This dissertation examines the role of ethical monism in the theology of Augustus Hopkins Strong. Chapter 1 discusses some of the reasons for examining Strong's theology and some of the difficulties entailed in such a study. Chapter 2 surveys the life of Strong up until the time when he returned to Rochester Theological Seminary and assumed the dual role of president and professor of theology in 1872. Special attention is given to factors which affected or pointed toward his later decision to embrace ethical monism. Chapter 3 explores the writings of several German thinkers who seem to have provided some of the philosophical building blocks which Strong used to construct his ethical monism. It also examines the writings of several English-speaking philosophers who emphasized the doctrine of divine immanence and who appear to have pushed Strong's thinking toward ethical monism. Chapter 4 discusses the various stages in Strong's decision to adopt ethical monism. It also traces his early incorporation of ethical monism into his larger theological system. Chapter 5 examines the impact which ethical monism had on other areas of Strong's theology. In particular, it discusses how ethical monism affected Strong's view of Scripture and experience, evolution and miracles, and sin and the atonement. Chapter 6 explores how other theologians viewed Strong's final theology and how Strong's theological journey affected the institution and people whom he impacted most. It argues that neither Rochester Theological Seminary nor the integrity of his theological system remained unaffected by his decision to embrace ethical monism. It also notes that both theological liberals and theological conservatives were generally critical of Strong's ethical monism, though for different reasons. This work contends that ethical monism was a means by which Strong attempted to reconcile Christian theology and modern thought while also trying to solve tensions within his own theology. In the end, Strong was unable to persuade modernists to embrace ethical monism or to convince conservatives that ethical monism was a legitimate theological option. Strong's attempt at a theological synthesis failed due largely to the contradictions which ethical monism produced within both Christian theology and philosophical monism.

In this study, John Gray&rsquo / s theory of value-pluralism is critically analyzed. Gray&rsquo / s modus vivendi, based on Isaiah Berlin&rsquo / s criticism of monism, is a theory that aims to create the conditions in which peace and diversity in late-modern societies can be protected. Gray argues that a legally pluralistic system where collectives have autonomy is more serving to peace than its liberal alternatives. This study argues that Gray fails to achieve its goal of promoting diversity. This is due to the fact that Gray&rsquo / s theory does not recognize &lsquo / personal autonomy&rsquo / and &lsquo / right of exit&rsquo / as standards for a legitimate regime. It is argued in this study that without &lsquo / personal autonomy&rsquo / and &lsquo / right of exit&rsquo / , legally pluralist systems curb the conditions that makes diversity possible and thereby work at the expense of diversity rather than for diversity.

The relationship between Psychology and Theology has become an issue of increasing concern in recent years for the Christian community. With the growing complexities of cultural differences, the moral decline of society and its drift away from a Christian worldview, the pastoral ministry seems to be as challenging as ever. The problem about the relationship between theology and psychology is that there is growing confusion in today's Christian community about the best way to help people overcome their personal problems of living. In this regard some scholars believe that Christians should only submit to Biblical counselling, while others support psychotherapy, as long as it is integrated with Biblical principles and has a firm Scriptural foundation. In researching the literature on the subject, it was found that various theoretical models have been defined and described as attempts to scientifically justify the union of the above mentioned two points of view. In this thesis the viewpoints of four prominent groups of scholars about the subject are described and analysed in order to determine to what extent will it be possible to identify common denominators amongst their different models and to eventually establish if it is possible to formulate a synthesis about the commonalities so defined. The integration models of the following four prominent groups of authors about the subject were analysed: (1) Larry Crabb (1977); (2) William T. Kirwan (1993), (3) John D. 2 Carter & Bruce Narramore (1979) and (4) Eric L. Johnson & Stanton L. Jones, eds., (2000). These scholar's contributions were chosen for analysis because, from the research about the subject, it was found that these 4 groups of authors made some of the most significant scientific contributions about the integration of theology with psychology. Before attempting to formulate a pastoral paradigm out of a synthesis of the contributions of the aforementioned scholars, it was fundamentally important to distinguish between the 3 prominent views of man. Some scholars argue that man is a monistic being, while others defend a dichotomous view of man as consisting of a body and a soul. A third significant view describes man as consisting of three significant parts, namely a body, a soul and a spirit. In this thesis it was argued that the trichotomous view of man was the most correct way of defining the fundamental composition of man. According to the researcher an understanding of the trichotomous nature of man is important as it serves as a theological basis for pastoral counselling in order to clearly communicate the precise truths of the believer's union with Christ. In the last part of the thesis a practical pastoral paradigm was proposed based on the trichotomous view of man in which psychology and theology can be harmoniously integrated by means of a meta-systemic approach. The first phase of the paradigm focused on a model within which Psychotherapy can be applied while the second phase described Spirituotherapy as a model within which pastoral counselling can be applied. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Pastoral))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2005.

