O objetivo geral da presente tese é demonstrar que existe no pensamento do filósofo Emmanuel Levinas uma relação entre ética e política sem a qual não seria possível pensar o sentido do humano em suas dimensões individual e social. Nele encontramos indicações claras sobre suas preocupações políticas ao ponto de podermos afirmar que suas análises filosóficas têm início a partir do fenômeno da guerra, fato eminentemente político. Para compreender o fenômeno da guerra, Levinas se dirige à filosofia onde constata que a mesma foi, quase sempre, uma ontologia, um discurso sobre o Ser, que se caracteriza pelo fechamento e totalidade do pensamento, impedindo qualquer possibilidade da alteridade surgir e se manter como tal. Nessa tarefa descobre o frente a frente do Eu e do Outro como momento inicial do sentido do humano em que o Eu é questionado pelo seu direito ser. Surge aí a ética como filosofia primeira caracterizada pela responsabilidade assimétrica do Eu pelo Outro. Mas, a ética é relação de único a único e a realidade comporta situações para além do frente a frente. Assim, para se chegar ao sentido do humano, torna-se necessário pensar a multiplicidade que é sugerida pela presença do Terceiro e que permite a Levinas tecer considerações sobre a política e suas relações mútuas com a ética, utilizando-se principalmente de dois sentidos da noção de justiça. Para esse propósito, abordaremos três momentos de sua produção intelectual. O primeiro se refere à estada de Levinas na Lituânia e na França onde nosso autor fora influenciado pelas questões políticas que se impunham pelo fenômeno da guerra e por suas incursões no pensamento filosófico na tentativa de compreender os fundamentos de tal fenômeno. O segundo momento é caracterizado por sua crítica à ontologia como pensamento dominante na filosofia e que, para Levinas, corrobora com o estado de guerra, assim como pelo estabelecimento da ética como filosofia primeira a partir da relação original entre o Eu e o Outro. O terceiro momento traz a temática da relação entre ética e política, permitindo a compreensão de que ela se dá a partir de mútuas impugnações. A ética surge e mantém-se pelas suas preocupações com a política, mas, por outro lado, a política interrompe a ética expandindo o princípio da responsabilidade, presente na relação Eu-Outro, à multiplicidade dos existentes e suas relações. A política surge imprimindo uma tensão à ética e sendo tensionada por ela. / The general objective, in this thesis, is to demonstrate that there is a relation between ethics and politics in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas without which would not be possible to think the human meaning in its individual and social dimension. In his thought we find evident indications about his politics concerns so that we can affirm that his philosophical analysis begin from the phenomenon of war. To comprehend the phenomenon of war, Levinas discusses the philosophy and states that it have been almost always an ontology, a discourse on the Being, which is characterized by closure and completeness of thought, preventing any possibility to the otherness emerge and to remain as such. In this task he discovers the face to face of the Self and the Other as an early stage of human meaning in that the Self is asked about its right to Be. There arises ethics as prime philosophy, characterized by asymmetric responsibility between the Self and the Other. But ethics is the relation between unique and unique and the reality has situations beyond the face to face. So, to get to the human meaning, it is necessary to consider the multiplicity that is suggested by the presence of the Third and that allows Levinas to make considerations about the politics and its mutual relations to ethics, using mainly two senses of the concept of justice. For this purpose, we will discuss three moments of his intellectual production. The first refers to Levinass stay in Lithuania and France where our author was influenced by political issues that were imposed by the phenomenon of war and by his incursions in philosophical thought in trying to understand the reasons for such a phenomenon. The second stage is characterized by its criticism to ontology as dominant thought in philosophy and that, for Levinas, corroborates the state of war, as well as the establishment of ethics as first philosophy of the original relation between the Self and the Other. The third stage brings the theme of the relation between ethics and politics, allowing the comprehension that it comes from mutual impugnment. The ethics emerges and remains by its concerns with the politics; but on the other hand, the politics interrupts the ethics, expanding the principle of responsibility, which stands in the relation Self-Other, and the multiplicity of existing relations. The politics emerges and imposes a tension to ethics and is tensioned by it.

