Denna essä undersöker fenomenet trötthet som det framträder i psykoterapeutens yrkesutövning och tar stöd i filosofen Emmanuel Levinas tankar om trötthetens ögonblick som uppkomsten av ett varande i varat, och författaren Peter Handkes utforskande av en trötthet som öppnar sig mot världen. Kampen mot tröttheten, som den tidige Levinas beskriver, innebär gestaltandet av en existentiell fördömelse medan att släppa taget och bejaka tröttheten (Handke) utgör en möjlighet att möta världen utan själviska avsikter. I ljuset av psykoterapeutens uppiggningstekniker och ett samhälle som starkt betonar ett energiskt görande framträder tröttheten i vissa lägen som en etisk praktik som kan relateras till den sene Levinas tankar om den Andre som oändlighet. / This essay examines the phenomenon of fatigue as it appears in the psychotherapist's professional practice and is supported by philosopher Emmanuel Levinas' thoughts on the moment of fatigue as the emergence of a being in being, and the writer Peter Handke's exploration of a fatigue that opens up to the world. The struggle against fatigue, as the early Levinas describes, is an embodiment of an existential condemnation, while letting go and affirming fatigue (Handke) constitutes an opportunity to face the world without selfish intentions. In the light of the psychotherapist's invigorating techniques and a society that strongly emphasizes an energetic doing, fatigue emerges in some situations as an ethical practice that can be related to the late Levinas' thoughts on the Other as infinity.

This thesis argues that a close reading of Karol Wojtyla (John Paul II) and Emmanuel Levinas reveals a common phenomenological and ethical interest in the embodied human person. Attention is also given to points of disagreement that are theological in character. Despite different religious commitments, their treatment of the body provides the basis for an overlooked dialogue in which both emphasise the giftedness of the embodied human subject, the ‘other’. In the postmodern context, the body is a key theme and the focus of much debate, yet little has been said of observations made by both Wojtyla and Levinas about each other’s work, or how this relates to their own development. This is surprising given their huge contribution to philosophy, ethics and theology in the 20th century. Levinas' mature philosophical works build on his ongoing interest in phenomenology, but the body remains problematical. For him, incarnation is questionable, because he refuses an incarnational avatar. There is no escape from commitment or responsibility and the theme of alterity is absolute. Yet, communio is the necessary objective of the human situation, in which bodies do not simply make incarnate presence possible, but are fragile, wounded and vulnerable. This is crucial: bodies can be violated and even crucified. Wojtyla addressed this paradox in his Wednesday audiences in what became known as his ‘theology of the body’, which in turn shaped his principle paradigm of alterity, the nuptial mystery. There is an irreconcilable difference in these two views of the body, in which Wojtyla’s nuptial mystery contrasts strongly with Levinas’ alterity. With this important variation in mind, it is demonstrated that the thread of agreement between Levinas and Wojtyla is the logic of the gift; that the body speaks a language of gift-exchange that is fundamentally ethical and theological.

Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study is concerned with the possibility and characterisation of poststructural ethics and the ethics of general theories. It contains a review of selected readings on Modernity and provides a "snapshot" of an ethical system that is essentially rule based and privileges rationality. Some of the problems with such a system, such as inflexibility, tolerance based on superiority and force and the privileging of male gender is explored. It proceeds by perusing some literature on postmodernity as an open ethical system in which values are free floating and lists of rules are constantly produced and disregarded in a dizzying ethical free for all in which "anything goes". No value is considered more worthwhile than personal survival. As a starting point for reading Modernity and postmodernity together, Levinas introduces a radical perspective on ethics that can be read as a condemnation of postmodern morality. He relates an ethics in which the survival of the "other" is more important than the survival of the self. However, he does not ground the metaphysics of such a privilege in rationality or knowledge and hence does not turn it into an ethical rule, but rather, subtly shifts the responsibility for the other person to an ultimate responsibility for the Other as God. This radical responsibility is rejected by deconstruction which does not reject either postmodernity or Modernity but is an attempt to think through the limits of rule-orientated rationality, free-play and mystical metaphysics to produce an ethical awareness that has a sensitivity for the complexity of context. Through the notion of "writing", the peculiarities it displays and the objections it attracts, Derrida seeks to establish a uniquely ethical writing that is both a stable manifestation of ethics and a dynamic engagement with those subject to it. With these readings in the background the thesis attempts to provide a framework for poststructural ethics. It is an ethics based in the notion of friendship but does not ground itself in any guarantees. It re-evaluates rationality in terms of a sublime struggle for meaning and truth. This sublime struggle offers a unique perspective on political debates that strive towards responsible development for multicultural societies and also on a sociological approach to law and the ability to dispense justice without undue prejudice. The main contention of the thesis is that although poststructuralism does not suppose a grounding metaphysics in either rationality or responsibility towards God it cannot be satisfied with the self-indulgent nihilism of an "anything goes" postmodernism. Thus, it depends on the notion of a "complex system" that "self-organises" and produces limits through spontaneous connections. Through the working of deconstruction complex systems can take on a more human manifestation as friendships flourish and decay through the interaction of faces. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie is gemoeid met die moontlikheid en karakterisering van poststrukturele etiek en die etiek van algemene teorië. Dit bevat In geselekteerde oorsig van Moderniteit en verskaf In "kiekie" van In etiese sisteem wat essentieël op reëls gebasseer is en rationaliteit privilegieer. Sommige probleme met so In sisteem, soos byvoorbeeld onbuigsaamheid, verdraagsaamheid gegrond in superioriteit, geweld en die privilegieering van manlikheid, word ondersoek. Die studie sit voort deur sommige literatuur oor postmoderniteit as In oop etiese sisteem onder oë te neem. So In sisteem veronderstel vryvloeiende waardes en lyste van reëls wat gedurig geproduseer en geabandoneer word in In duisligwekkende etiese vryspel wat beskryf kan word as "anything goes". Geen waarde word hoër geag as persoonlike oorlewing nie. As die beginpunt van In lesing wat Moderniteit en postmoderniteit met mekaar in verband bring verskaf Levinas In radikale perspektief op etiek wat verdoemend staan teenoor die moraliteit van postmoderniteit. Hy beskryf In etiek waarin die oorlewing van die "ander" meer belangrik geag word as die oorlewing van die self. Hy grond egter nie die metafisieka van so In voorreg in rationaliteit of kennis nie, en lê dit dus nie neer as In etiese reël nie, maar verskuif eerder op subtitle wyse verantwoordelikheid vir die ander persoon na In uiteindelike verantwoordelikheid vir die Ander as God. Laasgenoemde radikale verantwoordelikheid word deur dekonstruksie verwerp in In poging om postmoderniteit en Moderniteit saam te snoer en die limiete van reël-georiënteerde rationaliteit, vry-spel en mistiese metafisieka deur te dink. Hierdeur word 'n etiese gewaarwording geproduseer wat sensitiviteit vir die kompleksiteite van konteks vertoon. Deur die nosie van "skryf', die eienaardighede en teenkanting daaraan verbonde, is Derrida op soek na die neerlegging van In unike etiese skryf wat beide In stabille manifestasie van etiek is en 'n dinamiese betrokkenheid by die wat daaraan onderhewig staan. Met hierdie leeswerk in die agtergrond poog die tesis om 'n raamwerk vir poststrukturele etiek daar te stel. Dit is In etiek wat as basis die nosie van vriendskap aanvaar sonder om enige waarborge uit te deel. Rationaliteit word gere-evalueer in terme van In sublime stryd vir betekenis en waarheid. Hierdie sublime stryd bring 'n unieke perspektief na politieke debatte wat volhoubare ontwikkeling in multikulturele samelewings ten doel het en vir In sosiologiese benadering tot die reg en regsvaardigheid. Alhoewel poststrukturele etiek nie In metanarratief veronderstel, soos die etiek van Moderniteit, nie kan dit egter ook nie tevrede wees met die destabiliserende nihilisme van 'n "anything goes" postmodernisme nie. Poststrukturele etiek steun dus swaar op die idee van 'n "komplekse sisteem" wat self-organiseer en llrniette stel deur middel van spontane konneksievorming. Deur die werking van dekonstruksie kan so In komplekse sisteem ook in meer menslike terme verwoord word as vriendskappe wat groei en vergaan in die interaksie tussen "gesigte".

