From the foreword: A powerful idea underlies this book. It is the idea of addressing the vital issues and politics of war and peace, drawing together the views of leading thinkers and writers on these matters within successive Western civilizations across the centuries, contributing to our understanding of the important questions involved, and inviting and encouraging further study in additional depth and detail [...] / https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu_books/1283/thumbnail.jpg

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Twenty-three years ago, Israeli fighter pilots destroyed the Osiraq nuclear reactor and made a profound statement about global nuclear proliferation. In light of the recent preventive regime change in Iraq, a review of this strike reveals timely lessons for future counterproliferation actions. Using old, new, and primary source evidence, this thesis examines Osiraq for lessons from a preventive attack on a non-conventional target. Before attacking Osiraq, Israeli policymakers attempted diplomatic coercion to delay Iraq's nuclear development. Concurrent with diplomatic actions, Israeli planners developed a state of the art military plan to destroy Osiraq. Finally, Israeli leaders weathered the international storm after the strike. The thesis examines Israeli decisionmaking for each of these phases. The thesis draws two conclusions. First, preventive strikes are valuable primarily for two purposes: buying time and gaining international attention. Second, the strike provided a one-time benefit for Israel. Subsequent strikes will be less effective due to dispersed/hardened nuclear targets and limited intelligence. / Major, United States Air Force

In the current fight against Islamic extremism, the United States is challenged in its ability to isolate and target specific individuals and groups in select regional environments - efforts that are arguably symptomatic of broader shortfalls in US global influence and strategic reach. These particularly troublesome environments are characterized by a lack of State control and are populated with fiercely independent, largely Muslim, and decidedly anti-western communities. Unable to consistently penetrate and influence these "ungoverned" regions, operational intelligence remains sporadic and opportunities limited. No broader, structural change has yet been made that would weaken or sever the links among Islamic extremists and their regional hosts over a sustained period or enable greater cooperation between the US or its allies with indigenous tribal populations. Accordingly, these regions continue to provide ideal locations for terrorist sanctuary, bases of support and operation, and freedom of movement. A supplemental US policy option is required. The challenge thus becomes one of how to create more effective opportunities to gain influence and control over these select tribal regions while countering the influence of competitors over a sustained period. A policy of manipulating tribal fractures and rivalries in order to induce or heighten internal conflict could provide these opportunities.

Theoretical understandings of war have been dominated by the thought of Clausewitz for a number of decades. His thought is valid in many respects, but for various reasons it is open to misinterpretation and misunderstanding; furthermore, a number of his observations (particularly on the prevalence of chance and uncertainty in war) are not fully explored and substantiated theoretically. This thesis is an attempt to present and elucidate a new theoretical understanding of war's nature which complements Clausewitz's theories and addresses these concerns: this is the understanding of war as a form of violent conflict which is not bound by rules. The thesis consists of five main chapters. The first is an in-depth study of Clausewitz, which will provide an exegesis of his theories and highlight the deficiencies in his thought, before positing how understanding war as ‘violent conflict without rules' could be used to address and explain them. The second chapter is a study of the theory of rules, examining in particular the role they play in moderating conflict: we can find that amongst other things, rules lend predictability and psychological security to a contest, restrict the scope of physical harm and tend to preserve the political and social status quo. As war lacks rules (in the sense that there are no ‘rules of war' as there are ‘rules of chess'), it therefore lacks these benefits. A following chapter on the laws and customs of war will address cases where war appears to be bound by rules, and clarify my position. The final two chapters explore the implications of war's lack of rules with reference to two areas which are most commonly associated with war. The fourth chapter on strategy will explore how this military concept is necessitated by war's ruleless nature; the final chapter will examine the uniquely violent, physical nature of war through the same theoretical prism, and will show how the technological innovation associated with war is a consequence of its lack of regulation, and a potent contributor to the chance and uncertainty which plagues warfare.

Genom Försvarsmaktens doktrin och dess innehåll, tar Försvarsmaktens verksamhet från och mednu en tydligare utgångspunkt i militärvetenskapen. Doktrinens innehåll bygger på teorier ommedel och metoder för krigföring från krigsvetare (militärteorier) som sträcker sig kontextuelltöver en tidsmässigt lång period. Jämförelsen har studerat hur doktrinen på motsvarande sätt (sommed medel och metoder) tagit till sig synen på den militära chefens egenskaper och karaktär hosdessa krigsvetare.Krigsvetare har de facto påverkat doktrinens innehåll avseende medel och metoder för krigföring.Jämförelsen visar att inbäddat bakom de förmågor om egenskaper och karaktär hos chefen somdoktrinen uttrycker, finns spårbarheten till krigsvetares syn om egenskaper och karaktär hoschefen.Först vid en djupare analys och diskussion om jämförelsens resultat uppstår skillnader. Närverklighet avseende utbildning, övning och träning inom Försvarsmakten speglas i doktrinensinnehåll, och genomlyses av krigsvetares och militära tänkares syn om egenskaper och karaktär,då uppstår skillnader. / Through the Swedish Armed Forces’ doctrine and its content, the activities of the Swedish defensefrom now on take a starting point by referring to military science and theories. The doctrine isbased on science by military theorists about what are the means and the procedures for conductingwar. Those military theorists covering a span from contexts during a long historical period. Thiswork has studied whether the doctrine on the same deep and interest (as with the means andprocedures for conducting war) emphasizes the necessary characteristics and mentality needed ona military commander, expressed by the one and same group of military theorists.War scientists obviously have affected the doctrine’s content regarding means and procedures forconducting war. The comparison shows in the end that behind the capacities concerning necessarycharacteristics and mentality as war scientists express in today’s doctrine, there is a link also towhat war-scientists states about necessary characteristics and mentality needed on a militarycommander.After a final and deeper analyzes and discussion about the achievements in this study, differencesoccurs. These differences occur, when the reality within the Swedish Armed Forces is mirroredwith the content of the doctrine and its means, and above that, when further analyzes are made byassistance from theories expressed by military thinkers. / Avdelning: ALB – Slutet Mag. 3 C-upps. Hylla: Upps. ChP 07-09

Habilitation-Universität, Augsburg, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (p. and index.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 11, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision-Making and Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, Sept. 2004. / Thesis advisor(s): Peter R. Lavoy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-62). Also available online.