The relationship between Psychology and Theology has become an issue of increasing concern in recent years for the Christian community. With the growing complexities of cultural differences, the moral decline of society and its drift away from a Christian worldview, the pastoral ministry seems to be as challenging as ever. The problem about the relationship between theology and psychology is that there is growing confusion in today's Christian community about the best way to help people overcome their personal problems of living. In this regard some scholars believe that Christians should only submit to Biblical counselling, while others support psychotherapy, as long as it is integrated with Biblical principles and has a firm Scriptural foundation. In researching the literature on the subject, it was found that various theoretical models have been defined and described as attempts to scientifically justify the union of the above mentioned two points of view. In this thesis the viewpoints of four prominent groups of scholars about the subject are described and analysed in order to determine to what extent will it be possible to identify common denominators amongst their different models and to eventually establish if it is possible to formulate a synthesis about the commonalities so defined. The integration models of the following four prominent groups of authors about the subject were analysed: (1) Larry Crabb (1977); (2) William T. Kirwan (1993), (3) John D. 2 Carter & Bruce Narramore (1979) and (4) Eric L. Johnson & Stanton L. Jones, eds., (2000). These scholar's contributions were chosen for analysis because, from the research about the subject, it was found that these 4 groups of authors made some of the most significant scientific contributions about the integration of theology with psychology. Before attempting to formulate a pastoral paradigm out of a synthesis of the contributions of the aforementioned scholars, it was fundamentally important to distinguish between the 3 prominent views of man. Some scholars argue that man is a monistic being, while others defend a dichotomous view of man as consisting of a body and a soul. A third significant view describes man as consisting of three significant parts, namely a body, a soul and a spirit. In this thesis it was argued that the trichotomous view of man was the most correct way of defining the fundamental composition of man. According to the researcher an understanding of the trichotomous nature of man is important as it serves as a theological basis for pastoral counselling in order to clearly communicate the precise truths of the believer's union with Christ. In the last part of the thesis a practical pastoral paradigm was proposed based on the trichotomous view of man in which psychology and theology can be harmoniously integrated by means of a meta-systemic approach. The first phase of the paradigm focused on a model within which Psychotherapy can be applied while the second phase described Spirituotherapy as a model within which pastoral counselling can be applied. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Pastoral))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2005.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A presente pesquisa aborda historicamente a construção e o desenvolvimento prático e teórico da teologia holística de Ellen White legada à Igreja Adventista do Sétimo Dia. Ellen White, viveu no momento em que seu país, os Estados Unidos da América, estavam se firmando enquanto nação e morreu precisamente quando ele buscava a hegemonia mundial. Assim, passando pelos turbulentos anos da Secessão e incorporando o espírito pragmático estadunidense cresceu e se firmou com sua pátria. Autodidata, ajudou a fundar uma das igrejas originais daquele país, fruto da união do pensamento heterogêneo de várias congregações protestantes. Seu trabalho destaca-se pela afirmação e vivência das crenças bíblicas que compõem a fé brônzea adventista. Contudo, de seu compêndio, extraído de milhares de páginas produzidas ao longo de sete décadas dedicadas à igreja, destaca-se indubitavelmente a interrelação indissociável entre corpo e espírito. A partir deste paradigma, para ela, esses dois entes formam a alma, que tendo porção corpórea, é mortal. Eis pois o que é o ser humano: uma alma mortal em busca de imortalidade, apenas alcançada pelos redimidos depois da volta de Jesus, um evento literal a ser percebido em breve a maior esperança do adventista ainda hoje. Em Ellen White, como deverá ser percebido ao longo do trabalho, visto a serena e equilibrada relação entre corpo e espírito, há uma fervorosa defesa e ao mesmo tempo fremente ataque àqueles que ao contrário desta perspectiva tida por ela cristã, apelam à filosofia clássica. É no escopo dessa teologia carnal por ela dita bíblica que deve estar o ser humano alinhado. Assim, manter um regime alimentar saudável, fazer exercícios físicos regulares, zelar pela educação integral e vivenciar a natureza configuram-se exercícios em busca da espiritualidade plena, que aliados à vida de piedade e oração levam a santificação tema central de seus escritos. O primeiro capítulo da tese analisa historicamente os Estados Unidos e Europa à época de Ellen White; o segundo