Este trabalho elege a obra de Jerzy Grotowski como objeto de investigação da Alteridade na construção do sentido do fazer teatral. Seu escopo abrange as formulações do encenador polonês para uma metodologia do trabalho do ator e suas implicações, tanto no que se refere às artes performáticas quanto às artes rituais. Utiliza como ferramenta teórica categorias do pensamento filosófico de Emmanuel Levinas, notadamente suas proposições acerca do encontro face-a-face, da noção de rosto e da idéia de Infinito, no sentido de uma proposição da ética como filosofia primeira. A análise das diversas fases do percurso criativo de Grotowski permite afirmar que a Alteridade se constitui como o eixo conceitual em torno do qual a obra do encenador se estrutura. / This paper elects the work of Jerzy Grotowski as the subject of investigation in the construction of the theatrical practice\'s sense. It beholds the Grotowski\'s frame into a metodology of the actor\'s work and it\'s implications, as in performing arts and in ritual arts. It makes use of the categories of the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, as theorical tool, picking out his proposals refering to the face-to-face encounter, the \"face\" notion and the idea of infinity, as a proposal of the ethic as first philosofy. The analisis of the diverse fases of the criative path of Grotowski allows to declare that the Alterity is build with it\'s conceptual focus, that structures all his work.

本研究從對理性主體教育學之質疑出發，透過與Emmanuel Levinas他者哲學之對話，嘗試從責任、對話與正義三個與教育相關之議題切入，闡述Levinas他者哲學對存有論、知識論與政治學之批判，藉此，豐富教育學在主體觀、知識論與政治學三個面向上之倫理性意涵。因此，本研究關於Levinas他者哲學與教育學之連結，所採取的不是將Levinas他者哲學應用在教育學實踐之取徑，而是在理論層面上，透過Levinas他者哲學對西方傳統哲學之反思，重新返回教育學原初的倫理處境，挖掘更豐富的教育學意涵。最後，本研究之主要結論為：一、教育主體必先是為他人負責的責任主體，才可以是自由的主體；二、與他者的關係必先是一種言說關係，知識才可以有其客觀性，互為主體的認識關係方可以運作；三、在為他負責的主體性及不對稱關係作為教育正義之前提下，教育的多元性才可以不只是多樣性，才可以是平等的，而正義方可以是比較的。 / Based on “ethics as first philosophy”, Levinas criticized the western philosophy in ontology, epistemology, and politics. Along with Levinas’ thought, this research discusses the educational implications of responsibility, dialogue, and justice. As for the connection between Levinas’ thought and pedagogy, this research is not intended to apply the former to the latter. The author believes that Levinas’ ethical thought (about ontology, epistemology, and politics) can enrich the meanings of pedagogy theoretically. Finally, this research findings conclude: (1) the responsibility for the other is prior to the freedom of the subject; (2) the saying with the other is prior to the comprehension of the inter-subjectivity; (3) the dissymmetrical relation is prior to the equality.

Thinking of difference in this dissertation is presented by a philosophical reconstruction of the notion of “ontological difference” in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, and of the notion of ethical difference in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. It is shown that while in Western philosophy even before Heidegger there was research and intellectual developments regarding difference, difference itself was not considered a philosophical problem. It is in Heidegger’s philosophy that one first finds formulated the problem of difference or the philosophical problem of difference as the founding principle of philosophy and Western spirituality itself. Through an analysis of Dasein (“being there”), temporality, and the two different ways of being of entities, as found elaborated in his early work Being and Time, it is shown that the notion of ontological difference is first of all the perspective of thinking from which Heidegger raises the question of the meaning of being. Further, by discussing other fundamental problems of philosophy, such as those which arise with the concepts of time, truth, ground, and identity, it is shown how in Heidegger’s philosophy the problem of ontological difference is formulated. The latter problem opens the possibility of rethinking the essence of metaphysical thinking, which is seen by Heidegger as a forgetfulness of being and difference. The dissertation shows that there is an ambiguity in Heidegger’s conception of ontological difference:... [to full text] / Disertacijoje skirties mąstymas pristatomas rekonstruojant ontologinio skirtumo plėtotę Heideggerio filosofijoje bei etinio skirtumo plėtotę Levino filosofijoje. Parodoma, kad nors Vakarų filosofijoje iki Heideggerio ir brėžiami bei svarstomi įvairūs „skirtumai“, filosofine problema skirtumas čia taip ir netampa. Tuo tarpu Heideggerio filosofijoje suformuluojama filosofinė skirties, kaip steigiančio principo, problema. Atliekant štai-būties, laikiškumo, esinių skirtingo buvimo būdų analizę parodoma, kad ontologinis skirtumas visų pirma yra mąstymo perspektyva iš kurios Heideggeris kelia būties prasmės klausimą. Aptariant kitas fundamentalias filosofijos problemas – laiko, tiesos, pagrindo, tapatybės, atskleidžiama, kaip Heideggerio filosofijoje suformuluojama ontologinio skirtumo problema. Tai atveria galimybę permąstyti metafizinio mąstymo esmę, kuri Heideggerio pamatoma kaip būties, o drauge ir kaip skirtumo užmarštis. Ontologinio skirtumo dviprasmiškumas atskleidžiamas parodant ontologinį skirtumą kaip pačią metafizikos prielaidą bei numatant metafizikos įveikos galimybę. Pereinant prie Levino skirties sampratos analizės, parodoma, kad skirties mąstymas yra, viena vertus, tai kas jungia šiuos du mąstytojus, antra vertus, tai kas juos labiausiai ir atskiria. Disertacijoje analizuojama, kuria prasme ontologinis skirtumas yra Levino skirties mąstymo išeities taškas bei atskleidžiama, kaip performuluojama skirties problema. Būties ir esinio skirtumo radikalizavimas ir... [toliau žr. visą tekstą]

Disertacijoje skirties mąstymas pristatomas rekonstruojant ontologinio skirtumo plėtotę Heideggerio filosofijoje bei etinio skirtumo plėtotę Levino filosofijoje. Parodoma, kad nors Vakarų filosofijoje iki Heideggerio ir brėžiami bei svarstomi įvairūs „skirtumai“, filosofine problema skirtumas čia taip ir netampa. Tuo tarpu Heideggerio filosofijoje suformuluojama filosofinė skirties, kaip steigiančio principo, problema. Atliekant štai-būties, laikiškumo, esinių skirtingo buvimo būdų analizę parodoma, kad ontologinis skirtumas visų pirma yra mąstymo perspektyva iš kurios Heideggeris kelia būties prasmės klausimą. Aptariant kitas fundamentalias filosofijos problemas – laiko, tiesos, pagrindo, tapatybės, atskleidžiama, kaip Heideggerio filosofijoje suformuluojama ontologinio skirtumo problema. Tai atveria galimybę permąstyti metafizinio mąstymo esmę, kuri Heideggerio pamatoma kaip būties, o drauge ir kaip skirtumo užmarštis. Ontologinio skirtumo dviprasmiškumas atskleidžiamas parodant ontologinį skirtumą kaip pačią metafizikos prielaidą bei numatant metafizikos įveikos galimybę. Pereinant prie Levino skirties sampratos analizės, parodoma, kad skirties mąstymas yra, viena vertus, tai kas jungia šiuos du mąstytojus, antra vertus, tai kas juos labiausiai ir atskiria. Disertacijoje analizuojama, kuria prasme ontologinis skirtumas yra Levino skirties mąstymo išeities taškas bei atskleidžiama, kaip performuluojama skirties problema. Būties ir esinio skirtumo radikalizavimas ir... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Thinking of difference in this dissertation is presented by a philosophical reconstruction of the notion of “ontological difference” in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, and of the notion of ethical difference in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. It is shown that while in Western philosophy even before Heidegger there was research and intellectual developments regarding difference, difference itself was not considered a philosophical problem. It is in Heidegger’s philosophy that one first finds formulated the problem of difference or the philosophical problem of difference as the founding principle of philosophy and Western spirituality itself. Through an analysis of Dasein (“being there”), temporality, and the two different ways of being of entities, as found elaborated in his early work Being and Time, it is shown that the notion of ontological difference is first of all the perspective of thinking from which Heidegger raises the question of the meaning of being. Further, by discussing other fundamental problems of philosophy, such as those which arise with the concepts of time, truth, ground, and identity, it is shown how in Heidegger’s philosophy the problem of ontological difference is formulated. The latter problem opens the possibility of rethinking the essence of metaphysical thinking, which is seen by Heidegger as a forgetfulness of being and difference. The dissertation shows that there is an ambiguity in Heidegger’s conception of ontological difference:... [to full text]

L’objectif de notre présente étude est d’examiner un contexte philosophique dans lequel s’inscrit la recherche de la subjectivité liée à l’idée de l’extériorité à travers une étude des liens entre la philosophie de Franz Rosenzweig et celle d’Emmanuel Levinas. L’idée de socialité dans notre recherche se fonde sur la question de l’extériorité et sur celle de la subjectivité dans leurs philosophies. Ces deux philosophes soutiennent tous deux l’idée de la rupture de la totalité et défendent la subjectivité. Toutefois, leurs divergences sont profondescar la tentative de Levinas qui aboutit à la recherche d’une subjectivité consistant dans le dérangement de l’ordre ne renvoie pas au système rosenzweigien. Dès lors, quel est l’héritage de Rosenzweig dans la philosophie de Levinas ? Dans la première partie, nous déterminons la portée de la notion de système et celle de totalité dans leurs philosophies. Dans la seconde partie, nous observons la divergence