Orientador: José Oscar de Almeida Marques / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-20T23:24:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_LailaT.Correae_M.pdf: 649829 bytes, checksum: bf737501bf46eebb811b3721472034fe (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: David Hume, no Tratado da Natureza Humana, livro 1, parte 4, seção 2, "Do ceticismo quanto aos sentidos", pretende explicar a causa de nossa crença na existência do mundo exterior, isto é, a crença em existências contínuas e distintas da mente e da percepção. Ele inicia a seção com a seguinte afirmação: devemos dar nosso assentimento ao princípio referente à existência dos corpos, embora não possamos ter a pretensão de sustentar a sua veracidade por meio de argumentos filosóficos (T 1.4.2.1). Mas, ao final da seção, sua postura diante da crença na existência do mundo exterior muda totalmente, como Hume mesmo diz, em T 1.4.2.56, penúltimo parágrafo: "iniciei este tema com a premissa de que deveria ter uma fé implícita em nossos sentidos, e que essa é a conclusão que extrairia da totalidade de meu raciocínio", contudo, argumenta ele, "sinto-me neste momento possuído pelo sentimento contrário", ou seja, Hume não deposita mais nenhuma confiança nos sentidos, ou antes, imaginação. Por que Hume chega a tal conclusão? Hume argumenta que essas existências contínuas e distintas são ficções da imaginação e, como tais, não merecem nosso assentimento e confiança. Essa situação embaraçosa conduz Hume a um ceticismo radical que, segundo o próprio filósofo, somente pode ser curado por meio do "descuido e desatenção". Mas, como poderíamos interpretar essa declaração de Hume? Minha proposta de interpretação defende que através do conceito humeano de ceticismo mitigado presente no Tratado, livro 1, parte 4, seção 7, "Conclusão deste livro", e na Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano, seção 12, "Da filosofia acadêmica ou cética", somos capazes de compreendê-la. Nas duas obras mencionadas Hume apresenta o modo de investigação filosófica que é, para ele, o mais adequado, a saber: o método cético. Contudo, o ceticismo de Hume não é o ceticismo radical que impede toda a ação, mas sim um ceticismo mais mitigado que combina consigo uma parcela da "mistura bruta e terrena" (T 1.4.7.14), constituinte da vida comum e afazeres cotidianos / Abstract: David Hume, in the Treatise of Human Nature, book 1, part 4, section 2, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses", wants to explain the cause of our belief in the existence of external world, i.e., the belief in existence continued and distinct of the mind and perception. He begins the section with the following affirmation: we might give our assentiment to the principle regarding the existence of external world, even though we cannot pretend to sustain its veracity through philosophical arguments (T 1.4.2.1). But, at the end of section, Hume's position as regards of the belief of external world changes completely, as Hume says, in T 1.4.2.56: "I begun this subject with premising, that we ought to have an implicit faith in our senses, and that this wou'd be the conclusion, I shou'd draw from the whole of my reasoning", however, he says, "I feel myself at present of quite contrary sentiment", i.e., Hume didn't deposit any more trust in the senses, or first, imagination. Why Hume concluded that? Hume says that these continued and distinct existences are fictions of imagination, and in this way, don't diserve our trust and assentiment. This complicated situation brings Hume to the radical scepticism that, according to himself, can only be cured by "carelessness and in-attention". But how can we interpret Hume's declaration? My proposal is that by means of the humean concept of mitigate scepticism present in the Treatise, book 1, part 4, section 7, and in Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section 12, we can comprehended Hume's situation. In both books, he presented for us a way of philosophical investigation that is, for him, more adequate: the sceptical method. However, humean scepticism is not the radical one that obstructed all action, instead, more mitigated humean scepticism brings with itself one part of the "gross earthy mixture, as an ingredient" (T 1.4.7.14), that constitutes common life / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