aborda a construção histórica e social da crença na mortalidade da alma centro deste trabalho, enquanto o terceiro e último trata da abordagem holística whiteana do corpo e espírito com vistas a plenitude de alma. / The present research addresses historically the construction and development of practical and theoretical holistic theology of Ellen White bequeathed to the Seventh Day Adventist Church. Ellen White lived at the time in which her country, the United States of America, were firmed while nation and died precisely when it sought the world hegemony. Thus, passing through turbulent years of Secession and incorporating the spirit pragmatic American she grew and lean on with her homeland. Self-taught, she helped to found one of the original churches of this country, the fruit of the union of heterogeneous thought of various protestant congregations. Her work stands for affirmation and experience of biblical beliefs that comprise the Adventist brazen faith. However, her compendium, extracted from thousands of pages produced over the course of seven decades devoted to church, stands out clearly the inseparable intercorrelation between body and spirit. From this paradigm, for her, these two bodies form the soul, that having body portion is deadly. This is then what is the human being: a mortal soul in search of immortality, only achieved by redeemed after the coming of Jesus, a literal event to be soon perceived - the greatest hope of the Adventist still today. In Ellen White, as should be perceived along the work, since the serene and balanced relationship between body and spirit, there is a fervent defense and at the same time thrilled attack to those who unlike this perspective taken by her Christian, call for classical philosophy. It is in the scope of this carnal theology dictated by her biblical that it must be the human being aligned. Thus, to maintain a healthy diet, doing regular physical exercises, ensure the integral education and experience the nature, configure exercises in search of full spirituality which allied to the life of piety and prayer lead to sanctification - central theme of her writings. The first chapter of the thesis analyzes historically the United States and Europe at the time of Ellen White; the second deals with the historical and social construction of the belief in the mortality of the soul - center of this work, while the third and last is the holistic whitean approach of body and spirit with views to the fullness of soul.

Esta pesquisa terá como objetivo compreender a tese do monismo, isto é, a tese de que existe uma única substância cuja unidade é garantida pela compatibilidade entre sua natureza absolutamente infinita e a multiplicidade real dos seus infinitos atributos. Mas o monismo não é aceito por todos os intérpretes como não problemático, o que, se comprovado, levaria o sistema de Espinosa à ruína. No primeiro capítulo, através da crítica de um destes intérpretes, Ferdinand Alquié, será colocado o problema do monismo. De acordo com este intérprete, Espinosa não consegue estabelecer racionalmente a possibilidade da substância absoluta. Veremos que, não conseguindo conceber como os infinitos atributos podem constituir a essência de uma substância que seja única, Alquié conclui que a tese do monismo é incompatível com a estrutura argumentativa do primeiro livro da Ética. Após a exposição do problema do monismo apresentado a partir de Alquié, será realizada uma tentativa de resgatar a coerência interna da obra de Espinosa. Este estudo visará explicitar os conceitos de substância e atributo, procurando acompanhar as duas etapas da construção do monismo ao longo das onze primeiras proposições da Ética, a saber: (1) a prova de que há uma única substância por atributo; (2) a prova de que há uma única substância para todos os atributos. Para avançar na compreensão dos problemas ontológicos envolvidos na construção do monismo, e de como a posição de Espinosa só pode ser compreendida a partir de uma transformação profunda dos conceitos herdados do cartesianismo, a pesquisa privilegiará as interpretações magistrais propostas por Martial Gueroult (Spinoza, I, Dieu; Aubier-Montaigne, Paris, 1968) e Gilles Deleuze (Spinoza et le problème de l'expression; Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1968). Estes intérpretes realizam cada um ao seu modo uma genealogia da substância absolutamente infinita e apresentam soluções que permitem pensar a tese do monismo como coerente. Estas soluções serão apresentadas e avaliadas para que se saiba em que medida elas conseguem expor o problema do monismo e solucioná-lo de maneira plausível. / This work has the purpose to comprehend the monisms thesis, i.e. the thesis that only one substance exists which unity is secured by the compatibility between its absolute and infinite nature, and the real multiplicity of its infinite attributes. But the monism is not accepted as not problematic by all the interpreters, which, if confirmed, would lead Spinozas system to ruin. In the first chapter, the monisms problem will be presented through the critic of one of those interpreters, Ferdinand Alquié. According to him, Spinoza cannot establish, rationally, the possibility of the absolute substance. We will see