<p>The aim of this study is to examine if Kenneth, a character in the novel Nyår by Stig Larsson, takes his ethical responsibility for one of the characters that appears in one section of the book, Ann. Nyår has often been related to morality. This study shows that Levinas philosophy of ethics is a supplement to the discussion of morality. According to Levinas, a person that acts in a non-moral way still can act in a righteous ethical way. With this starting point, it is possible to be close to the text and to bring out new perspectives on the novel. Kenneth is a nihilist, but has got the possibility to take his ethical responsibility for Ann. The ethical responsibility for another person, according to Levinas, always comes first. Kenneth, like everybody else, is obligated to this responsibility.</p>

This thesis argues that attitudes of inhospitality operate subtly in our politics, in our religious beliefs and practices, and in our understandings of who we are. Consequently, the question of hospitality - what it is and what it signifies - is an urgent one for us to address. In this thesis I examine and outline the hermeneutics-deconstruction debate over the experience of otherness and what it means to respond to others ethically (or hospitably). In the first two chapters I defend the importance of properly understanding the ethics of both Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. Against the concerns of Paul Ricoeur and Richard Kearney, I maintain that a Levinasian and Derridean insistence on answering to the call of an unconditional hospitality is the best way forward in our attempt to respond with justice to strangers. Next, by engaging Martin Hagglund's objection to an ethical reading of Derridean unconditionality, I give attention to the theme of negotiation in Derrida's later work, a theme which I take to be the central feature of his account of hospitality. I conclude by proposing five theses concerning hospitality. These theses provide an overview of the main themes discussed in this thesis and once more address the various tensions internal to the concept of hospitality.

This study examines the transaction of the lived experience of ‘suffering’ in the process of psychotherapy. ‘Suffering’ is conceptualised as having its weight and value transacted between a psychotherapist and his or her client. As a psychotherapist from a family with a disabled member, my fieldwork in a hospital with the parents of disabled children was conducted in Taiwan. The development of our therapeutic relationship was discovered as the process of ‘suffering transaction’: the interaction of lived experience of suffering between my clients and myself. Two clients took part in this study in which eight to ten sessions of counselling or psychotherapy were conducted and transcribed as the research data. The data also included my lived experience, which was made explicit in this field work through records of six sessions of therapeutic supervision and my self-reflective therapeutic diary and research journal. Inspired by Gee’s (2000) work on data presentation, my understanding of client’s stories is represented as poetic form. Reflections from the use of reflexivity explore the inter-correlations of ‘suffering’ between us. The theoretical perspective informing the further analysis of this study is hermeneutic phenomenology and social suffering. The socio-cultural embodiments in language are explored as the hermeneutic horizons of the theme of suffering transaction. Politically, the development of ‘early intervention’ in Taiwan creates as ‘unjust’ context for those encountering medical services, and this shared understanding of the medical bureaucracy influenced the psychotherapeutic encounter. The analysis also explores the influence of Confucian approaches to gender difference and family ethics, and Christian religious beliefs, in relation to the self-identification of my clients in suffering for other. These three horizons indicate that searching for the meaning of suffering is an inter-subjective process that entails taking the responsibility for the ‘Other’ as the symbolic socio-cultural body. The thesis concludes with discussion about the ethics of the therapeutic relationship. I argue that in psychotherapy, both therapist and client are engaged in the Levinasian idea of the primordial responsibility ‘for’ the other. In the context of wider debates about psychotherapy as an ethical practice, I argue that a therapist has the pre-moral position of not only witnessing client’s lived experience of suffering but also being witnessed by the client. This study provides an example in which the context of ‘witness’ is inter-subjectively developed in psychotherapy.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer offers a vibrant, theological depiction of the self constituted by and for the other in responsibility. The thesis argues that the concept of orientation is crucial for understanding this self; the self is a being oriented to, or away from, the other. To grasp the distinctiveness of Bonhoeffer’s self this thesis aims to open up critical conversation with his historical contemporaries, Emmanuel Levinas and Simone Weil. Like Levinas, Bonhoeffer depicts the self as confronted by the other. Yet unlike Levinas, Bonhoeffer’s other does not render the self a ‘host-hostage’. An oriented self, grounded in Bonhoeffer’s theology, is neither dominating nor other-dominated. Bringing Bonhoeffer and Weil into critical dialogue with one another helps to describe the precise way in which the self is responsible for the other. Conversation with Weil refines Bonhoeffer’s account of responsibility by integrating her account of attention into his account of existing on behalf of another. It is also neither self-affirming nor self-negating. The first chapter outlines two recent conceptions of the self as oriented; but each, as will be demonstrated, does not recognise fully the ethical contours of the oriented self. The second chapter examines in detail Bonhoeffer’s contributions to a Christological account of the responsibly oriented self. Integral to this account are the images of ‘the heart turned in on itself’ (cor curvum in se) and Christ who is fundamentally ‘for’ the other. The third chapter converses with Emmanuel Levinas, both constructively and critically. Of help is Levinas’s reading of the other as a confrontation to the self. His rendering of the other as dominating, or holding hostage, the self is a serious issue. Such a construction resists positive elements of the self-other relation. The fourth chapter investigates what conversation with Simone Weil can offer to Bonhoeffer’s framework. Her concept of attention helps to articulate how the self becomes a self through engagement with another. The fifth chapter presents Adolph Eichmann, as portrayed by Hannah Arendt, as the supreme and pivotal opposite of attentive responsibility. In Eichmann’s irresponsibility and disunity [while doing his ‘duties’] one finds justification for a fundamental re-working of ethics in a Bonhoefferian vein. The image of the ethically blind cor curvum in se exposes Eichmann’s fundamental issue. In contrast, Bonhoeffer’s ethically oriented self both perceives the other and gives of itself as for that other.

