Undersökningens syfte är att pröva om en mindre stat kan nyttja sig av vilseledning för att minska åverkan från en motståndare som nyttjar sig av Wardens systemteori. Undersökningen fokuserar främst på att vilseleda en motståndares målinhämtning innan ett angrepp. Undersökningen ger förslag på ett antal sätt att genomföra defensiv vilseledning, både innan ett angrepp och under påbörjat angrepp. För att underlätta för undersökningen tas fiktiva målval ut inom Sverige med stöd av Wardens litteratur och med stöd i viss annan litteratur. En mindre jämförelse mot befintliga sårbarhetsanalyser genomförs. Undersökningen har visat att alla presenterade målval utom ett har viss användning av den defensiva vilseledningen som skildras i uppsatsen. Vidare har undersökningen presenterat en motståndares troliga målval mot Sverige om motståndaren följer Wardens teori. Uppsatsen har också visat på ett antal sårbarheter i Sverige om en motståndare nyttjar Wardens teori. / The purpose of the survey is to test whether a smaller state can use deception to reduce the impact of an opponent who uses Wardens theory regarding the enemy as a system. The survey focuses on an opponent's target acquisition before an attack and the deception that might complicate the target acquisition. The survey presents a number of ways to implement defensive deception, both before and during an attack. To aid the survey a fictitious target acquisition within Sweden has been produced with the support of Wardens literature and with the support of other sources. A comparison is made between the identified vulnerabilities and existing vulnerability reports. The survey has shown that all the presented fictitious targets except one has some use of the defensive deception as presented. Furthermore the survey has presented credible targets in Sweden that an opponent might choose to attack if the opponent makes use of Wardens theory. The survey has shown several vulnerabilities in Sweden if the opponents makes use of Wardens theory.

<p>This essay aims to analyse if the Russian military operation carried out against Georgia between the 7^th and 12^th of august 2008 were executed with adherence to the Russian principles for military deception, <em>maskirovka</em>.</p><p>   A superior purpose is to assess the situation according to the Swedish Armed Forces task of identifying possible needs for new or changed needs for abilities and competence.</p><p>   The method used is two-alternative hypotheses which are tried by comparing actual events before and during the Russian-Georgian war with the ten methods of <em>maskirovka</em>, compiled from military analytical literature. Such traces of resemblance are further examined, both individually and as a part of a larger indication.</p><p>   Further the essay describes the Russian art of war, the prerequisites for military surprise, information warfare in Russian doctrine, the disputed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the principles for <em>maskirovka</em>.</p><p>   The conclusion is that the Russian operation was executed with some adherence to maskirovka, though unspecified of to what degree.</p><p>   Author of this essay is Cadet Martin Svensson of the Swedish Army, currently a student at the Armed Forces Technical School in Halmstad.</p>

This essay aims to analyse if the Russian military operation carried out against Georgia between the 7th and 12th of august 2008 were executed with adherence to the Russian principles for military deception, maskirovka.    A superior purpose is to assess the situation according to the Swedish Armed Forces task of identifying possible needs for new or changed needs for abilities and competence.    The method used is two-alternative hypotheses which are tried by comparing actual events before and during the Russian-Georgian war with the ten methods of maskirovka, compiled from military analytical literature. Such traces of resemblance are further examined, both individually and as a part of a larger indication.    Further the essay describes the Russian art of war, the prerequisites for military surprise, information warfare in Russian doctrine, the disputed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the principles for maskirovka.    The conclusion is that the Russian operation was executed with some adherence to maskirovka, though unspecified of to what degree.    Author of this essay is Cadet Martin Svensson of the Swedish Army, currently a student at the Armed Forces Technical School in Halmstad.

The Russian operation on the Crimean peninsula has been referred to as a victory enabled by the operationalization of the concept of New Generation Warfare. According to some military theorists, this concept and its operationalization cannot be characterized in terms of the traditional wars waged up to this point. It is, however, also argued that this new generation of warfare is primarily a new approach to strategy, a new way of applying traditional methods to achieve political goals. The purpose of this study is to discern whether Russia employed strategic deception in its operation in Crimea and if this is the case; what methods and principles were used and if these can be explained using a traditional view of deception. The application of theories on deception by Michael Dewar and Barton S. Whaley respectively on the Russian operation in Crimea finds that the foundation for conducting deception operations has not changed fundamentally and that the methods and principles originally formulated within the concept of ‘maskirovka’ in the Soviet Union still applies to this day, even within the context of New Generation Warfare.

