This thesis looks at fundamental disagreements about the role of society in the delivery of health care services. In particular, it develops an argument for viewing health care as a human right, and in doing so, argues that society is at least partially responsible for the health of its members. In the first section of the thesis, I argue that health is a human need, and that the institutional goal of health care is to restore to an individual their health. As an institution, health care is a primary social good and, as such, it ought to be afforded the same institutional protections as other primary social goods, and encoded as a “human right.” In the second section, I tackle the “Difficult Costs” objection, noting that while there is high financial cost associated with the provision of health care services, the moral and social cost of not providing health care and viewing it as a human right far outweighs the financial costs. With another appeal to Rawlsian principles, by way of reflective equilibrium, I argue that the design of an institution is paramount to the cost-effective distribution of health care resources in accordance with the view that health care is a human right. In the final section, I acknowledge that the objections to health care as a human right should be taken seriously, and that they form the basis of the limits to this right. I argue that any right to health care cannot be extended beyond the restoration of basic, species-typical normal human function. I acknowledge that the Rawlsian ideal has difficulty rendering decisions where priority is a central concern. Finally, I suggest that these limitations can be overcome when the right to health care is viewed as progressively realizable, in conjunction with other basic human rights.

This thesis aims to contribute to Norman Daniels&#039 / expansion of Rawls&#039 / theory of Justice as Fairness to health care by considering individual responsibility in maintaining and restoring health. The thesis also considers transplantation as a special case and develops a Rawlsian model for transplantation.

The construction of International Humanitarian Law and the norms regarding protection of prisoners of war have evolved as a reaction to the horrors of war. After September 11 and the following war on terrorism the notion of POWs has been widely debated. The USA holds prisoners at the navy base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba without granting them status as POWs; this thesis is placing the treatment of these detainees within a historical context. The norm concerning rights of POWs is today both internationalized and institutionalized, but that has not always been the case. This thesis illuminates how the norms have evolved during World War I, World War II and Vietnam War; finally the war against terrorism and the treatment of the prisoners at Guantánamo Bay is analyzed. The intention of the thesis is to use a historical overview of the evolution of IHL, and the rights of POWs in particular, to formulate a wider assumption about the implication of IHL in the war against terrorism and the future. The thesis adopts a theory which combines constructivism and John Rawls´ theory of justice and uses constructivist ideas about the nature of the international system applied to Rawls´ notion of justice. The constructivist theory and ontology are the basis of the theoretical framework of this thesis and Rawls´ definition of justice as the base of social institutions are viewed from a constructivist perspective. IHL and the norms regarding protection of POWs are thus considered as social facts, constructed and upheld through social interaction between states.

Cette thèse concerne la pensée de trois auteurs qui s’interrogent quant à la manière dont les philosophes politiques devraient procéder pour en arriver à comprendre et à juger les phénomènes politiques de manière adéquate : Raymond Geuss, Chantal Mouffe et Pierre Manent. Plus spécifiquement, elle se propose d’étudier les critiques que ces derniers dirigent à l’endroit de l’approche dominante en philosophie politique contemporaine et qui est à leur avis le mieux exemplifiée par l’œuvre de John Rawls. Aux yeux de ces derniers, cette approche, qui consiste essentiellement à s’engager dans une réflexion abstraite sur la nature de la justice définie comme l’ensemble des droits politiques dont les citoyens devraient légitimement pouvoir jouir, souffre d’un important manque de réalisme, c’est-à-dire qu’elle reflète très peu la délibération dans laquelle les citoyens et les hommes politiques doivent concrètement s’engager pour faire face aux problèmes politiques réels. Dans un premier temps, l’auteur expose les objections que Geuss, Mouffe et Manent formulent contre la philosophie rawlsienne et il présente les fondements de la pensée de ces trois auteurs. Il s’efforce ensuite de vérifier si leur critique du normativisme abstrait en philosophie politique nous permet toujours de penser un certain fondement aux jugements politiques.

This paper examines common and past applications of affirmative action, including arguments for and against the application; presents John Rawls’ theory of justice, and proposes a framework using Rawls’ theory for future applications of affirmative action. The proposal relieves heavily on the principle of fair equality of opportunity, both as an indicator for when using affirmative action is appropriate as well as a tool to help identify the people that affirmative action programs should target. Using this framework, the public education system is identified as a sector of society that fails to provide fair equality of opportunity for all citizens, and an example of how the Rawlsian conception of affirmative action should be used in practice to help address the inequalities and help restore equality of opportunity within the public education system is given. Objections to affirmative action, both in general and more specifically tailored to the model proposed in this paper, are raised and responded to. This paper comes to the conclusion that affirmative action programs, when targeted towards individuals who are denied fair equality of opportunity and have low rates of social mobility, will help create a more just society.

abstract: Large-scale land acquisition (LaSLA), also called "land grabbing" refers to the buying or leasing of large tracts of land, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) by foreign investors to produce food and biofuel to send back home. Since 2007, LaSLA has become an important development issue due to the opportunities and threats for SSA countries. LaSLA has the potential to create local jobs, transfer technology, build infrastructure, and modernize SSA's agriculture. Nonetheless, it can also aggravate food insecurity, perpetuate corruption, degrade ecosystems, cause conflicts, and displace local communities. What drives LaSLA, what are its impacts on local people, and under what circumstances can we consider it as just and ethical? To examine what drives LaSLA, I used country level data from 2005 to 2013 on economic conditions, natural resources, business practices, and governance to estimate LaSLA models. I find that LaSLA increases with increasing government effectiveness, land prices, and the ease of doing business, and decreases with stronger regulatory regimes. To assess LaSLA's impacts on local people, I conducted a comparative case study in Tanzania. I compare changes in peoples' livelihood between treatment villages (those experiencing LaSLA) and control villages (those without LaSLA projects). The results show that under current practices, the risks of LaSLA outweigh the benefits to local livelihoods, yet there are potential benefits if LaSLA is implemented correctly. To philosophically examine whether LaSLA can be considered just and ethical, I apply John Rawls' theory of justice. The analysis indicates that from both procedural and distributive justice perspective, LaSLA currently fails to satisfy Rawlsian principles of justice. From these analyses, I conclude that if implemented correctly, LaSLA can produce a win-win outcome for both investors and host countries. I suggest that strong governance, rigorous environmental and social impact assessment, and inclusion of local people at all levels of LaSLA decision making are critical for sustainable and equitable outcomes. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Biology 2017