There is a close relationship between art and philosophy. From time to time, philosophy attempts to make art its theme. Invariably it has to acknowledge the very qualities of art that it seeks to explain - art’s elusiveness and its indeterminateness. On the other hand, it is the nature of art to philosophise within itself, about itself, and about the world. In this sense it operates as tacit philosophy. The language of art and the language of philosophy differ in form; but recent turns in philosophy have led to the expression of its truth in terms that transcend language and question its own epistemic structure. At the same time, art has always acknowledged its approach to ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ as being ‘other’ to that epistemology. This ‘otherness’ to traditional ways of knowing is recognised in philosophical discourse as ‘alterity’. The thesis posits that in art alterity has always been, and remains, tacit and integral to art’s being. Thus, by exploring the ways in which – through alterity – art and philosophy intersect and interweave, the thesis aims to reveal a new kind of knowledge that transcends the rational and the empirical but is nonetheless not only valid, but of the very highest integrity. That knowledge is transmitted through a particular critical and creative approach to philosophy and to art that opens the possibility of the ‘event’ of Alterity. The thesis uses a discourse of philosophy and critical theory to reveal Alterity in philosophy, principally through the work of Derrida, Heidegger, Adorno, and Levinas; Alterity in art through the works of Fra Angelico, Pollock, Fantin-Latour, Malevich, Vermeer, and Saitowitz; and Alterity in my own art practice through a set of six sculptures.

The aim of this diploma thesis is a philosophical interpretation of the problem of intersubjectivity in the work of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905 - 1980) and Emmanuel Levinas (1906 - 1995). In the first part, it deals with the conception of the Other in the Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness and analyzes (after a brief introduction to Sartre's philosophy) concrete aspects of Sartre's theory of intersubjectivity. This part ends with a critique of Sartre's theory, which enable us to interpret the Levinas's theory as an alternative conception of intersubjektivity. The analysis in the second part is based on the Levinas's book Totality and infinity. The final part sums up the main differences of both conceptions. Key words: intersubjectivity, the Other, existence, freedom, ethics, Sartre, Levinas

Emmanuel Levinas views the phenomenological tradition as being predicated on an asymmetrical relationship between the self and the other in which the self possesses the power to dominate and represent the other. This leads to the reduction of the other to the same. Instead, he wants to flip this relationship in favor of the other by showing how the very qualities of alterity and infinity enable the other to resist the self’s attempts at representation. Furthermore, he conceives of an ethics in which the self is compelled to listen to the other’s command and respond accordingly. The inherent issue in such an ethics as Levinas’s is that the self is held responsible for responding to a command which it cannot represent in some meaningful way. Thus, either Levinas contradicts himself or there must be some way to respond to the other’s command prior to representation. Levinas himself says that the transcendent relationship itself involves the convergence of the self and the other through language. Language occurs prior to representation and involves the putting in common of both the self and the other’s worlds. It is an ethical donation to the Other. As well, Levinas’s idea of paternity suggests the dialogical nature of the self in the ethical relationship. Using theories of self-consciousness by Hegel, Sartre, and Meade, I show how the dialogical nature of the social self enables it to enter into a transcendent relationship without committing an act of violence.