This thesis investigates the advantages and limitations of applying culture to the analysis of violent conflict and peacebuilding, with a particular focus on liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. While fully aware of the critique of the concept of culture in terms of its uses for the production of difference and ‘otherness,’ it also seeks to respond to the critique of liberal peacebuilding on the account of its low sensitivity towards local culture, which allegedly undermines the peace effort. After a careful examination of the terms of discussion about culture enabled by theoretical approaches to conflict in Chapter 2, the thesis presents a theoretical framework for the analysis of cultural aspects of conflict and peace based on the processes and effects of meaning-generation (Chapter 3), developing the conceptual apparatus and vocabulary for the subsequent empirical study. Instead of bracketing out the recursive nature of cultural theorising, the developed approach embraces the recursive dynamics which arise as a result of cultural ‘embeddedness’ of the analyst and the processes which s/he seeks to elucidate, mirroring similar dynamics in the cultural production of meaning and knowledge. The framework of ‘embedded cultural enquiry’ is then used to analyse the practices of liberal peacebuilding as a particular culture, which shapes the interaction of the liberal peace with its ‘subjects’ and critics as well as framing its reception of the cultural problematic generally (Chapter 4). The application of the analytical framework to the case study investigates the interaction between the liberal peace and ‘local culture,’ offering an alternative reading of the conflict and peace process in Sierra Leone (Chapter 5). The study concludes that a greater attention to cultural meaning-making offers a largely untapped potential for peacebuilding, although any decisions with regard to its deployment will inevitably be made from within an inherently biased cultural perspective.

The liberal peace framework has in the past two decades experienced an increased amount of criticism for its uniform strategies, with several alternatives being presented as a response. One such an alternative is the framework of the post-liberal peace. Although researched in multiple articles by various scholars, Richmond’s (2011) book A Post-Liberal Peace is the most extensive piece on the subject and has therefore chiefly been used in the analysis of this paper. While previous studies and literature has examined different aspects of the post-liberal peace, none had considered a country’s foreign policy both in general and specific to one country. The prior neglection of Sweden and Afghanistan led to a focus of the two countries in this study. The aim of this paper was to fill the gap in the literature on the post-liberal peace framework as applied to a country’s foreign policy, thereby illuminating whether Sweden’s foreign policy adheres to the post-liberal peace framework. Text analysis was employed so as to critically examine the Swedish foreign policy by looking at certain concepts, in addition to implicit and explicit statements made relating to values inherent to the post-liberal peace framework. The hypothesis of this study claimed that Sweden’s social democratic feminist foreign policies adhere to the post-liberal peace framework and therefore would illustrate the proposed likeness between Sweden’s social democratic foreign policy and the post-liberal peace framework. The results from the data analysis displayed several qualities that adhered to the above-stated framework, while also exhibiting a number of inconsistencies and indubitably contrasting values. In sum, the study provides evidence that the social democratic feminist foreign policy of Sweden to a certain extent share similarity with the post-liberal peace framework, thereby partly confirming the hypothesis.

The dominant liberal peacebuilding critiques tends to focus on ‘states’ and the failure of interventions in rebuilding them. Consequently, a standardised critique has emerged largely because the critics apply a broad brush across a diverse range of contexts, programmes, issues and activities as illustrated by the lack of scrutiny on mine action and emerging contexts such as Somaliland. The liberal peacebuilding critics critique the standardised ‘one size fits all approach’ employed by interveners, yet they take the same approach. I therefore argue for the need to broaden the critique to include other elements and contexts of peacebuilding. I demonstrate that as an intervention mine action has intrinsic peacebuilding potential. However, the way mine action is implemented both globally and in Somaliland reflects the same dominant characteristics of the liberal peacebuilding critique i.e.; it is externally led; uses technical and standardised formulaic approaches; disregards local context thus failing to secure local ownership. Attributes that the critics argue have led to the failure and/or limited success of peacebuilding interventions. I therefore contend with the critics and demonstrate how these attributes have contributed to the challenges of implementing mine action activities thereby limiting mine actions ‘peace-ability’ potential in Somaliland. However, beyond the implementation modalities there are other factors that further contribute to limiting this potential; these include the Sector Actors; the Somaliland context i.e. the historical and political context, and the perception of Somaliland people. Thus in conclusion I argue for a nuanced critique that acknowledges the challenging realities of implementing programmes in challenging post conflict environments.

