Thesis advisor: Stephen Hudson / There has been a growing consensus within political philosophy that liberalism is the most rational form of political organization. The arguments in favor of liberalism are theoretical and also based on historical observations. The view of liberalism as a moral conception of the good life, however, seems to betray its original historical purpose, namely, to provide a peaceful political forum despite competing comprehensive doctrines. How can liberalism be a thick moral conviction of its own if it was meant to temper such zero-sum convictions? To pose this question more concretely: If historic wars between strong religious convictions were tempered by provisional liberal ceasefires, could we accept the evolution of liberalism into a strong conviction of its own? This paradoxical development of liberalism in history runs parallel with contemporary philosophical debates. Whether the most proper conception of liberalism is comprehensive, and whether it is legitimized upon such comprehensiveness are both hotly debated. Exploring these historical and philosophical avenues uncover what I think is a need for a conception of comprehensive liberalism. It is beyond my scope here to formulate a new conception of liberalism that decisively settles the debate. I do, however, point to reasons why comprehensive liberalism should be the focus of contemporary efforts. First, I find that history shows a trend of liberalism growing into a positive doctrine of its own. Second, I invoke two famous traditional conceptions, one successful and one failed, which fuel our baseline intuitions of liberalism with comprehensive, not political justifications. Finally, I show that while contemporary philosophy surrounding liberalism developed a political conception, it cannot avoid slipping towards comprehensiveness. Taken together, my argument is that any enforceable and useful theory of liberalism must be grounded on thick and comprehensive philosophical premises. / Thesis (MA) — Boston College, 2017. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

The study examines if methods used by MeToo-movement can be justified as civil disobedience, using contract theories formulated by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. The study aims at two things. Firstly, to explore the justification of public accusations in order to give new perspectives on the contemporary debate on the Swedish MeToo-movement. Three cases are examined, all in which profiles names and pictures have been published in media due to accusations of sexual harassments. Secondly, the study aims to examine and evaluate the normative standpoints behind the contractarian approach to civil disobedience from a feminist perspective. By applying feminist critic of contract theory, carried out by Carole Pateman, Susan Moller Okin and Jean Hampton, I hope to contribute to a more sustainable theory on civil disobedience as a tool for fighting structural injustice. The analysis shows that the contractarian way of defining and justifying civil disobedience is founded on assumptions that are unacceptable from a feminist point of view. Amongst other things, I find that Rawls definition of political consciousness ignores the structural subordination and discrimination of women, by paying attention only to the public sphere and its political institutions. As a result of this, although some aspects of the methods used by the MeToo-movement fits in to the contractarian definition of civil disobedience, the theories prove unable to justify our cases. In the conclusion, I argue that the MeToo-movement broadens our understanding of civil disobedience by challenging the boundaries of how injustices are created, defined and remediated.

