本研究之目的在探討討強制性財務預測下,公司管理當局對於不準確度程度過高之公司,其可能之修正行為, 準確度係預計值與實際值之間的差異從會計理論之觀點而言管理當局可用盈餘管理(隱含方式),或修正預測(外在方式)為之達到預測準確性之目的,本研究首先要了解之問題便是財務預測之更新與否與盈餘管理之間的關連,其次由於新上市公司於國內外實證研究中發現其於上市前後存有盈餘管理之現象故本研究推論由上市目的所編製之財務預測亦有較現金增資者有較樂觀之傾向存在另外在我國企業之歷史性財務報表之查核會計師通常亦為該公司之財務預測核閱會計師故本研究亦推論會計師之聲譽對於準確度有影響以上三項問題均以WILCOXONTEST 及T TEST 來回答另外本研究欲建立一可以解釋預測準確性之迴歸式而以預測更新與否,會計師聲譽,財務預測發布目的及盈餘管理幅度為自變數研究結果顯示管理當局傾向於以更新預測之方式達成其準確度之目的會計師聲譽並非決定準確度之決定性因素上市目的所發佈者較現金增資所發布者保守推論其可能之原因與承銷商之連坐記點有關故閱表者可從財務預測之更新與否及發布目的兩者綜合判斷財務預測之準確性

O Federalismo é uma das formas mais difundidas de organização política, marcado pela coexistência de duas ou mais instâncias de governo, a União e as unidades federadas. Em termos institucionais, um arranjo federal origina-se de um pacto entre unidades territoriais, estabelecido através de um contrato federativo, a Constituição, através da qual, procura-se garantir a participação equânime de todos os entes federados. O Federalismo pressupõe uma divisão de poder entre o governo central e os demais níveis de governo, através da qual, diferentes instâncias de poder moldam as relações intergovernamentais. A busca de um relacionamento intergovernamental, que permita a compatibilização da autonomia e a interdependência de cada ente federativo, evidencia a natureza de conflito inerente aos sistemas federais. Essa natureza de conflito do Federalismo está relacionada com o fato de todo arranjo federal enfrentar um trade-off básico: o risco de um governo central muito forte intimidar os demais níveis de governo, desrespeitando sua autonomia e; o risco de um governo central muito fraco possibilitar o comportamento oportunista e a falta de cooperação dos demais níveis de governo. O objetivo da tese é analisar em que medida as instituições criadas a partir da promulgação da Constituição de 1988 até a instituição da Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF) no ano de 2000, possibilitaram o desenvolvimento de uma trajetória de equilíbrio no arranjo federativo brasileiro. Através de um modelo de teoria dos jogos, propõem-se duas hipóteses sobre quando uma Federação pode ser sustentada em equilíbrio: quando existem incentivos e mecanismos de enforcement para que todos os níveis de governo cumpram as regras e; quando existe renda excedente a ser dividida. O arranjo federativo brasileiro desde sua criação enfrenta o trade-off fundamental do Federalismo, alternando períodos de maior ou menor poder institucional da União, evidenciando dessa maneira o conflito entre a busca de maior autonomia dos governos subnacionais e a natureza centralizadora da União. O arcabouço institucional criado após a promulgação da Constituição de 1988 aumentou o poder dos governos subnacionais vis-à-vis a União, possibilitando que estes níveis de governo adotassem comportamentos oportunistas. Somente a partir da estabilização econômica obtida através do Plano Real e através da criação de mecanismos de enforcement, com destaque para a Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF), a correlação de forças entre a União e os governos subnacionais foi alterada, através do aumento do poder institucional da União, podendo dessa maneira a Federação brasileira ser sustentada em uma trajetória de equilíbrio. / The Federalism is one of the most widespread forms of political organization, marked by the coexistence of two or more levels of government, the Union and federal units. In institutional terms, a federal arrangement stems from a pact between territorial units, established through a federal contract, the Constitution, through which seeks to ensure the equitable participation of all counties. Federalism presupposes a division of power between central government and other levels of government, in which different levels of power mold the intergovernmental relations. The search for an intergovernmental relationship that allows the compatibility of autonomy and interdependence of each federal entity shows the nature of the inherent conflict in federal systems. This kind of conflict is related to the fact that every federal arrangement faces a basic trade-off: the risk of a strong central government intimidate the other levels of government, disrespecting their autonomy and the risk of a weak government behave taking advantage of that and with lack of cooperation with the other levels of government. The aim of the thesis is to analyze the extension of the institutions created from the Constitution of 1988 until the institution of the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF) in 2000, that enabled the development of an equilibrate path to the Brazilian federal arrangement. Through a game theoretic model, we propose two hypotheses about when a federation can be sustained in equilibrium: when there are incentives and enforcement mechanisms for all levels of government abide by the rules and; when there is surplus income to be divided. The Brazilian federal arrangement faces, since its creation, the fundamental trade-off of Federalism, alternating periods of greater or lesser institutional power of the Union, thus highlighting the conflict between the pursuit of greater autonomy of subnational governments and the centralizing nature of the Union. The institutional framework created after the 1988 Constitution increased the power of subnational governments in relation to the Union, enabling these levels of government to adopt opportunistic behaviors. Only after the economic stabilization by the Real Plan and through the creation of enforcement mechanisms, with emphasis on the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF), the balance of power between the Union and the subnational governments has changed in order to sustain the Brazilian Federation in equilibrium path.