The Russian concept of maskirovka has been misunderstood by western military scientists since the soviets coined it before the second World War. It is usually translated into deception or camouflage, terms that are unable to explain the entirety of the concept. Throughout the 20th century maskirovka has shifted in terms of focus and practitioners from the battlefields of Europe to nuclear deterrence, politics and diplomacy. The purpose of this study is to analyze the ideas expressed in recognized western depictions of maskirovka in order to initiate a higher understanding of the concept and reduce the confusion surrounding it. Two texts, Den stora maskeraden by Lars Ulfving and Soviet Maskirovka by Charles Smith, analyzed with Mats Lindberg’s model for idea analysis show indications of both different and similar ideas. Both texts stress the importance of a centralized leadership, plausible feints, deception, dividing the opponents forces and disrupting the opponents intelligence service. Among the differing ideas are the argued main purposes for maskirovka. Ulfving claim surprise to be the main purpose whilst Smith states maskirovka is a concept used to affect the opponents intelligence. It is possible, this study finds, to argue that the two purposes are similar.

The Russian term maskirovka can be translated as deception. Maskirovka has been part of Russian military doctrine since at least WWII and is considered to be a central part of their warfare. Maskirovka has been broadly researched since WWII, although not specifically in two of Russia’s most recent wars in Georgia and Ukraine from 2022. The Russo-Georgian war and the Russo-Ukrainian war share common ground considering the conventional sphere; the use of regular units and the methods used. This study has aimed to research how Russia applied deception in these wars, and finally compared its application between 2008 and 2022, all through the theoretical framework for this study that was drawn from Barton Whaley’s theory of deception. The study identified many similarities in utilization of strategic maskirovka; the most vital one perhaps a military exercise north of the border to both Georgia and Ukraine, disguised as an exercise but functioning to mobilize troops. The study also showed similarities in Russian attempts to control the narrative and portray the enemy as bandits, both leading up to the invasion and ongoing throughout the war. Notable is that the attempts in Georgia had effects that caused confusion and made important factors of their success. In Ukraine and the attack against Kiev, the attempts of strategic maskirovka were predicted and seen through by both west and Ukraine. Russia used maskirovka on a tactical level in Georgia and Ukraine as well, which may had effect on individual battles rather than the warfare in general.

Russian application of deception in warfare has an extensive history. A lot of previous research has explored both its application and development through different historical conflicts. However, the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea has raised a debate that challenges the classic application of Russian deception methods. Nevertheless, many researchers claim that Russia continues to use traditional methods of warfare and deception, albeit adapted to a modern context.   This thesis explores these claims by a concrete comparison of the application of Russian deception methods during the annexation of Crimea with a successful historical Russian deception operation, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This is done by a comparative case study, which breaks down both cases with theoretical support from Barton Whaley's theory of deception. The study validates claims that traditional Russian deception methods are being applied in a contemporary context. What has changed, however, is how the different types of deception mutually support one another and are utilized to achieve synergy effects.

The characteristics of the Russian military operations during the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and again in the Crimean Crisis 2014, were “rude awakenings” to a shift in the strategic behaviour of Russia, not refraining from military aggression as means to political aims. In the aftermath of these “strategic shocks”, the scholarly debate on how to interpret and understand these limited wars, has several ongoing discussions, among which is whether this modern Russian style of warfare, as demonstrated in Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine and elsewhere, really is a novel concept or plainly “old wine in a new bottle”. This thesis is part taking in that debate through the theoretical framework of three Soviet era warfare methods from the psychological dimension: Deception – Maskirovka, Information Warfare – Reflexive Control, and Subversion – Active Measures. Within the framework, an analytical tool for qualitative text analysis is designed and then applied for the case studies of the Russo-Georgian War, as it compares to the Crimean Crisis, collecting indicators for the apparent presence of traditional methods in these cases. The study concludes that the Soviet era warfare concepts of Maskirovka, Reflexive Control and Active Measures, are relevant as explanators for a facet of the modern day Russian warfare style, in alignment with the general argument on the Russian warfare doctrine as evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, vis-a-vis the strategic practices of the Soviet era.

Deception has long been a central component of Russian warfare, a fact that has become evident in modern conflicts where the state has been involved, not least during the annexation of Crimea in 2014. After the armed conflict, an unstable period unfolded in several Ukrainian regions, as well as in the adjacent maritime areas of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Russia’s aggressive behavior in the sea regions was driven by a goal of dominance, manifested through multifaceted actions that included both conventional and unconventional methods. A gray zone conflict was launched in the maritime domains. Existing research studying Russia’s naval warfare has paid only limited attention to use of deception, which means it misses a key aspect of its on-sea activity. With the aim to contribute more broadly to research on Russian naval warfare, this study has used a theory of deception to describe how and when the state has employed methods related to the phenomenon in the gray zone conflict. The result of the analysis shows that Russia, in its multidimensional conduct across the broad spectrum between war and peace, has utilized deception methods in various instances, with an increased intensity in the year preceding to the conflict’s escalation into full-scale war.