Submitted by PPG Filosofia (filosofia-pg@pucrs.br) on 2018-05-21T13:43:38Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TES_JADERSON BORGES LESSA.pdf: 1883533 bytes, checksum: e3484db9f132bfc3c19567541b5d676a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Sheila Dias (sheila.dias@pucrs.br) on 2018-06-01T13:26:37Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 TES_JADERSON BORGES LESSA.pdf: 1883533 bytes, checksum: e3484db9f132bfc3c19567541b5d676a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-06-01T13:32:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TES_JADERSON BORGES LESSA.pdf: 1883533 bytes, checksum: e3484db9f132bfc3c19567541b5d676a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-16 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior - CAPES / The aims of this research on the criticism of Michael Sandel to John Rawls it is to investigate the possibility to carry out another solution the problem of the priority of the right over the good, about the limits of the theory of justice and of political liberalism. This aims signals an attempt to solve a problem internal justice as fairness but became the target of external critics, who saw in this situation their practical and conceptual limits. Even acknowledging external criticism, the proposed solution to the limits presented involves an internal response. The proposal includes: ?) the displacement of the problem of priority to the problem of congruence; ?) the affirmation of the relevance of conceptions of good, both from the moral and political point of view, of a conception of justice; ?) the recognition that a rejection of a vision of good could weaken political institutions. The implication of this perspective is that any absolute understanding of these perspectives is undone if emphasized the elements of justice and good in the perspective of congruence. Given these objectives and proposals, the research plan is based on the state of how this question is found in the work of Rawls, either in terms of priority or of congruence. Then are the critical considerations that Sandel presents as limits to the realization of that theory of justice and that form of political liberalism. Namely, that justice cannot be primary and that political liberalism leads to a loss of the politics of good (common, public). The result is a "procedural republic". The last part is to demonstrate that the problem of congruence ? that of showing the possibility of a theory of justice finding a place within the conceptions of good ? it is not rejected by liberalism. This idea reinforces the possibility of Rawls's theory goes beyond the limits indicated by Sandel. / O objetivo desta pesquisa sobre a cr?tica de Michael Sandel a John Rawls ? investigar a possibilidade de se efetivar outra solu??o, para os limites da teoria da justi?a e do liberalismo pol?tico, ao problema da prioridade do justo sobre o bem. Esse objetivo sinaliza uma tentativa de resolu??o de um problema, interno a justi?a como equidade, mas que se tornou alvo dos cr?ticos externos, que viram nessa situa??o os seus limites, pr?ticos e conceituais. Mesmo a cr?tica externa sendo reconhecida, a proposta de solu??o para os limites apresentados abrange uma resposta interna, que envolve: ?) uma guinada do problema da prioridade para o problema da congru?ncia; ?) a afirma??o da relev?ncia das concep??es de bem, tanto para o ponto de vista moral, quanto pol?tico, de uma concep??o de justi?a; e, ?) o reconhecimento de que uma rejei??o de uma vis?o de bem poderia enfraquecer as institui??es pol?ticas. A implica??o desse ponto de vista ? que, enfatizados os elementos da justi?a e do bem na perspectiva da congru?ncia, desfaz-se qualquer compreens?o absoluta destes aspectos. ? luz desses objetivos e propostas, o plano de investiga??o ? realizado ao se partir do estado de como essa quest?o encontrase na obra de Rawls, seja no que se refere ? prioridade, seja no que se refere ? congru?ncia. Em seguida, encontram-se as considera??es cr?ticas que Sandel apresenta como limites para a realiza??o daquela teoria da justi?a e daquela forma de liberalismo pol?tico, a saber, que a justi?a n?o pode ser prim?ria e que o liberalismo pol?tico conduz a uma perda da pol?tica do bem (comum, p?blico). O resultado ? uma ?rep?blica procedimental?. A ?ltima parte consiste em demonstrar que o problema da congru?ncia ? aquele de mostrar a possibilidade de uma teoria da justi?a encontrar lugar dentro das concep??es de bem ? n?o ? rejeitado pelo liberalismo, refor?ando, assim, a possibilidade da teoria de Rawls ir al?m dos limites apontados por Sandel.

Baserat på olika vetenskapliga och filosofiska definitioner av vad liberalismen kännetecknas av så åsyftar denna uppsats att ge klarhet i vilken liberalismkonception som tre olika svenska riksdagspartier använder sig av i debatten om religiösa friskolor. Det stora fokuset för uppsatsen är att beskriva hur liberalismen kan se olika ut beroende på hur man väljer att värdera olika liberala begrepp. Begrepp som frihet, jämställdhet och rättvisa visar sig definieras olika av de tre riksdagspartier som granskas, och således landar även partierna olika i sina argument beträffande de religiösa friskolorna i Sverige. Med anledning av liberalismens utveckling i historien så har begreppet liberalism och vad som räknas som liberala begrepp ändrats och formats om så att det idag kan uppfattas som svårt att definiera vad som kan anses vara liberalt. Liberalismen lider av en kluvenhet vilket visar sig när partier som anser sig föra en liberal argumentation ibland lyckas landa i beslut som kan anses vara varandras motsatser. Uppsatsens slutsats är att de tre riksdagspartier som presenterats använder sig av huvudsakligen två liberalismkonceptioner, där den ena konceptionen förespråkar en starkare stat för ökad liberalism, medan den andra konceptionen förespråkar en större frihet för individen att forma sitt eget liv.