O Federalismo é uma das formas mais difundidas de organização política, marcado pela coexistência de duas ou mais instâncias de governo, a União e as unidades federadas. Em termos institucionais, um arranjo federal origina-se de um pacto entre unidades territoriais, estabelecido através de um contrato federativo, a Constituição, através da qual, procura-se garantir a participação equânime de todos os entes federados. O Federalismo pressupõe uma divisão de poder entre o governo central e os demais níveis de governo, através da qual, diferentes instâncias de poder moldam as relações intergovernamentais. A busca de um relacionamento intergovernamental, que permita a compatibilização da autonomia e a interdependência de cada ente federativo, evidencia a natureza de conflito inerente aos sistemas federais. Essa natureza de conflito do Federalismo está relacionada com o fato de todo arranjo federal enfrentar um trade-off básico: o risco de um governo central muito forte intimidar os demais níveis de governo, desrespeitando sua autonomia e; o risco de um governo central muito fraco possibilitar o comportamento oportunista e a falta de cooperação dos demais níveis de governo. O objetivo da tese é analisar em que medida as instituições criadas a partir da promulgação da Constituição de 1988 até a instituição da Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF) no ano de 2000, possibilitaram o desenvolvimento de uma trajetória de equilíbrio no arranjo federativo brasileiro. Através de um modelo de teoria dos jogos, propõem-se duas hipóteses sobre quando uma Federação pode ser sustentada em equilíbrio: quando existem incentivos e mecanismos de enforcement para que todos os níveis de governo cumpram as regras e; quando existe renda excedente a ser dividida. O arranjo federativo brasileiro desde sua criação enfrenta o trade-off fundamental do Federalismo, alternando períodos de maior ou menor poder institucional da União, evidenciando dessa maneira o conflito entre a busca de maior autonomia dos governos subnacionais e a natureza centralizadora da União. O arcabouço institucional criado após a promulgação da Constituição de 1988 aumentou o poder dos governos subnacionais vis-à-vis a União, possibilitando que estes níveis de governo adotassem comportamentos oportunistas. Somente a partir da estabilização econômica obtida através do Plano Real e através da criação de mecanismos de enforcement, com destaque para a Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF), a correlação de forças entre a União e os governos subnacionais foi alterada, através do aumento do poder institucional da União, podendo dessa maneira a Federação brasileira ser sustentada em uma trajetória de equilíbrio. / The Federalism is one of the most widespread forms of political organization, marked by the coexistence of two or more levels of government, the Union and federal units. In institutional terms, a federal arrangement stems from a pact between territorial units, established through a federal contract, the Constitution, through which seeks to ensure the equitable participation of all counties. Federalism presupposes a division of power between central government and other levels of government, in which different levels of power mold the intergovernmental relations. The search for an intergovernmental relationship that allows the compatibility of autonomy and interdependence of each federal entity shows the nature of the inherent conflict in federal systems. This kind of conflict is related to the fact that every federal arrangement faces a basic trade-off: the risk of a strong central government intimidate the other levels of government, disrespecting their autonomy and the risk of a weak government behave taking advantage of that and with lack of cooperation with the other levels of government. The aim of the thesis is to analyze the extension of the institutions created from the Constitution of 1988 until the institution of the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF) in 2000, that enabled the development of an equilibrate path to the Brazilian federal arrangement. Through a game theoretic model, we propose two hypotheses about when a federation can be sustained in equilibrium: when there are incentives and enforcement mechanisms for all levels of government abide by the rules and; when there is surplus income to be divided. The Brazilian federal arrangement faces, since its creation, the fundamental trade-off of Federalism, alternating periods of greater or lesser institutional power of the Union, thus highlighting the conflict between the pursuit of greater autonomy of subnational governments and the centralizing nature of the Union. The institutional framework created after the 1988 Constitution increased the power of subnational governments in relation to the Union, enabling these levels of government to adopt opportunistic behaviors. Only after the economic stabilization by the Real Plan and through the creation of enforcement mechanisms, with emphasis on the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF), the balance of power between the Union and the subnational governments has changed in order to sustain the Brazilian Federation in equilibrium path.

