No plano da filosofia já há mais de dois mil anos se discute qual a melhor forma de conduta humana: aquela dirigida pela razão ou pela emoção; prevalência de uma ou de outra, ou equilíbrio entre ambas. Para o que interessa à filosofia do direito, mais especificamente à interpretação e aplicação legais, Martha Nussbaum tem oferecido interessantes reflexões sobre as emoções, de modo a conceituá-las não como forças irracionais, mas sim respostas inteligentes à percepção de valor e importância de objetos, fatos ou pessoas. Neste sentido, caso demonstrada a plausibilidade de algumas destas reflexões, a própria controvérsia filosófica entre o uso da razão e/ou da emoção perderia um tanto de sentido. Indo além dos métodos comumente usados pela filosofia – introspecção consciente, análise lógica e argumentos especulativos – o objetivo deste trabalho é investigar a sustentabilidade do ponto de vista científico das reflexões de Nussbaum sobre o papel das emoções. Isto será feito através da compilação e análise comparativa entre aquelas e os resultados de recentes pesquisas neurocientíficas sobre a atuação das emoções no processo de tomada de decisões, no campo da memória e do comportamento. Ao final, observaremos quais reflexões são atualmente sustentáveis do ponto de vista científico, quais são pertinentes para um modelo de aplicação e interpretação legal que faça uso das nossas capacidades cognitivas plenas, assim como quais as reflexões que carecem de novos testes científicos para se consolidarem. / In the field of philosophy, fore more than two thousand years there have been controversy about which is the better role model for human behavior: one driven by reason, other driven by emotion, supremacy of one over the other, or an equal balance between both. For the matter of Law’s philosophy, especially legal interpretation and application, Martha Nussbaum has been offering interesting insights about emotions, defining them not as irrational forces, but intelligent answers for perception of value and importance of objects, facts, and people. In that sense, in the case of discovering evidence about the plausibility of some of Nussbaum’s insights, the philosophy debate about the use of reason or emotion, will become a non-sense. Going further the traditional methods commonly used by philosophy – conscious introspection, logical analysis, speculative reasoning – the target of this work is to investigate the scientific plausibility of Nussbaum’s insights about emotions. That will be done through the compilation and comparative analysis between her those insights and recent work in neuroscience investigations about “decision-making” processes, memory, and behavior. By the end, we will observe which insights nowadays have empirical support, which ones concern to a legal model of interpretation and application which uses our full cognitive capacities, and beside which insights demand more scientific investigation to became consolidated.

No plano da filosofia já há mais de dois mil anos se discute qual a melhor forma de conduta humana: aquela dirigida pela razão ou pela emoção; prevalência de uma ou de outra, ou equilíbrio entre ambas. Para o que interessa à filosofia do direito, mais especificamente à interpretação e aplicação legais, Martha Nussbaum tem oferecido interessantes reflexões sobre as emoções, de modo a conceituá-las não como forças irracionais, mas sim respostas inteligentes à percepção de valor e importância de objetos, fatos ou pessoas. Neste sentido, caso demonstrada a plausibilidade de algumas destas reflexões, a própria controvérsia filosófica entre o uso da razão e/ou da emoção perderia um tanto de sentido. Indo além dos métodos comumente usados pela filosofia – introspecção consciente, análise lógica e argumentos especulativos – o objetivo deste trabalho é investigar a sustentabilidade do ponto de vista científico das reflexões de Nussbaum sobre o papel das emoções. Isto será feito através da compilação e análise comparativa entre aquelas e os resultados de recentes pesquisas neurocientíficas sobre a atuação das emoções no processo de tomada de decisões, no campo da memória e do comportamento. Ao final, observaremos quais reflexões são atualmente sustentáveis do ponto de vista científico, quais são pertinentes para um modelo de aplicação e interpretação legal que faça uso das nossas capacidades cognitivas plenas, assim como quais as reflexões que carecem de novos testes científicos para se consolidarem. / In the field of philosophy, fore more than two thousand years there have been controversy about which is the better role model for human behavior: one driven by reason, other driven by emotion, supremacy of one over the other, or an equal balance between both. For the matter of Law’s philosophy, especially legal interpretation and application, Martha Nussbaum has been offering interesting insights about emotions, defining them not as irrational forces, but intelligent answers for perception of value and importance of objects, facts, and people. In that sense, in the case of discovering evidence about the plausibility of some of Nussbaum’s insights, the philosophy debate about the use of reason or emotion, will become a non-sense. Going further the traditional methods commonly used by philosophy – conscious introspection, logical analysis, speculative reasoning – the target of this work is to investigate the scientific plausibility of Nussbaum’s insights about emotions. That will be done through the compilation and comparative analysis between her those insights and recent work in neuroscience investigations about “decision-making” processes, memory, and behavior. By the end, we will observe which insights nowadays have empirical support, which ones concern to a legal model of interpretation and application which uses our full cognitive capacities, and beside which insights demand more scientific investigation to became consolidated.

