In new economics such as high-tech, knowledge-driven industries, the competitive game changes frequently and dramatically. Two maxims are widely accepted in these markets: 1. it pays to hit the market first. 2. it pays to have superb technology. These industries face a high change and high speed competitive business environment. Information systems of these firms often have to be modified or created based on imprecise requirements or even conceptual ideals. According to past research literature, precise requirement is one of the key success factors for software development outsourcing. Imprecise requirements indicate uncertain project scope and tend to risk. This research of imprecise requirement software development outsourcing base on Adaptive Software Development and Incomplete Contract theory. A case study is used to analyze below imprecise requirement software outsoucing issues issues in a semiconductor foundry MES project: 1. How to deliver a usable system to achieve project goals from imprecise requirements? 2. How to manage frequent change ascribed to imprecise requirements? 3. How to manage project escalation and cost issue ascribed to imprecise requirement?

In this thesis, we follow the incomplete contract model developed by Freixas and Rochet (1997). They model the decision of a bank regulator for continuing the sound bank or restructuring the failing bank as a game between bank equity owners, the bank manager, and the regulator under the incomplete contract framework. In this essay, we apply this incomplete contract model to Taiwan empirical data. After using several kinds of financial ratios as our indicators, we select nine ratios to process our empirical examination. And we find that: there are two banks appeared in the “ex-post efficient interference” segment except two ratios and also another two banks shown in the “ex-post efficient passivity” segment except one ratio. / In this thesis, we follow the incomplete contract model developed by Freixas and Rochet (1997). They model the decision of a bank regulator for continuing the sound bank or restructuring the failing bank as a game between bank equity owners, the bank manager, and the regulator under the incomplete contract framework. In this essay, we apply this incomplete contract model to Taiwan empirical data. After using several kinds of financial ratios as our indicators, we select nine ratios to process our empirical examination. And we find that: there are two banks appeared in the “ex-post efficient interference” segment except two ratios and also another two banks shown in the “ex-post efficient passivity” segment except one ratio.

The primary objective of this thesis is to analyse the public private partnership (PPP) framework for infrastructure development in developing countries across the six regions of the world. The thesis utilises the World Bank's private participation in infrastructure (PPI) dataset for the period 1980–2014, and examines three thematic areas. The first comprises of an exploratory analysis of the PPI dataset. The second research area focuses on the relationship between countries' attractiveness for PPPs and the characteristics of the countries, including: macroeconomic and market; fiscal constraints; regulatory and governance; and experience in PPPs, by utilising the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial and Cragg's Double Hurdle models in an attempt to model private investors' decision to engage in PPPs as separate participation and consumption decisions. The third research area employs the methodology of survival analysis to investigate the risk of failure of PPP projects based on the allocation of residual facility ownership between the partners. The thesis's primary contributions include the utilisation of a wider and more informative range of econometric methodologies which have not been previously applied to the PPI dataset, and for the first time also, provides a framework to select an appropriate structure for PPPs that will enhance project survival. A key finding of the thesis is that private investors prioritise macroeconomic and market variables, such as price stability over regulatory and governance variables, such as corruption, in their determination as to which country to engage in PPPs. Contrary to previous research, corruption was found to be of no consequence to private investors who wish to engage in PPPs even for developing countries. Another key finding is that PPP projects which confer residual ownership on the public sector have lower risk of failure than those for which such ownership is conferred on the private sector. Evidence also suggests that the size of the project and the participation of multilateral institutions in PPPs also affect the risk of project failure.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(工学) / 甲第18572号 / 工博第3933号 / 新制||工||1604(附属図書館) / 31472 / 京都大学大学院工学研究科都市社会工学専攻 / (主査)教授 小林 潔司, 教授 大津 宏康, 教授 河野 広隆 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Philosophy (Engineering) / Kyoto University / DFAM

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(工学) / 甲第21725号 / 工博第4542号 / 新制||工||1708(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院工学研究科都市社会工学専攻 / (主査)教授 小林 潔司, 教授 大津 宏康, 教授 山田 忠史 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Philosophy (Engineering) / Kyoto University / DFAM

