Avec la mondialisation, les groupes de sociétés ont multiplié les transactions internationales et, de fait, les phénomènes d'optimisation fiscale internationale. La nécessité de fixer des prix de transfert « objectifs » afin de permettre une juste répartition de la manne fiscale entre les États s'est très vite imposée. La remise en cause des prix de transfert conduit à une double imposition économique.Aujourd'hui, le principe de pleine concurrence est la norme internationale utilisée comme norme de référence pour la fixation de prix de transfert « objectifs ». Toutefois, cette norme est perfectible. Aussi, la communauté internationale cherche et expérimente des alternatives à la norme du prix du marché. Dès lors, les réglementations étatiques et internationales sont amenées à repenser la problématique des prix de transfert dans sa dimension économique et non plus dans un but exclusivement fiscal.L'évolution majeure de ces dernières années est la nouvelle approche de la relation administration fiscale/entreprise. L'entreprise doit fixer ses prix de transfert en accord avec l'administration pour réduire le risque de double imposition économique. Le souci d'assurer une juste répartition des recettes fiscales entre les États et de garantir la sécurité juridique au développement du commerce mondial, constituent les défis de demain. / As a result of globalization, multinational companies have increased their international transactions, and in consequence, international tax planning. The need to determine "objective" transfer pricing in order to ensure the fair allocation of tax revenue between States quickly became a global necessity. However, the readjustment of transfer pricing as carried out by tax administrations leads to double taxation.At present, the arm's length principle is the international standard used as a reference norm to determine "objective" transfer pricing. However, this standard is perfectible and so the international community has been looking for and trying out alternatives to the norm of arm's length pricing. Consequently, both domestic and international rules and regulations need to be reassessed with regard to the problems of transfer pricing so that transfer pricing issues can be addressed not only from the perspective of tax revenue but also taking into account their overall economic dimension.The major evolution over last few years is the new approach to the tax administration/company relationship. The company must determine its transfer pricing in agreement with the tax administration in order to reduce the risk of economic double taxation. This aims to make sure that a fair share of income tax is apportioned between States and also guarantees a secure legal framework for the future allowing international trade to continue to develop and rise to meet the challenges that lie ahead.

Cette thèse est un recueil de trois articles sur la théorie microéconomique. Les deux premiers traitent de la question de la course vers le bas lorsque les gouvernements se livrent à la concurrence pour certains facteurs mobiles. Le troisième article propose une extension du problème d'appariement plusieurs-à-un en y introduisant des agents de tailles différentes. Dans le premier article, nous montrons comment le résultat standard de course vers le bas (race-to-the-bottom) peut être évité en introduisant du bien public dans un modèle de compétition fiscale. Notre économie comporte deux juridictions peuplées par de la main-d’œuvre parfaitement mobile répartie en deux catégories : qualifiée et non-qualifiée. Les gouvernements, en poursuivant un objectif Rawlsien (max-min), annoncent simultanément leur projet d'investissement en bien public avant d'adopter une politique de taxation non-linéaire du revenu. Les travailleurs, après avoir observé la politique de taxation des différents gouvernements et leurs promesses d'investissement en bien publique, choisissent chacun un lieu de résidence et une offre de travail. Ainsi, les gouvernements atteignent leurs objectifs de redistribution en cherchant à attirer de la main-d’œuvre productive à travers la fourniture de bien public en plus d'une politique de taxation favorable. Nous montrons qu'il existe des équilibres où les travailleurs qualifiés paient une taxe strictement positive. En outre, lorsque l'information sur le type des travailleurs est privée, il existe, pour certaines valeurs des paramètres, des équilibres où la main-d’œuvre non-qualifiée bénéficie d'un transfert net (ou subvention) de la part du gouvernement. Dans le second article, nous étudions comment le modèle standard de compétition des prix à la Bertrand avec des produits différenciés pourrait fournir des informations utiles pour les programmes de citoyenneté par investissement dans les Caraïbes. Nous montrons que lorsque les pays peuvent être classés en deux types en fonction de la taille de leur demande, l'imposition d'un prix minimum uniforme et d'un quota maximum appropriés amène les pays à un résultat efficace qui Pareto domine l'équilibre de Nash non coopératif. Enfin, le troisième article explore une extension du problème standard d'appariement plusieurs-à-un en y incorporant des agents de tailles différentes (familles de réfugiés) d'un côté, à assigner à des foyers de capacités différentes de l'autre. La taille d'une famille de réfugiés représente le nombre de membres qui la compose. Une caractéristique spécifique à ce modèle est qu'il n'autorise pas de répartir les membres d'une même famille entre différents foyers. Il est bien connu que, dans ces conditions, bon nombre de propriétés désirables des règles d'appariement s'effondrent. Nous faisons donc l'hypothèse des priorités croissantes avec la taille pour chaque foyer, c'est-à-dire qu'une famille d'accueil préférerait toujours un plus grand nombre de réfugiés tant que la capacité de son foyer le permet. Nous montrons qu'un appariement stable par paire existe toujours sous cette hypothèse et nous proposons un mécanisme pour le trouver. Nous montrons que notre mécanisme est non-manipulable du point de vue des réfugiés : aucun groupe de réfugiés ne pourrait tirer profit d'une déclaration truquée de leurs préférences. Notre mécanisme est également optimal pour les réfugiés en ce sens qu'il n'existe aucun autre mécanisme stable par paire qui serait plus profitable à tous les réfugiés. / This thesis is a collection of three articles on microeconomic theory. The first two articles are concerned with the issue of race-to-the-bottom when governments engage in competition for some mobile factor. The third article proposes an extension for the many-to-one matching problem by introducing different-size agents. In the first article, we show how the standard race-to-the-bottom result can be avoided by introducing public good into a tax competition