This thesis explores the relation between two interpretations of chôra, drawn from a reading of Plato’s Timaeus. The first I label the elemental chôra. The second, I call the social chôra. The first chapter addresses the elements in Ionian philosophy, with an eye toward the political and social backdrop of the important cosmological notion of isonomia, law of equals. Here social and elemental are continuous. Chapter two looks at the next phase of Presocratic thought, Elea, specifically Parmenides and his influence on later thought, then turns to Heidegger’s reading of Parmenides’ through the key word of alêtheia. Finally, I offer a reading of Parmenides through a different key word— trust. The third chapter examines Plato’s cosmology in the Timaeus, focusing on the way the beginning of this dialogue inflects the dialogue in a political/social direction, putting the social chôra in tension with the elemental chôra that the body of the Timaeus’ discusses. In the fourth chapter, which examines the Phaedrus, this tension is inverted, since this dialogue on writing and justice set in what proves to be the mesmerizing and erotic elemental milieu of the world outside the walls of the polis. The second half of the dissertation turns to some modern thinkers within the phenomenological tradition or its wake who write about elementals. Chapter five examines Gaston Bachelard’s reveries on imagination which dream the natural world of fire, air, water, and earth from the standpoint of what he calls material and dynamic imagination, concepts that imply a strong sense of embodiment. Chapter six treats Levinas’ description of the elemental and fixes it in a stark relation to the human. I will suggest some possible points of contact between the elemental and the social in Levinas. Chapter seven turns to John Sallis’ analysis of the imagination as the means of access proper to the elemental in ways that differ from Bachelard. He position the earth as a fundamental other. I will suggest that in the end his position inherits Heidegger’s lack of emphasis on embodied and needy humanity. Alphonso Lingis offers his own unique reading of the elemental in a more Levinasian and Merleau-Pontian vein, speaking of the directives the world, both human and natural, puts to us, and returning to a philosophy of substance that puts the body in the picture. Chapter eight uses his thought to focus the issue of the dissertation.

Diss.--Freiburg--Univ., 1994. / Bibliogr. p. 230-244.

Despite the burgeoning field of Contemporary Continental Philosophy of Religion and the surfeit of literature on the philosophy of the body, little discusses the connections between the religious practice and the body in any phenomenologically rigorous way. However, one might argue that the phenomenology of incarnation serves as an excellent example of the ways in which the phenomenological innovations achieved by French phenomenologists Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Michel Henry, and Jean-Luc Marion allow for the study of both the body and the religious to be furthered. Given that the field of French phenomenology is vast, it is essential that we limit our study to but a few phenomenologists whose work is most substantially involved with the problem of incarnate experience, religious experience, embodiment, and the relation to the transcendent. Therefore, this project will proceed by way of working through phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, and Michel Henry in order to explore the resources these four thinkers have for our investigation into incarnate experience. Afterwards, I will attempt to construct a phenomenology of incarnate experience, drawing from their resources and insights into potential problems in hopes of being able to move beyond the problems of "doctrinal importation" and "allusory ambiguity" and further the discourse of philosophy's encounter with religious experience.

Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:55:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000345068-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 1976934 bytes, checksum: 7107cec5ed0a9bbbc123a5ff4b4d08bf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / The purpose of the present study is to analyze and to interpret the concept of being in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. We can distinguish different “levels” of being in the whole thought of the author; one of them is a pure “there is”, the impersonal and anonymous being. One of the most important ideas is the connection between being and evil, which explains Levinas’ critics of ontology, the need of an evasion out of being and the search of overcoming the evil of being. The Platonic idea of Good beyond being is presupposed: Good is previous to being, with a temporality that is not a conscious’ one; Good transcends being, it is “otherwise than being”; Good is the other name of Infinite. According to Levinas, this means that the distinction between good and evil is presupposed in all ontological thought, it is previous to ontological difference. Good accomplishes in the subjectivity, which cannot be understood in its relation to being only. Being is the movement of perseverance in one’s existence, which in the human being imposes interest in oneself and the disregard of others. However, due to the anteriority of the Good, there is a trace already inscribed in the subjectivity: the need of evasion, the movement toward the Infinite, that alters the being and signifies an obligation of responsibility for Others, previous to free decision. In the subjectivity that receives the Other, the being can transcend itself in goodness, in truth, in plurality and justice. / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo a análise e a interpretação da concepção do ser nas obras de Emmanuel Levinas. O autor concebe nas suas obras vários “níveis” do ser, entre eles o do ser puro, o puro “há” impessoal e anônimo. Destaca-se a relação entre o ser e o mal, que explica a crítica da ontologia, a necessidade de pensar a evasão do ser, a procura da superação do mal no ser. O que está pressuposto é a idéia platônica do Bem além do ser: o Bem é anterior ao ser, anterior segundo uma temporalidade que não é a da consciência e do discurso, e transcende o ser; o Bem é o outro nome do Infinito, define também o conceito do “outramente que ser”. Isto significa, segundo Levinas, que a distinção entre o bem e o mal está pressuposta em todo o pensamento ontológico, a diferença ética é anterior à diferença ontológica. Ela se efetua no ser a partir da subjetividade, pois esta não se pode compreender unicamente na sua relação com o ser. O ser é a posição, a afirmação de si, o movimento de persistência no próprio ser que, no ente humano, impõe interesse por si e indiferença diante dos outros. Contudo, na subjetividade já se inscreve, por causa da anterioridade do Bem, a necessidade da evasão, o movimento em direção ao Infinito, movimento que transtorna o ser e que se realiza como obrigação à responsabilidade pelos outros, anterior à livre decisão. Na subjetividade que acolhe o Outro, o ser pode transcender-se em bondade, verdade, multiplicidade pacífica, justiça.

Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:55:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000393647-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 546531 bytes, checksum: 225074584578df8c934cb96351896410 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / The present text has for objective to make an analysis of the workmanship Totality and the Infinite, by Emmanuel Levinas, with emphasis in the category of alterity. The conducting wire of this project is concentrated in the possibility to be able to find the Other in its alterity. As general problem of research, we have two questions: a) Why we cannot objectify the Other? b) Which the possibility to think the Other about its absolute Alterity? The first chapter makes a general introduction to the problem of research by means of an intent analysis in the authors Husserl and Heidegger. Due to phenomenological option assumed the agreement of these authors in the aid to better understand the structure and the way to proceed from the thought of Levinas. The analysis undertaken in this chapter it makes possible one better understanding of our central problem, the category of the alterity. The second chapter deals with the interiority category. Descriptions of slight knowledge as joy, economy, house, ownership, feminine work and had been analyzed in order to demonstrate the relations of I front to the Real, as well as its way of constitution, making possible the construction of separate one and to be opened for the relation with the exteriority. The third chapter deals with the category of the alterity, that is, of the opening to the exteriority that makes possible and bases the levinasian ethics. In it the way is displayed for which if of or if it constructs, in the being, this opening, through the analysis of categories as Infinity, Face and Exteriority. In the conclusion we present a joint between the alterity and the ethical conception proposal for Levinas. The intention of this joint is to demonstrate that, for the author, the Other, while expression of the infinity, cannot be objectified and, in this manner, possible of being thought while an absolute alterity. / O presente texto tem por objetivo fazer uma análise da obra Totalidade e Infinito, de Emmanuel Levinas, com ênfase na categoria de “alteridade”. O fio condutor deste projeto concentra-se na possibilidade de podermos encontrar o Outro na sua alteridade. Como problema geral de pesquisa, temos duas questões: a) Porque não se pode objetivar o Outro? b) Qual a possibilidade de pensarmos o Outro na sua “Alteridade” absoluta? O primeiro capítulo faz uma introdução geral ao problema de pesquisa mediante uma análise concentrada nos autores Husserl e Heidegger. Devido à opção fenomenológica assumida o entendimento desses autores nos ajuda a compreender melhor a estrutura e o modo de proceder do pensamento de Levinas. A análise empreendida neste capítulo nos possibilita uma melhor compreensão do nosso problema central, a categoria da alteridade. O segundo capítulo trata da interioridade. Descrições de noções como gozo, economia, casa, posse, trabalho e feminino foram analisadas a fim de demonstrar as relações do Eu frente ao real, bem como o seu modo de constituição, possibilitando a edificação de um ser separado e aberto para a relação com a exterioridade. O terceiro capítulo trata da categoria da alteridade, isto é, da abertura à exterioridade que possibilita e fundamenta a ética levinasiana. Nele está exposto o modo pelo qual se dá ou se constrói, no ser, esta abertura, através da análise de categorias como Infinito, Rosto e Exterioridade. Na conclusão apresentamos uma articulação entre a alteridade e a concepção de uma ética proposta por Levinas. O intuito desta articulação é demonstrar que, para o autor, o Outro, enquanto expressão do infinito, não pode ser objetivado e, desse modo, possível de ser pensado enquanto uma alteridade absoluta.

Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:55:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000407021-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 563663 bytes, checksum: e14cdf3a4590b547ff6819d289ac442b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / The central purpose of this work is to study the idea of temporality within the field of the aesthetics of the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. It is studied, in a cronological way, the period that extends from 1948 - when the first formulation of a so-called levinasian aesthetics is proposed in the article La réalité et son ombre - to 1974, year of the publication of Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence, understood by many as the work of maturity of the author. In order to clarify the question of temporality, the development of the concepts of sensibility and language, very important to the levianasian theory, is carefully studied. Therefore, the various places attributed by Levinas to the artist and its production are intended to be presented: from the work of art as the shadow of reality (1948) to art as the very exposure of the essence (1974). / O trabalho aqui apresentado tem por objetivo central estudar a idéia de temporalidade no âmbito da estética do filósofo Emmanuel Levinas. É estudado, de forma cronológica, o período que se extende desde 1948 - época da primeira formulação, no atigo La réalité et son ombre - do que se poderia chamar de uma estética levinasiana - até 1974, ano em que é publicada aquela por muitos é considerada a obra de maturidade do autor, Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence. De modo a tornar explícita a questão da temporalidade, o desenvolvimento dos conceitos de sensibilidade e de linguagem, tão importantes para a teoria levianasiana, é investigado de modo cuidadoso. Busca-se, por fim, apresentar os diversos lugares que Levinas atribui ao artista e a sua produção: desde a obra como sombra da realidade (1948) até a arte como exposição mesma da essência (1974).

Submitted by Paula Quirino (paula.quirino@ufpe.br) on 2015-03-05T18:05:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO Waldemir Ferreira Lopes Neto.pdf: 1038296 bytes, checksum: 0c5951f132b9882502cd429572a66cdb (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-05T18:05:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO Waldemir Ferreira Lopes Neto.pdf: 1038296 bytes, checksum: 0c5951f132b9882502cd429572a66cdb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Nosso trabalho pretende analisar e expor a maneira como o filósofo franco-lituano, Emmanuel Levinas (1905-1995) recepciona de forma crítica a fenomenologia husserliana e procura entrever, a partir dessa recepção, uma radicalização da Sensibilidade/Afetividade, como afecção e abertura, que proporciona uma passagem para uma metafenomenologia ou uma metafísica da alteridade. Aos olhos levinasiano, a fenomenologia husserliana conseguiu proporcionar uma abertura para um novo e diferente caminho, ensejo que não se enxergou como possibilidade possível na tradição filosófica, imodicamente hermética no “eu”, no Conatus do Ser ou na Gnose. Em razão do exposto, Levinas entendeu a Fenomenologia husserliana como método que permitiria, após radicalização, uma afecção e uma afetividade anterior ao Saber e ao Ser que reivindica uma novidade na relação da subjetividade com o Outro metafísico. Neste percurso, Levinas radicaliza a sensibilidade husserliana e encontra na fruição e na vulnerabilidade, inflamadas a partir da transcendência metafísica, elementos sensíveis que, entre outras razões, servem na defesa de uma subjetividade traumática, i.e., já desde sempre afetada e responsável por outrem. Esta nova forma de conceber a sensibilidade/afetividade, a consciência e a própria subjetividade, e derivado disto, as relações intersubjetivas, principia a investigação das fronteiras do Ser e do Saber, norteia e procura a passagem da intencionalidade à ética e/ou do fenômeno à recepção do enigma humano, ou ainda, da fenomenologia eidética e genética à fenomenologia do Rosto, metafenomenologia, como metafísica da alteridade. Neste percurso, pretendemos dar resposta a uma das mais significativas discussões em torno do filósofo franco-lituano, a saber, se a Metafenomenologia exclui a Fenomenologia abordada inicialmente por Levinas ou não.