Submitted by Maria Dulce (mdulce@ndc.uff.br) on 2014-07-01T17:14:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Lopes, Marcos-Tese-2014.pdf: 6603472 bytes, checksum: 9e8313f43a0e7522a9525cbf008489ee (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-01T17:14:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lopes, Marcos-Tese-2014.pdf: 6603472 bytes, checksum: 9e8313f43a0e7522a9525cbf008489ee (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Esta Tese de Doutorado em História Social tem como objeto de estudo a obra do fotógrafo Mario Baldi, austríaco radicado no Brasil a partir de 1921. A trajetória profissional de Baldi foi marcada pela fotografia etnográfica e jornalística, com ênfase nos povos indígenas brasileiros. O objetivo do estudo é abordar as representações da alteridade cultural presentes na produção do fotógrafo, desde sua imigração até os anos 1950. A pesquisa apresenta também o círculo de sociabilidades do fotógrafo e o circuito das suas imagens, com o objetivo de delinear suas práticas fotográficas e como elas compuseram a experiência fotográfica brasileira na primeira metade do século XX. / This doctoral thesis hás the work of the photographer Mario Baldi as its object of study. Baldi, an Austrian who immigrated to Brazil in 1921, dedicated his career as a photographer to ethnography and journalism, especially among Brazilian indigenous peoples. The aim of this study is to address the representations of cultural otherness in the photographer’s work, since his immigration until the 1950s. The research stresses as well the social relations of Baldi and the circuits of his images, so that one can grasp the Brazilian photographic experience in the twentieth century through his photographic practices.

Orientador: Luiz Roberto Monzani / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-04T03:36:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mattos_ElizangelaInocencio_M.pdf: 6574100 bytes, checksum: 8bb5bb8ed2deb9752c86056752d1789c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2003 / Resumo: O presente trabalho tem por objetivo, situar a obra de Sade na história das idéias, explorando as aproximações de seu pensamento com os principais fIlósofos do iluminismo. Em seguida, propõe uma análise do, caráter emancipador do ateísmo na obra. Para depois, analisar a imaginação em seu contexto, como principal instrumento para a verdadeira liberdade do homem. De posse destes elementos, propomos uma análise da critica de Sade à idéia de pacto social, tomando como exemplo, a idéia de pacto descrita por Rousseau em seu Contrato Social / Abstract: The present work has for objective to point out the workmanship of the Marquis of Sade in the history of the ideas, being explored the approaches of its workmanship with the main philosophers of the Iluminism. After that, it considers an analysis of emancipador carater of the ateísm in the workmanship. It stops later, to analyze the imagination in its context, as main instrument for the true freedom of the mano Of ownership of these elements, we consider an analysis of criticizes of Sade the idea of social pact, taking as example, the described ide_ of pact for Rousseau in its Social Contract / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

Cette thèse se propose d’analyser les manifestations oniriques (rêve, hallucination, projection mentale) dans six films de Terry Gilliam réalisés entre 1985 et 2009 : Brazil, Fisher King, L’Armée des douze singes, Las Vegas parano, Tideland et L’Imaginarium du docteur Parnassus. Après avoir déterminé l’étendue et les limites de l’espace onirique, la première partie en décrit les principales caractéristiques sur le plan dramatique (organisation et place des manifestations dans les films) et sur le plan formel (effets oniriques). La deuxième partie s’intéresse plus particulièrement au corps du héros "gilliamien", qui sert d’interface entre le réel et l’onirisme, en insistant sur trois points : le mouvement du corps, l’importance accordée au regard et la capacité de dédoublement. Enfin, la troisième partie aborde les manifestations oniriques sous l’angle de la dimension critique à l’œuvre dans ces six films. À partir d’une vision pessimiste de l’existence tempérée par des notes d’espoir, Gilliam remet en cause les sociétés occidentales contemporaines, leur matérialisme et leur idéologie libérale. / This Ph.D. attempts to analyse the numerous dreamlike scenes (dreams, hallucinations, mind projections) to be found in six films directed by Terry Gilliam from 1985 to 2009: Brazil, The Fisher King, Twelve Monkeys, Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas, Tideland, and The Imaginarium of Doctor Parnassus. The first part delineates the range and limits of the dreamlike occurrences as well as their main characteristics, both on the dramatic side (the organisation and distribution of dreamlike scenes) and on the formal side (dreamlike effects). The second part deals with the main character’s body as an interface between the “real world” and the dream world depicted by the films, laying emphasis on three aspects: the body language, the all-important gaze and the hero’s ability to split himself in two. Finally, the third part studies how the dreamlike scenes contribute to build up Gilliam’s critical stance toward the modern world. Informed by a pessimistic view on human life barely alleviated by some glimpses of hope, Gilliam challenges the contemporary occidental societies, which he sees as suffused with materialism and a free-enterprise ideology.