entre leurs philosophies sur la conception du Soi et son rapport à l’extériorité. Dans la troisième partie, nous examinons la signification de la socialité fondée sur la question du temps. Selon nous, la question du langage qui fonde la relation entre le sujet et autrui se déploie à travers les analyses du temps, et ce sont des modalités du langage – le rapport entre le dialogue du « face-à-face » et l’intrusion de l’autre dans le sujet exprimé par Levinas comme « Dire sans Dit » - qui nous permettent de relier encore une fois la philosophie de Levinas à la philosophie de Rosenzweig. Levinas approfondit la question rosenzweigienne du dialogue sans dévaloriser sa signification et sans la systématiser, en partant de la pensée du système. / The objective of our present study is to examine the philosophical context in which the research of a subjectivity which would be linked to the idea of the exteriority becomes possible. This objective will be achieved thanks to the study of the connection between Franz Rosenzweig’s philosophy and Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy. In our research the idea of sociality is founded upon the question of the exteriority and upon the question of the subjectivity. Both Rosenzweig and Levinas are determined to put the idea of the totality into question and to defend the subjectivity. However, their differences are great: Levinas’s endeavor to open the field for a new understanding of the subjectivity, which consists in the disturbance of the order, doesn’t appear in Rosenzweig’s system. If such is the case, what does Levinas’s philosophy owe to the heritage of Rosenzweig? In the first part, we try to determine the realm of the notion of system and that of totality in their philosophies. In the second part, we try to observe the difference between their philosophies about the conception of the Self and of its link to the exteriority. In the third part, we examine the meaning of a sociality founded upon the question of time. In our view, the question of language, which is the basis of the relationship between a subject and the other, is inseparable from a profound analysis of time. The modalities of language – the connection between the dialogue of the “face-to-face” and the intervention of the other into the subject expressed by Levinas as “ Saying without Said” - allow us to underline the relation between the philosophy of Levinas with that of Rosenzweig. Levinas has deeply studied Rosenzweig’s understanding of the dialogue without depreciating its signification.

Rares sont les références explicites à Marx ou au communisme sous la plume de Levinas, du moins dans ses œuvres principales. Étonnamment rares, si l’on considère leur contexte de rédaction. Les sciences humaines de la seconde moitié du XXème siècle sont occupées par la discussion du paradigme marxiste. Levinas subit de plein fouet les vicissitudes de l’histoire. A Kharkov, il assiste à la révolution russe de 1917. La catastrophe de la Shoah, dans laquelle disparait une grande partie de sa famille, marque à jamais sa mémoire. Toute sa démarche philosophique est orientée par la nécessité d’une nouvelle pensée de la communauté humaine assumant les leçons du XXème siècle. A rebours des lectures qui relèguent la question politique au rang de dimension subsidiaire dans l’œuvre levinassienne, nous faisons alors l’hypothèse de sa centralité. Ce sont les enjeux collectifs qui accusent l’insuffisance et imposent la reconsidération de l’approche humaniste du sujet et de l’éthique menée par Levinas. De ce point de vue, le projet de justice et d’universalisme porté par la tradition socialiste, notamment par Marx, constitue bien pour sa réflexion un objet central. A la fois sources d’inspiration, et révélatrices des limites d’une pensée strictement politique de la communauté, qui prétend faire l’économie de la transcendance, les propositions de Marx travaillent en sous-main les conceptions levinassiennes de l’individu, du pluralisme, de la justice ou encore de l’État. Nous avons voulu reconstituer ce dialogue implicite de Levinas avec Marx. Explorant la portée sociale et politique des motifs levinassiens, il s’avère que ces derniers recèlent une fécondité inattendue. La considération de l’ « anarchie du Bien », de la « patience » et de ce que Levinas nomme l’ « État libéral » permettent d’aborder de manière originale les questions de la justice, de la lutte sociale et des institutions politiques, faisant émerger des propositions ignorées tant par la tradition libérale que par celle du socialisme, dans ses versions marxienne et anarchiste. / Explicit references to Marx or to communism are rare in Levinas’ writing, especially in his major works. This is astonishing, considering the context in which he was writing. In the second half of the 20th century, human sciences were particularly influenced by the debate of