The South African legal system is dualistic in nature with the one part consisting of the Western common law and the other consisting of African customary law. Although these two legal systems enjoy equal recognition, they regularly come into conflict with each other due to their divergent value systems. It is especially within the context of the South African criminal law that this conflict becomes apparent, because an accused's conduct can be viewed as lawful in terms of African customary law, but unlawful in terms of the South African common law. In such cases the accused may attempt to raise a cultural defence by putting forth evidence of his cultural background or values to convince the court that his prima facie unlawful conduct is actually lawful and that he should escape criminal liability. Alternatively, an accused may put forth evidence of his cultural background or values in an attempt to receive a lighter sentence. The question which therefore arises is whether a so-called "cultural defence" exists in the South African criminal law, and if so, what the influence of such a defence on the South African criminal law is. The conflict between African Customary law and the South African common law in the context of the criminal law arises due to the fact that the indigenous belief in witchcraft, (including witch-killings), the indigenous belief in the tokoloshe and the use of muti-medicine (including muti-murders), as well as the phenomenon of "necklacing" and the custom of ukuthwala can result in the commission of various common law crimes. In the case of witch-killings, the perpetrators can be charged with the common law crimes of murder or, if the victim survives, attempted murder, common assault or assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. Similarly, necklacing, as a method used for killing witches, can also result in the commission of these common law crimes. What is more, the perpetrators of witch-killings can also be charged with the statutory crimes of accusing someone of witchcraft, pointing the victim out as being a witch or wizard or injuring a person based on information received from a traditional healer, or similar person. The indigenous belief in the tokoloshe can lead to the commission of the common law crimes of murder or, if the victim survives, common assault or assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. The perpetrators of mutimurders can also face charges of murder or attempted murder, if the victim survives. The indigenous custom of ukuthwala can result in the commission of common law crimes such as abduction, kidnapping and common assault, as well as the statutory crime of rape. A perusal of South African case law dealing with the indigenous beliefs and customs above reveals that the accused in such cases have indeed attempted to put forth evidence of their indigenous beliefs or customs to persuade the criminal courts that they should escape criminal liability for a particular crime. In fact, these arguments were raised within the context of the existing common law defences such as private defence, necessity, involuntary conduct and a lack of criminal capacity. However, the South African criminal courts have up till now in general been unwilling to accept arguments of indigenous beliefs and customs to serve as a defence, either alone or within the context of the existing defences above, for the commission of a common law or statutory crime. They have, however, been more willing to accept evidence of an accused's indigenous belief or custom to serve as a mitigating factor during sentencing. The extent to which an accused's cultural background will serve as a mitigating factor will, of course, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. As a result an accused who is charged with the commission of a culturally motivated crime has no guarantee that his cultural background and values will in fact be considered as a mitigating factor during his criminal trial. It is thus ultimately concluded that a so-called "cultural defence" does not exist in the South African Criminal law. The indigenous beliefs and customs above not only result in the commission of common law or statutory crimes, but also in the infringement of various fundamental human rights in the Constitution. Witch-killings result in the infringement of the constitutional right to life and the right to freedom and security of the person. However, witches and wizards who are persecuted for practising witchcraft are also denied their right to a fair trial entrenched in the Constitution. Similarly, muti-murders and necklacing also result in the infringement of the right to life and the right to freedom and security of the person entrenched in the Constitution. The custom of ukuthwala results in the infringement of the right to equality, the right to freedom and security of the person, the right to live in an environment that is not harmful to health or well-being, the right not to be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour, the right to basic education and other constitutional safeguards aimed at protecting children. In light of the constitutional right to freedom of culture and the right to freely participate in a cultural life of one's choosing the question can be asked whether the time has come to formally recognise a cultural defence in the South African criminal law. In this study it is argued that these constitutional rights do not warrant the formal recognition of a cultural defence. Instead, it is recommended that the conflict between African customary law and the South African common law can be resolved by bringing indigenous beliefs and customs in line with the values that underpin the Constitution as the supreme law of South Africa. Of course, this does not mean that the courts should ignore cultural considerations during