This paper looks to examine how the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) was meant to create a stable, unified Bosnia and Herzegovina versus what was actually achieved. The institutional rules of Dayton were designed to check and balance the three ethnic groups, yet the country is defined by political division rather than cooperation. The international community, prescribed by Dayton to oversee and enforce Bosnia’s transition, has supported a flawed institutional design. The theories of consociationalism, centripetalism, and the prevalence of the ethno-territorial principle are used to explain how Dayton has failed in facilitating cooperation and moderation. The impact of the prolonged, involved role of the High Representative and the European Court of Human Right's 2009 case, Sejdić and Finci, are used as analysis. I argue that Dayton’s institutional design has allowed ethnic division to define BiH's political system and the prolonged intervention of the High Representative has removed incentive for local elites to cooperate.

Twenty eight years ago there was a brutal war in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the three main ethnic groups in the country as a part of the bracke-up of Yugoslavia  (Balazs, 2008). This thesis analyses how the OHR has contributed to the reconciliation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina by looking at academic articles, information from local actors, analysing the local debate and semistructured interviews within the international community in BiH. Primarily, Bar-Tals conditions for reconciliation are used to measure how the OHR has contributed to the reconciliation process. It is clear that OHR has contributed positively to the reconciliation process however the process has been slow and some consider the reconciliation process to go in the wrong direction right now. To push the reconciliation process forward is explicitly not a part of the OHRs mandate however there is a lack of actors working with it and OHR has been a suitable actor to do so. However, the OHR have lost respect because they have not held people accountable when violating the OHR decisions. Additionally, the OHR is seen as anti-Serb by the Bosnian Serbs, even though it is unrightfully so this has resulted in there decisions occasionally leading to further polarisation between the ethnic groups. Thus, the OHR may not be the most suitable actor to push BiH forward in the reconciliation process in the future, however they are still needed to make sure that the peace agreement is followed to avoid another war. There is already extensive research on the reconciliation process in BiH and the OHR separately however there is very limited research on how the OHR have worked with the reconciliation process even though the research is relevant considering that there is an discussion on about how much influence the OHR should have in BiH and if they should remain in BiH (Hayat Media BiH, 2023). As well as to give the OHR an opportunity to learn from perilous mistakes and perfect their way of working with reconciliation.

<p>This dissertations aims to examine the EU Foreign Policy, and more precisely map the High Representative (HR) and his impact on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the EU. Using two theoretical frameworks, leadership theory and institutional theory, the study tests the explanatory power of these theories to explain the HR and his impact on the CFSP. The study is limited to a period of time, from November 2002 until December 2003, when several different events took place within the framework of the CFSP. The conclusion indicates that both leadership theory and institutional theory can help explain the development and outcomes of the CFSP.</p><p>Keywords: EU foreign policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, High Representative of the CFSP, European Security and Defence Policy, Iraq war, European Security Strategy</p>

This dissertations aims to examine the EU Foreign Policy, and more precisely map the High Representative (HR) and his impact on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the EU. Using two theoretical frameworks, leadership theory and institutional theory, the study tests the explanatory power of these theories to explain the HR and his impact on the CFSP. The study is limited to a period of time, from November 2002 until December 2003, when several different events took place within the framework of the CFSP. The conclusion indicates that both leadership theory and institutional theory can help explain the development and outcomes of the CFSP. Keywords: EU foreign policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, High Representative of the CFSP, European Security and Defence Policy, Iraq war, European Security Strategy

The primary aim of this essay and qualitative case study is to identify different explanations of why the European External Action Service (EEAS) was organised and why it resulted in today’s organisation. Existing research not entirely updated highlighted the need for new information. Furthermore, since existing research mostly focuses on other aspects, such as the character of EU foreign policy or the role of the EU internationally, this motivated an alternative approach. Three main branches of New Institutionalism (rational choice, historical and sociological) constitute a theoretical framework, aimed at identifying explanations perhaps not earlier contemplated. Findings suggest for example that a major reason for the organisation of this service is due to self-interest maximising, increasing the EUs political and economic influence by acting more coherent. The need to attain legitimacy and resemble other established actors by adopting institutionalised practices and structures in the homogeneous diplomatic field is another explanation. The Service is partially organised the way it is because of the successes of major EU institutions and the member states in ‘locking-in’ their preferences. Organisational characteristics can also be explained as results of several historical, institutional upgrades in relation to earlier treaties and debates on the future of Europe.

