado, bem como jornais publicados no período, em Minas Gerais e na Corte. / This research analyzes the profile and the performance of the mining bench in the House of Representatives between 1853 and 1863, in order to understand the integration of miners representatives in the discussions that led to the adoption of two of the most important electoral laws of the Empire. Besides making notes on the interests represented by the members of the mining bench, I propose to compare three different legislatures in relation to the electoral system in force. The hypothesis investigated was that the provincial election system favored the formation of the mining bench committed to the interests centralized in the provincial capital (Ouro Preto) and favors the formation of \"unanimous chambers.\" On the other hand, the district election system resulted in the formation of the diverse Minas Gerais workbench, of the party point of view and more committed to the interests of Minas Gerais towns, since they were elected only by the most directly districts attached to them. The sources selected to conduct this study were the annals of the House of Representatives, the annals of the Senate and papers published in the period, in Minas Gerais and in the Court.

Over the course of the past 30 years, states across the nation have adopted early in-person voting laws. The bulk of academic literature on early in-person voting revolves around the policy’s effect on turnout. This research was conducted over the course of several decades, in different electoral contexts, measuring a diverse array of laws, and remains inconclusive. Meanwhile, the political discussion of voting rights and electoral reform has become increasingly polarized. The divisive views on early voting both in the academic community and in the political realm are indicators of a distinctive evolution of early voting. I argue that early voting reforms were implemented in three unique eras, characterized by different political motivations and an evolving early electorate. I use case studies in Texas, Florida, Missouri, and Massachusetts to explain this theory and provide a framework for more ordered future research.

Dr. Dinah Mayoo-Bobee, Assistant Professor, Department of History, East Tennessee State University, will address one of today’s hot topics at its inception and other issues which confronted the forefathers of our country.

No description available.

Assuming gender neutrality in comparative analysis, i.e. not including either explicit or implicit references to a particular gender or sex, runs the risk of camouflaging the unequal distribution of political power, economic influence, and political access for men and women. Unfortunately, in assuming such neutrality, one is blinded to the inherent flaws of political systems, the inequalities they create, and their lack of consideration of gender and women's rights. To counteract this inequality between the sexes, women's social movements are fighting to create gender awareness and establish formal policies that place them at the same level as their male counterparts, and feminist ideals are slowly becoming more prominent. As in other regions, in Latin America, quota laws have been established as affirmative action-type mechanisms that are meant to create a balance in view of the inequalities women face in ascending to political office. My study focuses on whether or not quota laws have increased women's presence in Latin American political legislatures and if they have met the intended objectives by the women's social movements that advocated for them. My results indicate that quota laws have not worked in every Latin American country to dramatically increase women's presence in politics. The literature also suggests that quota laws have not entirely been able to produce the desired outcomes as proposed by women's social movements in the region. I also address the question of what has made quota laws successful in some countries, yet not in others. My research indicates that the effectiveness of quota laws depends on how they are drafted and implemented, that is if institutions have effectively been altered and if the government is taking specific measures to ensure that the law is being enforced. Since women have not been able to rely on the good faith of the political parties to determine their entry to positions of public authority, traditional procedures for candidate selection have been in need of alteration. I conclude that if quota laws are not customized to a country's electoral system and applied meticulously by political parties, they will hardly produce any results for women.

What consequences arise as a result of repeated control of the legislature by the same party or coalition? Are incumbent parties less likely to lose an election the longer they remain in power? Furthermore, as parties remain in power longer and longer, do the factors which electoral scholars have proposed influence elections have less of an impact on election outcomes? The purpose of this project is to examine the electoral impact of repeated control of the legislature by the same party or ruling coalition. In this project, I argue that the length of time an incumbent party or coalition has maintained control of the legislature is a critical consideration for scholars interested in studying elections. In doing so, I hope to develop a better understanding of elections, the factors which influence election, and the mechanisms by which these factors affect election outcomes. Central to this project is the phenomenon I call party duration. I define party duration as the number of years the incumbent party has maintained control of the legislature in unicameral legislatures or the lower house in bicameral legislatures. This is the party that has secured enough seats to control the legislature independently in cases where a single party controls the legislature, or the party that serves as the largest party in the ruling coalition that controls the legislature in cases where a single party does not control the legislature by itself. Using cross-sectional time-series analysis to study a novel dataset, I show that not only does increasing party duration decreases the likelihood that an incumbent party will lose an election, controlling for various other factors, but I find evidence that party duration also affects the effect of other variables which influence elections. Specifically, I focus on the impact that the length of party duration has on the effect of economic conditions on the incumbent party's performance in elections. These findings highlight the importance of party duration, a variable which has previously not received attention from electoral scholars