This research evaluates the potential challenges to a total eradication of child trafficking in Nigeria. The magnitude of the problem, as well as its despicable nature, triggered increasing legislations in Nigeria in recent years. This research shows that despite the remarkable efforts in term of law and policy approaches the problem appears to persist. The objective of the research is to demonstrate that law and policies approaches to addressing the issue are not proving effective. It appears that several socio-cultural issues related to child trafficking remain unaddressed. Despite the wealth of knowledge in relation to the topic there is a gap in literature. Indeed the existing gap in literature regarding child trafficking in Nigeria is evidenced by the fact that no adequate way forward has been indicated to overcome the phenomenon. In an attempt to fil the existing gap this research inquires whether the non-achievement of goals in combatting child trafficking is imputable to the lack of toughness in the spirit of the laws and policies or the lack of efficacy due to ineffective implementation and enforcement. By proving the appropriate answers to these crucial questions the research may not only fil the existing gap in literature by also offer the adequate approach to be taken by law and policy makers and other stakeholders in the fight against child trafficking to overcome the problem. The approach taken in conducting this research is textual analysis or doctrinal analysis and deconstruction of the enforcement mechanisms of human trafficking laws and policies in Nigeria in general. However Nigeria has sufficiently domesticated international human trafficking legislation and Human Rights instruments, the issue of enforcement remains a crucial element in achieving the ultimate goal of total eradication. Where such prospect appears unattainable, it is necessary to adopt a holistic approach to combatting child trafficking in order to achieve the ultimate goal of total eradication.

O Federalismo é uma das formas mais difundidas de organização política, marcado pela coexistência de duas ou mais instâncias de governo, a União e as unidades federadas. Em termos institucionais, um arranjo federal origina-se de um pacto entre unidades territoriais, estabelecido através de um contrato federativo, a Constituição, através da qual, procura-se garantir a participação equânime de todos os entes federados. O Federalismo pressupõe uma divisão de poder entre o governo central e os demais níveis de governo, através da qual, diferentes instâncias de poder moldam as relações intergovernamentais. A busca de um relacionamento intergovernamental, que permita a compatibilização da autonomia e a interdependência de cada ente federativo, evidencia a natureza de conflito inerente aos sistemas federais. Essa natureza de conflito do Federalismo está relacionada com o fato de todo arranjo federal enfrentar um trade-off básico: o risco de um governo central muito forte intimidar os demais níveis de governo, desrespeitando sua autonomia e; o risco de um governo central muito fraco possibilitar o comportamento oportunista e a falta de cooperação dos demais níveis de governo. O objetivo da tese é analisar em que medida as instituições criadas a partir da promulgação da Constituição de 1988 até a instituição da Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF) no ano de 2000, possibilitaram o desenvolvimento de uma trajetória de equilíbrio no arranjo federativo brasileiro. Através de um modelo de teoria dos jogos, propõem-se duas hipóteses sobre quando uma Federação pode ser sustentada em equilíbrio: quando existem incentivos e mecanismos de enforcement para que todos os níveis de governo cumpram as regras e; quando existe renda excedente a ser dividida. O arranjo federativo brasileiro desde sua criação enfrenta o trade-off fundamental do Federalismo, alternando períodos de maior ou menor poder institucional da União, evidenciando dessa maneira o conflito entre a busca de maior autonomia dos governos subnacionais e a natureza centralizadora da União. O arcabouço institucional criado após a promulgação da Constituição de 1988 aumentou o poder dos governos subnacionais vis-à-vis a União, possibilitando que estes níveis de governo adotassem comportamentos oportunistas. Somente a partir da estabilização econômica obtida através do Plano Real e através da criação de mecanismos de enforcement, com destaque para a Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF), a correlação de forças entre a União e os governos subnacionais foi alterada, através do aumento do poder institucional da União, podendo dessa maneira a Federação brasileira ser sustentada em uma trajetória de equilíbrio. / The