Thesis advisor: Richard Kearney / This dissertation investigates the possibility of a renewed phenomenological ethics that would ground ethics in the structure of lived experience, so that daily existence is ethically informative and the good is located in the concrete, heartfelt affairs of dwelling in the world with others. Thus far, phenomenological ethics has been deeply influenced by the two schools of Max Scheler’s value ethics and Emmanuel Levinas’ alterity ethics, both of which I argue share a fundamental point of contact in what I am calling Deep Kantianism. That is, phenomenological ethics has been haunted by Immanuel Kant’s non-phenomenological divide between nature and freedom, being and goodness, ontology and ethics. In response, I will suggest a new point of departure for phenomenological ethics beginning with the originary unity of being and goodness as revealed by the love that moves the self beyond herself toward her ground in the other person. Chapter One seeks to establish and identify the problem of Deep Kantianism, or explain what exactly Deep Kantianism is according to its origins. Kant begins his ethics with Hume’s assumption that being and goodness, is and ought, are separate. The implications of this divide threaten to reduce being to bare being without ethical import and to convert the good into an abstract shadow that is irrelevant to the situations of daily life. Chapter Two examines how Scheler in his value ethics shows against Kant that the ethical is only experienced by a being with a heart. The source of normativity is revealed and known through affectivity. However, this insight is troubled by Scheler’s distinction between values and bearers of value that repeats the Kantian distinction between nature and freedom, respectively. Chapter Three focuses on Scheler’s prioritization of love as the fundamental affect of the heart and person in its moving the person outside of herself, a movement that constitutes the person as such. However, this love turns out to not be for the sake of the person but for the value-essence that she bears, again placing the ethical with Kant outside of the realm of Being. Chapter Four begins with Levinas’ discovery that ethics is constituted by the relation to the Other, an ethical relation that is the first relation before any ontological relation, indicating that the self is responsible for the Other. Yet Levinas here is haunted by Deep Kantianism in his denigration of affectivity, which for him is an egoist return to the self that excludes the Other. Chapter Five argues that Levinas’ ethics is permeated by an abyssal nothingness that is exhibited in the destitution of the Other in Totality and Infinity and the passivity of the self in Otherwise than Being. The nothingness that permeates the ethical relation hints at the necessity of a return to the ontological, suggesting that ontology is not, as Levinas maintains following Kant, devoid of ethical implications. Chapter Six turns to Martin Heidegger in his retrieval of a pre-Kantian pathos through his readings of Augustine and Aristotle. This pathos suggests that affectivity is always already oriented toward the things and persons of the world in a way that reveals what is conducive and detrimental to one’s Being, implying a notion of what is good and bad for one’s Being, which Heidegger leaves undeveloped. Chapter Seven conducts a phenomenology of the ground of ethics that is informed by the discoveries made by Scheler, Levinas, and Heidegger. The self begins as constituted by a nothing, demanding that it move outside of itself in the exteriorization of love. This exteriorization directs the self to the concrete other person, the thou, who is revealed to be both the Good and Being as the proper end of love, indicating that the self is constituted by Being-for-the-Other. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

The current approach to science for mainstream psychology relies on the philosophical foundation of positivism that cannot account for meaning as humans experience it. Phenomenology provides an alternative scientific approach in which meaning is constituted by acting toward objects in the world that is more consistent with how humans experience meaning. Immanuel Levinas argues that the phenomenological approach, while more consistent with human experience, does not provide a grounding for meaning. Rather, Levinas argues that meaning is grounded in the ethical encounter with the Other, or other person, such that meaning is given by the Other in rupture. For Levinas, the physical world, or elemental, and the I provide constraints for the meaning given by the Other but the Other is logically prior to all other experience. This alternative to the mainstream scientific approach in psychology of positivism has implications for the epistemology, methodology, and scientific community of psychology. The Levinasian perspective advocates an epistemology that is open to the rupture of the Other as a way to provide new knowledge. This emphasis on openness to rupture produces a methodology in which the scientist must allow object of study to influence the method used in research. Finally, the Levinasian perspective implies a scientific community that is sensitive to the rupture occasioned by the encounter with the Other.

Thesis advisor: Jeffrey Bloechl / The dissertation addresses two interrelated questions through a reading of works by Emmanuel Levinas and Simone Weil: (1) what justification is there for the reality of ethics since the Shoah, and (2) what does the vulnerability of the person and of ethics imply about the nature of human subjectivity and its witness to atrocity? The thesis argued is that vulnerability is the one quality that best defines human existence at every level of experience, hence that ethics requires constant active preservation. After introducing Levinas and Weil through their ideas of substitution and decreation, respectively, we consider how their tolerance of contradiction defines a decreative hermeneutics, or self-abdicative interpretation of the world. Further preliminaries justify Levinas’s use of value judgments in philosophical arguments and review the relation of his and Weil’s thought to Heidegger’s philosophy, to Nelson Goodman’s notion of worldmaking, and to the problem of evil. Through Levinas’s controversial notion of persecution, the method of decreative phenomenology is developed as an approach to ethical problems that explicitly seeks to preserve the alterity of the other person. Applications include Levinas’s idea of subjectivity as expiation, the status of testimonial literature on atrocity, and the present-day totalizing legacy of the concentration camps. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2020. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.