Cette thèse concerne la pensée de trois auteurs qui s’interrogent quant à la manière dont les philosophes politiques devraient procéder pour en arriver à comprendre et à juger les phénomènes politiques de manière adéquate : Raymond Geuss, Chantal Mouffe et Pierre Manent. Plus spécifiquement, elle se propose d’étudier les critiques que ces derniers dirigent à l’endroit de l’approche dominante en philosophie politique contemporaine et qui est à leur avis le mieux exemplifiée par l’œuvre de John Rawls. Aux yeux de ces derniers, cette approche, qui consiste essentiellement à s’engager dans une réflexion abstraite sur la nature de la justice définie comme l’ensemble des droits politiques dont les citoyens devraient légitimement pouvoir jouir, souffre d’un important manque de réalisme, c’est-à-dire qu’elle reflète très peu la délibération dans laquelle les citoyens et les hommes politiques doivent concrètement s’engager pour faire face aux problèmes politiques réels. Dans un premier temps, l’auteur expose les objections que Geuss, Mouffe et Manent formulent contre la philosophie rawlsienne et il présente les fondements de la pensée de ces trois auteurs. Il s’efforce ensuite de vérifier si leur critique du normativisme abstrait en philosophie politique nous permet toujours de penser un certain fondement aux jugements politiques.

Skollagen reglerar inte hur dokumentation av extra anpassningar genomförs. Detta beslut fattas av rektor eller skolhuvudman på varje enskild skola. Denna valfrihet kan leda till skillnader i hur dokumentationen utförs vilket i slutänden kan påverka likvärdigheten för elever. Skolinspektionens granskning av skolans arbete med extra anpassningar visar att det finns svårigheter att dokumentera på ett ändamålsenligt sätt (Skolinspektionen, 2016). Syftet med den här studien var att skapa kunskap om hur dokumentation av extra anpassningar kan påverka likvärdigheten för elever genom att studera hur några skolor arbetar med att dokumentera extra anpassningar. Med en kvantitativ metodansats och ett målstyrt urval genomfördes en webbaserad enkätundersökning i fyra grundskolor i två kommuner. Enkätsvaren sammanställdes med hjälp av ett digitalt enkätverktyg. Resultatet analyserades med stöd i Rawls teori om rättvisa och tidigare forskning inom området. En slutsats som dragits är att dokumentationen av extra anpassningar inte utförs likvärdigt. Studien visar även på att riktlinjer och rutiner gällande dokumentation av extra anpassningar fortfarande behöver utvecklas för att säkra likvärdigheten för eleverna.

La hipótesis que ha guiado toda la investigación es que el concepto de utopía ha ido evolucionando a lo largo de su historia, desde una inicial hostilidad ante ciertas instituciones que caracterizan al Derecho, especialmente la figura de los abogados litigantes, hasta una cierta complementariedad. Si bien ese progreso no carece de excepciones, se nota un mayor grado de apertura a las instituciones jurídicas, como consecuencia de la necesidad de organización de la vida social compleja ante el hecho de la escasez de recursos y el altruismo limitado que están en la base de ambos conceptos. Dicha complementariedad se ve reforzada con el auge de teorías que van más allá de los postulados positivistas que buscaban separar completamente el Derecho de la esfera valorativa, o aquellos planteos neoconstitucionalistas que buscan disolverlo en ella. Hoy algunas concepciones reconocen que los valores juegan un rol importante en la comprensión de la práctica social que llamamos Derecho y se considera que un cierto grado de utopismo, en tanto que reconocimiento y persecución de ideales razonables, es legítimo y hasta necesario para comprender esa práctica.

Ever since Rawls published The Theory of Justice (1971/2009), the theory itself, along with many of its components, have been subject to intense debate. Both the "original position" and the "veil of ignorance" have been argued to be too unrealistic since the restriction on information makes it impossible to apply in the real world. Furthermore, it is argued that this restriction is too extensive, in that it excludes information that is necessary for making a just decision, and thus, that it contravenes fundamental egalitarian principles, making it less just than it should be. However, there still seems to be something appealing about the concept of the veil of ignorance and results from various experiments that have used it have shown results that indicate it has an effect, which implies that the concept might have some use after all. In this paper, I will argue for a modified version of Rawls' veil of ignorance that, while limited in its available applications, might both serve a practical use in society to increase justice and have a low risk of obtaining inegalitarian results. I will do this by first summarizing Rawls' theory of justice with a focus on his veil of ignorance. Second, I will present and discuss the critiques from various philosophers. Third, I will discuss the implications of several experiments that make use of the veil of ignorance, including the issue that these experiments are 'one-shot', or single iteration, experiments. Finally, I will detail my version of the veil of ignorance and explain why it both meets the critiques of the original veil of ignorance and could potentially serve a practical use in society.