Federalism is one of the most widespread forms of political organization, marked by the coexistence of two or more levels of government, the Union and federal units. In institutional terms, a federal arrangement stems from a pact between territorial units, established through a federal contract, the Constitution, through which seeks to ensure the equitable participation of all counties. Federalism presupposes a division of power between central government and other levels of government, in which different levels of power mold the intergovernmental relations. The search for an intergovernmental relationship that allows the compatibility of autonomy and interdependence of each federal entity shows the nature of the inherent conflict in federal systems. This kind of conflict is related to the fact that every federal arrangement faces a basic trade-off: the risk of a strong central government intimidate the other levels of government, disrespecting their autonomy and the risk of a weak government behave taking advantage of that and with lack of cooperation with the other levels of government. The aim of the thesis is to analyze the extension of the institutions created from the Constitution of 1988 until the institution of the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF) in 2000, that enabled the development of an equilibrate path to the Brazilian federal arrangement. Through a game theoretic model, we propose two hypotheses about when a federation can be sustained in equilibrium: when there are incentives and enforcement mechanisms for all levels of government abide by the rules and; when there is surplus income to be divided. The Brazilian federal arrangement faces, since its creation, the fundamental trade-off of Federalism, alternating periods of greater or lesser institutional power of the Union, thus highlighting the conflict between the pursuit of greater autonomy of subnational governments and the centralizing nature of the Union. The institutional framework created after the 1988 Constitution increased the power of subnational governments in relation to the Union, enabling these levels of government to adopt opportunistic behaviors. Only after the economic stabilization by the Real Plan and through the creation of enforcement mechanisms, with emphasis on the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF), the balance of power between the Union and the subnational governments has changed in order to sustain the Brazilian Federation in equilibrium path.

Submitted by Mateus de Lima Santos (santos.mateus.lima@gmail.com) on 2017-06-19T21:37:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 An_Essay_on_Self_Enforcing_Debt.pdf: 523181 bytes, checksum: 177e70e82c09a7844b9d13faa7170c93 (MD5) / Rejected by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br), reason: Boa tarde Mateus, Por favor, as palavras Agradecimentos, resumo e abstract em caixa alta e como o trabalho é em inglês o abstract vem antes do resumo. Grata. Suzi 3799-7876 on 2017-06-21T19:12:45Z (GMT) / Submitted by Mateus de Lima Santos (santos.mateus.lima@gmail.com) on 2017-06-21T19:27:43Z No. of bitstreams: 1 An_Essay_on_Self_Enforcing_Debt.pdf: 523679 bytes, checksum: 4401cc05ce8780c1fe7be31eb232b44a (MD5) / Rejected by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br), reason: Mateus, Conforme conversamos ao telefone. Abs. Suzi on 2017-06-21T19:38:29Z (GMT) / Submitted by Mateus de Lima Santos (santos.mateus.lima@gmail.com) on 2017-06-21T21:12:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 An_Essay_on_Self_Enforcing_Debt.pdf: 511332 bytes, checksum: 86afa158144a508b5aca51409f581b4f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2017-06-21T21:19:14Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 An_Essay_on_Self_Enforcing_Debt.pdf: 511332 bytes, checksum: 86afa158144a508b5aca51409f581b4f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-22T12:27:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 An_Essay_on_Self_Enforcing_Debt.pdf: 511332 bytes, checksum: 86afa158144a508b5aca51409f581b4f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-05-26 / We analyze repayment incentives in an infinite horizon competitive economy where agents cannot commit to financial contracts. We follow Bulow and Rogoff (1989) by assuming that a defaulting agent is excluded from borrowing forever but keeps the ability to save. Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) provide an important characterization result by showing that endogenous debt limits are self-enforcing and not-too-tight if, and only if, they form a rational bubble in the sense that they can be exactly rolled over at infinity. Our contribution is technical. We provide a rigorous and correct proof of this result without imposing any ad-hoc assumption on the endogenous debt limits. In that respect, we extend the result in Bidian and Bejan (2014). / Nós analisamos incentivos de repagamento em uma economia competitiva de horizonte infinito onde os agentes não podem se comprometer com contratos financeiros. Nós seguimos Bulow e Rogoff (1989) ao assumir que um agente que deu default é excluído da possibilidade de empréstimo para sempre mas mantém a possibilidade de poupança. Hellwig e Lorenzoni (2009) fornecem um importante resultado de caracterização ao mostrarem que limites à dívida endógenos são auto-sustentados e não muito restritos se, e somente se, eles formam uma bolha racional no sentido que podem ser exatamente rolados até o infinito. Nossa contribuição é técnica. Nós provemos uma prova rigorosa e correta desse resultado sem impor nenhuma condição ad-hoc nos limites à dívida endógenos. Nesse sentido, nós estendemos o resultado de Bidian e Bejan (2014).

The advent of prohibition in America in the early 1920's brought on wide-spread smuggling activity along the Canadian and Mexican borders as well as along the Atlantic coastline. Since many of the smuggling vessels sought protection from American authorities by foreign registry, the State Department initiated efforts to enable American officials to enforce prohibition without interfering with legitimate commerce. Washington concluded compromise agreements with fifteen countries that provided for American enforcement measures and suitable liquor cargo arrangements for the other signatory nations. The liquor conventions were not a final solution to the smuggling problem but they did provide for better enforcement. The agreements reinforced existing principles and represented an attempt to eliminate possible sources of friction on the international level arising out of American prohibition enforcement.

In this paper, we discuss the endogenous formation of self-enforcing climate coalitions linked to the issue of a free trade agreement. As a framework, a strategic trade model is used in which countries may discourage greenhouse gas emissions by means of an import tariff on dirty goods. In addition, countries can set an emissions cap being effective on a permit market. Our main focus, however, is on the utilization of terms of trade privileges provided to members of a preferential free trade area. We propose evidence for that the welfare gains of trade liberalization are strongly promoting the formation of climate coalitions. In the parametrical simulation of the model, global emissions as well as climate change damages are found significantly reduced compared to the BAU scenario while global welfare is found significantly higher.

Submitted by Gabriela Gentille Menna Barreto El Dib (mgabisu@msn.com) on 2014-11-12T14:08:33Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese Protocolo Final.pdf: 1101862 bytes, checksum: bb828605787c32e621cada76fb92d250 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vera Lúcia Mourão (vera.mourao@fgv.br) on 2014-11-12T19:44:05Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese Protocolo Final.pdf: 1101862 bytes, checksum: bb828605787c32e621cada76fb92d250 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-11-12T19:49:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese Protocolo Final.pdf: 1101862 bytes, checksum: bb828605787c32e621cada76fb92d250 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-09-08 / The New Institutional Economics gave a prominent role to institutions, classifying them as the "rules of the game" in a society. A part of this literature focuses on analysing the link between contractual enforcement of judgments handed down by the courts and its impact on the economic development of nations, in particular developing countries. In Brazil, this debate became relevant in the late 1990s due to social researches conducted with judges, which has attested that the courts tend to sacrifice judicial predictability in favour of social justice. In this context, some Brazilian economists pointed out the hypothesis that the Brazilian courts present an anticreditor bias, which can be translated as the court’s position to rule in favour of the debtors. This results in the maintenance of high interest rates in the country and the absence of a long term credit market. Within this context, a specific segment was selected: factoring, to develop a substantive qualitative empirical research in order to (i) investigate the enforcement of contractual decisions, and (ii) test whether there is the existence of an anticreditor bias by the Courts of Justice of São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul. / A teoria da Nova Economia