Faking in applications was found to be an important issue in which social desirability plays a relevant role. The present study brings Social Desirability Responding, Honesty-Humility, and different stakes of situations into relation. Social Desirability Responding, i.e. Communion Management and Self-Deceptive Enhancement, operationalized by the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) and Honesty-Humility (HEXACO-60) are analysed regarding their relationships and differences in and between high-stake, low-stake, and high-stake-low-framed situations. Relationships between Honesty-Humility and Communion Management were significantly positive, while no relationship between Honesty-Humility and Self-Deceptive Enhancement was found. There were also no significant differences in the constructs across situations. It was further investigated whether individuals scoring low in Honesty-Humility show different responding behaviour dependent on situational frames compared to individuals scoring high in Honesty-Humility. No significant differences were found. Results imply that Social Desirable Responding scales do not measure what they intent to, hence further research is needed. The tested high-stake-low-framed situational instruction did not significantly reduce faking. However, exploring the option of framing application situations is recommended for organizations. Further, the problematic nature of measuring Social Desirability Responding is considered.

This is a thesis centering around the importance of humility in Martin Luther's Lectures on Romans, written in 1515-1516. Included are a word study of humility and its derivatives in Luther's original Latin text, an exposition of each usage, and a thematic exegesis of Luther's theology of humility in his Lectures on Romans.

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[pt] Conceitos Essenciais para uma Teologia Moral Fundamental pós-conciliar: reflexões a partir da Ética de Jesus nas Bem-aventuranças de Mt 5,3-10 propõe uma reflexão acerca das questões morais que assolam a humanidade. Faz um estudo filosófico do campo que alguns nomeiam de ética e outros, de moral para propor uma reflexão acerca da teologia moral e/ou da ética religiosa. Em seguida, procura estabelecer os fundamentos da ética teológica contemporânea. Sendo assim, faz uso dos conceitos de fenomenologia e intencionalidade, além de adentrar a antropologia teológica de Edith Stein e a Ética do Seguimento de Jesus de Nazaré. Em seguida, apresenta-se uma fundamentação histórica da teologia moral, desde o horizonte pós-tridentino e casuístico até o contexto pós-Vaticano II, por meio de seus principais teólogos moralistas. Na sequência, faz-se um esforço de reflexão acerca das Bem-Aventuranças, com uma exegese e hermenêutica de cunho ético-teológico. Por fim, debruça-se sobre os conceitos fundamentais da Teologia Moral Contemporânea com um destaque maior para os conceitos de Opção Fundamental, Discernimento Moral e Consciência. / [en] Essential Concepts for a Post-Conciliar Fundamental Moral Theology: Reflections from the Ethics of Jesus in the Beatitudes of Mt 5,3-10 proposes a reflection on the moral issues that plague humanity. There is a philosophical study of the field that some call ethics and others, moral to propose a reflection on moral theology and/or religious ethics. Then there is an attempt to the foundations of contemporary theological ethics. Therefore, the concepts of phenomenology and intentionality are used, in addition to entering the theological anthropology of Edith Stein and the Ethics of the Follow of Jesus of Nazareth. Then, a historical foundation of moral theology is presented, from the post-Tridentine and casuistic horizons to the post-Vatican II context, through its main moralist theologians. Subsequently, an effort is made to reflect on the Beatitudes, with an exegesis and hermeneutics of an ethical-theological nature. Finally, it focuses on the fundamental concepts of Contemporary Moral Theology with a greater emphasis on the concepts of Fundamental Option, Moral Discernment and Conscience.

This research adopts a heuristic method of inquiry to explore the intersections of social justice theory, cultural humility, and community art therapy to strengthen both the internal awareness and art therapy practices of the researcher. Data was collected over a structured eight-week period through art-making and reflective writing. Six core themes were extrapolated from the data, which were then applied to the researcher’s experience with a community-based art therapy engagement. Through this process of investigating authentic self-reflection and deep consideration for community-based applications, the researcher illuminated personal biases, beliefs, and assumptions to better understand personal and societal implications of the adoption of a more culturally humble art therapy practice.

This thesis deals with the research of humility from the view of its elusiveness - it does not define humility and it also does not even try to do so. Conversely, it walks around the phenomenon of humility and points at it in different ways. It uses examples, mostly from works of Comenius, and builds it with parallels from works of Jung, Foucault, Jünger, Drewermann and some other authors. It delimits humility against pride at example of different view of "epoché" in works of Comenius and Descartes; pride is basicly seen where human does not leave any unnaturalness and completely absorbs the world by his own opinion; work also uses Husserl's criticism of Descartes' view of "epoché" and Comenius' criticism of Machiavelli is also mentioned. Thence, the thesis sees the principle of humility in a close relation with the principle of faith or simply with the knowledge of the principle of some higher instance than the human's own sense is. The principle of humility is also nearby to the principle of grace - for this example the thesis researches Simone Weil's concept of "weight and grace"; grace from this point of view is an unpredictable step outside the performance-based part of human life. This thesis deals with mentioned phenomenons at first at the level of the visions of the world, later at the...