a criminal trial if and when they arise. In fact, as pointed out in this study, the courts have a constitutional duty to apply African customary law when that law is applicable. It goes without saying that, when an accused attempts to escape criminal liability for his unlawful conduct by raising arguments of his cultural background, African customary law will be applicable and must be considered by the court. This in turn raises the question as to how the criminal courts can ensure that they give enough consideration to the possibility that an accused's criminal conduct was culturally motivated so as to comply with their constitutional mandate referred to above. Although it would be nearly impossible to formulate a perfect or flawless approach according to which a judicial officer can adjudicate criminal matters involving culturally motivated crimes, the author suggests the following practical approach which may provide some guidance to judicial officers in dealing with cases involving culturally motivated crimes: • Step 1: Consider whether the commission of the crime was culturally motivated or not. If it seems as though the accused did not commit a culturally motivated crime, the trial can continue on that basis. If, however, it is evident that the accused indeed committed a culturally motivated crime, step 2 follows. • Step 2: Once it has been determined that the commission of the crime was culturally motivated, the next step is to determine which indigenous belief or custom led to the commission of the crime. Once the relevant indigenous belief or custom has been identified, step 3 follows. • Step 3: When it is clear which indigenous belief or custom led to the accused's commission of the crime, the next step is to determine whether arguments pertaining to that particular indigenous belief or custom may be raised within the context of the existing defences in the South African Criminal law in order to exclude the accused's criminal liability. If an accused relies on one of the existing defences in the South African criminal law, he will have to lay a proper evidential foundation for his defence before the court. In assessing the evidence put forth by the accused, the judicial officer must consider the judgment and reasoning in previous cases dealing with the particular indigenous belief or custom. A judicial officer must also consider the values underpinning the Constitution when conducting such an assessment. If a judicial officer upholds an accused's defence, the accused is acquitted. However, if the judicial officer rejects an accused's defence, the accused must be convicted and step 4 follows. • Step 4: Once an accused has been convicted, a court should consider whether arguments of his cultural background can serve as an extenuating circumstance, mitigating the punishment to be imposed on him. However, the practical approach above merely serves as a suggestion to judicial officers in dealing with culturally motivated crimes and ultimately it will be up to the judiciary to develop both the Western common law and African customary law to resolve the criminal law conflicts between these two legal systems. The research for this study was concluded in November 2013. / LLD, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

The September 11, 2001 Jihadists attack on the West and the subsequent wars on terrorism indicate that war may be a permanent condition of life in the contemporary world. This implies that to understand contemporary society, culture and communication requires an understanding of war because war could perhaps provide a perspective through which to understand the world. The aim of this study is to provide such a perspective and to critically explore the link between war and communication. However, in approaching a study of war one is confronted with a pervasive pacifist anti-war ideological bias. To overcome the bias the study adopts a critical strategy: firstly it deconstructs the taken for granted assumptions about the positive value of peace and then it reconstructs and traces the contours of a Western tradition of philosophical thought that considers war as being an integral and formative aspect of human identity and communication. Chapter 2 uncovers the limitations of the pacifists' discourse on war. Chapter 3 traces the Western tradition originating in Heraclitus that considers war as formative experience of being human. Chapter 4 traces war and killing as formative of language and communication. Using these insights a careful reading and interpretation of how war informs the thought and functions in the texts of selected social theorists of the twentieth century. Chapter 5 traces war as an agonistic structure in the works of Johan Huizinga on the role of play and in the political theory of Carl Schmitt. Chapter 6 explores the idea of war as a model of society in the works of Foucault. Chapter 7 investigates the central influence of real and imagined war on Marshall McLuhan’s theory of the media. Chapter 8 explores the way war structures the thought of Lyotard on the postmodern condition. Chapter 9 concludes by drawing implications on how a perspective on war contributes to development of communication theory and understanding life in the postmodern condition. / Communication Science / D. Litt. et Phil. Communication )