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2016-08-16T12:19:26Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Moacyr da Costa Neto.pdf: 1362537 bytes, checksum: 12379c7df64e67d7138cad12bd92c189 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-16T12:19:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Moacyr da Costa Neto.pdf: 1362537 bytes, checksum: 12379c7df64e67d7138cad12bd92c189 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-29 / The penalty clause is a tradition in contracts. In Brazil, there is a consolidated understanding of it as a device that replaces the proposed role of the obligation agreed upon by the compensation required, in case the partners do not meet their obligations. The penalty clause also focuses on the classification of the delay as a way to reinforce the fulfillment of the obligation. In both cases, control of the penalty established will be kept, in order to prevent what could be considered unfair enrichment by the lender. The problem is that the socioeconomic situation, increasingly complex, requires more flexible coordination models which may enable contractors to take care of their interests with freedom and in a responsible way. The possibility presently being discussed is based on the relational contracts, because a certain incommensurability in the equivalence of the exchanges planned for the future is typical of them, and depends fundamentally on the confidence that a party places upon the other. In this situation, failure to perform what has been agreed upon - understood as the prohibition to exploit vulnerabilities -, will make room for punition strictu sensu not connected to indemnification purposes. Such strategy aims to reinforce trust as an indispensable duty, and its objective is to keep the contractual relationship. From an economic perspective, the solution offered, that is, the use of the penalty clause, will be a tool for reducing the transactional costs. / A cláusula penal é um instituto tradicional. Consolidou-se na experiência brasileira sua compreensão como dispositivo que desempenha o papel de proposta de substituição da obrigação avençada pela indenização prefixada, na hipótese de sua inexecução total, ou incide por ocasião da tipificação do atraso, concorrendo com o cumprimento da obrigação. Em ambas as hipóteses, haverá o controle de redução equitativa da multa fixada, evitando-se o enriquecimento sem causa do credor. O problema é que a ordem socioeconômica, cada vez mais multifacetada, exige modelos de coordenação das relações mais flexíveis e que permitam aos contratantes dirigi-los com liberdade e responsabilidade. Essa possibilidade é estudada com base no exemplo dos contratos relacionais, por ser considerado um tipo contratual caracterizado por certa incomensurabilidade na equivalência das trocas projetadas para o futuro, é dependente fundamentalmente da confiança que um contratante deposita no outro. Nesta situação, a inexecução do dever de confiança, compreendido como a proibição de exploração de vulnerabilidades, permitirá a imposição de sanção em sentido estrito, desapegada da finalidade indenizatória. A estratégia é destinada ao reforço dos deveres de confiança e assistida pelo princípio da conservação do vínculo contratual. Numa perspectiva econômica, a solução pensada é responsável por diminuir os custos da transação

This thesis consists of three self-contained essays dealing with different aspects of macroeconomics and political Economy. The Relative Price of Investment Goods and Sectoral Contract Dependence I develop a quantitative model to explain the relationship between TFPs at the aggregate and sector levels and contracting institutions across countries. The incomplete contract enforcement induces distortions in the production process which come from the “hold up” problem between a final goods firm and its suppliers. Because investment goods sector is more contract dependent, its productivity suffers more from the distortion. In turn, countries endowed with weaker contract enforcement institutions face higher relative prices of investment goods. A Ricardian Model of the Labor Market with Directed Search I analyze how search friction affects the allocation in a Ricardian model of the labor market. The equilibrium shows that the matching pattern is partially mixed: Some tasks are only performed by skilled workers; some are only performed by unskilled workers; the remaining tasks are performed by both skilled and unskilled workers. The mixed matching pattern implies a mismatch in equilibrium. It turns out that the reason for the mismatch has its roots in search friction. In addition, I show labor market institutions have interesting implications for the unemployment rate and mismatch. A Dynamic Analysis of the Free-rider Problem I argue that special interest groups overcome their free-rider problem thanks to distorted government policy. As policy confers monopoly privileges on a group, it can also preserve and promote group’s organization. The key to sustaining the organization of the group is a dynamic incentive: when distorted policy generates rents for a group, each member of the group wish to make contributions not just to raise their rents today; they want to sustain their cooperation so that they will be able to influence policy in the future.

The diploma thesis deals with the process of prison privatization in the United Kingdom particularly in England and Wales especially in the form of PFI deals, in which the private sector not only manages prison facility but also designs and constructs the buildings. Due to transfer of this kind of service we can look at the relationship between state and private provider trough the lenses of Principal-agent theory. This theory, in its purest form, is constituted of one principal and one agent to whom the performance of the service is transferred, part of the risks associated with it and also a certain decision-making power are transferred as well. According to the theory, the basic precondition for the relationship between the principal and the agent is a discrepancy in the goals of the actors and the agent's effort to act opportunistically at the expense of the performance of the service for the principal. In this sense, the thesis examines the decision from 2018 not to launch new PFI or its successor PF2 projects. In this scenario, England and Wales are the principal and the prison operators are the agents. The hypothesis of the thesis is that this decision not to launch new PFI projects is related to problematic aspects of the relationship between the principal and the agent and that the control...