Institucional atribuiu papel de destaque às instituições, classificando-as como as 'regras do jogo' nas sociedades. Uma das vertentes desta literatura foca-se em analisar a relação entre o grau de enforcement ou exigibilidade das decisões proferidas pelo Poder Judiciário e seu impacto no desenvolvimento econômico das nações, em especial, dos países em desenvolvimento. No Brasil, este debate ganha relevância no final da década de 1990 a partir de determinadas pesquisas de cunho social realizadas com magistrados, demonstrando que estes tenderiam a sacrificar a previsibilidade judicial em favor da justiça social. Nesse contexto, certos economistas brasileiros lançam a hipótese da existência de um viés anticredor por parte do Poder Judiciário brasileiro, cuja tendência é a de favorecer a parte devedora, fato que resulta na manutenção das altas taxas de juros no país, bem como na inexistência de um mercado de crédito de longo prazo. Diante deste debate, foi selecionado segmento específico – a atividade de factoring – para se desenvolver pesquisa empírica qualitativa substantiva a fim de se (i) investigar o grau de enforcement das decisões contratuais e (ii) testar a existência ou não de um viés anticredor por parte dos Tribunais de Justiça de São Paulo e do Rio Grande do Sul.

La toxicité et l’efficacité de plus de 30 agents anticancéreux présentent de très fortes variations en fonction du temps de dosage. Par conséquent, les biologistes qui étudient le rythme circadien ont besoin d’une méthode très précise pour estimer le vecteur de composantes périodiques (CP) de signaux chronobiologiques. En outre, dans les développements récents, non seulement la période dominante ou le vecteur de CP présentent un intérêt crucial, mais aussi leurs stabilités ou variabilités. Dans les expériences effectuées en traitement du cancer, les signaux enregistrés correspondant à différentes phases de traitement sont courts, de sept jours pour le segment de synchronisation jusqu’à deux ou trois jours pour le segment après traitement. Lorsqu’on étudie la stabilité de la période dominante nous devons considérer des signaux très court par rapport à la connaissance a priori de la période dominante, placée dans le domaine circadien. Les approches classiques fondées sur la transformée de Fourier (TF) sont inefficaces (i.e. manque de précision) compte tenu de la particularité des données (i.e. la courte longueur). Dans cette thèse, nous proposons une nouvelle méthode pour l’estimation du vecteur de CP des signaux biomédicaux, en utilisant les informations biologiques a priori et en considérant un modèle qui représente le bruit. Les signaux enregistrés dans le cadre d’expériences développées pour le traitement du cancer ont un nombre limité de périodes. Cette information a priori peut être traduite comme la parcimonie du vecteur de CP. La méthode proposée considère l’estimation de vecteur de CP comme un problème inverse enutilisant l’inférence bayésienne générale afin de déduire toutes les inconnues de notre modèle, à savoir le vecteur de CP mais aussi les hyperparamètres (i.e. les variances associées). / The toxicity and efficacy of more than 30 anticancer agents presents very high variations, depending on the dosing time. Therefore the biologists studying the circadian rhythm require a very precise method for estimating the Periodic Components (PC) vector of chronobiological signals. Moreover, in recent developments not only the dominant period or the PC vector present a crucial interest, but also their stability or variability. In cancer treatment experiments the recorded signals corresponding to different phases of treatment are short, from seven days for the synchronization segment to two or three days for the after treatment segment. When studying the stability of the dominant period we have to consider very short length signals relative to the prior knowledge of the dominant period, placed in the circadian domain. The classical approaches, based on Fourier Transform (FT) methods are inefficient (i.e. lack of precision) considering the particularities of the data (i.e. the short length). In this thesis we propose a new method for the estimation of the PC vector of biomedical signals, using the biological prior informations and considering a model that accounts for the noise. The experiments developed in the cancer treatment context are recording signals expressing a limited number of periods. This is a prior information that can be translated as the sparsity of the PC vector. The proposed method considers the PC vector estimation as an Inverse Problem (IP) using the general Bayesian inference in order to infer all the unknowns of our model, i.e. the PC vector but also the hyperparameters.