<p>This dissertation explores the ‘socio-cultural dilemma’ facing international peacebuilders in war-torn societies through a case study of the post-conflict process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is done with the help of a typological approach of the grid-group Cultural Theory framework, which defines four social solidarities – or ideal type cultures – of individualism, egalitarianism, fatalism and hierarchy. A central argument in the thesis is that international intervention is culturally individualistic and/or egalitarian, thus socio-culturally unviable in war-torn societies, which are usually dominated by hierarchical and fatalist social solidarities.</p><p>This underlying socio-cultural conflict is used to trace the Bosnian post-war process, where the relationship between the managing international institution – the Office of the High Representative of the International Community – and the local nationalist elites repeatedly changed in response to the failure of international policies to produce the desired result, namely broad socio-cultural change in the local politics and society. Four different periods in the process are identified: 1) ’economic conditionality’, 2) ‘Bonn Powers’, 3) ‘the concept of ownership’ and 4) ‘Euro-Atlantic integration’. Each period is defined by different culturally biased policies, supported by corresponding social relations and strategic behaviours.</p><p>The individualistic and egalitarian biased approaches usually resulted in failures, as they were not viable in the local socio-cultural context. After adapting to the local context, new viable approaches produced results in specific policy areas, but at the cost of unwanted side-effects in the form of reinforcement of dominant social solidarities. The result was therefore contrary to the broad goal of the process, which was to transform the local political culture.</p><p>In other words, the defining and re-defining of the OHR’s role in the Bosnian process was a consequence of the dilemma of having to make an unsatisfactory choice: either to adapt to the way the political game is played in the Bosnian socio-cultural context in order to achieve effectiveness in the policy process, or to stay true to the peacebuilders’ own cultural biases and attempt to change the local socio-cultural accordingly. In essence, it is argued, this is the socio-cultural viability dilemma that is inherent in international peacebuilding.</p><p>In unveiling of the socio-cultural viability dilemma, the dissertation explores central problems in the Bosnian post-conflict process. It provides a credible explanation to a number of hitherto unexplained difficulties and paradoxes experienced in Bosnia. It concludes that the international intervention in this particular case was neither a success story nor a failure per se, but one which failed to properly address the dilemma of socio-cultural viability. The key conclusions regarding peacebuilding in general are that there should be a greater under¬¬standing of socio-cultural issues in peacebuilding in order to better manage the socio-cultural viability dilemma. Practically, this means that international peacebuilders need to adapt to local context and strive towards the goal of local ownership of the process. The aim should be to make the intervention as viable as possible, as quickly as possible, to boldly implement policies that promote changes in the local socio-cultural context, and to withdraw only after the necessary conditions for local ownership are in place.</p>

This dissertation explores the ‘socio-cultural dilemma’ facing international peacebuilders in war-torn societies through a case study of the post-conflict process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is done with the help of a typological approach of the grid-group Cultural Theory framework, which defines four social solidarities – or ideal type cultures – of individualism, egalitarianism, fatalism and hierarchy. A central argument in the thesis is that international intervention is culturally individualistic and/or egalitarian, thus socio-culturally unviable in war-torn societies, which are usually dominated by hierarchical and fatalist social solidarities. This underlying socio-cultural conflict is used to trace the Bosnian post-war process, where the relationship between the managing international institution – the Office of the High Representative of the International Community – and the local nationalist elites repeatedly changed in response to the failure of international policies to produce the desired result, namely broad socio-cultural change in the local politics and society. Four different periods in the process are identified: 1) ’economic conditionality’, 2) ‘Bonn Powers’, 3) ‘the concept of ownership’ and 4) ‘Euro-Atlantic integration’. Each period is defined by different culturally biased policies, supported by corresponding social relations and strategic behaviours. The individualistic and egalitarian biased approaches usually resulted in failures, as they were not viable in the local socio-cultural context. After adapting to the local context, new viable approaches produced results in specific policy areas, but at the cost of unwanted side-effects in the form of reinforcement of dominant social solidarities. The result was therefore contrary to the broad goal of the process, which was to transform the local political culture. In other words, the defining and re-defining of the OHR’s role in the Bosnian process was a consequence of the dilemma of having to make an unsatisfactory choice: either to adapt to the way the political game is played in the Bosnian socio-cultural context in order to achieve effectiveness in the policy process, or to stay true to the peacebuilders’ own cultural biases and attempt to change the local socio-cultural accordingly. In essence, it is argued, this is the socio-cultural viability dilemma that is inherent in international peacebuilding. In unveiling of the socio-cultural viability dilemma, the dissertation explores central problems in the Bosnian post-conflict process. It provides a credible explanation to a number of hitherto unexplained difficulties and paradoxes experienced in Bosnia. It concludes that the international intervention in this particular case was neither a success story nor a failure per se, but one which failed to properly address the dilemma of socio-cultural viability. The key conclusions regarding peacebuilding in general are that there should be a greater under¬¬standing of socio-cultural issues in peacebuilding in order to better manage the socio-cultural viability dilemma. Practically, this means that international peacebuilders need to adapt to local context and strive towards the goal of local ownership of the process. The aim should be to make the intervention as viable as possible, as quickly as possible, to boldly implement policies that promote changes in the local socio-cultural context, and to withdraw only after the necessary conditions for local ownership are in place.

"Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en droit (LL.D) et à l'Université Jean Moulin en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en droit" / Les États européens n'ont, jusque dans les années 90, envisagé leur défense que dans le cadre d'alliances militaires et restaient maîtres de leur défense nationale. La mise en place d'une politique européenne de défense a toujours connu des obstacles, reflets des problèmes de souveraineté. Dans l'Union européenne, l'intégration politique, et en particulier celle de la défense, reste le domaine le plus incertain. Cette thèse de nature essentiellement empirico-descriptive aborde le thème de la défense européenne sous une approche réaliste, en plaçant les États au centre de la construction européenne et en en faisant les acteurs principaux. Depuis 1992, les États tentent de définir une politique européenne de défense mais rencontrent différentes difficultés. En effet, la politique européenne de défense souffre d'un double déficit. Le premier est un déficit institutionnel puisque la P.E.D. est loin d'être une politique commune et se limite à un mécanisme de coopération. Le second est un déficit matériel puisque l'Union européenne n'a pas la puissance militaire pour mettre en oeuvre une éventuelle décision commune. Afin d'évaluer les perspectives d'évolution d'une politique européenne de défense, nous devons étudier les différents défis que les États et les institutions communautaires doivent relever pour combler ces deux déficits. Les défis d'ordre institutionnel concernent les multiples acteurs, États et institutions, qui interviennent dans la définition de la P.E.S.D. Il s'agit de déterminer quelle instance est la mieux à même d'assurer la représentation internationale de l'Union européenne afin de donner l'impulsion politique nécessaire de la P.E.S.D. Les défis d'ordre militaire concernent les moyens que les différents acteurs souhaitent engager afin de concrétiser la politique définie. Toutes ces discussions montrent la justification d'un système européen de défense mais la question est de savoir si les États, acteurs centraux de la construction européenne, sont prêts à relever ces défis. / Up until the 1990's, the European States have solely thought of their security forces inside military alliances as they kept control of their national defense. The putting in place of a European defense policy has always met obstacles, which reflect the problems linked to the preservation of sovereignty. The political integration in Europe remains uncertain, mostly when it comes to common defense. With an empirical and descriptive manner, this thesis depicts the European defense theme in a realistic approach, by placing the States in the middle of the European construction and by giving them the main role. Since 1992, the States tried to lay down a European policy of defense, but they encountered various difficulties. Indeed, the European policy of defense suffers from a double deficit. The first is institutional since the European Defense Policy is far from being part of a common policy and is strictly a cooperation mechanism. The second is a material deficit since the European Union doesn't have a military force to implement a common decision. In order to evaluate the possible evolution of a European defense policy, we had to study the various challenges that the States and institutions must face in order to address those two deficits. The institutional challenge concerns the multiple actors, States and institutions, which intervene in the definition of E.P.S.D. This part will try to identify which institution would be best capable of ensuring the international representation of the European Union and to give the political impetus necessary to the putting into place of the E.P.S.D. The military challenge concern the means that the different actors would engage in order to concretize the policy. Ali these discussions show the justification of a European system of defense, but the question remains as to whether the States, central figures of the European construction, are ready to take up these challenges.