Bibliographic Record DANIEL, JAN. International Peacekeeping and Hybrid Order: UNIFIL II in South Lebanon. Prague, 2017. 257 p. Doctoral dissertation (Ph.D.) Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies. Thesis supervisor: JUDr. PhDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D. Abstract The thesis explores an engagement of a UN peace operation with a local political order. It builds on understanding of peacekeeping as policing of certain vision of international and local order and on that basis, it explores practices and politics of keeping peace. Drawing on the study of UNIFIL II, the UN peacekeeping operation deployed in South Lebanon, the study focuses on practices by which peacekeepers perform their policing duties in the local order, which is marked by entanglements between state and non- state ordering authorities and different practice of stateness. By doing so, it seeks to advance the research on the everyday practices of peacekeeping, as well as the research on local hybridity of peace operations and engagement of liberal actors with the local difference. Drawing on the debates in critical peace studies and works on practice-oriented approaches to research on liberal governmentality, it makes the case for focusing on the peacekeepers' engagement with the 'local' order on the...

Critics of the liberal peace paradigm call for the consideration of local realities in order to come to a more sustainable, comprehensive form of peace – which is not imposed by external actors. The “local” is generally seen as the place where bottom-up or grassroots peace is developed in contrast to the liberal peace proposed by external international agents. Whereas critical peacebuilding literature stresses the difference between the “liberal” and the “local” and acknowledges the incoherence of liberal actors, much less attention has been paid to differences and variations within the “local” sphere. Drawing on empirical research in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) we argue that the “local” is much more complex than presumed by many critics of the liberal peace. We argue that a) the local is fragmented and actors and issues are highly contested; b) neither actors nor discourses are purely local; and c) the very idea of a coherent collective local agency is contested locally.