that, Alquié, not being able to conceive how the infinite attributes can constitute the essence of a substance that is unique, concludes that the monisms thesis is incompatible with the argumentative structure of the first book of the Ethic. After the explanation of the monisms problem, presented from Alquié, we will try to recover the internal coherence of Spinozas work. This study aim to make explicit the concepts of substance and attribute, looking to follow the two stages of the monisms construction along the first eleven propositions of the Ethic, that is: (1) the proof that exists one unique substance per attribute; (2) the proof that exists only one substance for all attributes. To advance in the ontological problems involved in the monisms construction, and how Spinozas position can only be comprehended through a profound transformation of the concepts inherited by the cartesianism, the research will favour the masterly interpretations propounded by Martial Gueroult (Spinoza, I, Dieu; Aubier-Montaigne, Paris, 1968) and Gilles Deleuze (Spinoza et le problème de l'expression; Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1968). These interpreters carry out each in its own fashion a genealogy of the absolutely infinite substance and present solutions that allow us to think the monism as coherent. Such solutions will be presented and evaluated, aiming to know to what extent they can show the problem of the monism and solve it in a plausible way.

L’ontologie contemporaine, héritière de l’ancienne querelle des universaux et des contestations empiristes de la substance, se débat aujourd’hui dans les controverses sur l’individu et l’universel. Qu’est-ce qu’un individu ? Qu’est-ce qui est individuel, qu’est-ce qui en fait un individu ? Le point de départ méthodique de la philosophie analytique, l’analyse du langage, pose côte à côte les universels, les particuliers, les propriétés, les événements etc. On tâche alors de donner de toutes ces notions un compte-rendu systématique. Mais les difficultés rencontrées suggèrent, plutôt que de partir du langage, d’analyser l’objet de notre expérience commune, le particulier concret, pour se donner de ces réalités qui sont la première donnée de notre connaissance une notion satisfaisante, c’est-à-dire qui rende compte de nos perceptions et souffre la confrontation avec les problématiques contemporaines. C’est l’objet de ce travail. On trouve dans la conjonction des propriétés d’unité et de distinction une caractérisation des individus qui permet de résoudre les paradoxes posés par des théories antiques ou contemporaines telles que les divers monismes (de l’acte ou de la puissance), la question du principe d’individuation, les difficultés liées à la désignation de l’individu, la dissolution de la notion de corps matériel dans la théorie quantique, etc. Ces deux propriétés pouvant être possédées à divers degrés suggèrent de parcourir la hiérarchie des êtres en suivant l’échelle qu’elles constituent, jusqu’à l’individu par excellence d’ici-bas, la personne, dont on saisit au passage qu’elle ne peut se réduire à la simple conscience de soi ou égologie. Mais quelques considérations sur la vie politique montrent que l’individu qu’est la personne humaine ne réalise pas au maximum la raison d’individu : elle est encore trop dépendante. On peut tâcher dès lors de se représenter ce que peut être l’Individu qui se tient au sommet de cette échelle, l’individu souverain, en qui la simplicité et l’indépendance ontologiques atteignent le degré souverain. Ce parcours de l’individuation dans tous ses états permet de vérifier à quel point les concepts antiques de l’aristotélisme – substance, matière et forme, nature – demeurent pertinents / Contemporary ontology follows the old controversies about universals and particular beings. What is an individual ? What is it to be an individual ? In virtue of which principle is an thing an individual ? The methods of analytic philosophy begins with an analysis of language, and tries to give a systematic explanation of concepts like universal, particular, feature, event, and so on.But the encountered difficulties suggest rather to study the object of our common experience, the concrete particular in order to give a satisfactory account of our perceptions that succeeds in confronting contemporary problematics. That is the aim of this work. We may through the features of unity and division characterize what an individual is and resolve the paradoxes laid by ancient and contemporary theories : monism, problem of the principle of individuation, reference to individuals, quantum mechanics, and so on.These two features may be more or less possessed. The person occupies the top of the scale among the objects that we commonly meet. Our analysis shows that the person cannot be the mere self-consciousness. It must be a substance endowed with reason. Nevertheless it doesn’t fit the perfect realization of the concept of individual. There is place for another being which completely fulfills thesovereign independence that the features of simplicity and division means.This journey through the various states of individuals give by the way a proof of the relevance of aristotelian concepts like substance, matter, form, nature, even in contemporary ontology