At the outset the International Criminal Court (ICC) was heralded as a revolution within international society, but it has since found itself at the centre of much controversy and debate. According to the Rome Statute’s Preamble, a broad aim of the ICC is: “to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice”. However, a review of the critical literature surrounding the ICC uncovered a noticeable lack of discussions applying theoretical understandings of justice to neither the Court’s design nor operations; a gap in the literature that the thesis aims to address. Moreover, the review identified that the primary concerns regarding the ICC’s performance all focussed on stakeholder practices. Combining these two observations, the thesis hypothesised that the controversies and issues facing the ICC emerged because the practice of the Court’s primary stakeholders has been incompatible with the demands of justice. In order to test this hypothesis, the thesis analyses the compatibility of the ICC with what the thesis identifies as the core theoretical demands of justice across three areas: purpose, procedure, and stakeholder practice. It does this by building a theoretical framework from the justice literature which is then used to analyse and critique data relating to the ICC’s purposes, procedures and stakeholder practices gathered from empirical observations, interviews, official documents and speeches. The thesis concludes that, for the most part, it is the practice of ICC stakeholders that have been incompatible with the demands of justice, not the Court’s purposes or procedures.

Este trabalho discute a teoria do direito de Ronald Dworkin, desde sua gênese até seus desenvolvimentos mais recentes, com o objetivo específico de aferir a influência que esta sofreu da filosofia política de John Rawls e de sua concepção de justiça. Essa influência foi especialmente sentida na metodologia inicialmente concebida por Dworkin para responder às tradicionais questões de teoria geral do direito, já que estas teriam sido mal resolvidas pelos positivistas. O que se verifica é que tal método se baseia na idéia de equilíbrio reflexivo de Rawls. Essa intensa convergência que inicialmente se verifica é progressivamente afastada na medida em que Dworkin caminha rumo a um liberalismo abrangente, defendendo uma continuidade entre a moralidade política e a ética, e Rawls reinterpreta sua teoria para defender uma limitação desta ao domínio do político. / This paper will discuss Ronald Dworkins legal theory since its genesis till its most recent studies, aiming specifically assess how this theory was influenced by John Rawls political philosophy and his conception of justice. This influence was specially noticed in the methodology first conceived by Dworkin to respond to the traditional issues of jurisprudence, since these ones had been unresolved by the legal positivism. What can be verified is that such method is based on Rawls idea of reflective equilibrium. This strong convergence, that is initially observed, is gradually deviated insofar as Dworkin moves towards to a comprehensive liberalism, defending continuity between morality and ethics, and Rawls reinterprets his theory to defend a limitation of it to the domain of the political.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-06-15T14:50:48Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Pércio Davies Schmitz_.pdf: 562620 bytes, checksum: c115ed27d354445d713cfb6eacee7088 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-15T14:50:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pércio Davies Schmitz_.pdf: 562620 bytes, checksum: c115ed27d354445d713cfb6eacee7088 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-04-12 / Nenhuma / A presente dissertação de Mestrado trata da questão da justiça que é tema controverso e aberto desde os primórdios das indagações filosóficas sobre o tema. Nossos dias são marcados por contradições acerca da própria visão de homem e de sociedade, principalmente após termos vivenciado ao mesmo passo as maravilhas do avanço técnico, científico e cultural dos dois últimos séculos, também as atrocidades realizadas contra o homem ferindo os seus direitos mais fundamentais, em especial os fatos históricos do século XX, como as duas grandes guerras. Esse paradoxo entre o enaltecimento das potencialidades humanas e a própria redução utilitária da condição humana leva à busca de uma nova teoria da justiça que seja capaz de repensar o valor do humano e a sua condição natural e que a mesma não seja simplesmente uma condição instrumental e calcada nos princípios de maior satisfação para o maior número de indivíduos, próprios do utilitarismo que se impunha até o momento. O tema proposto visa situar a visão de homem, no interior do contexto da justiça, focando-se especificamente na questão do atomismo social do indivíduo, presente na teoria da justiça como equidade de John Rawls, que o entende uma parte autônoma no interior de uma doutrina contratualista, atomizada portanto, e que se dá, privilegiadamente, em sua teoria, no “momento” ahistórico da posição original. Aqui o enfoque será dado à teoria da justiça de Rawls e se pretende considerar as críticas à questão do atomismo elaboradas por Taylor, no contexto do debate atual entre liberalismo e comunitarismo. / This dissertation is on the issue of justice which is an open and controversial theme since the earliest times of the philosophical questions about the topic. Our time is marked by contradictions about the own vision of man and society, mainly after we have experienced both the wonders of the technical scientific and cultural development of the last two centuries and also carried out the atrocities against man, hurting his most fundamental rights, specially the historical facts of the twentieth century, as the two world wars. This paradox between the enhancement of the human potential and the very utilitarian reduction of the human condition lead us to a search of a new theory of the justice that is able to rethink the value of the human and its natural condition and that it is not only an instrumental condition grounded upon the principles of greater satisfaction for the greatest number of individuals, typical of the utilitarianism that was imposed so far. The proposed debate aims to locate the vision of man within the context of justice focusing specifically on the issue of the individual’ social atomism that is present in the theory of justice as John Ralws fairness that means it as an autonomous part within a contractual doctrine, thus atomized , and which gives, as a privilege in his theory, in the a-historical “moment” of the original position and, on the other hand, the Charles Taylor’s opposed vision that, introducing concepts as the one of interiority, of recognition and of no decomposition of the goods, which are genuinely social, tends to locate his vision of man in an human being located within a broader context than himself. Here the focus is going to be given to Rawls’ justice theory and one intend to consider the criticism to the atomism issue elaborated by Taylor within the context of the current debate between liberalism and communitarians.