Marxist paradigms. Levinas was truly impacted by the context of his era. He was a witness of the Russian revolution at Kharkov in 1917. Many members of his family were victims of the Shoah. This tragedy profoundly impacted him. His philosophical approach is lead by the necessity of re-thinking the « human community », whilst bearing in mind the lessons that the 20th century has left behind. Several critics have considered Levinas’ work to be “apolitical”, or have at least argued that the political undertones of his work are to be taken in consideration as a secondary factor. This thesis has, in contrary, focused upon and sustained the centrality of Levinas’ politically motivated thought. Communal and societal dilemmas are at the heart of Levinas’ ethical approach. The traditional socialist stance towards justice and universalism, in the line of Marx, constitutes a central focus of his reflexion. The suggestions made by Marx underpin Levinas’ conceptions of the individual, of pluralism, of justice and of the State. On one hand, they are a source of inspiration for Levinas, on the other, a source of critic. The thesis has aimed to reconstitute the intellectual dialogue that Levinas carried out with Marx between the lines. Whilst exploring the social and political leitmotivs of Levinas’ thought, the interminglement with Marx has been illuminating and innovative. It has enabled an original approach to questions revolving around justice, social struggle and political institutions. Considering the levinassian “Anarchy of Good”, the “Patience” and what Levinas calls the “Liberal state”, previously ignored positions emerge, which have been left on the side by the liberal tradition and by socialist thoughts both in Marxian and anarchist terms.

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / In the occidental philosophical tradition, the gnoseological reflection did not conferred to sensibility a prominent role. The sensitive life has value just when it is submitted to the forming power and the structuring of intellect or understanding. Criticizing the intellectualism of our philosophical tradition, Levinas defends the primacy of representation, that is, the theoretical movement and the objectifying movement of consciousness, without which, the sensitive would never mean or to have meaning. To explicit this these by Levinas is the aim of the present dissertation. For that, we will identify some consequences of this representations primacy and to present a way of philosophizing which aims to rehabilitate the sensibility in the philosophy s framework. Therefore, we focused, initially, in the concept of representation, mainly in what regards the gnoseology built by modern philosophers among them, Husserl, the father of phenomenology. He is the philosopher who we studied in a more detail, because, in many ways, he was the master of Levinas. Thus, we present the reading and the further analysis of the work Logical Investigations II (1901), entitled About intentional experiences and their contents . We opted for this logical investigation because of Levinas s several references in his text Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology (1930). Initially, this text motivated this search and supported, mainly, the studies developed in the second chapter of this dissertation. Levinas s reflection about Husserl s phenomenology enabled us to resume some critical comments about modern thinkers, as also to glimpse philosophical horizons which open a beyond the theory in the representation. If, on one hand, Husserl could be seen as the culmination of a tradition, which favored the representation instead of sensibility, Husserl is the same who taught Levinas the importance of a phenomenology based on sensibility! In Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World (1967) Levinas criticizes the primacy of representation and presents the importance of returning to the study of sensibility which is not reduced to the gnoseological status of knowledge. In this sense, we return to the concept of sensibility beyond the submission of the rational and totalizing I . Levinas s attention is focused on an I that do not have a way to exist only guided by the immanent sphere of consciousness, but rather notices himself or herself as being an I next to the world, an I embodied, an I in situation . So, this is, curiously, the teaching of Hurssel! The phenomenology of sensibility developed by him provoked, according to Levinas, the representation s ruin. However, this ruin does not mean, in Levinas s conception, to embrace an anonymous metaphysics (Heidegger), but rather to embrace a new way of making philosophy that is not based on the primacy of ontology and logos. In this sense, it is a philosophy as wisdom of love, that is, it does not come from the logic of yourself , but rather from the alterity (another human