L’objectif de ce mémoire est d’analyser les impacts et l’efficacité de la politique d’assassinats ciblés d’Israël dans le cadre du conflit israélo-palestinien. Pour ce faire, trois angles d’approches sont utilisés; militaire, légale et politique. Pour cette raison, l’hypothèse de départ soutient que la politique compromet la résolution du conflit et se divise en trois sections. Tout d’abord, les assassinats ciblés nuisent au règlement du conflit car ils engendrent un cycle de représailles contre Israël. Deuxièmement, ils représentent une violation du droit international ainsi que du droit national israélien. Finalement, ils sont un sérieux obstacle à la résolution politique du conflit dû au climat de violence et de méfiance qu’ils instaurent. Dans la conclusion, il est retenu que, bien que la politique d’assassinats ciblés ne soit pas efficace pour lutter contre les organisations terroristes, elle n’engendre cependant pas d’effet contreproductif de cycle de violence. Dans un second temps, la politique va à l’encontre de lois internationales mais elle peut cependant être justifiée par certains articles issus de ces mêmes textes alors que la Cour suprême israélienne a reconnu que certaines opérations pouvaient s’avérées légales. Troisièmement, elle nuit bel et bien à la résolution politique du conflit israélopalestinien en exacerbant les tensions de par le climat qu’elle instaure. Finalement, les nombreux impacts de celle-ci sur le conflit n’en font pas une politique efficace. / This goal of this thesis is to analyse the impact and effectiveness of the Israeli targeted killing policy within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To this end, three different approaches will be used; military, legal and political. Our hypothesis supports that the policy impedes the resolution to the conflict and is divided into three sections. First of all, Israeli targeted killings impede the conflict resolution because they, in turn, generate retaliations against Israel. Secondly it is a clear violation of international rights, including those of the Israelis. Finally, the policy is a serious obstacle to the settlement of the conflict due to the violent and distrustful atmosphere it arouses. In the conclusion, it is said that, although the policy does not prove to be an effective measure to fight terrorism, neither does it create an escalating cycle of violence. Secondly, the policy is a violation of the international legal system; however it can still be justified by some of the articles present in the same law texts. The Israeli Supreme Court has ruled that some of the operations could be legal. Thirdly, it is effectively detrimental to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because the ambiance it creates exacerbates tensions. In conclusion, the myriad of impacts the policy has on the conflict make it ineffective.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the history behind and the use of militarized drones in modern day conflicts, and to conclude whether the use of these machines, with special attention to the United States, is legal, ethical, and morally defensible. In achieving the aforementioned goals, shortcomings of current policy surrounding drone warfare will be highlighted, acting as the catalyst for a proposal for changes to be made to better suit legal, ethical, and moral considerations. The proposal of a policy to help us work with armed drones is due to the fact that this thesis acknowledges that armed drones, like guns, nuclear weapons, or any type of military technology, is here to stay and that once we acknowledge that fact, the most important step is to make sure we have the right tools to judge the conduct of conflict carried out using armed drones or other weapons that raise similar issues and questions.

This dissertation examines the early modern representation of the Ottoman sultan as merciless murderer of his own family in dramas depicting Islam that are also revenge tragedies or history plays set in empires. This representation arose in part from historical events: the civil wars that erupted periodically from the reign of Sultan Murad I (1362-1389) to that of Sultan Mehmed III (1595-1603) in which the sultan killed family members who were rivals to the throne. Drawing on these events, theological and historical texts by John Foxe, Samuel Purchas, and Richard Knolles offered a distorted image of the Ottoman sultan as devoid of pity for anyone, but most importantly family, an image which seeped into early modern drama. Early modern English playwrights repeatedly staged scenes in the dramas that depict Islam in which one member of a family implores another for pity and to remain alive. However, family killing became diffuse and was not the sole province of the Ottoman sultan or other Muslim character: the Spanish, Romans, and the Scythians also kill their kin. Additionally, they kill members of their own religious, ethnic, and national groups as family killing expands to encompass a more general self destruction, self sacrifice, and self consumption. The presence of the Muslim character, Turk or Moor, serves to underscore the political and religious significance of other characters' family killing. Part of the interest of English playwrights in the Ottoman history of family killing is that England had suffered its own share of family killing or the specter of it during the Wars of the Roses, the Babington Plot against Queen Elizabeth's life, and the martyrdom of many English during the Protestant Reformation. Through an analysis of such plays as Thomas Kyd's The Spanish Tragedy , William Shakespeare's Titus Andronicus , and Christopher Marlowe's Tamburlaine I and II , among others, I argue that English playwrights represented family killing to contend with England's past of civil war, its Protestant Reformation present, and its political future. The dramas that depict Islam portray rulers who elevate empire building above kinship bonds and who feel no pity for those in their own kinship, national, or religious groups. The plays illustrate that the emotion, pity, leads a ruler to the just action of extending mercy and that the converse, lack of pity, leads a kingdom or empire to injustice and destruction. The plays ultimately declare empire building unjust because it is pitiless, creating an argument against empire for English audiences.