La présente étude est consacrée à la naissance d'une diplomatie européenne sous le regard polonais. À travers l'histoire de la construction européenne, il s'agit d'analyser la marche vers la mise en place du Service européen pour l'action extérieure (SEAE). Lancé en 2010 sous l'autorité du Haut Représentant de l'Union pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité, il devait réformer en profondeur les relations extérieures de l'Union européenne et lui permettre de s'affirmer en tant qu'acteur sur la scène internationale. Le regard de la Pologne permet de saisir plus concrètement les enjeux politiques et stratégiques liés à la création d'une diplomatie commune de l'UE. Deux aspects de cette diplomatie européenne sont étudiés : son visage et son appareil. Cette étude s'intéresse aux développements successifs de la représentation extérieure de l'UE dans la perspective de l'émergence d'une diplomatie européenne de réseaux. Elle démontre que la création du SEAE a provoqué des mouvements tectoniques dans l'architecture institutionnelle européenne et à l'intérieur des appareils diplomatiques nationaux. / The present study deals with the birth of a European diplomacy from the Polish point of view. Throughout the history of the European construction, the aim is to analyze the progress towards the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Launched in 2010 under the authority of the High Représentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and the Security Policy, it had to reform in depth the external relations of the European Union (EU) and allow it to assert itself as an actor on the international stage. The Polish approach enables to grasp more concretely the political and stratégie issues related to the création of a common EU diplomacy. Two aspects of this European diplomacy are studied : its face and its apparatus. This study examines the successive developments of the EU external représentation in the context of the emergence of European diplomacy networks. It demonstrates that the EEAS has caused tectonic movements in the European institutional architecture and within national diplomatie services.

Les États européens n'ont, jusque dans les années 90, envisagé leur défense que dans le cadre d'alliances militaires et restaient maîtres de leur défense nationale. La mise en place d'une politique européenne de défense a toujours connu des obstacles, reflets des problèmes de souveraineté. Dans l'Union européenne, l'intégration politique, et en particulier celle de la défense, reste le domaine le plus incertain. Cette thèse de nature essentiellement empirico-descriptive aborde le thème de la défense européenne sous une approche réaliste, en plaçant les États au centre de la construction européenne et en en faisant les acteurs principaux. Depuis 1992, les États tentent de définir une politique européenne de défense mais rencontrent différentes difficultés. En effet, la politique européenne de défense souffre d'un double déficit. Le premier est un déficit institutionnel puisque la P.E.D. est loin d'être une politique commune et se limite à un mécanisme de coopération. Le second est un déficit matériel puisque l'Union européenne n'a pas la puissance militaire pour mettre en oeuvre une éventuelle décision commune. Afin d'évaluer les perspectives d'évolution d'une politique européenne de défense, nous devons étudier les différents défis que les États et les institutions communautaires doivent relever pour combler ces deux déficits. Les défis d'ordre institutionnel concernent les multiples acteurs, États et institutions, qui interviennent dans la définition de la P.E.S.D. Il s'agit de déterminer quelle instance est la mieux à même d'assurer la représentation internationale de l'Union européenne afin de donner l'impulsion politique nécessaire de la P.E.S.D. Les défis d'ordre militaire concernent les moyens que les différents acteurs souhaitent engager afin de concrétiser la politique définie. Toutes ces discussions montrent la justification d'un système européen de défense mais la question est de savoir si les États, acteurs centraux de la construction européenne, sont prêts à relever ces défis. / Up until the 1990's, the European States have solely thought of their security forces inside military alliances as they kept control of their national defense. The putting in place of a European defense policy has always met obstacles, which reflect the problems linked to the preservation of sovereignty. The political integration in Europe remains uncertain, mostly when it comes to common defense. With an empirical and descriptive manner, this thesis depicts the European defense theme in a realistic approach, by placing the States in the middle of the European construction and by giving them the main role. Since 1992, the States tried to lay down a European policy of defense, but they encountered various difficulties. Indeed, the European policy of defense suffers from a double deficit. The first is institutional since the European Defense Policy is far from being part of a common policy and is strictly a cooperation mechanism. The second is a material deficit since the European Union doesn't have a military force to implement a common decision. In order to evaluate the possible evolution of a European defense policy, we had to study the various challenges that the States and institutions must face in order to address those two deficits. The institutional challenge concerns the multiple actors, States and institutions, which intervene in the definition of E.P.S.D. This part will try to identify which institution would be best capable of ensuring the international representation of the European Union and to give the political impetus necessary to the putting into place of the E.P.S.D. The military challenge concern the means that the different actors would engage in order to concretize the policy. Ali these discussions show the justification of a European system of defense, but the question remains as to whether the States, central figures of the European construction, are ready to take up these challenges. / "Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en droit (LL.D) et à l'Université Jean Moulin en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en droit"