This is a study of Epicurus garden in Athens in the 300´s bce, and the method of rehabilitation applied in the garden of Alnarp today at the Swedish University of Agricultural Science. The study aims to pinpoint areas of comparison in methods of healing in a garden environment, in Epicurus garden versus the rehabilitating garden of Alnarp. To make this comparison I have split my analysis into four parts, the conversational therapy, the hierarchy, the garden and its community, and finally the isolation from society. This is a qualitative study, and methods used is, amongst others, hermeneutics.The essay ends with a final discussion of the finds, which conclude that although very different contexts in both time and space, it is easy to find similarities between the two.

Orientador: Paulo Sergio de Vasconcellos / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-13T11:51:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lima_SidneyCalheirosde_D.pdf: 4349754 bytes, checksum: 20121ead18adbfbc21105ec1bee4948f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Resumo: Os cinco livros do De finibus bonorum et malorum de Cícero, obra publicada em 45 a.C., constituem três diálogos em que são discutidas as doutrinas morais de três escolas filosóficas da época helenística. O primeiro diálogo trata do pensamento de Epicuro; no segundo, discute-se o pensamento dos estóicos; o terceiro, por fim, contempla a filosofia moral de Antíoco, pensador grego contemporâneo de Cícero cujo nome está ligado à Academia. No presente trabalho, nós apresentamos a tradução dessa obra em Português acompanhada de notas explicativas que tratam de alguns aspectos dramáticos, históricos, culturais e filosóficos que nos pareceram pertinentes a uma boa compreensão das discussões que são representadas em cada um dos diálogos. Para introduzir o texto da tradução, nós apresentamos um estudo, que se divide em dois capítulos. No primeiro capítulo, nós nos propomos investigar o gênero literário a que pertence o De finibus, isto é, o diálogo filosófico, dando uma especial atenção a seu estatuto mimético e às relações que esse gênero mantém com outras formas de discurso que foram cultivadas na Antigüidade. No segundo capítulo, foi nosso objetivo analisar o caso específico do De finibus. Dessa forma, nós estudamos a maneira como o autor unifica os três diálogos sob a forma de um tratado e analisamos as relações que existem entre o gênero dialógico e o método de investigação que consiste em in utramque partem dicere com vistas a descobrir aquilo que é mais probabile no que diz respeito a uma quaestio. Por fim, nós examinamos a composição mimética dos diálogos particulares para propor algumas interpretações a respeito da maneira como a utilização das diferentes cenas e das personagens e também a organização da obra sob a forma de um tratado puderam servir à argumentação do autor. / Doutorado / Letras Classicas / Doutor em Linguística

La volonté : peu de termes reviennent dans des débats aussi nombreux et aussi divers ; peu se prêtent à un aussi large éventail de registres, de l’ordinaire au sacré. Mon travail voudrait introduire à la notion de volonté chez Cicéron, et aux nouveaux champs sémantiques ouverts par lui pour la postérité. Le rôle accordé à lui jusqu’ici dans les généalogies de la volonté a été au mieux mineur. Mais les archives numériques confirment un fait curieux : tout le corpus latin antérieur à Cicéron contient environ 25 occurrences de voluntas ou de ses formes déclinées. Dans le seul corpus cicéronien, le mot apparaît 644 fois. Sa théologie pense l’univers en tant qu’il est déterminé par la mens ac voluntas des dieux, et fait passer le progrès de l’âme par la contemplation de la volonté divine. La voluntas est centrale dans sa réflexion sur l’émotion et la responsabilité en contexte judiciaire. Dans ses traités philosophiques, il adapte l’éthique stoïcienne et fait de la volonté le siège de la progression morale. En outre, c’est Cicéron et non Lucrèce qui a le premier examiné la liberté du vouloir humain : lorsqu’il entreprit, à trente-six ans, l’accusation de Verrès, puis dans le De fato, où sa défense de la libera voluntas mobilise le Portique et l’Académie contre le Jardin. Enfin, Cicéron invente la volonté du peuple telle que nous la connaissons. Le plus grand orateur romain, pionnier de la pensée politique de langue latine, fait de la voluntas populi la force agissante d’une république souveraine. Son idée de la volonté populaire contient d’ailleurs en germe les problèmes de représentativité des élites que nos démocraties électorales cherchent encore à résoudre. / The will : few words feature in so many distinct debates, nor range so vastly from the simple to the sacred. This thesis is intended to provide a thorough study of the notion of will in Cicero, and of the new semantic pathways he opens for posterity. The role attributed to him in genealogies of the will has been relatively minor. But digital archives confirm a curious fact: all extant Latin texts prior to his lifetime yield around two dozen occurrences of voluntas and its cognates. In the texts we have, Cicero uses the word 644 times. His theology examines the character of the world determined by the mens ac voluntas of the gods, and the improvement of the soul in the contemplation of divine will. Voluntas propels and inspires Cicero’s study of emotion in criminal liability. In the Tusculan Disputations and De officiis, he adapts Stoic ethics to propose the will as locus of moral progress. Further, it was Cicero, not Lucretius as some have argued, who first considered the “freedom” of human will – as a 36-year-old prosecutor, and then in the De fato, where his argument for libera voluntas marshals the Stoa and Academy to repudiate the Epicureans. Finally, Cicero invents “the will of the people” as we know it. Rome’s greatest orator and the pioneer of political thought in Latin, he makes voluntas populi the catalyzing force of a sovereign republic. So too does he sow problems of elite “trusteeship” into his notion of popular will, problems which electoral democracies still struggle to resolve.