John Rawls developed principles of justice to guide the fair allocation of resources in a society. However, his principles did not take into consideration a society’s differing health needs. Norman Daniels attempted to extend Rawlsian principles of justice to apply to the allocation of health resources. In Just Health, Daniels argued that, under certain circumstances, an age-based allocation of health resources can be prudent. He proposed the Prudential Lifespan Account (PLA) to defend age-rationing against claims that it would lead to favoring one age-group over another. In this paper, I analyze Daniels’s PLA and argue that societal aging poses a significant threat to its effectiveness. I then examine and critique alternate theories to extend Rawlsian principles of justice to account for health, specifically those proposed by Dennis McKerlie and Hugh Lazenby.

John Rawls's theory of justice, which he calls "justice as fairness," has proven to be most influential with regard to the course of contemporary political theory. In both of Rawls's books, A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, his aim was to present a theoretically-compelling defense of deontological liberalism, and to present a set of principles by which to fairly order a just society. While Rawls's project has attracted a fair number of proponents over the years, it has also been a popular target for liberal and nonliberal critics alike. A recurrent theme among these criticisms has been an objection with Rawls's conception of the self as presented in A Theory of Justice. This thesis will focus on feminists' criticisms of Rawls's conception of persons. In general, feminists contend that Rawlsian liberalism suffers a structural gender bias resulting from Rawls's conception of the self. Rawls's notion of the self, feminists argue, rests on male or masculine attributes. I will demonstrate in the course of this thesis that feminists' charges fail on two accounts. First, feminists do not present an accurate reading of Rawls's conception of persons in either A Theory of Justice or Political Liberalism. Second, in reviewing feminist approaches to gendering the self (which is integral to their critique), it will be shown that feminists are unable to gender the self in a theoretically defensible manner. Thus, feminists cannot make the claim that the Rawlsian self is a male or masculine concept. It follows from these twin defects that feminist contentions fail to prove that Rawls's theory is gender biased.

Communities near nuclear power plants are at potential risk from natural and man-made failures at the nuclear power plants located within those communities. This study explored the concerns and rationalizations of residents of a community who live within a 10-mile evacuation zone of the nuclear power plant located there. Using the general theory of deliberative democracy, the purpose of this qualitative study was to understand and explore why individuals continue to live close to nuclear power plants. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with 15 individuals who live within a 10- mile radius of a nuclear power plant in the western US. These interviews were transcribed, coded, and analyzed using a modified Van Kaam procedure. Findings indicated that members of the community had concerns that natural or man-made disasters could lead to catastrophic failure of the nuclear power plant but rationalized living in proximity. Another key finding was that the community itself was supported by the revenue generated from the plant which led many of the participants to live in the community and this contributed to their rationalizing for why they should live close to the plant. The social change implications of this study included recommendations to mayors, city councils, and regulatory bodies to provide more information about nuclear power plants to communities to help them cope with fear and feelings of helplessness. Residents living near nuclear power plants would benefit from the recommendations made in this study because it would help them understand the risks of living near nuclear power plants.