Submitted by Irene Nascimento (irene.kessia@ufpe.br) on 2016-06-27T17:33:44Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) DISSERTACAO_CJEland_DEFINITIVA.pdf: 1117645 bytes, checksum: 72bd32d2e20b55b08b4f94191834359b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-27T17:33:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) DISSERTACAO_CJEland_DEFINITIVA.pdf: 1117645 bytes, checksum: 72bd32d2e20b55b08b4f94191834359b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-02 / CAPES / A presente dissertação tem como objetivo examinar a relação entre o conceito de fraternidade nos primeiros escritos de Emmanuel Levinas, especialmente em Totalidade e Infinito, e suas obras posteriores sobre Direitos Humanos a fim de investigar uma possível fundamentação não liberal para os Direitos Humanos na contemporaneidade. Para tanto, será necessário explicitar como a obra de Levinas sobre a relação ética para com o Outro que fundamenta sua ideia de Direitos Humanos se ancora na relação política para com o terceiro. O conceito de fraternidade, como a não-indiferença universal para com o Outro, implica o conteúdo dessa relação ética que vai além da ética e permeia as categorias tradicionalmente políticas do pensamento filosófico. Assim, através da leitura relacional entre o conceito de Direitos Humanos e o conceito de fraternidade, que toma forma política na figura do terceiro, torna-se claro que a perspectiva de Levinas sobre os direitos como direitos dos outros se opõe a uma leitura liberal do seu trabalho, podendo, portanto, apontar para uma leitura não liberal dos direitos humanos na atualidade. / This dissertation seeks to examine the relationship between Emmanuel Levinas’s early work on fraternity, especially Totality and Infinity, and his later work on Human Rights in order to investigate the possibility of a non-liberal foundation for Human Rights in the contemporary world. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to develop the way in which Levinas’s work on the ethical relation to the Other serves as the foundation of his concept of Human Rights and anchors the political relation to the third party. The concept of fraternity, as a universal non-indifference to the Other, implies the content of the ethical relation which goes beyond ethics and reaches into traditionally political categories of philosophical thought. As such, by reading Levinas’s concept of Human Rights in relation to this early concept of fraternity, which takes its political form through the third party, his account of rights as the rights of the other stands in clear opposition to a liberal understanding of his work and describes a non-liberal account of human rights in the contemporary world.

Este trabalho elege a obra de Jerzy Grotowski como objeto de investigação da Alteridade na construção do sentido do fazer teatral. Seu escopo abrange as formulações do encenador polonês para uma metodologia do trabalho do ator e suas implicações, tanto no que se refere às artes performáticas quanto às artes rituais. Utiliza como ferramenta teórica categorias do pensamento filosófico de Emmanuel Levinas, notadamente suas proposições acerca do encontro face-a-face, da noção de rosto e da idéia de Infinito, no sentido de uma proposição da ética como filosofia primeira. A análise das diversas fases do percurso criativo de Grotowski permite afirmar que a Alteridade se constitui como o eixo conceitual em torno do qual a obra do encenador se estrutura. / This paper elects the work of Jerzy Grotowski as the subject of investigation in the construction of the theatrical practice\'s sense. It beholds the Grotowski\'s frame into a metodology of the actor\'s work and it\'s implications, as in performing arts and in ritual arts. It makes use of the categories of the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, as theorical tool, picking out his proposals refering to the face-to-face encounter, the \"face\" notion and the idea of infinity, as a proposal of the ethic as first philosofy. The analisis of the diverse fases of the criative path of Grotowski allows to declare that the Alterity is build with it\'s conceptual focus, that structures all his work.