abstract: Russellian monism is a promising theory of consciousness that attempts to capture the strengths of both physicalism and dualism while avoiding their weaknesses. I begin by showing that the Russellian monist’s chief anti-physicalist rival, emergentism, is unable to give an adequate solution to the exclusion problem. Specifically, they fall prey to what I call “the opacity problem.” That is, because the emergentist is committed to there being both a sufficient physical cause and a sufficient mental cause for our actions, it is unclear what difference the mental cause is making in bringing about the effect. This is because, for the physical cause to truly be a sufficient cause, it must be sufficient to bring about the effect as it occurred. This distinguishes mental overdetermination from non-problematic kinds of overdetermination (like double rock throwing cases). I then show how the constitutive Russellian monist is able to avoid the exclusion problem, while the emergent Russellian monist faces similar opacity problems to emergentism. Finally, I give an account of how the constitutive Russellian monist can give a response to the strongest objection against—the subject-summing problem. I argue that we only have translucent access to our conscious states—that is, only part of the essential nature of the state is revealed to us through introspection. I then argue that we have reason to think that part of the essential nature of the conscious state not revealed to us is involved in subject-summing. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Philosophy 2018

Submitted by Edilene de Souza Leite null (edilenesz@hotmail.com) on 2017-04-07T12:30:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 EdileneSz Meditação e Monismo publicada.pdf: 1502925 bytes, checksum: e1bd0b706103c532c177742e1d1d732e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luiz Galeffi (luizgaleffi@gmail.com) on 2017-04-17T13:53:59Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 leite_es_me_mar.pdf: 1502925 bytes, checksum: e1bd0b706103c532c177742e1d1d732e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-17T13:53:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 leite_es_me_mar.pdf: 1502925 bytes, checksum: e1bd0b706103c532c177742e1d1d732e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-07 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Pesquisas sobre meditação em muitos campos de investigação cresceram amplamente no Ocidente no último século, principalmente por causa de seus benefícios. No entanto, não há um conceito bem definido do que é meditação. Há uma diversidade de técnicas e tradições de culturas diferentes que a cultivam, de tal forma que podemos encontrá-la em todos os continentes. No campo científico, a maioria dos pesquisadores procura pelas relações da meditação e atividades cerebrais, contribuindo para investigações sobre a consciência e para filosofia da mente, e ajudando a abordar debates não resolvidos sobre percepção, atenção e processos de aprendizagem. Neste trabalho enfrentamos o desafio de abordar filosoficamente a meditação, considerando a variedade de abordagens disponíveis e a diversidade de achados empíricos. Revisamos teorias e interpretações sobre a natureza da mente, e abordamos a hipótese de Walach (2014) que a meditação seria uma capacidade epistêmica da consciência que acessa uma realidade objetiva. Partindo do Monismo de Triplo Aspecto de proposto por Pereira Jr. (2013, 2015) assumimos que a marca da consciência é o sentimento, e resgatamos os antigos argumentos budistas de Nagarjuna sobre o sofrimento para conceber a meditação como uma experiência que é sobre o sentimento. Sugerimos também ao final da dissertação que a intuição pode ser vista como uma maneira de conhecer o mundo por meio de práticas de meditação. / Research on meditation in many fields of investigation has been widely growing in the Occident in the last century, mainly because of its benefits. However, there isn‘t a well-defined concept of what is meditation and there is a vast quantity of technics and traditions from different cultures that cultivate it, in a way that we can find it in every continent. On the scientific field, most of the researchers are looking for the relations of meditation and brain activities, contributing to investigations on consciousness and to the philosophy of the mind, helping to approach unsolved debates about perception, attention, and learning processes. In this work we present the challenge of working with meditation, considering the many approaches available and the diversity of empirical findings. We review theories and interpretations about the nature of the mind and address a hypothesis by Walach (2014) that meditation would be an epistemic capacity of the consciousness that accesses an objective reality. Starting up from Monism of Triple Aspect proposed by Pereira Jr. (2013, 2015) we assume that the mark of consciousness is feeling, and rescue the ancient Buddhist arguments of Nagarjuna about suffering to conceive meditation as an experience that is about feeling. We also suggest by the end of the dissertation that intuition can be regarded as a way of knowing about the world by means of meditation practices.

