Nos recherches ont pour point de départ le constat d’un manque de dialogue entre trois philosophies politiques du XXe siècle nous provenant des États-Unis alors même que cet État devrait être le chef de file et un modèle d’ouverture en matière de réflexion sur la démocratie libérale. Les trois philosophies politiques en question sont celles de John Rawls, de Richard Rorty et de Leo Strauss. Nous avons donc procédé à l’amorce d’un dialogue en mettant en relation les idées des trois auteurs sur les grands thèmes de la vérité, de l’histoire, des dimensions de l’homme et des principes démocratiques, et avons fait un effort supplémentaire de rapprochement en montrant le rapport de chacun à onze dualismes classiques liés à ces quatre thèmes. Ces dualismes sont des oppositions binaires habituellement vénérables qui classent et divisent deux ordres de réalité. Avec ce langage commun des dualismes classiques, les obstacles aux rapprochements dus aux jeux de langage ou aux vocabulaires trop particuliers des trois auteurs sont tombés. Nous montrons d’abord qu’aucun vainqueur clair ne ressort de notre confrontation, mais qu’il y a moyen de porter un jugement sur les trois auteurs en fonction de critères non controversés (cohérence, complexité ou nuances, capacité à réfuter les deux autres). Ensuite, une confrontation et un dialogue directs des trois positions permettent de les faire s’exprimer sur les mêmes enjeux et de dégager des conclusions d’intérêt général dépassant le débat d’auteurs. Ces conclusions montrent quel genre de compromis peut être trouvé entre les principes de vérité et d’histoire, approuvent le projet de résoudre les tensions dans la vision de l’homme, en particulier entre les sphères publiques et privées, mais rappellent l’importance du point de vue ancien sur les principes repris par la démocratie (liberté, égalité, justice), ne serait-ce que pour faire contrepoids à la tendance générale. Ultimement, nous montrons comment de cette confrontation peut se dégager le programme pour la philosophie politique de vivre dans une tension féconde entre critique (prémoderne) et confiance (moderne), ainsi que la nécessité réaffirmée de poursuivre les efforts de dialogue pour rendre notre pensée digne de l’idée de la démocratie libérale. / Our study stems from the awareness that three twentieth-century political philosophies emanating from the United States have not partaken in any serious dialogue, even though this country should be a leader and model of openness regarding the topic of liberal democracy. The three political philosophies in question are those of John Rawls, Richard Rorty and Leo Strauss. Consequently, we have initiated a dialogue by confronting the ideas of these three thinkers on matters concerning truth, history, the dimensions of man, and democratic principles, having furthered this effort by highlighting the opinion of each on eleven classical dualisms related to these four matters. These dualisms are binary oppositions, generally venerable, which classify and divide two orders of reality. Using the common language of classical dualisms allowed us to overcome the obstacles due to the particular language game or vocabulary of each. In the first place, we show that if no real victor emerges from our confrontation, it is possible to judge each of the thinkers according to non contentious criteria (consistency, complexity or subtlety, capacity to refute the other positions). Then we illustrate that the direct confrontation through dialogue allows each of the three positions to express itself on the same issues and leads one to conclusions regarding matters beyond simple exegetic analysis. These conclusions show what kind of compromise is possible between the principles of truth and history. They support the project of resolving the tensions in our understanding of man, in particular, between the public and private spheres. Finally, they remind us of the importance of the ancient view of democratic principles (freedom, equality, justice), if only to counterbalance the current overwhelming trend. Ultimately, we explain how this confrontation can lead to a program for a political philosophy which balances the claims of (premodern) criticism and (modern) confidence, as well as restates the importance of continuing the dialogue in order that our thought be worthy of the idea of liberal democracy. / Réalisé en cotutelle avec l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV).