Levinas s’intéresse à la notion du concret de la phénoménologie de Husserl. En 1930, Levinas montre que la notion de l’être a son origine dans l’expérience concrète de l’être qui est l’intuition immanente philosophique. Dans les années 1940, d’une part, Levinas met en relief que la phénoménologie consiste à rechercher dans les vécus concrets l’origine du phénoménologue et de sa vie ; et d’autre part, il détermine l’esprit humain par sa puissance de coïncider avec l’origine de sa vie et de lui-même. À l’époque de Totalité et infini, Levinas clarifie que la description phénoménologique de l’expérience concrète d’une entité est à la fois l’événement même de la révélation de l’être concret de cette entité et l’événement même de l’effectuation de cette entité. D’où Levinas met en évidence, d’une part, la méthode de concrétisation qui lie les expériences concrètes les unes aux autres et, d’autre part, le perspectivisme qui décrit l’expérience concrète telle qu’elle est vécue maintenant. Dans Totalité et infini, Levinas effectue la description phénoménologique comprise par lui. En décrivant les expériences concrètes du moi, il les distribue en deux séries : celle du besoin (vie naïve) et celle du désir (critique de soi). Dans la série du besoin, sur la base de l’habitation se fondent les expériences du moi naïf : le travail, la possession et la représentation. Et dans la série du désir se distribuent les expériences avec autrui : la parole, l’amour avec la femme et la fécondité. Ces deux séries d’expériences constituent la forme originaire de l’expérience du moi personnel. Totalité et infini est en ce sens la description phénoménologique du moi personnel par excellence. / Levinas brings out the notion of the concrete from Husserl’s phenomenology. In his 1930 book, Levinas shows that the notion of the being has its origin in the concrete experience of the being that is philosophical immanent intuition. In two articles published in the 1940s, Levinas reveals that the phenomenology searches in concrete experiences the origin of the phenomenologist himself and his life. On the other hand, he determines the human spirit by its power to coincide with the origin of his life and himself. In four articles published around 1960, Levinas clarifies the phenomenological description of the concrete experience of an entity is the very event of revelation of the concrete being of this entity and the very event of the effectuation of the entity. Hence, Levinas brings out the method of concretization which connects together concrete experiences as well as the perspective which describes concrete experience as it is now experienced. In Totality and infinity, Levinas practices the phenomenological description understood by himself. By describing concrete experiences of the “I”, Levinas categorizes them into two series of experience: that of need (naive life) and that of desire (self-criticism). In the series of need, the experiences of the naive “I” relies on the dwelling : labor, possession and representation. And in the series of desire, experiences with the other are distributed: speech, love with woman and fecundity. These two series of experiences constitute the proto-form of the experience of the personal “I”. Totality and infinity is in this sense the phenomenological description of the personal “I” par excellence.

Puis-je croire ce que je vois ? Cette question surgit dans la religion, la science et l'art. Elle persiste, comme si la focale d'une caméra pouvait mesurer la distance entre la justice et la justesse. En effet, existe-t-il une éthique de la création cinématographique, interrogée tant du côté du travail d'un cinéaste que du côté de la réception, c'est-à-dire dans la façon de rendre compte d'une expérience de cinéma ? Si oui, cette éthique dérive-t-elle toujours d'un engagement politique préalable qui la guiderait ? Ou bien, son origine est-elle d'un tout autre type ? Cette thèse en esthétique du cinéma pose ces questions et confronte quelques-uns des films les plus énigmatiques et puissants du septième art avec les notions clé du philosophe français E. Levinas. La relecture serrée de son œuvre, sa critique du "dévoilement" heideggérien, jalonne les analyses détaillées de films comme Solaris, Les harmonies Werckmeister ou encore Zelig. Progressivement, chacun d'entre eux révèle sa profonde affinité avec les autres, même si tous n'appartiennent pas à la même période, ni au même style ou genre. La cohérence de l'ensemble est dans la problématique, dont chaque chapitre s'efforce d'éclairer un nouvel aspect. Ainsi, la recherche de l'autre et la pensée de Dieu représentent des points nodaux du texte sans que l'on y ait recours aux "images sacrées". / Can I believe what I see ? This question occurs in religion, science and art. As if pulling a camera's focus could measure the distance between justice and justness. Actually, is there any ethics of creation in cinema questioned from a filmmaker's inner motivation, as well as from the possibilities of transcription of such an experience ? If so, are ethics always directed by prior political involvement ? Or by another type of instruction ? This thesis in film studies asks these questions and confronts some of the most demanding and multi-leveled films by great authors with the key notions of E. Levinas (1906-1995), one of the most important French philosophers in the 20th century. Reading closely the thinker's oeuvre, his criticism of Heidegger's unveiling, this thesis offers a detailed analysis of Solaris, Werckmeister Harmonies and Zelig. Step by step, they reveal their deep-rooted affinities with each other, even though they do not all belong to the same period, style or genre. They are also connected to metaphysics in an innovative way. Both, seeking for the other and thinking of God, represent main points in this exposé without referring to holy images.