being) that come to us as a face , as a concrete presence (someone else). The I in Levinas s concept is immersed in other search: the attitude of respect, of responsibility, of care, of ethos not only in relation to himself or in relation to herself, but also and, especially, to the other , to the world and the unexpected in history. / Na tradição filosófica ocidental, a reflexão gnosiológica não conferiu à sensibilidade um papel de relevo. A vida sensível só possui valor quando submetida ao poder formador e estruturante do intelecto ou do entendimento. Ao criticar o intelectualismo de nossa tradição filosófica, Levinas fala em primado da representação, isto é, do movimento teórico e objetivante da consciência, sem o qual o sensível jamais poderia significar ou possuir sentido. Explicitar esta tese de Levinas será o alvo desta dissertação. Nós o faremos identificando algumas consequências desse primado da representação, bem como apresentando um modo de filosofar que visa reabilitar a sensibilidade no âmbito da filosofia. Para tanto, focalizamos, inicialmente, o conceito de representação, principalmente no que se refere à gnosiologia construída por filósofos do período moderno. Dentre eles, Husserl, o pai da fenomenologia, foi o filósofo que estudamos de forma mais detalhada, pois, sob muitos aspectos, foi o mestre de Levinas. Apresentamos, assim, a leitura e posterior análise da obra Investigações Lógicas II (1901), mais especificamente, da Quinta Investigação, intitulada Sobre vivências intencionais e seus conteúdos . Optamos por essa investigação lógica em função de Levinas referenciá-la inúmeras vezes em seu texto A Teoria Fenomenológica da Intuição (1930), escrito que motivou, inicialmente, esta pesquisa e que sustentou boa parte dos estudos desenvolvidos no segundo capítulo. A reflexão levinasiana sobre a fenomenologia de Husserl nos possibilitou retomar algumas críticas aos pensadores modernos, como também, vislumbrar horizontes filosóficos que abrem um além da teoria e da representação. Se, por um lado, Husserl poderia ser visto como o ponto culminante de uma tradição que privilegiou a representação em detrimento da sensibilidade, é o mesmo Husserl que ensinou a Levinas a importância de uma fenomenologia pautada na sensibilidade. Na obra Descobrindo a existência com Husserl e Heidegger (1967), Levinas critica a primazia da representação e apresenta a importância do retorno ao estudo da sensibilidade não mais reduzida ao estatuto gnosiológico do saber. Trata-se de retomar a noção de sensibilidade, para além da submissão ao eu racional totalizante. A atenção de Levinas recai sobre um eu que não tem seu modo de existir unicamente pautado na esfera imanente da consciência, mas sim que se percebe como sendo um eu junto do mundo, um eu encarnado, um eu em situação . Ora, este é, curiosamente, o ensinamento de Husserl! A fenomenologia do sensível desenvolvida por ele provocou, segundo Levinas, a ruína da representação. Mas esta ruína não significa, no caso de Levinas, aderir a uma metafísica do anônimo (Heidegger), e sim uma nova forma de fazer filosofia, não mais alicerçada no primado da ontologia e do logos. Trata-se de uma filosofia como sabedoria do amor, isto é, que parte não da lógica do mesmo , mas da alteridade (outro ser humano), que vem a nós como rosto , como presença concreta (outrem). O eu em sentido levinasiano se descobre imerso em outra busca: atitude de respeito, de responsabilidade, de cuidado, de ethos não só em relação a si mesmo, mas também e, sobretudo, ao outro , ao mundo e aos imprevistos da história.

Levinas’ standpoint in the hermeneutic turn: language as ethics”. This paper develops Emmanuel Levinas’ conceptions about language and its placein the linguistic-hermeneutic turn of contemporary philosophy. It examines the relations with the authors associated to this turn (Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeurand Derrida) due to the importance given to language and, at the same time, it sets him apart from them for his original ethical transmutation of language. This paper also considers the main philosophical notions by which Levinas treats the topic of language: desire, diachrony, the said and the saying, trace, absence, no-indifference, otherness. / El artículo desarrolla la concepción de Emmanuel Levinas sobre el lenguaje y su ubicación dentro del giro lingüístico-hermenéutico de la filosofía contemporánea. Se lo relaciona con los autores comprendidos en este esto giro (Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Derrida) por la importancia concedida al lenguaje a la vez que se lo distingue radicalmente de ellos por su original transmutación ética del lenguaje. En la argumentación se recuperan las nociones filosóficas principales con que Levinas tematiza la cuestión del lenguaje: deseo, diacronía, decir y dicho, huella, ausencia, no-indiferencia.