Despite being similarly concerned with the legitimacy of law under conditions of diversity, political and legal theorists currently seem to differ significantly in the role they would reserve for religious reasons in public decision-making processes. Religious arguments that would generally be considered inappropriate if not inadmissible in a courtroom are increasingly viewed as acceptable and even desirable contributions to debate in the political public sphere. The author argues that the existence of this disconnect can be explained by the special challenges that religion poses for constitutional adjudication which in turn should inform our understanding of the judicial decision-making function. Constraints inherent to constitutional courts that make them effective institutions for concrete dispute resolution significantly limit their ability to engage seriously with the normative challenges posed by religious diversity. We should thus properly understand the role of constitutional adjudication as peripheral in matters of public policy that intersect with questions of religious difference. / Graduate

La publication de Théorie de la justice par John Rawls en 1971 a apporté un nouvel élan à la philosophie politique. Plusieurs commentaires et critiques de ce livre ont ainsi nourri la réflexion sur la question de la justice sociale dans son application à l’échelle mondiale. Dans ce livre, l’auteur a démontré entre autres que la démocratie libérale permet aux citoyens ayant diverses conceptions du bien, conceptions religieuses, philosophiques ou morales, souvent incompatibles et irréconciliables, d’avoir par ailleurs une conception politique de la rectitude morale et de la justice comme fondement de la structure de base de leur société. Ceci permet alors de soutenir l’unité politique et sociale de cette structure sur une base rationnelle et raisonnable. Par la suite, dans The Law of Peoples, Rawls a présenté un autre projet, celui d’étendre cette conception à la ‘Société des peuples’ qui, pour lui, est une idéalisation du regroupement des peuples qui respectent les idéaux et les principes du ‘Droit des peuples’ dans leurs relations mutuelles, le ‘Droit des peuples’ étant, pour Rawls, une conception politique particulière de la rectitude morale et de la justice qui s’applique aux principes et aux normes du droit et des usages internationaux. Ce projet de Rawls est, comme il l’a nommé lui-même, une utopie réaliste. Partant de cette dernière comme d’un prétexte, notre étude s’inscrit dans un champ de recherche particulier de la philosophie politique, à savoir l’éthique des relations internationales. Elle se veut une contribution à l’élaboration d’une réflexion normative portant sur les principes fondamentaux de justice dans l’ordre international tel qu’il se présente dans les institutions qui l’incarnent aujourd’hui encore, comme le système des Nations Unies, et sur les conséquences de cet ordre dans l’intégration des pays de la région africaine des Grands Lacs. D’où ces questions : Qu’est-ce que l’utopie rawlsienne change-t-elle à l’ordre mondial actuel? Ses principes fondent-ils une éthique susceptible d’améliorer les relations internationales? Quelle serait la place des pays africains, et plus spécialement ceux de la région des Grands Lacs, dans l’ordre mondial inhérent à ce projet? Les réponses à ces questions déterminent ce qui pourrait être considéré comme l’éthique de la gouvernance démocratique globale et les structures pouvant l’incarner. / The publishing of A Theory of Justice by John Rawls in 1971 brought a new impetus to political philosophy. Several comments and critical analyses of this book have thus provided food for thought on the issue of social justice in its application on a world scale. In this book, the author has demonstrated, among other things, that liberal democracy allows citizens with different conceptions of good – whether religious, philosophical or moral – often incompatible and irreconcilable, to have, otherwise, a political conception of moral rectitude and justice as the foundation of the basic structure of their society. This allows to support the political and social unity of this basic structure on a rational and reasonable basis. Subsequently, in his book The Law of Peoples, Rawls presented another project, that of extending that concept to the “Society of Peoples” which, for him, is an idealization of the regrouping of those people who respect the ideals and principles of the Law of peoples in their mutual relations, the “Law of peoples” being, for him, a particular political conception of moral rectitude and justice that is applicable to principles and standards of international law and customs. This project, as Rawls called it himself, is a realistic utopia. Based on the latter as an excuse, our study is in keeping with a particular field of research in political philosophy – namely, the ethics of international relations. It is intended as a contribution to the development of a normative reflection on the fundamental principles of justice in the international order as it is found in the institutions that still embody it nowadays – such as the United Nations Organization – and on the consequences of that order in the integration of the countries of the African region of the Great Lakes. This raises questions such as: What changes does the rawlsian utopia bring to the current world order? Are its principles the basis for an ethic susceptible of improving international relations? What would be the role of African countries, particularly those of the Great Lakes, in the world order inherent in this project? The answers to these questions determine what could be considered the ethics of global democratic governance and the structures which embody it.

Univ., Diss.--Tübingen, 2003.