Because Emmanuel Levinas distanced himself from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophy for a more radical account of the self as primordially oriented by a radical passivity and asymmetrical ethical obligation to the other, few secondary sources have articulated the clear influence Merleau-Ponty had on the trajectory of Levinas's thought. Further, Levinas's more radical account of intersubjectivity raises three primary concerns: (1) Levinas resorts to a form of Platonic dualism when he depicts the other as beyond culture, history, and the physical appearance of the body; (2) there are questions as to whether the phenomena warrant his later view that the self is grounded in a radical passivity and an utter noncoincidence between self and other; (3) his ethics based on an infinite, asymmetrical obligation for the other conflates any kind of self-regard with egoism, thus creating a scenario in which my infinite concern for the singular other stands at odds with concerns of equality and justice. <br> Drawing on the work of Levinas and Merleau-Ponty, I develop a hybrid account of intersubjectivity. Echoing the work of Adriaan Peperzak, I depict the self-other relation as "chiastic asymmetry" that stresses that the asymmetry in Levinas's thought and the mutuality in Merleau-Ponty's must be seen as equiprimordial. Peperzak neither considers Merleau-Ponty's thought, nor does he provide a phenomenological description of chiastic asymmetry. The parent-child relationship provides this explanation by highlighting how ethics is cultivated simultaneously in both the child and the caregiver, and thus, both responsibility and mutuality constitute the self-other relation. In addition, the study of the parent-child relation (1) offers a phenomenological analyses of passivity and sensibility that decenter the autonomous, self-reflective cogito that is prioritized by Descartes, Kant, and Husserl and (2) stands in contrast to the predominant accounts of intersubjectivity that are grounded in self-interest, indifference, or shame, as represented by Hegel, Heidegger, and Sartre. This alternative account seeks to preserve the alterity of the other and unearths an originary posture toward the other that is peaceful and positive. <br> After considering Levinas's and Merleau-Ponty's respective roots in Husserl's thought (chapter 1), I respond to Levinas's criticisms of Merleau-Ponty in the areas of language, history, aesthetics, and embodiment (chapter 2). Then, I turn to their respective accounts of the parent-child relation, supplemented by current empirical research in child development, to establish my account of chiastic asymmetry (chapter 3). After explaining how chiastic asymmetry offers an alternative to the views set forth by Hegel, Heidegger, Sartre, and Hobbes (chapter 4), I conclude by considering how intersubjectivity as chiastic asymmetry might serve as a basis for a peaceful politics that reframes the use of violence and suggest its conceptual presence in the thought of Enrique Dussel, Desmond Tutu, and Miroslav Volf. <br> / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts; / Philosophy / PhD; / Dissertation;

Few philosophers, today, are doing more than simple recognition of Levinass debt to phenomenology when a thorough explication of how phenomenological methodology impacts Levinass work is needed. This dissertation is the needed discussion of methodology that has been so absent in Levinas as well as in so many of his interpreters. The purpose, herein, is to synthesize Levinass work, explicating it in terms of transcendental methodology, the result of which reveals Levinass claims to be more defensible when understood in these terms than when the full rigor of this methodology is not properly grasped. First, to connect Levinas to transcendental phenomenology a correct perspective of the phenomenological tradition is needed. I argue that phenomenology is a methodology that discloses those horizons that condition experience such that appearance takes on meaning. I further argue that it is important to see this disclosure as something open-ended and ongoing rather than a method capable of fully revealing a final telos. Levinas fits into this methodology by providing the ethical as just such a horizonal condition, while his constant returning to this theme highlights the need to keep reworking the description of its meaningful impact on experience. Second, I defend Levinas from those who claim his work cannot be phenomenological, based on what they see as an implied Jewish tradition informing his description. I argue that what must be understood is that Levinass reference to God, Biblical stories, and Jewish wisdom impose an unsettling language that is introduced to replace traditional phenomenological language that does not always allow for the goals phenomenology sets for itself. This imposition does not use the Jewish tradition to make his argument but as a vocabulary far better at describing the ethical condition than what is commonly used in phenomenology. The final step of explication involves the actual application of the methodology, now understood aright, to Levinass claims about the other, the self, and the ethical. The result is that once we understand the ethical as the infinite originative horizon out of which the conscious ego emerges, later interpretations of Levinas will be able to successfully move beyond his work.