. / Corporate acquisitions are classified as part of “the market for corporate control” in which management teams are facing constant competition from other management teams. If the team that currently controls a company is not maximizing the value of the company’s assets, then an acquisition will likely occur and increase the value of the company by replacing its poor managers with good managers. This dissertation focus on two issues on mergers, the first compares the strategy between mergers and joint ventures. The second investigate how much liquidity should the acquirer preserve and what is the equilibrium price of the acquired firm in considering the merger strategy. Drawing upon the incomplete contract theory, I examine the criterion of the strategic choice between joint ventures (JVs) and mergers when two firms contemplate vertical integration. The model reaches the following conclusions: (1) some ownership provision to the acquired company after the mergers may prove to be more lucrative to the acquirer than 100% takeover; (2) given the same equity share arrangement for JVs and mergers I conclude that these two firms should choose to merge or be merged rather than JVs; (3) I derive the optimal equity share arrangement in both JVs and mergers when ownership provision is considered as a strategic means. In addition, I also compare the welfare and effort of both companies in JVs and mergers under symmetric cost structures, and find that mergers would provide greater social efficiency and welfare than 50-50 JVs when the acquirer’s equity share is between 30% and 65%. Firms are concerned that they may in the future be deprived of the funds that would enable them to take advantage of exciting growth prospects, strengthen existing investments or simply stay alive. I specifically examine a firm’s liquidity need in order to grasp any future opportunity of mergers and acquisitions. However, a firm’s manager (borrower) can shed his interim wrongdoings (misbehavior) under the pretext of further financial need for mergers and acquisitions because he knows that he can easily raise sufficient cash from lenders to cover any adverse shock. My study derives the conditions that when this soft-budget-constraint (SBC) problem will occur. It happens when the interim income is small. Moreover, I analyze how the purchase price of acquisition is affected by this soft-budget-constraint syndrome. If there is SBC problem, the acquisition price will be raised by the investors when the interim income is small. Besides, a firm with severe moral hazard problem will be merely able to offer a smaller purchase price for the acquisition. On the contrast, a firm with a stronger balance sheet will be able to secure a greater credit line and offer a more attractive price for the acquisition. The empirical study of U.S. firms during 1988 to 2006 supports my conclusions.

A tese objetiva construir, sob o ponto de vista dogmático, critérios para a caracterização do contrato incompleto no direito brasileiro, estabelecendo o traço distintivo de sua causa e a disciplina jurídica que lhe é aplicável, à luz da metodologia civil-constitucional. Pretende-se, ainda, na perspectiva funcional dos fatos jurídicos, que permite a qualificação do contrato incompleto como negócio jurídico que emprega a técnica da gestão negativa da álea normal dos contratos, definir parâmetros interpretativos que orientem a sua execução. Por representarem o esmorecimento voluntário da técnica regulamentar, os contratos incompletos exigem elevados padrões de cooperação entre os contratantes na integração das lacunas, a ensejar a incidência reforçada dos princípios da boa-fé objetiva, da função social e do equilíbrio contratual, relativamente aos contratos em que ocorre a gestão positiva da álea normal. Após investigar os mecanismos legais incidentes na hipótese de inadimplemento do dever de integração da lacuna, analisam-se os limites legais e valorativos a que se sujeitam os contratos incompletos. Em chave conclusiva, almeja-se estabelecer o contrato incompleto como negócio jurídico lícito e merecedor de tutela no atendimento aos interesses concretos dos particulares no exercício de suas atividades econômicas, a evidenciar os novos confins da autonomia privada na legalidade constitucional. / This thesis aimsto buildstandards, from a dogmatic point of view, to define the incomplete contract in Brazilian Law, establishingthe distinctive feature of its function(causa) and its juridical discipline, inlight of the civilconstitutional methodology. It also intendsto determine interpretative parameters for its performance, under the functional perspective of the juridical facts, which allows the definition of the incomplete contract as a juridical act which adopts the negative technique of distribution of risks (álea normal).Since the incomplete contract intentionally doesnot regulate every possible contingency, ahigh level of cooperation between the contracting parties is required in order to fill its gaps. As a result,incomplete contracts set a higher standard when referring tothe principles of objective good faith, social function and contractual balance,which will be applied with more intensitythan in juridical actswherethere is a positive distribution of risks (álea normal).After analyzing the legal mechanisms applicable to the breach of the duty offillingcontractual gaps, this work will examine the legal and axiological limits to the incomplete contracts. In conclusion, this thesis aims to establish the incomplete contract as a licit juridical act, worthy of protection,asitmeets the parties interests in its economic activities, highlighting new boundaries ofthe private autonomy in the constitutional legality.