This thesis provides a critical examination of John Rawls’s political philosophy as it relates to international justice and human rights, Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness has made an enormous impact on contemporary political and ethical theory, yet it has been criticized by some for failing to address the extra-domestic aspects of social justice, including universal human rights. In Chapter One I describe the theoryof.rights, developed in the social contract tradition and how this theory has influenced the modern discourse of human rights. In Chapter Two I discuss Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, the basic rights and liberties, and the idea of political liberalism. In Chapter Three 1 analyze Rawls’s account of international justice and argue that it fails to uphold the same rigorous principles of justice as found in his account of domestic justice. Finally, in Chapter Four l discuss Rawls’s more recent attempts to theorize international justice and human rights, I conclude that Rawls is not justified in limiting the set of human rights available to persons in different societies, and that this limitation is an unnecessary feature of his theory of justice. In contrast 1 argue for a more cosmopolitan system of social justice that is strongly normative and grounded in Rawlsian ideal theory. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D.Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

This work deals with the different concepts of justice that are presented by works of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Seeing that they are liberal authors, the first chapter is devoted to liberalism and its forms. Rawls is presented as a supporter of modern liberalism and Nozick is presented as a representative of classical liberalism, concretely libertarianism. The second chapter discusses how both authors describe natural state. The third chapter is devoted to it how Rawls and Nozick talk about conception of liberty. The following chapter describes and compares their theories of justice: justice as fairness and justice as entitlement. The fifth chapter deals with the final reflection on the theories of both authors. There are presented various reactions and interpretations of the mentioned theories. At the same time, there is shown considerable asset of Rawls?s Theory of Justice and Nozick?s Anarchy, State and Utopia which both influenced political-philosophical discussion.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rosane Terezinha Felipe.pdf: 343926 bytes, checksum: 224c503dc3bfd9bea2ea039acc896491 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-07-04 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The objective of the present work consists in the investigation and exhibition of the conception of the original position in the theory of justice as fairness, drawn by John Rawls. For that, it is highlighted the way the author exhibits the agreement made in this initial situation of the choice, in other words, the parts symmetrically situated in the original position and covered by the veil of ignorance, that has the function to impede the passage of arbitrary information that can influence in the choice of the principles. Besides, the agreement made in the original position is characterized as hipothetical and non-historical. Rawls, in the subsequent works of A Theory of Justice, emphasizes that the misunderstanding about the hypothetical aspect of this position is due to the fact it isn´t seen as a representation artifice. By this way , in order to understand the argumentation about the original position, it treats the doctrines, in which the theory of justice as fairness, is presented as an alternative, with the intent to contextualize the theory of Rawls. From the works of the own author, it looks for presenting the fundamental ideas and the way how they are linked in this theory. Besides, they are object of study the role and the characteristics of this initial situation of the choice and the principles of justice, as the result of the agreement made between the parts in the original position, are objects of the study. This position is understood as an initial situation of the suitable equality for the choice of the principles, that must specify the fair terms of the society understood as a system of social cooperation. / O objetivo do presente trabalho consiste na investigação e exposição da concepção de posição original na teoria da justiça como eqüidade, elaborada por John Rawls. Para isso, destaca a maneira como o autor expõe o acordo realizado nesta situação inicial de escolha, ou seja, as partes simetricamente situadas na posição original e encobertas pelo véu de ignorância, que tem como função impedir a passagem de informações arbitrárias que possam influenciar na escolha dos princípios. Além disso, o acordo realizado na posição original é caracterizado como hipotético e a-histórico. Rawls, nas obras posteriores a Uma Teoria da Justiça, destaca que o mal-entendido quanto ao aspecto hipotético desta posição está no fato dela não ser vista como um artifício de representação. Desta forma, a fim de compreender a argumentação acerca da posição original, trata-se das doutrinas nas quais a teoria da justiça como eqüidade é apresentada como uma alternativa, com o intuito de contextualizar a teoria de Rawls. A partir das obras do próprio autor, procura apresentar as idéias fundamentais e a forma como estão interligadas nesta teoria. Além disso, são objetos de estudo o papel e as características dessa situação inicial de escolha e os princípios de justiça, como o resultado do acordo realizado entre as partes na posição original. Esta posição é compreendida como uma situação inicial de igualdade adequada para a escolha dos princípios, que devem especificar os termos eqüitativos da sociedade compreendida como um sistema de cooperação social.