Comment les intervenants internationaux peuvent-ils (re)construire des institutions légitimes après un conflit intra-étatique ? En d’autres termes, quels facteurs déterminent le résultat du statebuilding post-conflit ? D’un côté, l’approche dominante, dite « technique », soutient que des ressources significatives (financières, humaines, politiques) permettent aux intervenants internationaux de construire les institutions voulues. Au Kosovo, les acteurs internationaux ont établi une administration internationale dotée de pouvoirs exécutifs et des ressources étendues et maintenues tout au long du processus. Or, le bilan du statebuilding est mitigé. D’un autre côté, le paradigme de la « paix libérale » affirme que la libéralisation (politique et économique) contribue au résultat limité des opérations post-conflit car elle est mal appliquée, illégitime voir dangereuse pour les sociétés sortant de conflits violents. Cette approche néglige aussi bien les facteurs internes que les variations dans les intentions internationales et se base, comme l’approche technique, sur un postulat implicite (erroné) de l’asymétrie porteuse de rapports de pouvoir qui favoriseraient les intervenants internationaux. En conséquence, ces approches ignorent la manière dont les acteurs locaux peuvent résister aux normes et objectifs internationaux.Pour expliquer les variations du résultat du statebuilding international, nous proposons un modèle théorique alternatif en modélisant une approche multicausale et séquentielle d’un jeu à deux niveaux. Notre thèse est la suivante. Les variations dans l’issue du statebuilding sont fonction des interactions stratégiques, elles-mêmes déterminées par les changements dans les préférences et les relations de puissance entre les intervenants internationaux et les élites politiques locales. Le statebuilding est étudié comme un processus interactif, mettant en relation potentiellement trois acteurs clés qui dominent le paysage politique post-conflit. Dans ces conditions, le statebuilding est un succès uniquement si les réformes internationales ne menacent pas le pouvoir politique des élites locales – pouvoir qui s’appuie sur deux piliers, le nationalisme et les pratiques informelles – et que les acteurs internationaux ont mobilisé suffisamment de ressources pour amener les élites locales à adopter et appliquer les réformes désirées.Or, le cas du Kosovo montre que les préférences des acteurs ne s’alignent que très rarement. Le statebuilding international a été instrumentalisé et miné par les préférences divergentes et contradictoires entre les principaux acteurs clés. Les acteurs internationaux ont voulu créer un Etat démocratique et multinational, mais ont privilégié la stabilité car ils ont été confrontés à des élites politiques locales – kosovar-albanaises et kosovar-serbes – préoccupées par le pouvoir et la domination de leur groupe sur autrui et par le maintien du leadership à l’intérieur de leur propre groupe. Entraînant ainsi une multiplication des autorités et à une fragmentation de la légitimité : deux systèmes politiques et sociaux persistent et empêchent la cohésion et le caractère multinational de l’Etat. L’intervention de l’UE a permis de changer le jeu en contribuant à apaiser la situation sur le terrain. Mais des tensions persistent, confortant le compromis. / How can international actors build legitimate institutions following intra-state conflict? In other words, what factors determine the outcome of post-conflict statebuilding? On the one hand, the dominant approach, termed "technical", argues that significant resources (financial, human and political) allow international actors to build the required institutions. In Kosovo, international actors have established an international administration with executive powers, extending and sustaining resources throughout process. However, the success of statebuilding generally is mixed. On the other hand, the so-called "liberal peace" paradigm affirms that liberalization (political and economic) is a contributing factor to the limited success of post-conflict operations because it is either misapplied, illegitimate or even dangerous for societies emerging from violent conflicts. The liberal peace approach neglects these facts and ignores variations in international intentions. It is based, as is the technical approach, on an implicit (erroneous) assumption of an asymmetry in power relationships in favor of international actors. The result is that, these approaches fail to acknowledge the possibility of local actors resisting international standards and objectives.To explain variations in the success of statebuilding, we present an alternative theoretical model where a multi-level, sequential approach is modeled to a two-level game. Our thesis is as follows: variations in the statebuilding success are the function of strategic interactions, themselves determined by changes both in preferences and the power relationships between international actors and domestic political elites. Statebuilding is seen here as an interactive process, potentially linking three key actors who dominate any post-conflict political landscape. In unique conditions, no statebuilding process or international reforms need pose a threat to the political power of local elites - power derived from two pillars, i.e. nationalism and informal practices. Rather, international actors mobilise sufficient resources to induce local elites to adopt and implement the desired reforms.However, the preferences of the actors are very rarely aligned. In the case of Kosovo, it has been shown that international statebuilding has been instrumentalized and undermined by divergent and contradictory preferences among key actors. The international actors’ desire was to create a democratic and multinational state, but they opted for stability instead because they had to deal with local political elites - Kosovar-Albanian and Kosovar-Serb. The latter were concerned about maintaining their power over, and domination of, their group over others as well as maintaining leadership within their own group. This has led to a multiplication of authorities and a fragmentation of legitimacy: two distinct political and social systems persist, preventing the development of a cohesive and multinational state. While EU intervention has brought about a game change and helped to calm the situation on the ground, tensions persist, reaffirming the compromise that has taken place.

A critical re-examination of the liberal peace is conducted to explore the ways in which certain ideas around peace have come to dominate and to be regarded as “common sense”. The foundation of my critique comes in the personalisation of peacebuilding through the stories of people who are the intended beneficiaries of its actions. This thesis seeks to open up and challenge the current measures of success and the location of power by introducing voices and experiences of Mende people located in the Southern and Eastern provinces of Sierra Leone. I have attempted to open up a reflexive space where simple questions can be re-examined and the location of recovery can be seen as a space influenced, shaped and performed in the context of diverse influences. I draw on my personal experience living in Bo, Sierra Leone for two months in 2014 and local level actors' subjective reflections on individual and communal notions of recovery, post-conflict. My findings are reflected in “building blocks” that uncover a partial story of personal perspectives on recovery. The story suggests a de-centred and complex “local” within the existing context and realigns the understanding of subject and agency within peacebuilding. This collection of experiences, stories and encounters reshapes the notion of peace as an everyday activity with the aim of improving well-being on a personal level. It is also a part of the peacebuilding process that exists outside of the traditional organisational lens. My main contribution has been in allowing alternative space(s) of peacebuilding and peace-shaping to have a platform that is not restricted by the confined epistemic “expert” community toward an understanding of “progress” as an experiential and subjective process of recovery. This approach sought to challenge the current site of legitimacy, power and knowledge, and in order to achieve this aim I drew on a new methodological toolkit and the absorption of key concepts from other disciplines such as managerialism and the sociological concept of the “stranger”. My research offers an opportunity to observe and utilise information sourced from the creativity and spontaneity of the everyday lived experiences of Sierra Leoneans and ordinary phenomena connected with this.