Peut-on dire Dieu ? Dieu lui-même parle-t-il et se dit-il ? Les deuxquestions semblent intimement liées : si le langage est tenu pour une réalité étrangèreà la nature divine, il est en effet susceptible d’être jugé inapte à son expression. Cettethèse est consacrée à l’exploration d’une question qui a rencontré un intérêt sansprécédent dans le platonisme des débuts de l’époque impériale : celle de l’articulationentre le discours (λόγος) et le divin (θεός). Le signe le plus évident de cet intérêtnouveau pour la question du rapport entre discursivité et divinité est l’essor queconnaît alors le motif du « dieu ineffable » (θεὸς ἄρρητος). Les trois auteurs surlesquels porte cette étude – Philon, Plutarque et l’auteur présenté dans l’Élenchos(VII, 14-27, X, 14) comme « Basilide » – se caractérisent par une commune adhésionà l’idée que Dieu échappe à l’appréhension verbale, mais cette idée est loin des’exprimer chez eux de façon uniforme : si Plutarque semble réticent à déclarer Dieu« ineffable », Philon, lui, le reconnaît tel avec insistance, tandis que « Basilide »,considérant que le dire « ineffable » revient encore à en dire quelque chose,surenchérit en le déclarant « pas même ineffable ». Pour comprendre ces divergences,il s’agira d’examiner les données ontologiques, gnoséologiques et linguistiques quiexpliquent les positions respectives de ces auteurs sur la question de l’expression dudivin. Cette enquête débutera par un chapitre préliminaire où l’on situera dans soncontexte – celui du médioplatonisme – le débat sur le divorce entre λόγος et θεός etoù l’on en recherchera les prémisses chez Platon, Aristote et dans la spéculationpythagorisante. / Can one make statements about God ? Does God speak and does hemake statements about himself ? These two questions are intimately related: iflanguage is taken to be a reality extraneous to God’s nature, it might be consideredunsuitable for expression of his nature. This dissertation explores the question of thearticulation between discourse (λόγος) and the divine (θεός) that became a prominentlocus of debate in early imperial Platonism. The clearest sign of this new-foundinterest in the relationship between discursivity and divinity is the growth in the motifof “ineffable God” (θεὸς ἄρρητος). The study looks at three authors – Philo,Plutarch, and the author presented in the Elenchos (VII, 14-27, X, 14) as “Basilides” –linked by a common adherence to the idea that God escapes verbal apprehension.Their respective way of expressing this idea is by no means uniform, however : ifPlutarch seems reticent to declare God “ineffable”, Philo declares this moreemphatically; “Basilides”, meanwhile, reckoning that declaring God “ineffable” isstill saying something about him, goes even further by declaring him “not evenineffable”. In order to understand these differences we must examine the ontological,gnoseological, and linguistic facts that explain the respective positions of theseauthors on the expression of the divine. This inquiry starts with a preliminary chapterwhich situates the debate about the gulf between discourse and God in its context –Middle Platonism – and seeks its premises in the thinking of Plato, Aristotle andPythagoreanizing speculation.

