This paper is a discussion of the relation between ethics and politics in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas. Generally speaking, I will examine how justice emerges out of a prior relation of infinite responsibility. Levinas points to a tension that arises between ethics and politics. We are always in a paradoxical situation where we are pulled in two opposing directions. On the one hand, we are drawn toward a responsibility for each unique individual. On the other hand, we are always compelled to act justly, to treat everyone equally. Instead of trying to ease this tension, it is my belief that Levinas attempts to heighten it. While a perfect balance between responsibility and politics can never be attained, justice can only arise where there is recognition of, and engagement with the tension that is unavoidable. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Thesis advisor: Richard Kearney / This dissertation asks what it means to be faithful to the friend. From Aristotle onward friendship has often been taken as the foundation of political life, but as it is a private relation that excludes many fellow citizens, fidelity to the friend may conflict with the duties of citizenship and endanger the political realm. What is more, one can never be perfectly faithful to one’s friend, so is true friendship impossible? I argue that friendship, though always a risk, directs us toward a justice that is higher than the political. Moreover, friendship is a great good that is suited to our finitude. While our finitude renders perfect fidelity impossible, it is also the horizon within which alone friendship can take place. Friendship is possible for those who admit its impossibility, who love precisely that the other – whether the other person or a language – escapes them.Chapter 1 considers selected ancient and medieval examinations of friendship in order to clarify friendship’s unstable place in the borderlands of hostility and hospitality. Only the dispossession of the self opens it to alterity. Thus if friendship is possible, it is possible only between strangers, not citizens secure in their ipseity. To bind people into a community, it must also shatter open any community in which they believe themselves to be comfortably at home. Chapter 2 further explores, in light of Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics, the conflict between friendship and one’s obligation to others. Levinas posits a self who is absolutely responsible for every other according to an asymmetrical ethical relation; how then can one prefer the friend to others? I reply that friendship serves as a forceful reminder of the singularity of the other and of the inadequacy of the comparisons among people that politics must employ to determine whose interests will win out. Friendship is not, however, only a signpost that points to ethics: it is a good that needs no justification to be worthwhile. Chapter 3 proposes that friendship arises from our finitude. Drawing on Emmanuel Falque’s work, I maintain that finitude is a positive good that is suited to humans. Friends translate the world for each other – but what of the fact that translation is always unfaithful? It is impossible, as Jacques Derrida has emphasized, to maintain infinite fidelity to the friend, but this impossibility is constitutive of friendship. Stepping beyond this horizon would not lead to better friendships but would destroy the possibility of friendship by taking us outside the limits that constitute humanity, when it is as humans that we love each other in friendship. Chapter 4 further investigates the possibility of friendship by taking up the suggestion, raised in Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, that friendship is an illusion because it pretends to offer knowledge of another even though such knowledge is impossible. I argue that a careful reading of the Search reveals that writing itself functions as an act of friendship: the narrator discovers that through writing his world can encounter the worlds of others. True friendship is a relation across absence. Finally, chapter 5 shows how the promise of fidelity to the friend constitutes the self: the promise creates the very world that the self is called to translate for the friend. I conclude that although one can never achieve perfect fidelity to the friend, this is no reason to despair of fidelity: the very infidelity of the self’s witness to the friend may still bear witness to the friend’s irreplaceability. Bearing witness to the friend is a task to be undertaken in fear and trembling but also in gratitude and joy, for friendship is a great good of our existence within finitude. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2020. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