No plano da filosofia já há mais de dois mil anos se discute qual a melhor forma de conduta humana: aquela dirigida pela razão ou pela emoção; prevalência de uma ou de outra, ou equilíbrio entre ambas. Para o que interessa à filosofia do direito, mais especificamente à interpretação e aplicação legais, Martha Nussbaum tem oferecido interessantes reflexões sobre as emoções, de modo a conceituá-las não como forças irracionais, mas sim respostas inteligentes à percepção de valor e importância de objetos, fatos ou pessoas. Neste sentido, caso demonstrada a plausibilidade de algumas destas reflexões, a própria controvérsia filosófica entre o uso da razão e/ou da emoção perderia um tanto de sentido. Indo além dos métodos comumente usados pela filosofia – introspecção consciente, análise lógica e argumentos especulativos – o objetivo deste trabalho é investigar a sustentabilidade do ponto de vista científico das reflexões de Nussbaum sobre o papel das emoções. Isto será feito através da compilação e análise comparativa entre aquelas e os resultados de recentes pesquisas neurocientíficas sobre a atuação das emoções no processo de tomada de decisões, no campo da memória e do comportamento. Ao final, observaremos quais reflexões são atualmente sustentáveis do ponto de vista científico, quais são pertinentes para um modelo de aplicação e interpretação legal que faça uso das nossas capacidades cognitivas plenas, assim como quais as reflexões que carecem de novos testes científicos para se consolidarem. / In the field of philosophy, fore more than two thousand years there have been controversy about which is the better role model for human behavior: one driven by reason, other driven by emotion, supremacy of one over the other, or an equal balance between both. For the matter of Law’s philosophy, especially legal interpretation and application, Martha Nussbaum has been offering interesting insights about emotions, defining them not as irrational forces, but intelligent answers for perception of value and importance of objects, facts, and people. In that sense, in the case of discovering evidence about the plausibility of some of Nussbaum’s insights, the philosophy debate about the use of reason or emotion, will become a non-sense. Going further the traditional methods commonly used by philosophy – conscious introspection, logical analysis, speculative reasoning – the target of this work is to investigate the scientific plausibility of Nussbaum’s insights about emotions. That will be done through the compilation and comparative analysis between her those insights and recent work in neuroscience investigations about “decision-making” processes, memory, and behavior. By the end, we will observe which insights nowadays have empirical support, which ones concern to a legal model of interpretation and application which uses our full cognitive capacities, and beside which insights demand more scientific investigation to became consolidated.