Aux vers 102 et 109 du premier livre de DRN, Lucrèce, poète épicurien, condamne les Vates (poète, prophète) qui, par leurs paroles, inspireraient une peur de la mort liée à des supplices d’après-vie. Pour un épicurien, l’âme cesse d’exister lors de la mort, d’où la condamnation exprimée dans les vers de Lucrèce. On a pensé que Lucrèce utilisait tout simplement le terme de façon péjorative en référence générique à des prophètes latins. Sous Auguste, le mot signifiera poète, tandis que des auteurs comme Virgile se désigneront eux-mêmes par ce terme. Ce travail cherche à donner une réponse à la question: qui sont les vates dont Lucrèce parle? Nous proposons d’identifier les vates de Lucrèce comme étant Orphée et Musée. Ces poètes étaient très connus dans l’antiquité, en particulier par leur association aux rituels mystiques. Ces cultes étaient pour leur part essentiellement eschatologiques. En ce sens, ils véhiculaient une croyance en l’immortalité de l’âme, et des menaces de punition ou de mauvais sort dans le cas où les rituels initiatiques n’étaient pas accomplis. Parmi ces rituels, on peut compter les fameux mystères d’Éleusis. Par leur forte association avec ces cultes, Orphée et Musée se présentent comme les poètes eschatologiques les plus importants du monde antique. Épicure et son système, qui enseignaient que l’âme était mortelle, étaient donc certainement en conflit avec l’ensemble des croyances associées aux rituels mystiques et à leur pratique. Qui plus est, une étude de la piété épicurienne révélera qu’Épicure encouragea la participation aux cultes traditionnels dont les mystères, tout en rejetant les raisons traditionnelles de ces rituels (bienfaits des dieux, eschatologie de l’âme, etc.) Ainsi, Épicure ne put manquer de critiquer les croyances associées aux initiations, ainsi que les deux poètes qui en étaient inséparables. C’est cette critique que nous retrouvons dans le poème de Lucrèce. / In lines102 and 109 of his first book, Lucretius uses the term vates of unnamed persons that preached eternal punishment of the soul. Lucretius (and Epicurus) reject the reality of these punishments, holding them a cause of needless trouble for the mind. Most translators understand the word vates to mean «prophet». But given such a translation, it is hard to identify clearly who the vates could be, especially if we seek the answer in the Roman world. This paper seeks a satisfactory answer to the question "Who are Lucretius’ vates?" The author proposes to identify those Lucretius had in mind when he wrote the lines as Orpheus and Musaeus. These two mythical poets were well known in antiquity, especially through their association with mystic rites and initiations. These rites, it turns out, were fundamentally eschatological. As such, they promoted belief in the immortality of the soul, and of eternal punishments if the rituals were not accomplished. Such rites included the famous Mysteries of Eleusis. Through their association with them, Orpheus and Musaeus are the most important eschatological poets of the ancient world. Because Epicurus asserted that the soul was mortal, there certainly existed a tension between the complex of beliefs associated with mystic rites and the Epicurean system. In addition, a study of Epicurean piety reveals that Epicurus encouraged participation in traditional cults, among them the mysteries, although the Epicurean had to reject the traditional justification of the cults (eschatology, good deeds from the gods, etc.). Consequently, Epicurus must have developed a critique of the beliefs associated with initiations, and certainly a critique of the two well-known poets that were inseparable from these rites. This critique is the one we find in Lucretius’ poem.

This thesis is a context-sensitive study of key epistemological commitments and concerns presented in Philo’s two series of exegetical writings. The major conclusion advanced in this thesis is that two theological epistemologies, distinct yet related, can be detected among these writings. The first epistemology is specific to the Allegorical Commentary. The second epistemology is specific to the ‘Exposition of the Law.’ The epistemology of the Allegorical Commentary reflects a threefold conviction: the sovereignty of God, the creaturely contingency of the human mind and its inescapable limitations. In conversation with key epistemological notions of his day, Philo develops this threefold conviction in exegetical discourses that are grounded in Pentateuchal texts portraying the God of Moses as both possessing epistemic authority and aiding the aspiring mind to gain purification and perfection in the knowledge of God. Guided by this threefold conviction, Philo enlists key metaphors of his day – initiation into divine mysteries and divine inspiration, among others –in order to capture something of the essence of Moses’ twofold way of ascending to the divine, an approach which requires at times the enhancement of human reason and at other times the eviction of human reason. The epistemology of the ‘Exposition’ reflects Philo’s understanding of the Pentateuch as a perfect whole partitioned into three distinct yet inseverable parts. Philo’s knowledge discourses in the ‘creation’ part of the ‘Exposition’ reflect two primary movements of thought. The first is heavily invested with a Platonic reading of Genesis 1.27 while the second invests Genesis 2.7 with a mixture of Platonic and Stoic notions of human transformation and well-being. Philo’s discourses in the ‘patriarchs’ segment reflect an interest in portraying the three great patriarchs as exemplars of the virtues of instruction (Abraham), nature (Isaac), and practice (Jacob) which featured prominently in Greek models of education. In the ‘Moses’ segment of the ‘Exposition,’ many of Philo’s discourses on knowledge are marked by an interest in presenting Moses as the ideal king, lawgiver, prophet and priest who surpasses Plato’s paradigm of the philosopher-king. In keeping with this view, Philo insists that the written laws of Moses represent the perfect counterpart to the unwritten law of nature. The life and laws of Moses serve as the paradigm for Philo to understand his own experiences of noetic ascent and exhort readers to cultivate similar aspirational notions and practices.