This thesis interrogates how Lawrence Hill’s The Book of Negroes represents histories of violence ethically by utilizing Emmanuel Lévinas’s philosophy of ethics as a methodology for interpretation. Traditional slave narratives like Olaudah Equiano’s autobiography and postmodern neo-slave narratives like Toni Morrison’s Beloved animate the violence endemic to slavery and colonialism in an effort to emphasize struggles in conscience, the incomprehensible atrocities, and strategies of rebellion. However, this project illustrates how The Book of Negroes supplements these literary goals with Hill’s own imagination of how slaves contested the inhumanities thrust upon them. Through his aesthetic choices as a realist, Hill foregrounds the possibilities of pacifism, singular identities, and altruistic agency through his protagonist Aminata Diallo. These three narrative elements constitute Lévinas’s ethical peace, which means displaying a profound sensitivity towards the historical Other whom imperial discourses and traditional representations of catastrophes in Black history might obscure. / Graduate / 0325 / 0328 / 0352 / jaslife12@hotmail.com

Engaging the question of postmodern ethical intersubjectivity in the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Luce Irigaray I attempt to move beyond Levinas sacrificial view of intersubjectivity with Irigaray's critique of sexual difference. I argue that Levinas view of ethical 'subjectivity' is violently conditioned by a necessary narcissim located in Levinas's description of the feminine dwelling. Instead of narcissim I argue with Irigaray for a way of love that offers an ethical relationship bonded in mutuality. This way of love is rooted in an understanding of the primordial matter of life as good for intersubjective-relationships that do not depend upon narcissim for connection. Concluding this study I suggest that his kind of intersubjectivity can be rooted in a primordial way of life found in the rhythm of breath.

The present investigation develops the notion of sociality based on Emmanuel Levinas’s thought, and proposes an understanding of sociality that resists becoming a common foundation: an un-common sociality which interrupts the reciprocal shared common, and thereby, paradoxically, makes it possible. By engaging in the larger debate on community, this work gives voice to Levinas on the question of community without a common ground, a topic and a debate where he has previously been underestimated. In this way, the aim is to reveal new directions opened up by Levinas’s philosophy in order to think an un-common sociality.

Thesis advisor: Roberto Goizueta / The injunction to `love our neighbor' is a constitutive element of any Christian ethic. It is frequently found embedded within the triadic formulation of `love of God, love of neighbor, and love of self.' Because this injunction must always be contextualized within each historical period it was important to explore how one should love the neighbor in our contemporary context. The dissertation begins by exploring the contemporary conditions of pluralism and interdependence. In this context we realize that love of neighbor must manifest in an encounter with the other. The project shows some current models of encountering the other. In showing the inadequacies of each model I also introduce the work of Johann B. Metz and Enrique Dussel. I then construct a process entitled Agapic Solidarity which seeks to use some aspects of the political theology of Metz and the liberation philosophy of Dussel to formulate an authentic encounter with the other. This process honors both elements; the condition of pluralism and the acknowledgement of interdependence. In doing this we begin the process of loving the neighbor which is so central to any Christian ethic. In the conclusion of the dissertation I show some possible applications of the process. The final component is a case study of the undocumented migrant in the United States of America as a demonstration of the process in action. In this way, it shows how the ethical demand can be enacted and embodied within a particular, concrete ethical issue. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.