Loving God is our highest perfection for Leibniz. It secures our belief and trust in the Creator, which is integral to the sciences as well as faith. Those who love God have justification for reasoning, that is, they can rationally expect to arrive at truth. This is because love is a receptivity to the perfection all of things; loving God, then, is a disposition and tendency toward the most perfect being, the ens perfectissimum. Individuals who perceive the divine nature “do not merely fear the power of the supreme and all-seeing monarch,” Leibniz writes, “but are assured of his beneficence, and lastly—and what brings everything together—burn with a love of God above all else.”1 In my dissertation, I argue that Leibniz’s qualification should be taken seriously: love of God “brings everything together.” The subject of my dissertation can be stated schematically. It consists of two pairs of claims, one pair philosophical, the other theological: A moral quality is required to secure our reason. From a most perfect unity, a moral quality follows. Love of God is our highest perfection. Love of God secures our reasoning. Both concern the security of reason, by which I mean the rational motivation for reasoning itself. They are reasons we ought to expect reasoning to lead to truth. Yet they do not form a tight demonstration: while an inference is clearly at work in the first pair, there are no inferences in the second. Also, there is a distinction between a moral quality and love for God. Unless they are identified, Leibniz’s philosophy and theology secure reasoning apart from one another. In 1686, Leibniz wrote his well-known “Discourse on Metaphysics.” A few months after, he composed a theological treatise, Examination of the Christian Religion. These texts, I argue, should be read side by side, and the first chapter compares how divine perfection secures our reasoning in both texts. Some Moderns’ notion of perfection—namely, Descartes’, Spinoza’s, and Malebranche’s—fail to secure our reasoning because their views entail arbitrariness in the world and the divine nature. But a proper sense of perfection, one that includes a moral quality, secures our reasoning by ensuring that everything is amenable to reason. Descartes also sought to secure our reasoning, and for the second and third chapters I compare his account with Leibniz’s own, then draw out the latter’s criticisms. For Descartes, the deity’s moral quality is characterized by an indifferent will, which is eminently and formally revealed throughout creation. Although recognizing the infinite source of all things directs our attention appropriate in the Cartesian system, Leibniz criticizes Descartes’ detached and indifferent God. When our disposition toward God is not characterized by love, we are less rational than otherwise. Leibniz finds intolerable moral implications in the Cartesian system, and I work out these implications in chapter three. Descartes’ criteria of true and false ideas does not settle dispute, but relies on “interior testimony.” Proper reasoning, then, does not tend toward unity among persons, and this is especially problematic in religious debate. Descartes’ method is Stoic, which also leads to trouble when it comes to church unity: one remains in the church by a sheer act of will, which can violate reason. Leibniz views such a detachment of faith and reasoning as dangerous, besides impoverishing the concept of reason altogether. Leibniz’s notions of God and perfection secure our reason by engendering love for God. “Discourse” and Examen begin with a moral disposition and tendency. In the last chapter, I argue that this is the case by considering two criteria Leibniz adopts—his test for perfection and the kinds of knowledge—as well as the foundation of his logic at the time. Leibniz can tolerate provisional beginnings, hypothetical truths, and original sin because of his robust conception of love. He distinguishes two ways we love God: spes, or hope, is a disposition or tendency to natural perfection, and caritas, or esteem, affection, or love, regards divine perfection. These states orient us according to the divine plan. Miracles are within the world as an effect of the deity’s moral quality: they are a means God personally relates to rational beings. Miracles reveal the moral effects of our perception of phenomena generally, included the regularity observed and classified by science. So, to conclude, I compare Leibniz’s discussion of revelation in Examen with his discussion of miracles in “Discourse” to draw out the significance of miracles for him. Besides much debate on the implications of miracles for his conception of substance, I argue that there is a moral motivation for retaining miracles, even those of the second rank.

Although recent scholars have attempted to recuperate the cultural and literary value of Francis Quarles' Emblemes, traditional emblematic interpretations categorize the images as merely illustrations of the poetic utterance. The investment of this paper shifts critical attention away from the content of Quarles' text as the only source of meaning and argues that meaning is contingent on the interpretation of both word and image. In order for the images of the text to have full consideration, I have stepped away from the traditional emblem metaphor of body and soul in favor of an incarnational metaphor that joins image and word in a hypostatic union of interpretation.