O objetivo geral da presente tese é demonstrar que existe no pensamento do filósofo Emmanuel Levinas uma relação entre ética e política sem a qual não seria possível pensar o sentido do humano em suas dimensões individual e social. Nele encontramos indicações claras sobre suas preocupações políticas ao ponto de podermos afirmar que suas análises filosóficas têm início a partir do fenômeno da guerra, fato eminentemente político. Para compreender o fenômeno da guerra, Levinas se dirige à filosofia onde constata que a mesma foi, quase sempre, uma ontologia, um discurso sobre o Ser, que se caracteriza pelo fechamento e totalidade do pensamento, impedindo qualquer possibilidade da alteridade surgir e se manter como tal. Nessa tarefa descobre o frente a frente do Eu e do Outro como momento inicial do sentido do humano em que o Eu é questionado pelo seu direito ser. Surge aí a ética como filosofia primeira caracterizada pela responsabilidade assimétrica do Eu pelo Outro. Mas, a ética é relação de único a único e a realidade comporta situações para além do frente a frente. Assim, para se chegar ao sentido do humano, torna-se necessário pensar a multiplicidade que é sugerida pela presença do Terceiro e que permite a Levinas tecer considerações sobre a política e suas relações mútuas com a ética, utilizando-se principalmente de dois sentidos da noção de justiça. Para esse propósito, abordaremos três momentos de sua produção intelectual. O primeiro se refere à estada de Levinas na Lituânia e na França onde nosso autor fora influenciado pelas questões políticas que se impunham pelo fenômeno da guerra e por suas incursões no pensamento filosófico na tentativa de compreender os fundamentos de tal fenômeno. O segundo momento é caracterizado por sua crítica à ontologia como pensamento dominante na filosofia e que, para Levinas, corrobora com o estado de guerra, assim como pelo estabelecimento da ética como filosofia primeira a partir da relação original entre o Eu e o Outro. O terceiro momento traz a temática da relação entre ética e política, permitindo a compreensão de que ela se dá a partir de mútuas impugnações. A ética surge e mantém-se pelas suas preocupações com a política, mas, por outro lado, a política interrompe a ética expandindo o princípio da responsabilidade, presente na relação Eu-Outro, à multiplicidade dos existentes e suas relações. A política surge imprimindo uma tensão à ética e sendo tensionada por ela. / The general objective, in this thesis, is to demonstrate that there is a relation between ethics and politics in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas without which would not be possible to think the human meaning in its individual and social dimension. In his thought we find evident indications about his politics concerns so that we can affirm that his philosophical analysis begin from the phenomenon of war. To comprehend the phenomenon of war, Levinas discusses the philosophy and states that it have been almost always an ontology, a discourse on the Being, which is characterized by closure and completeness of thought, preventing any possibility to the otherness emerge and to remain as such. In this task he discovers the face to face of the Self and the Other as an early stage of human meaning in that the Self is asked about its right to Be. There arises ethics as prime philosophy, characterized by asymmetric responsibility between the Self and the Other. But ethics is the relation between unique and unique and the reality has situations beyond the face to face. So, to get to the human meaning, it is necessary to consider the multiplicity that is suggested by the presence of the Third and that allows Levinas to make considerations about the politics and its mutual relations to ethics, using mainly two senses of the concept of justice. For this purpose, we will discuss three moments of his intellectual production. The first refers to Levinass stay in Lithuania and France where our author was influenced by political issues that were imposed by the phenomenon of war and by his incursions in philosophical thought in trying to understand the reasons for such a phenomenon. The second stage is characterized by its criticism to ontology as dominant thought in philosophy and that, for Levinas, corroborates the state of war, as well as the establishment of ethics as first philosophy of the original relation between the Self and the Other. The third stage brings the theme of the relation between ethics and politics, allowing the comprehension that it comes from mutual impugnment. The ethics emerges and remains by its concerns with the politics; but on the other hand, the politics interrupts the ethics, expanding the principle of responsibility, which stands in the relation Self-Other, and the multiplicity of existing relations. The politics emerges and imposes a tension to ethics and is tensioned by it.