This study investigates the subject of Muslims’ citizenship in contemporary Western European societies from the viewpoint of John Rawls’s political liberalism, in particular in light of the ‘idea of public reason’ [see John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) and the 1997 essay “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” originally published in University of Chicago Law Review 64 (1997), 765-807 and now included in Political Liberalism, expanded edition, 440-490]. By its very nature, political liberalism does not prescribe a single model for being Muslim in contemporary Europe. Thus, one may wonder if it is too vague as a point of departure for the analysis. On the other hand, however, here I argue that political liberalism specifies a peculiar evaluative framework that allows citizens to answer questions such as “What is politically at stake when citizens of Muslim faith are publicly presented as permanent aliens in contemporary European societies?”, “On what grounds is such exclusion based?”, and “What requirements can European citizens be reasonably expected to meet?” in a distinctively political way and, ideally, to solve the political and social problems from which those questions spring. In this research, I claim that public reason provides a common discursive platform that establishes the ground for a public political identity and for shared standards for social and political criticism. Together, these two elements solve the two dimensions of the problem of ‘stability for the right reasons’ (in Rawls’s terms) in contemporary European societies, because they secure both the political inclusion of Muslims on an equal footing as citizens and civic assurance that they will remain committed to fair terms of social cooperation. A joint solution of these two apparently conflicting demands of stability for the right reasons (i.e. inclusion and mutual assurance) requires an effort in political reconciliation. After having compared public reason citizenship with two prominent normative alternatives, I will conclude that the former is an adequate ideal conception of citizenship for European societies. Finally, I will apply the justificatory evaluative methodological framework (whose requirements I will specify starting from the idea of public reason itself) to a conception of citizenship elaborated by one of the most renowned Muslim public intellectuals in Europe: Tariq Ramadan. (I justify the choice of this author in sections 2.3 and 6.1). Such an evaluation sheds light on one of the main insights of this research, that is, the idea that public reason makes a decompression of the public space possible: it frees the public space from those forces that would prevent citizens from the possibility of exercising effectively their two moral powers (once more in Rawls’s words, the ‘capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good’) as free equals. In this sense, public reason tries to reconcile ideal political consensus and the fact of reasonable pluralism on a public political ground. I believe that this is the deepest meaning of what Rawls calls ‘reconciliation through public reason’: its aspiration is to reabsorb reasonable pluralism politically without annihilating it.This research is structured in three parts: the first is methodological, the second is reconstructive, and the third is evaluative. Each part is composed of two chapters.In chapter one (“General Framework”), I begin from some empirical observations about the role of perceptions and identities in relation to the issue of Muslims’ citizenship in contemporary Europe. I claim that from this point of view Islam seems to “make problem” in a very specific sense. This does not mean that Islam is a problem, but that Islam is frequently publicly presented and perceived as a problem. This is the background problem from which my work starts. Thus, I explore some dimensions of such a problem (see 1.1). Subsequently, I provide a more specific formulation of the research problem and questions and of the aims of this study. Then, the main research question (Q) is stated in these terms: Which ideal conception of citizenship should provide the common normative perspective in contemporary Western European societies, which are characterised by both demands of inclusion of Muslims and the need for solving a ‘problem of mutual assurance’ [on which, see in particular Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)] concerning citizens’ commitment to shared terms of social cooperation, so that those societies can be stable for the right reasons? In order to answer this question, I also specify three sub-questions that I call respectively Q1, Q2, and Q3 (see 1.2).In chapter two (“Toward a Justificatory Evaluative Political Theory”), I firstly try to frame the problem of public justification within Rawls’s political liberalism (see 2.1). I then consider a specific approach to the question of Muslim citizenship in liberal democracies which can be adopted from a Rawlsian perspective: namely, reasoning from conjecture (see 2.2). Finally, I explain my own approach (which I call justificatory evaluative political theory) by means of comparison with the method of reasoning from conjecture (see 2.3). In presenting the evaluative framework specified from a political liberal standpoint, I point out three political liberal evaluative requirements: the reciprocity requirement (RR), the consistency requirement (CR), and the civility requirement (CiR).Chapter three (“What is Public Reason?”) deals with the history of the notion of public reason from Kant to Rawls and its enunciation within Rawls’s work (see 3.1 and 3.2 respectively). In doing so, I also identify three specifications for the three political liberal evaluative requirements considered in the second chapter. Furthermore, in chapter three I also unpack CR in three different dimensions (PR1, PR2, and PR3).Chapter four (“Public Reason and Religion. Reinterpreting the Duty of Civility”) completes the reconstructive stage by analysing Rawls’s ‘wide view’ of public reason and two major lines of objection to it (see 4.1). After having