Au XVIIème siècle, la Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes donne l’occasion de s’interroger sur la manière dont l’homme construit ses connaissances. Deux facultés rentrent en jeu : l’imagination et la raison. Descartes, semble-t-il, a fait de la raison la seule faculté permettant à l’homme de connaître. Par ailleurs, Vico met en évidence l’imagination qui participe activement à la cognition chez l’homme. Ainsi, la tradition philosophique a tendance à faire de l’un l’opposé de l’autre. Mais, pouvons-nous prendre pour acquis une telle opposition ?En s’adonnant à une analyse du corpus cartésien, qu’est-il possible de faire ressortir au sujet de l’imagination ? Que dire de Vico qui, dans sa Scienza Nuova, prend en compte, d’une manière originale, ces deux facultés qui jouent un grand rôle dans la question de la cognition.D’un côté, des critiques font de Vico le farouche opposant de Descartes. D’un autre côté, une relecture de la position cartésienne de l’imagination nous conduit à une reconsidération de l’opposition Descartes/ Vico. La position de Vico permet de considérer l’imagination et la raison dans une relation de hiérarchisation et de complémentarité. Ainsi, l’imagination est chronologiquement la première faculté qui apparaît chez l’Homme. La raison la suit. Mais, ceci signifie t-il que l’une prime sur l’autre ou que l’une relève d’une plus grande importance que l’autre? Aussi, où Vico puise-t-il ses idées ? Comment agence-t-il celles-ci pour une nouvelle perspective dans la construction des connaissances ? Ces questions nous invitent à considérer le rapport Descartes/ Vico comme complexe et ambigu.Notre travail consiste à fixer le statut de l’imagination et son rapport avec la raison chez les deux philosophes et apporter un caractère scientifique à la première. Ceci nous amène à étudier le statut des deux facultés, la relation profonde qui existe entre elles lors de l’appréhension du réel. / In the 17th century, the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns gives the opportunity to wonder about the way in which men build knowledge. Two faculties come into play: imagination and reason. Descartes, it seems, has made reason the only faculty enabling men to know. In addition, Vico highlights the imagination that actively participates in cognition in humans. Thus, the philosophical tradition tends to make the one the opposite of the other. But can we take such opposition for granted?By indulging in an analysis of the Cartesian corpus, what is it possible to bring out about the imagination? What about Vico, who in his Scienza Nuova takes into account, in an original way, those two faculties that play a great role in the question of cognition.On the one hand, critics make Vico the fierce opponent of Descartes. On the other hand, a re-reading of the Cartesian position of the imagination leads us to a reconsideration of the opposition Descartes / Vico. Vico's position allows us to consider the imagination and the reason in a relation of hierarchization and complementarity. Thus, imagination is chronologically the first faculty which appears in men. The reason follows. But does this mean that the one over the other or that one is of greater importance than the other? So where does Vico get his ideas? How does he organize these for a new perspective in the construction of knowledge? These questions invite us to consider the Descartes / Vico report as complex and ambiguous.Our work consists in fixing the status of the imagination and its relationship with reason in the two philosophers and bringing a scientific character to the first. This leads us to study the status of the two faculties, the deep relationship that exists between them when apprehending the real.