L’ère est au débat sur l’expansion désordonnée et la fragmentation du droit international. Après avoir mis tant d’années à résoudre la question ontologique du droit international (existe-t-il ou n’existe-t-il pas ?), l’angoisse de l’internationaliste se poursuit sous de nouveaux auspices : survivra-t-il ou ne survivra-t-il pas à son expansion le parcellisant ? Longtemps délaissée, la question des conflits de normes occupe désormais une place de choix dans ces questionnements. Les conflits de normes, traditionnellement définis comme situation dans laquelle une ou plusieurs normes imposent des obligations qu’il est impossible de satisfaire simultanément, posent un certain nombre de défis au droit international contemporain : bien évidemment quant à leur méthodes de résolution mais également quant à la perception que l’on se fait du droit international dans son ensemble. La question des conflits de normes et celle de l’organisation du droit international (ou surtout la perception que l’on retient) sont consubstantielles. Le problème des conflits de normes n’est ni abordé ou résolu en droit international de la même manière selon que l’on envisage le droit international comme un ordre juridique dont la qualité principale est l’unité (ce qui renvoie à un système clos, rejetant les éléments extérieurs et la pluralité) ou que l’on envisage le droit international comme un système juridique dont la qualité principale est la cohérence et l’organisation (acceptant ainsi la diversité en son sein, notamment l’existence de sous-systèmes). / After years of discussion on the existence of international law, International law scholars are currently focalizing on a new subject: the disordered expansion and the fragmentation of international law. Indeed, conflicts of norms appear to be a new source of anxiety raising a new question: will international law survive? The question focuses on situations where two or more international norms impose international obligations that cannot be simultaneously complied with, which is without doubt a real challenge for modern international law. Trying to resolve that issue requires having a look on the conflict of norms resolution methods, but not only. A more theorical interrogation, that is how international law is thought as a whole, is raised by these situations. Our research shows in that aspect that very different solutions to the issue are conceivable, depending on the conception of international law as a traditional united hierarchized legal system or as a complex and pluralistic “ensemble”.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-05T17:19:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 19 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O tema da presente investigação é o âmbito de linguagem no qual se dá a relação entre metafísica e poder político ou entre filosofia e ciências (direito). Seu contexto é o da crise da modernidade e da teoria contratualista de Hobbes, o qual, quando passa pelo Dasein questionador, funciona como preparação de um salto para outros começos pós-modernos de uma nova filosofia prática, cujas bases estão no ser-no-mundo-com-outros de Heidegger e na ontologia da potência de Agamben. Visa-se enfrentar os escândalos da filosofia (no direito) e a função de parâmetro definidor, organizativo e legitimador do seu fundamento, que se reflete no poder, na ciência e no direito. Tem-se como objetivo geral “voltar de Siracusa” e pensar, através do método fenomenológico hermenêutico e da função crítica do filósofo do direito, os escândalos da filosofia (no direito). Conclui-se que, desde o fio condutor da linguagem, Agamben situa-se numa posição “intermediária” entre os extremos de Heidegger (filosofia, nível ontológico) e Hobbes / This research’s subject is the linguistic space in wich occurs the relations between methaphysics and politic power or between philosophy and sciences (law). Its context is that one of the crises of modernity and Hobbes’ theory of contract, which one, when pass through the questions of Dasein, works as the preparation for a jump to others post-modernity new begginings of a new practical philosophy, whose bases are in the Heidegger´s Mitdasein and Agamben´s potential ontology. It intends to face the philosophical scandals (in the law) and its fundamental definying, organizyng and legitimating parameter´s functions, that happen in power, science and law. The general objective is “come back from Siracusa” and think, through hermeneutics phenomenological method and through the critical function of the law´s philosopher, the philosophical scandals (in the law). As a conclusion, from the subject of the language, Agamben is in a middle position between Heidegger´s extreme point (philosophy, ontological level) and Ho

This paper does a profound description of the legal framework and its recent modifications related to the State’s use of force in socio-environmental conflicts. This analysis emphasizes in law’s violent nature as a theoretic approach that intends on showing the way that the legal system, instead of defending rights, violates them. The methodology is dogmatic when analyzing law and other legal documents, and interdisciplinary when comparing laws with evidence gathered in interviews, participant observation, documents and databases. The objective its to characterize critically the complex legal framework that articulates the politics that leads to the criminalization of social protests against extractive industries in Peru. / El artículo hace una descripción profunda del marco normativo y sus modificaciones recientes con relación al uso de la fuerza estatal en conflictos socioambientales. Pone énfasis en la naturaleza violenta del derecho como enfoque teórico e intenta mostrar de qué manera el sistema jurídico, antes que garante, es productor de violaciones a los derechos humanos. La metodología empleada es, por un lado, dogmática cuando analiza normas y otros documentos legales y, por otro, interdisciplinaria cuando compara leyes con evidencia recogida en entrevistas, observación participante, documentos y bases de datos. El objetivo es caracterizar críticamente el complejo entramado legal que articula la política de criminalización de las protestas sociales contra industrias extractivas en el Perú.

This thesis explores the afterlife and literary presence of the Anglo-Saxons in three literary works from the Middle English period. Middle English writers appropriated classical and French traditions for decidedly English purposes, but relatively few scholars have noted the way in which individuals in the Middle English period (particularly in the fourteenth century) drew upon and (re)constructed an organic English identity or essence emblematized by the Anglo-Saxons. Post-Conquest English men and women did not relate to their Anglo-Saxon forebears in an unproblematic manner; changes in language and culture, precipitated by the Norman Invasion, placed a vast, unwieldy gap between Middle English culture and Anglo-Saxon traditions. The uneasy relationship between the Middle English period and the Anglo-Saxon period marks Middle English literature's relationship with Anglo-Saxon precedents as one of negotiation and contestation. Through an examination of Chaucer's The Man of Law's Tale, and the anonymous Athelston and St. Erkenwald, I consider the ways in which Middle English writers conceived of their notions of "the past," and how such associations affected and generated new modes of thought in a relational and, at times, oppositional manner. This thesis explores the anxiety of relating to a past tradition that was recognizably "English" yet profoundly "other," and I analyze discourses on several distinct (occasionally conflated) "others," including Jews, Muslims, and "easterners" in order to suggest the trepidation of relating to a past tradition that was uncanny due to a familiarity that was quite unfamiliar. Middle English literature encounters, and, at times, recoils from this difference, and the works which I consider domesticate and make known/knowable the "primitive" Anglo-Saxon past.