無人飛行載具或簡稱無人機是一種不實際搭載乘員的飛行裝置，不論研發的目的為何其核心概念皆是希望以機械來代替人力從事較為辛苦或較為危險的工作；歷史上記載無人機由來已久，但是類議題真正受到國際社會關切乃是2001年9月11日九一一事件後才開始。為了回應九一一事件對美國的威脅，美國除了以行使自衛權為由進攻阿富汗外，更發動了以全球伊斯蘭極端主義份子為對象的「全球反恐戰爭」並且開始大量投入武裝無人機執行定點攻擊行動，狙殺蓋達組織領導人或是與其有關聯的極端主義團體的成員。 隨著反恐戰爭的推進，美國派出的武裝無人機架次也逐年上升，隨之而來的是急遽上升的傷亡人數；驟增的傷亡數，尤其是平民傷亡引起了國際社會關切，其中「美國的武裝無人機攻擊是否違反國際法上關於武力使用的規範」成了急待解決的問題。本論文以當前國際法上關於武力使用的兩大規範：使用武力的合法性(Jus ad bellum)、武力使用的方式(Jus in bello)為途徑，檢視當前美國武裝無人機攻擊是否符合前述兩大規範，進而替美國武裝無人機攻擊衍生的國際法問題提供一個解答。

The overall aim of this thesis is to look at some philosophical issues surrounding autonomous systems in society and war. These issues can be divided into three main categories. The first, discussed in papers I and II, concerns ethical issues surrounding the use of autonomous systems – where the focus in this thesis is on military robots. The second issue, discussed in paper III, concerns how to make sure that advanced robots behave ethically adequate. The third issue, discussed in papers IV and V, has to do with agency and responsibility. Another issue, somewhat aside from the philosophical, has to do with coping with future technologies, and developing methods for dealing with potentially disruptive technologies. This is discussed in papers VI and VII. Paper I systemizes some ethical issues surrounding the use of UAVs in war, with the laws of war as a backdrop. It is suggested that the laws of war are too wide and might be interpreted differently depending on which normative moral theory is used. Paper II is about future, more advanced autonomous robots, and whether the use of such robots can undermine the justification for killing in war. The suggestion is that this justification is substantially undermined if robots are used to replace humans to a high extent. Papers I and II both suggest revisions or additions to the laws or war. Paper III provides a discussion on one normative moral theory – ethics of care – connected to care robots. The aim is twofold: first, to provide a plausible and ethically relevant interpretation of the key term care in ethics of care, and second, to discuss whether ethics of care may be a suitable theory to implement in care robots. Paper IV discusses robots connected to agency and responsibility, with a focus on consciousness. The paper has a functionalistic approach, and it is suggested that robots should be considered agents if they can behave as if they are, in a moral Turing test. Paper V is also about robots and agency, but with a focus on free will. The main question is whether robots can have free will in the same sense as we consider humans to have free will when holding them responsible for their actions in a court of law. It is argued that autonomy with respect to norms is crucial for the agency of robots. Paper VI investigates the assessment of socially disruptive technological change. The coevolution of society and potentially disruptive technolgies makes decision-guidance on such technologies difficult. Four basic principles are proposed for such decision guidance, involving interdisciplinary and participatory elements. Paper VII applies the results from paper VI – and a workshop – to autonomous systems, a potentially disruptive technology. A method for dealing with potentially disruptive technolgies is developed in the paper. / <p>QC 20130911</p>

This work deals with the problems of conception, gravidity and abortion in the first part and in the second part than deals with problems of death and dying. It concerns two cut-off points, which are component parts of human life. The first part surveis the biginning of human life and tries to find answers for questions, which have a connection with the conception, artifical insemination, surrogative maternity and abortion. It describes paradoxes, which comes from such situations. It appreciates this paradoxes in the wiev of medicin, ethics, psychology and law. The second part describes the end of the human life in several forms. It broods killing, suicide and euthansia in aspects of the psychology, medicine, law and ethics. In the end it describes the palliative care as an alternativ to euthansia.