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This work intends to present the development of Ricoeur s theories of mimesis and representation, which he has built upon the concept of semantic innovation linked to metaphor. With Ricoeur, we followed the incorporation of Aristotle s mimesis ( bringingbefore- the-eyes ) and productive imagination (Kant s doctrine of schematism and free play concept) into the contemporary philosophy, drawing parallels with Husserl s phenomenology and with the analytic philosophy, through its lexicon (Wittgenstein s seeingas concept). We attempted to reassemble Ricoeur s theorization concerning the creation of poetic imagery and its practical importance to the redescription of reality and to art: the utopia and the creativity. In order to identify that creativity in Ricoeur s philosophy, we referred to the conflicts of opinion that surround metaphor, concept and imagination, pointing out the opposition between Derrida s ideas and Nietzsche s theory of intuitive metaphors (first metaphor) and presenting the cognitive aspects of poetic-creative imagination. The practical pertinence of this theory, as well as its aesthetic elements, is analyzed under the aegis of views of theorists who emphasized the formative role of imagination and metaphor (Jérome Cottin, Jean-Luc Amalric). / Esta dissertação teve como objetivo geral mostrar o desenvolvimento das teorias mimética e imaginativa que Ricoeur formulou a partir do conceito de inovação semântica relacionado aos enunciados metafóricos. Seguimos, com Ricoeur, a inserção da mímesis aristotélica ( pôr sob os olhos ) e da imaginação produtora (doutrina kantiana do esquematismo e jogo livre ) na filosofia contemporânea, no diálogo com a fenomenologia husserliana e com a filosofia analítica através de seu vocabulário (o ver como de Wittgenstein). Procurou-se reconstruir a fundamentação ricoeuriana da produção de imagens poéticas, e sua importância prática na redescrição da realidade e na arte: a utopia e a criatividade. Entendemos que para mostrar essa criatividade dentro da filosofia de Ricoeur foi necessário fazer referência às disputas em torno da metáfora, do conceito e da imaginação, e acompanhar a disputa com Derrida acerca da tese de Nietzsche (as metáfora intuitivas originárias ), além de apresentamos os aspectos cognoscitivos da imaginação poético-criadora. A relevância prática dessa teoria, assim como os elementos estéticos encontrados nela, é discutida através dos comentadores que deram primazia ao papel constituinte da imaginação e da metáfora (Jérôme Cottin, Jean-Luc Amalric).

The topic of this diploma thesis is the matter of the role of imagination in aesthetic appreciation of nature. Starting points of the inquiry are the concepts of Ronald W. Hepburn, Emily Brady, Marcia Muelder Eaton and others. This work tries to show, in spite of the divergencies of views that the philosophers hold, not only the differences but also similarities of their apprehensions of the role of imagination in aesthetic appreciation of nature. The aim of the thesis is among others to answer the following questions: What are the modes of imaginative activity relating to aesthetic object? What is the difference between execution of imagination in aesthetic experiencing of nature and in experiencing works of art? What is the role of exercise of imagination in developing and preserving sustainable environments? Is the cooperation of imaginative model and science- based model of aesthetic appreciation of nature possible? The first part of the work concerns the presentation of relevant approaches. The second part compares different understandings of the role of imagination in aesthetic appreciation of nature and it answers the question of how imagination relates to the discussed aesthetic object. The following parts of the work focus on answering above-mentioned questions.