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Nous avons investigué les propriétés des champs de jauge de spin élevé libres à travers une étude de divers aspects de leur dynamique hamiltonienne. Pour des champs se propageant sur un espace-temps plat, les contraintes issues de l'analyse hamiltonienne de ces théories de jauge ont été identifiées et résolues par l'introduction de prépotentiels, dont l'invariance de jauge comprend, de façon intrigante, à la fois des difféomorphismes linéarisés généralisés et des transformations d'échelle de Weyl généralisées et linéarisées. Cela a motivé notre étude systématique des invariants conformes pour les spins élevés. Les invariants correspondants ont été construits à l'aide du tenseur de Cotton, dont nous avons établi les propriétés essentielles (symétrie, conservation, trace nulle; invariance, complétude). Avec ces outils géométriques, l'analyse hamiltonienne a pu être complétée et une action du premier ordre écrite en termes des prépotentiels. Nous avons constaté que cette action possédait une invariance manifeste par dualité électromagnétique; cette invariance, combinée à l'invariance de jauge des prépotentiels, fixe d'ailleurs uniquement l'action. En outre, de façon générale, cette action s'est révélée être exactement celle obtenue à travers une réécriture des équations du mouvement des spins élevés comme des conditions d'auto-dualité tordue (non manifestement covariantes).Avec un intérêt pour les extensions supersymétriques, nous avons amorcé la généralisation de cette étude aux champs fermioniques. Le champ de masse nulle libre de spin 5/2 a été soumis à la même analyse, et son prépotentiel s'est révélé partager l'invariance de jauge conforme déjà observée dans le cas bosonique général. Le supermultiplet incorporant les spins 2 et 5/2 a ensuite été considéré, et une symétrie rigide de son action, combinant une transformation de dualité électromagnétique du spin 2 avec une transformation de chiralité du spin 5/2 a été construite pour commuter avec la supersymétrie. Dans une autre direction, nous avons étudié les propriétés d'un champ tensoriel chiral de symétrie mixte dans un espace-temps plat à six dimensions: une (2,2)-forme. Son analyse hamiltonienne a été réalisée, des prépotentiels introduits et l'action de premier ordre obtenue s'est encore une fois révélée être la même que celle obtenue à travers une réécriture des équations du mouvement comme des conditions d'auto-chiralité (non manifestement covariante).Finalement, nous nous sommes penchés sur les charges de surface des champs fermioniques et bosoniques de spin élevé se propageant sur un espace-temps à courbure constante. Cela a été réalisé par une analyse hamiltonienne de ces systèmes, les contraintes étant identifiées aux générateurs des transformations de jauge. Injectant dans ces générateurs des valeurs des paramètres des transformations de jauge correspondant à des transformations impropres de jauge (imposant une réelle variation physique sur les champs) a ensuite permis d'évaluer la valeur de ces générateurs pour des champs résolvant les équations du mouvement: elle s'est bien révélée finie et non-nulle, constituant les charges de surface de ces théories. / Doctorat en Sciences / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(理学) / 甲第18056号 / 理博第3934号 / 新制||理||1567(附属図書館) / 30914 / 京都大学大学院理学研究科物理学・宇宙物理学専攻 / (主査)准教授 戸塚 圭介, 教授 石田 憲二, 教授 川上 則雄 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Science / Kyoto University / DFAM

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(理学) / 甲第18069号 / 理博第3947号 / 新制||理||1569(附属図書館) / 30927 / 京都大学大学院理学研究科物理学・宇宙物理学専攻 / (主査)教授 佐々木 節, 教授 田中 貴浩, 教授 畑 浩之 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Science / Kyoto University / DGAM