When should it be permissible to act against someone's expressed wishes in their best interests? In both political philosophy and legal practice, answers to this question often appeal to the concept of autonomy. Broadly, the idea is that if a person is sufficiently self-governing, then their wishes must prevail; but if they are not, then their wishes need not be respected when promoting whatever is good for them. This thesis analyses both philosophical models of autonomy and the practice of judges in England and Wales when implementing the Mental Capacity Act 2005. With regard to the philosophical models, it finds that, despite claims to the contrary, they do not offer a plausible way of assessing whether someone else is autonomous without appealing to values that are not the person's own. With regard to legal practice, it finds that, although judges speak about 'autonomy' in contradictory ways, a coherent account of when they will find that they must respect a person's expressed wishes can be constructed. This first stage of analysis makes a gulf between 'autonomy' in philosophy and law obvious. When philosophers talk about 'autonomy', they are largely concerned with the person's relationship to themselves. When judges talk about 'autonomy', they are largely concerned with the person's relationship to the world. 'Autonomy' in the philosophical sense cannot justify current practice because it does not deal with the same subject matter. Analysis of mental capacity cases does, however, allow the development of an alternative justification for actions against a person's expressed wishes. This justification lies in an evaluation of the entire situation, not of the person. It is not reducible to any model of autonomy, not even 'relational' models. Taken seriously, this justification requires a reorientation of the ethics of mental capacity law: away from overreliance on relatively few abstract 'principles' and towards articulating the difficulty and complexity of real situations. The thesis offers two papers towards the development of this latter mode.

Cultural awareness is an ethical standard in the social work profession and, as the diversity in the United States continues to grow, it is a social work practice problem when cultural awareness is not implemented in mental health settings. The National Association of Social Workers revised the cultural awareness standards to include cultural humility and intersectionality as practice indicators. The purpose of this action research study was to examine how clinical social workers demonstrated cultural humility and intersectionality in mental health settings. Person-centered theory guided this study and a total of 17 clinical social workers in New Mexico participated in in-depth interviews to give examples of clinical practice behaviors that demonstrated cultural humility and intersectionality. Thematic analysis was used to identify common themes, which included (a) genuine interest in the client's culture, (b) therapist congruence, (c) unconditional positive regard, and (d) empathic understanding. The implications of this study for social work practice and social change are that findings could contribute to improved cultural awareness in mental health settings and decrease mental health disparities among minorities. Recommendations include creating continuing education, mentoring minority college students on their career path in mental health, and developing a mental health business model that integrates cultural awareness.

This thesis contributes to a field of Kant’s practical philosophy that has received renewed attention, namely his moral anthropology. While it is true that Kant, in some of his best-known writings, literally says that the fundamental ground of morality must be pure and thus entirely free from admixture with anthropological principles, he nevertheless admits that these “subjective conditions” in human nature that “either hinder or help people in fulfilling the laws of the metaphysics of morals” make up the foundation of all applied ethics. In other words, in order to know if and to which extent human beings are susceptible to moral commands, we need to know our abilities as well as our limitations. Kant wrote several works about these topics and his long-term teaching of anthropology shows that he had a continuing interest in the theory of man. Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that Kant, during the mid-1760s was highly influenced by Rousseau. It is hardly a coincidence that Kant’s first reference to the “unchanging nature of human beings” appeared at the same time as Rousseau proclaimed the need of finding the true nature of man – the unmasked being who has not been damaged by social prejudice. In order to understand man and his moral capacities we need to find his true essence or what really constitutes humanity. Accordingly, a careful examination of the multifaceted characteristics of human nature is needed in order to understand the very concept of a moral being and to account for his moral progress. I will argue that Kant’s early insights about this need runs like a thread through his entire course of philosophy and that Rousseauian ideas actually affect also his critical ethics. They agree that man is sociable, but also suspicious. He has good predispositions but is likewise susceptible to corruption. My analysis will shed light on man’s eternal balance between conflicting forces and on the means needed for the progress towards the vocation of humankind. This reveals the need of knowing oneself and explains why the question: “what is the human being?” ought to be taken seriously.