model. Our economy has two jurisdictions populated by perfectly mobile workers divided into two categories: skilled and unskilled. Governments, in pursuit of a Rawlsian objective (max-min), simultaneously announce their plans for investing in public good before deploying a nonlinear income tax schedule. After observing the tax schedules of the governments and their promises to invest in public good, each worker chooses a place of residence and a supply of labour. Thus, governments achieve their redistribution objectives by seeking to attract productive labour through the provision of public goods in addition to favorable taxation policy. We show that there exist equilibria where skilled workers pay a strictly positive tax. In addition, when information on the type of workers is private, there are equilibria for certain parameter values in which unqualified workers receive a net transfer (or subsidy) from the government. In the second article, we investigate how the Bertrand standard price competition with differentiated products could provide useful insight for Citizenship By Investment programs in the Caribbean. We show that when countries can be classified into two types according to the size of their demand, imposing appropriate uniform minimum price and maximum quota brings countries to an efficient outcome that Pareto dominates the Non-Cooperative Nash Equilibrium. Finally. in the third article, we explore an extension of the standard many-to-one matching problem by incorporating different-size agents (refugee families) on the many side of the market, to be assigned to entities (homes) with different capacities on the other side. A specific feature of this model is that it does not allow refugee families to be split between several homes. It is well known that many of the desirable properties of matching rules are unachievable in this framework. We introduce size-monotonic priority ranking over refugee families for each home, that is, a host family (home) would always prefer a greater number of members of refugee families until its capacity constraint binds. We show that a pairwise stable matching always exists under this assumption and we propose a mechanism to find it. We show that our mechanism is strategy-proof for refugees: no refugee family could benefit from misrepresenting his preferences. Our mechanism is also refugees optimal pairwise stable in the sense that there is no other pairwise stable mechanism that would be more profitable to all refugees.

Submitted by Daniel Schmitt (daniel@schmitt.adv.br) on 2017-03-08T14:29:56Z No. of bitstreams: 1 FGV - Trabalho de Qualificação da Dissertação (DS) (28-02-17).pdf: 1238374 bytes, checksum: 77427104099be295ae4735e8aae098ed (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Publicação Direito Rio (publicacao.direitorio@fgv.br) on 2017-03-15T18:39:05Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 FGV - Trabalho de Qualificação da Dissertação (DS) (28-02-17).pdf: 1238374 bytes, checksum: 77427104099be295ae4735e8aae098ed (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-23T13:10:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 FGV - Trabalho de Qualificação da Dissertação (DS) (28-02-17).pdf: 1238374 bytes, checksum: 77427104099be295ae4735e8aae098ed (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017 / This paper deals with the repressive regime in the private insurance market ('MSP'), supervised by SUSEP – Superintendência de Seguros Privados. The research focus is to investigate the structure and the application of the norms that govern SUSEP's regulatory activity, regarding the application of the administrative sanction of fine on the individual offender. The administrative accountability in these cases is analyzed. For that, the theory of sanctioning is dealt with, dealing with the violation and the administrative sanction, especially the administrative penalty of fine. Some of the main principles of administrative sanctioning law are also highlighted, such as due process, lawfulness, characteristics and culpability. It also addresses the issue of relativisation of legality in special compliance regimes. These issues are displayed in an environment of sectoral regulation, therefore, contextualizing the sanctioning power of regulatory agencies. The repressive regime of the MSP is systematized. It identifies the National Council of Private Insurance (CNSP), the Resource Council of the National Private Insurance System (CRSNSP) and SUSEP. The normative archetype of the repressive regime of the MSP is presented, especially CNSP Resolution 243/11. A confrontation between SUSEP's guidelines and decisions of the CRSNSP in the opposite direction is made, regarding the imposition of the administrative penalty of fine on the individual offender, due to its administrative responsibility. At the end, as an outcome of the research, a set of constraints that ensure a more consistent application of the administrative penalty of fines on individuals - when considered as offenders in the MSP – is proposed. / O presente trabalho aborda o regime repressivo no mercado de seguros privados ('MSP'), fiscalizado pela Superintendência de Seguros Privados (SUSEP). O problema de pesquisa é investigar a estrutura e a aplicação das normas que regem a atividade regulatória da SUSEP, no que toca a aplicação da sanção administrativa de multa sobre o infrator pessoa física. Analisa-se a responsabilização administrativa realizada nestes casos. Para tanto, aborda-se a teoria da sanção, tratando do ilícito e da sanção administrativa, em especial da penalidade administrativa de multa. Alguns princípios informadores do direito administrativo sancionador também são destacados, tais como o devido processo legal, a legalidade, a tipicidade e a culpabilidade. Aborda-se, também, a questão da relativização da legalidade nos regimes de sujeição especial. Estas questões são expostas em um ambiente de regulação setorial, portanto, contextualizando-se o poder sancionador dos órgãos reguladores. É realizada a sistematização do regime repressivo do MSP. Identifica-se o Conselho Nacional de Seguros Privados (CNSP), o Conselho de Recursos do Sistema Nacional de Seguros Privados (CRSNSP) e a SUSEP. O arquétipo normativo do regime repressivo do MSP é descrito, destacando-se a Resolução CNSP no 243/11. Realiza-se um confronto entre orientações da SUSEP e decisões do CRSNSP em sentido contrário, a respeito da imposição da sanção administrativa de multa sobre o infrator pessoa física, em razão da sua responsabilização administrativa. Ao final, como resultado de pesquisa, propõe-se um conjunto de condicionantes que asseguram uma aplicação juridicamente mais consistente da penalidade administrativa de multa sobre as pessoas físicas, quando consideradas como infratores no MSP.