Esta pesquisa terá como objetivo compreender a tese do monismo, isto é, a tese de que existe uma única substância cuja unidade é garantida pela compatibilidade entre sua natureza absolutamente infinita e a multiplicidade real dos seus infinitos atributos. Mas o monismo não é aceito por todos os intérpretes como não problemático, o que, se comprovado, levaria o sistema de Espinosa à ruína. No primeiro capítulo, através da crítica de um destes intérpretes, Ferdinand Alquié, será colocado o problema do monismo. De acordo com este intérprete, Espinosa não consegue estabelecer racionalmente a possibilidade da substância absoluta. Veremos que, não conseguindo conceber como os infinitos atributos podem constituir a essência de uma substância que seja única, Alquié conclui que a tese do monismo é incompatível com a estrutura argumentativa do primeiro livro da Ética. Após a exposição do problema do monismo apresentado a partir de Alquié, será realizada uma tentativa de resgatar a coerência interna da obra de Espinosa. Este estudo visará explicitar os conceitos de substância e atributo, procurando acompanhar as duas etapas da construção do monismo ao longo das onze primeiras proposições da Ética, a saber: (1) a prova de que há uma única substância por atributo; (2) a prova de que há uma única substância para todos os atributos. Para avançar na compreensão dos problemas ontológicos envolvidos na construção do monismo, e de como a posição de Espinosa só pode ser compreendida a partir de uma transformação profunda dos conceitos herdados do cartesianismo, a pesquisa privilegiará as interpretações magistrais propostas por Martial Gueroult (Spinoza, I, Dieu; Aubier-Montaigne, Paris, 1968) e Gilles Deleuze (Spinoza et le problème de l'expression; Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1968). Estes intérpretes realizam cada um ao seu modo uma genealogia da substância absolutamente infinita e apresentam soluções que permitem pensar a tese do monismo como coerente. Estas soluções serão apresentadas e avaliadas para que se saiba em que medida elas conseguem expor o problema do monismo e solucioná-lo de maneira plausível. / This work has the purpose to comprehend the monisms thesis, i.e. the thesis that only one substance exists which unity is secured by the compatibility between its absolute and infinite nature, and the real multiplicity of its infinite attributes. But the monism is not accepted as not problematic by all the interpreters, which, if confirmed, would lead Spinozas system to ruin. In the first chapter, the monisms problem will be presented through the critic of one of those interpreters, Ferdinand Alquié. According to him, Spinoza cannot establish, rationally, the possibility of the absolute substance. We will see that, Alquié, not being able to conceive how the infinite attributes can constitute the essence of a substance that is unique, concludes that the monisms thesis is incompatible with the argumentative structure of the first book of the Ethic. After the explanation of the monisms problem, presented from Alquié, we will try to recover the internal coherence of Spinozas work. This study aim to make explicit the concepts of substance and attribute, looking to follow the two stages of the monisms construction along the first eleven propositions of the Ethic, that is: (1) the proof that exists one unique substance per attribute; (2) the proof that exists only one substance for all attributes. To advance in the ontological problems involved in the monisms construction, and how Spinozas position can only be comprehended through a profound transformation of the concepts inherited by the cartesianism, the research will favour the masterly interpretations propounded by Martial Gueroult (Spinoza, I, Dieu; Aubier-Montaigne, Paris, 1968) and Gilles Deleuze (Spinoza et le problème de l'expression; Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1968). These interpreters carry out each in its own fashion a genealogy of the absolutely infinite substance and present solutions that allow us to think the monism as coherent. Such solutions will be presented and evaluated, aiming to know to what extent they can show the problem of the monism and solve it in a plausible way.