The theoretical starting point of the thesis focuses on the contemporary concept of the development of personality and musical preschool values. It brings closer the psychological and physiological mechanisms of the connections between musicality, personality structures and dynamics in the ontogenetic development of the child before its entry into elementary school. It aims from the field of musicality into the essence of musical imagination and ideas shaping the association. In the practical part a partial deduction of the theoretical background down to the methodological level is carried out. It deals about eroding the syncretic perception in the context of changes in abstraction from the illustrative factuality, (eg. the characters, colors) to non-illustrative factuality (music notes, graphic signs rhythmic articulation and movement melodies). In this sense it touches the current scientific trends about the constitution trans-methodology as a discipline. Keywords Musical imagination, project, preschool age, abilities and skills

Grief and ritual : a pastoralperspective This study was undertaken with the aim to investigate the value of ritual for pastoral care, with a specific focus on loss – mainly the loss of a loved one because of death. Ritual is approached from a variety of perspectives in order to build a foundation for an understanding of the origins, functions and purposes of ritual. From this understanding of ritual, the effectiveness of ritual in the practice of pastoral care with the grieving is explored. Not only knowledge of ritual, but also the effect of death on those who are left behind and the process of grieving should be understood before the role of ritual in grief care can be investigated. The pastoral caregiver plays a guiding role in the practice of rituals in grief care. The bereaved should always be the main actor and the ritual should be planned in consultation with the person for whose benefit it is applied and performed. A lack of knowledge concerning the effect of death on people and systems as well as the process of grieving, can lead to people – pastoral caregivers and family, friends and colleagues who form the support system of those in the grief process – doing more harm than good, even though they meant well. Knowledge and an understanding of the process of grieving can enhance the support offered both by pastoral caregivers and by support systems. Since grief work cannot be done in isolation, this study emphasizes the involvement of the supporting group or community of the bereaved. Pastors and the faith community supporting the grieving persons should also beware of and actively oppose damaging theologies with regard to death. This study prefers ‘grief tasks’ that are to be completed, to ‘phases of grief’ through which the person goes, since the latter implies passivity on the side of the bereaved – something that ‘happens to’ them. ‘Grief tasks’, on the other hand, implies an active involvement in working through grief towards a desired outcome and a new future that does not exclude the deceased from the narrative of the lives of the living, but includes it in a way that accepts the death and supplements the new life narrative with memories of the deceased. Rituals of remembrance are pivotal since remembering in a healthy way has healing power for those who grieve. Ritual is found to be a very useful resource in pastoral care with the grieving and bereaved. A cognitive approach to healing is not sufficient. A cognitive-emotive approach is more appropriate, since it involves both mind and emotions. Ritual contributes a further aspect and speaks to a person’s whole being. Ritual can reach beyond words because it is symbolically laden and requires the active participation and performance of the bereaved. When grieving persons make the decision to deal with their loss actively, they will likely reach the desired outcome sooner and more effectively than would otherwise have been the case. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2014. / gm2014 / Practical Theology / unrestricted

My research focuses on the philosophy of imagination. Within the analytic tradition, there recently has been a growing interest in imagination. The current research lies at the crossroads of various sub-disciplines of philosophy, including aesthetics, moral psychology, ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. My work joins this choir as a voice from within philosophy of mind. My dissertation addresses two questions within philosophy of imagination. What I call the Relation Question asks what is the proper relation between supposition and imagination, and what I call the Unification Question asks what is the imagination. With regards to the Relation Question, philosophers answer it in one of two ways: either supposition and imagination are distinct mental capacities (what I call two-nature views) or supposition is a kind of imagination (what I call one-nature views). I argue that both views fail to explain all of the features central to the relation. With regards to the Unification Question, many philosophers doubt it has an answer because there is no clear way to unify the disparate activities of imagination. I argue that this skepticism is the result of mischaracterizing the relation between imagining and supposing. Thus, I answer both the Relation and Unification Questions by arguing that both imagining and supposing (as we typically understand these terms) are both instances of what I call the as-if-true attitude. I call this the as-if-true attitude view of imagining. The explanatory payoff of this is that my view can explain all of the features central to the relation without positing two distinct mental capacities (as two-nature views do) and without getting facts about supposition wrong (as one-nature views do). It also gives us a way of seeing how we might unify the different activities of imagination. Finally, I demonstrate that my view has application to what is known in the literature as the phenomenon of imaginative resistance. This phenomenon has to do with competent imaginers failing to comply with invitations to imagine certain propositions. It has been noted in the literature that there is variation to this phenomenon, where some people experience it and some do not. Some philosophers attempt to explain this by appealing to contextual factors. Thus, I call them Contextual Variant Views. I argue that these views fail to account for all of variation. I show that from my as-if-true attitude view comes another view that I call Constraint Variant View. I argue that this view can account for all of the variation of imaginative resistance.