In this study the maximum entropy formalism [JAYN 57] is suggested as an alternative theory for general queueing systems of computer performance analysis. The motivation is to overcome some of the problems arising in this field and to extend the scope of the results derived in the context of Markovian queueing theory. For the M/G/l model a unique maximum entropy solution., satisfying locALl balance is derived independent of any assumptions about the service time distribution. However, it is shown that this solution is identical to the steady state solution of the underlying Marko-v process when the service time distribution is of the generalised exponential (CE) type. (The GE-type distribution is a mixture of an exponential term and a unit impulse function at the origin). For the G/M/1 the maximum entropy solution is identical in form to that of the underlying Markov process, but a GE-type distribution still produces the maximum overall similar distributions. For the GIG11 model there are three main achievements: first, the spectral methods are extended to give exaft formulae for the average number of customers in the system for any G/G/l with rational Laplace transform. Previously, these results are obtainable only through simulation and approximation methods. (ii) secondly, a maximum entropy model is developed and used to obtain unique solutions for some types of the G/G/l. It is also discussed how these solutions can be related to the corresponding stochastic processes. (iii) the importance of the G/GE/l and the GE/GE/l for the analysis of general networks is discussed and some flow processes for these systems are characterised. For general queueing networks it is shown that the maximum entropy solution is a product of the maximum entropy solutions of the individual nodes. Accordingly, existing computational algorithms are extended to cover general networks with FCFS disciplines. Some implementations are suggested and a flow algorithm is derived. Finally, these results are iised to improve existing aggregation methods. In addition, the study includes a number of examples, comparisons, surveys, useful comments and conclusions.

Cosmology is an attempt to mathematically describe the behaviour of the universe, the most commonly used models are the Friedmann-Lemaître-Robertson-Walker solutions. These models seem to be accurate for an old universe, which is homogeneous with low anisotropy. However for an earlier universe these models might not be that accurate or even correct. The almost non-existent anisotropy observed today might have played a bigger role in the earlier universe. For this reason we will study another model known as Bianchi Type I, where the universe is not necessarily isotropic. We utilize a 1+3-covariant formalism to obtain the equations that determine the behaviour of the universe and then use a tetrad formalism to complement the 1+3-covariant equations. Using these equations we examine the geometry of space-time and its dynamical properties. Finally we briefly discuss the different singularities possible and examine some special cases of geodesic movement.

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[pt] O papel dos juízes é tipicamente relacionado à função de respeitar e aplicar o direito. Acredita-se que há uma obrigação de fidelidade entre juízes e seus respectivos sistemas jurídicos, vinculando-os a obedecer aos ditames do direito positivo. Alguns argumentos, como o juramento, a autoridade prática do direito, a obrigação política judicial, e a contensão dos erros de julgamento, são invocados para justificar esse vínculo de fidelidade. Mas e nos casos cuja aplicação dos padrões jurídicos institucionalizados parece insatisfatória? Quando se ater ao direito implica um resultado evidentemente injusto que pode ser corrigido pelo juiz? Esses casos desafiam a obrigação de fidelidade entre juízes frente suas ordens jurídicas. Parece que o juiz nessa posição tem razões morais para ignorar as regras e atingir a solução mais justa. Mas seguir e aplicar essas razões morais é parte do papel do juiz? Ele deve fazê-lo? Outro conjunto de concepções do papel judicial pretende responder afirmativamente a essas duas questões. De acordo com elas, o papel judicial é composto por outras funções além do dever de seguir apenas padrões legais. Minha hipótese é que uma dessas concepções está correta. / [en] The role of the judges is typically related to the function to respect and apply the law. It is believed that there is an obligation of fidelity between judges and their respective legal systems, binding them to obey the dictates of positive law. Some arguments, like the oath, the practical authority of law, the judicial political obligation, and the containment of errors of judgment, are invoked to justify this loyalty bond. But what about the cases whose application of the institucionalized legal standards seems unsatisfactory? When adhering to the law implies an obviously unfair result which can be corrected by the judge? These cases challenge the obligation of fidelity between judges towards their legal systems. It seems that the judge in this position have moral reasons to ignore the rules and achieve the fairest solution. But following and applying these moral reasons is part of the role of the judge? He should do it? Another set of conceptions of the judicial role intends to answer affirmatively these two questions. According to them, the judicial role consists of other functions besides the duty to follow only legal standards. My hypothesis is that one of these views is correct.