Introductory: If the relations existing between the Native chiefs and the Colony which Sir George Grey found on his arrival are to be fully understood, a brief consideration of Cathcart’s policy and Frontier settlement is necessary. When Cathcart came out as Governor in 1852, he found the rebel chief Sandile, with associate chieftans’ and large bands of followers, still occupying their locations in the Amatola ranges. From this haunt no force had as yet been able to drive them. During the series of skirmishes known as the Eighth Kaffir War, their first crop of Indian corn was destroyed so early in the season as to allow of a second crop springing up. This unusual phenomenon inspired prophet Umlangeni to claim that he had worked a miracle. Fortunately later reverses and the expulsion of Sanailli from his mountain fastness discredited this thoughtful opportunist. Sandilli, as paramount chief of the Gaikas, might have held and influential position in the councils of the Kaffrarian chiefs, that he did not hold such a position, was due, in Charles Brownlee’s opinion, to his timid and suspicious nature and to the fact that his mental capacity was ‘hardly above mediocrity’. He was unable to fight owing to lameness, and he lacked ‘sufficient’ resciution and strength of mind to resist the evil influence of the bad advisers, nevertheless he could be obstinate and he never, to the end of his life, gave up on the idea of getting back to this old locations in the Amatolas. Macomo with some three thousand followers had likewise evaded all attempts to turn him out of this haunts in the mountain range. He, together with his associate the Tambookie chief Quesha, and diverse rebel Hotttentots, indulged in the frequent marauding forays into the surrounding country. Macomo was the eldest of Gaika’s sons and was “allowed by all to be the greatest politician and best warrior in Kaffraria’. During the minority of Sandilli Macomo had acted as his regent and had attained great influence over the tribe; this he afterwards lost for he moved to the neighbourhood of Fort Beaufort, where in a state of intoxication most of this time was passed. He had in Brownlee’s opinion, done more mischief in the war than any other chief. Great jealously was felt between Macomo and Sandilli, especially on the part of the former; this was shown through the cattle killing period in his efforts to involve Sandilli, while attempting to keep on the right side of the Government himself. Further south, indeed within the Colony itself, such petty chiefs as Seyolo and Botman, lurking in the Fish River bush, and the Keiskamma kloofs, rendered the main road dangerous, and even succeeded, for a time, in completely cutting the ling of communication between Kingwilliamstown and Grahamstown.

The September 11, 2001 Jihadists attack on the West and the subsequent wars on terrorism indicate that war may be a permanent condition of life in the contemporary world. This implies that to understand contemporary society, culture and communication requires an understanding of war because war could perhaps provide a perspective through which to understand the world. The aim of this study is to provide such a perspective and to critically explore the link between war and communication. However, in approaching a study of war one is confronted with a pervasive pacifist anti-war ideological bias. To overcome the bias the study adopts a critical strategy: firstly it deconstructs the taken for granted assumptions about the positive value of peace and then it reconstructs and traces the contours of a Western tradition of philosophical thought that considers war as being an integral and formative aspect of human identity and communication. Chapter 2 uncovers the limitations of the pacifists' discourse on war. Chapter 3 traces the Western tradition originating in Heraclitus that considers war as formative experience of being human. Chapter 4 traces war and killing as formative of language and communication. Using these insights a careful reading and interpretation of how war informs the thought and functions in the texts of selected social theorists of the twentieth century. Chapter 5 traces war as an agonistic structure in the works of Johan Huizinga on the role of play and in the political theory of Carl Schmitt. Chapter 6 explores the idea of war as a model of society in the works of Foucault. Chapter 7 investigates the central influence of real and imagined war on Marshall McLuhan’s theory of the media. Chapter 8 explores the way war structures the thought of Lyotard on the postmodern condition. Chapter 9 concludes by drawing implications on how a perspective on war contributes to development of communication theory and understanding life in the postmodern condition. / Communication Science / D. Litt. et Phil. Communication )