Abstract The international UN-led peacebuilding mission MINUSMA has been deployed in Mali since 2013 and was initially rather successful. The mission managed to support the government with stabilization and a peace agreement that ended the conflict between the north and the south. However, since 2017 the situation has deteriorated in the presence of MINUSMA. Violence has escalated and several new communal conflicts have emerged primarily in the central regions where Islamist groups have gained ground, and there have been two more coup d’états and the government have been carrying out human rights violations against civilians. By 2023 the people of Mali and the current military government has demanded the mission to withdraw and leave the country. This study set out to understand why civilians oppose international peacebuilding and made a comparative case study of three regions in Mali, Koulikoro in the south, Mopti in the central and Gao in northeastern Mali looking at how opposition against MINUSMA has changed between 2017-2020. The study found that reasons for opposition are multilayered and stem from both historical and contemporary events and experiences. Moreover, the study found that despite substantial research on the importance of including civil society in peacebuilding processes, most civilians, groups and communities have been left out of the peace process and instead the approach has been mainly top-down with MINUSMA supporting the Malian government. The problematic aspect of this is that the government did not support its own people. The study suggest that international peacebuilding must be more context-sensitive and understand the history and root causes of the conflicts to successfully support a country with peacebuilding in order to avoid a situation where the civilian population oppose the mission instead of being included, engaged and committed to the peace process.

[pt] A paz liberal é um projeto político cujas tradições remontam ao conjunto de ideias que compõem o liberalismo. Ela representa o modelo pelo qual o ocidente se propõe a uniformizar o mundo através da democracia e de réplicas de instituições, normas e sistemas econômicos, sociais e políticos. Assim, pensar em tal projeto implica pensar também em seus aspectos práticos e na sua implementação. A paz liberal foi escolhida como objeto de estudo da dissertação porque, na medida em que se traduz em uma relação hierárquica baseada em interesses, acarreta em uma série de exclusões e marginalizações, uma vez instaurada através de uma operação de peacebuilding. A presente pesquisa procura entender quais as suas reais motivações, através da busca por qual seu objeto referente de fato: o indivíduo do país receptor ou o estado mandante? Para ilustrar tal reflexão, foi conduzida uma investigação através de um estudo de caso da missão de peacebuilding no Afeganistão, e como a questão da produção vertiginosa do ópio em tal país, que cresceu após a entrada de tais operações, pode indicar uma resposta acerca de qual o objeto referente de fato da paz liberal pós 11/9. / [en] The liberal peace is a political project rooted in the set of ideas and values that sustain liberalism as an ideology. It represents a model through which the west gauges the world by bringing in democracy and by replicating institutions, norms and economic, social and political systems. Thinking about such project implies that there are practical and implementation aspects that cannot be ignored. Liberal peace has been chosen as the theme of this dissertation because it is about a hierarchical relationship between North and South that produces exclusions and marginalizations that happen through peacebuilding operations. This research aims to understand what the real motivations behind the liberal peace project are, by seeking which is its real referent object: the individual who lives in the state being intervened or the western countries national securities? In order to illustrate the findings for such questions, this research has carried out a case study focused on NATO s operations in Afghanistan and the concurring vertiginous growth of opium production in the country. This will lead us to understand what the real referent object behind the liberal peace project after 9/11 is.

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