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Philosophe de l'éthique, Emmanuel Levinas a critiqué l'histoire de la philosophie occidentale comme celle de l'ontologie réduisant l'Autre au Même. Bien que les études lévinasiennes n'aient cessé de commenter son éthique, rares sont celles qui s'intéressent à sa genèse. Ce travail tente de combler cette lacune en jetant la lumière sur les écrits du jeune Levinas et son dialogue avec ses contemporains : Jacob Gordin, Jacques Maritain, Léon Brunschvicg, Edmund Husserl et Martin Heidegger.Héritier de la « philosophie juive » esquissée par les écrits de Gordin, la philosophie de Levinas pouvait se caractériser dès les années 30 comme « d’inspiration juive », bien avant sa rencontre avec Monsieu rChouchani. Bien que le philosophe lui-même n’ait jamais tenté d’établir une « philosophie juive », la proximité et la distance que révèlent ses écrits sur Maritain (héritier de l’analogie de l’être) et Brunschvicg (représentant de l’idéalisme rationnel) tracent les contours de cette philosophie essentiellement éthique cherchant toujours la séparation avec la totalité.Le mouvement de sa pensée vers l’éthique contre la philosophie de « participation » semble avoir son origine dans la gigantomachie que le jeune étudiant lituanien aurait vue entre ses deux maîtres de la phénoménologie à Fribourg autour de la question de la monadologie « métaphysique » capable de rendre compte de l’expérience de l’Autre. C’est dans cette problématique que le jeune Levinas fait son premier pas vers le refus de la constitution analogique de l’Autre, ainsi qu’à la participation à la vérité de l’être, tout en s’appuyant sur l’éthique de séparation. / Philosopher of ethics, Emmanuel Levinas has criticized the history of western philosophy as that ofontology reducing the Other to the Same. Studies on Levinas’ philosophy has so far annotated on his ethicswithout cease, whereas they are seldom interested in its genesis. This work tries to make up for this gap byfocusing on young Levinas’ writings and his dialogue with his contemporaries: Jacob Gordin, JacquesMaritain, Léon Brunschvicg, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger.Heir of « Jewish philosophy» as sketched by the writings of Gordin, Levinas’ philosophy could becharacterized, in the 1930’s, as Jewish inspired, before his encounter with Mr Chouchani. Although thephilosopher himself has not ever tried to establish a Jewish philosophy, the proximity and the distance revealedby his writings on Maritain (heir of analogy of being) and on Brunschvicg (representative of rational idealism)trace the contour of this essentially ethical philosophy always seeking the separation from totality.The movement of his thought toward the ethics against the philosophy of « participation » seems tohave its origin in the gigantomachy which the young Lithuanian student would have seen between his twoteachers of phenomenology in Freiburg about the question of the « metaphysical» monadology, capable ofexplaining the experience of the Other. It is in this question that the young Levinas has made his first steptoward the refusal of analogical constitution of the Other and of the participation to the truth of being, relyingon the ethics of separation.

El objetivo general de nuestro trabajo pasa por ocuparse de la figura del minotauro en las reelaboraciones propuestas por Borges, con su cuento “La casa de Asterión”, y por Cortázar, con su pieza teatral Los reyes, en relación a los conceptos de monstruosidad y otredad y a la ética del humanismo del otro hombre presentada por Levinas. Se trata de un estudio comparativo en donde se analizará tanto el mito clásico del minotauro como también estas dos versiones surgidas al sur del continente americano. Las preguntas de investigación apuntan, por un lado, al interés por los géneros literarios escogidos por los autores argentinos en cuanto condición de posibilidad para la creación de sus minotauros humanizados. Por el otro, a la posición marginal a la que, en principio, la otredad monstruosa queda relegada. Por último, a la inversión producida con sus refinadísimas construcciones estéticas, en las cuales el minotauro es reconocido y en donde creemos ver un llamado de atención a la sociedad para hacerse responsable de los monstruos que crea. / The principal objective of this research is to investigate the minotaur´s portrait in the reinterpretations proposed by Borges, in his short story entitled “The House of Asterion”, and by Cortázar, in his play The Kings. The comparison is made in relation to the concepts of monstrosity and otherness and the ethics of humanism of the Other presented by Levinas. This is a comparative study that aims to analyze the classical myth of the minotaur and the two versions that emerged simultaneously in South America. The research questions refer, first, to the interest in the literary genres chosen by the Argentinian authors that prepare the ground for the creation of humanized minotaurs. Second, to the marginal position to which the monster is relegated. Finally, to the inversion produced in their aesthetic constructions, where the minotaur is recognized and would later becomea wake-up call to society to take responsibility for the monsters it creates.