Le concept de renvoi mobile trouve son origine dans la littérature italienne la plus distinguée en théorie du droit international privé. Apparu, dans ce contexte, sous le nom de rinvio mobile, il était positionné sur la branche extravertie de la règle de rattachement, afin de rendre compte de l’insertion des normes étrangères, considérées dans leur contenu, dans l’ordre juridique pris pour base du raisonnement. À cet effet, la règle de rattachement était tenue pour une «norme en blanc», prête à recevoir, par le biais d’une incorporation, n’importe quel contenu normatif. L’ordre juridique de renvoi, ainsi disposé à reprendre à son compte la totalité des dispositions adoptées par les droits étrangers au gré des renvois effectués en double face du rattachement, devait bien vite prendre les traits d’une mosaïque de normes issues de toutes origines et introduites de manière somme toute erratique en son sein. La présente étude renouvelle les bases et les fonctions du renvoi mobile pour proposer, à travers lui, un concept relationnel capable de s’immiscer dans la sphère du droit international privé dans le cadre de l’adaptation de la réglementation des situations individuelles issue des droits nationaux à la garantie européenne des libertés de circulation. Le renvoi au droit étranger répond à une logique « plurilatérale », dont la reconnaissance des décisions, actes, ou situations juridiques constitue une expression méthodologique. Le renouvellement du concept permet d’envisager le «plurilatéralisme» comme une nouvelle identité méthodologique, distincte du bilatéralisme et de l’unilatéralisme. / The concept of “renvoi mobile” was born in the most distinguished private international law’s scholarship in Italy, where it was known as “rinvio mobile”. Situated on the “foreign-oriented” side of the choice-of-law rules, it gave them the ability to insert, by way of incorporation, the foreign applicable rules’ content into the legal order of the forum. For such a reading to be plausible, the choice-of-law rule was considered as “norma in bianco”, i.e. contentless rule. Thus, it seemed to be able to receive every and any normative content. The counterpart of this was that the state’s legal order seemed to be willing (or obliged) to adopt all the rules existing in foreign law as if they were its own, and, consequently, to become a patchwork of different norms, with different origins, and introduced randomly. The present work reconstructs the basis and the functions of the “rinvio mobile” in order to propose it as a relational concept able to take place in the sphere of private international law, in the process of adaptation of the regulation given to private situations by national legal orders according to the European rights of free movement. The “renvoi” to foreign law is governed by a “plurilateral” logic. The recognition of foreign decisions, acts or legal situations, is a methodological expression of this logic. The renewal of this concept enables “plurilateralism” to be considered as a new methodological identity distinct from bilateralism and unilateralism.

À la différence d'autres phénomènes juridiques, le déplacement du droit d'un lieu à l'autre s'inscrit dans une analyse beaucoup plus ample que celle de droit comparé. Les États sont mis en concurrence dans de nombreux domaines : politiques économiques et fiscales, protection sociale, systèmes éducatifs, innovation, etc. Les systèmes juridiques se retrouvent également en compétition. Avec la mondialisation les échanges entre les systèmes juridiques se sont multipliés, ouvrant la voie à un recours plus fréquent à la démarche comparative. Par conséquent, la circulation du droit est un sujet qui a intéressé à la pensée juridique depuis toujours, mais qui ne commence à être traité que récemment. Pour le comprendre il convient de se rapporter à un cas spécifique, qui étant donné son caractère paradigmatique est celui de la réception du droit, de la doctrine et du régime constitutionnel français pendant les années trente en Colombie. Son examen servira comme support empirique d'un modèle explicatif du phénomène de la diffusion, d'un État à un autre, d'un droit formalisé et systématisé. / Unlike other legal phenomena, law's moving one place to another is part of a much broader analysis than that of comparative law. States are in competition in many areas: economic and fiscal policies, social protection, education systems, innovation, etc. Legal systems are also in competition. With globalization, exchanges between legal systems have proliferated, opening the way to more frequent use of comparative approach. Therefore, the circulation of law is a subject that always interested to legal thought, but it begins to be treated recently. To understand it should relate to a specific case, which given its paradigmatic character is that of reception of the law, the doctrine and the constitutional French regime during the thirties in Colombia. This review will serve as empirical support for a model explaining the phenomenon of diffusion from one state to another, of a formalized and systematized law.