discussed such criticisms, I then introduce my own interpretation of the ‘proviso,’ which is structured around a two-level (or bifurcate) model of the ‘duty of civility’ (see 4.2).Chapter five (“Reconciliation through Public Reason: Justificatory Evaluative Political Theory between Modelling and Application”) bridges the second and the third part, that is, the reconstructive and the evaluative stage respectively. In the first section of the chapter, I summarise the political liberal evaluative requirements developed in the second part. In doing this, my purpose is to present my justificatory evaluative model of public reason citizenship (see 5.1). In the second section, I firstly argue that a conception of citizenship grounded in public reason is not only possible in existing European societies, but also preferable if compared with alternative conceptions (I consider liberal multiculturalism and Cécile Laborde’s critical republicanism [Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)]) with reference to the problem under scrutiny in this research. In conclusion, I show that public reason citizenship is able to solve the theoretical problem and the main research question mentioned above: Which ideal conception of citizenship should provide the common normative perspective in contemporary Western European societies, which are characterised by both demands of inclusion of Muslims and the need for solving a problem of mutual assurance concerning citizens’ commitment to shared terms of social cooperation, so that those societies can be stable for the right reasons? In the final part of chapter five, I try to demonstrate that public reason citizenship can both include Muslim citizens and solve the assurance problem because it provides both shared standards for political criticism and a common political identity on the basis of which citizens politically recognise one another as free equals. If my argument succeeds, then public reason citizenship not only could but also should be adopted as the ideal conception of citizenship in European societies (see 5.2).In the sixth chapter (“Tariq Ramadan’s European Muslims and Public Reason”) I apply the evaluative framework based on public reason to the conception of citizenship for Muslims in Europe developed by Tariq Ramadan. (According to a principle introduced in chapter two which I call the “plausibility principle” PP, I argue that Ramadan’s theory of citizenship can be plausibly presented as a “European Muslim” approach to the issue of citizenship, see 6.1). The purpose of such an evaluative work is twofold. Firstly, it aims at examining whether and how the idea of public reason accounts for a version of European citizenship for Muslims coming from Muslims themselves. Secondly, it aims at disclosing whether what such a Muslim conception of citizenship in Europe says about the two dimensions of ‘stability for the right reasons’ of the system of social cooperation (namely, inclusion and ‘mutual assurance’) is consistent with the provisions of public reason citizenship (see 6.2-6.5). / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / N.B. 1) Le lieu de défense de la thèse en cotutelle est ROME (Luiss Guido Carli)2) L'affiliation du co-promoteur de la thèse en cotutelle (Sebastiano Maffettone) est: LUISS Guido Carli / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

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<p dir="ltr">In my dissertation, “Scanlonian Contractualism and Animals,” I take T.M. Scanlon’s ethical contractualism, convert it into a political theory, and apply it to deriving the duties of justice we owe to nonhuman animals. Here is the narrative structure of my dissertation. First, I argue in chapter 1 that nonhuman animals should be included within the scope of morality, or justice, as contractualism construes this notion. Animals are some of the “others” to whom we owe duties, particularly duties of justice. To this effect, I defend a revised version of the argument from marginal cases. </p><p dir="ltr">Second, I tell the reader how contractualism works in detail in chapters 2 and 3, making modifications and conversions into political philosophy along the way. Crucial for my discussion will be the debate between Derek Parfit and Scanlon over issues such as how to take numbers into account within contractualism. Scanlon’s considered view is that personal reasons should be added up to determine what we ought to do, but this is not the aggregation of impersonal value, for example, as in utilitarianism.</p><p dir="ltr">In chapter 4, a major step taken is the conversion of political contractualism into a form of Rawlsian political liberalism. Political liberalism takes the fact of reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines on life’s important questions as a permanent feature of liberal democracy. In order to address this pluralism, political liberalism seeks to provide a political conception of justice that can be endorsed by people who differ on fundamental ethical, philosophical, and religious matters. My version of animal rights contractualism adopts this framework, but it takes work to show how animal rights and political liberalism are compatible.</p><p dir="ltr">Third, in chapter 5, a neutral metric for the harm of death will be suggested, following the requirements of political liberalism to offer a political conception of various aspects of our theories. This needs to be done because the harm of death is a complex, contested philosophical issue. The contractors need this metric to figure out what burdens are imposed by death. A neutral metric is meant to be one that can be endorsed by adherents of different comprehensive philosophical viewpoints in an overlapping consensus.</p><p dir="ltr">Fourth, and finally, some of the specific political duties we have to nonhuman animals will be stated. I survey some of the most common topics that are usually explored here, such as factory-farming, medical research, and hunting. The hope is that at the end of the work, the reader will be convinced that contractualism provides a plausible account of what we owe to each animal.</p>