[pt] Da Existência ao Infinito: a redução ética no pensamento de Emmanuel Lévinas visa a apresentar o pensamento de Emmanuel Lévinas em sua fundamental característica, qual seja, como uma redução ética. Tal hipótese localiza o pensamento levinasiano como o terceiro estágio da Fenomenologia, a partir dos diversos aspectos que o distinguem das precedentes filosofias do fenômeno. Dentre estes aspectos, ressalta-se, sobretudo, a mudança no eixo da filosofia que Lévinas pretende realizar, partindo da Ontologia rumo à Ética, como também a inauguração de um novo modo de filosofia decorrente dos conseqüentes deslocamentos que esta redução opera (da Existência aos existentes, do Mesmo ao Outro, do Masculino ao Feminino etc.). Deste modo, o objetivo desta pesquisa concentra-se em, a partir de um diálogo com a tradição filosófica (com destaque para o debate com o pensamento do Ser), precisar a especificidade do discurso filosófico de Lévinas, tendo como motes as questões relativas à Existência, ao Humanismo, à morte, ao amor e à justiça. / [en] From Existence to Infinity: the ethical reduction in the thought of Emmanuel intends to present the thought of Emmanuel Lévinas in its fundamental characteristic, that is like an ethical reduction. This hypothesis places the levinasian thought as the third stage of the Phenomenology based on the several features that distinguish it from the precedent philosophies of the phenomenon. Among this features, it is especially emphasized the change in the axis of philosophy that Lévinas intends to achieve, from Ontology to Ethics, as well as the inauguration of a new way of philosophy resulting from the consequent dislocations that this reduction performs (from Existence to the existents, from the Same to the Other, from Masculine to Feminine etc.). Therefore, the aim of this research is concentrated on indicating the specificity of the philosophical discourse of Lévinas, starting from a dialogue with the philosophical tradition (and above all the debate with the thought of Being) and motivated by the questions concerning to Existence, Humanism, death, love and justice.

Thèse (Ph. D.)--Université Laval, 2003. / Bibliogr.: f. 246-265. Publ. aussi en version électronique.

In Otherwise than Being (1974), Levinas asked if and how philosophy could make justice of the concrete ethical meeting by philosophical practice, which is unconditionally conditioned by language. Language, understood as partly situated in being and ontology, is analysed as an appropriation of the other, who is other than being. Language could therefore according to Levinas never fully express the other – sometimes referred to as “otherism”. A condition, then, that needs to be fulfilled for philosophical practice to reach the goal of making justice for the other, and hence be meaningful in the Levinasian picture, is to transcend language through language. In the essay, I analyse through textual interpretation what appears to be a contradiction regarding Levinas’ answer to the possibility of transcendence through and by language in philosophy. On one hand, it appears as if philosophy could not overcome language through language, and that philosophical practice therefore is not meaningful. On the other hand, it appears as if sceptical discourse could overcome language through language. Scepticism might then be considered as the only meaningful practice and philosophy a game of deconstructive dialogue. Since skepticism is understood as a part of philosophy, this would imply that there is a contradiction. I argue that the contradiction could be understood as apparent when considering the criticism executed in Levinas’ analysis of language. I suggest that the contradiction is apparent because sceptical interchange is meaningful.

Notre thèse vise donc à confronter la pensée de Levinas à celle d’Hegel autour du problème de la reconnaissance. Elle a pour but non seulement de faire une lecture critique de la pensée de Levinas à la lumière de la pensée de Hegel, mais de mener également une lecture critique du problème de la reconnaissance chez Hegel à la lumière des exigences de Levinas. Le propos est d’envisager une relecture du problème de la reconnaissance qui permette de surmonter l’ensemble des critiques. Ainsi, nous projetons de faire une relecture de l’ensemble de la philosophie hégélienne en donnant une portée post-métaphysique à son œuvre. Cela implique aussi d’élaborer une interprétation systématique du problème de la reconnaissance qui porte non seulement sur la Phénoménologie de l’esprit, mais aussi sur trois autres versions de la dialectique de la reconnaissance dans la periode de Francfort, la periode d’Iéna et l’Encyclopédie de Heidelberg. Notre thèse est que les deux philosophes adressent réciproquement l’un à l’autre une critique radicale qui risque vraisemblablement de changer le visage du problème de la reconnaissance, et qui a des conséquences normatives et politiques. / Our thesis therefore aims to confront the thought of Levinas to that of Hegel around the problem of the recognition. It is designed not only to make a critical reading of the thought of Levinas in the light of the thought of Hegel, but to carry out also a critical reading of the problem of hegel’s recognition theory in the light of the requirements of Levinas. The purpose is to explore a new lecture of the problem of recognition which allows us to overcome all the criticism, as well as intending to do a replay of the whole of the hegelian philosophy in giving a post-metaphysical scope of its implementation. This also implies to develop a systematic interpretation of the problem of recognition which is to be focused not only on the Phenomenology of the spirit, but also on three other versions of the dialectic of the recognition in the Frankfurt writings, the Jena writings and the Encyclopedia of Heidelberg. Our thesis is that the two philosophers directed conversely one to the other a radical criticism that is likely to change the face of the problem of recognition, and which has normative and political consequences.