The Normativity of the Mental and the Role of the Second Person’s Standpoint. On Davidson’s Footsteps”. I offer in this paper an elucidation of the normativity of the mental in terms of the second person’s standpoint, with the hope of opening a conceptual horizon that will allow us to go beyond Donald Davidson. Aiming at this, the paper is structured as follows. In the first part I present Davidson’s original response to the mind/body problem and reconstruct his argument in favour of the irreducibility of mental concepts thesis. In the second part I deal with the feature that the peculiarity of the mental bears in his system, that is, normativity. In the third section I explore and assess the davidsonian treatment of the first, second and third person standpoints with the aim of finally narrowing down my proposal. / En este trabajo ofrezco una elucidación de la normatividad de lo mental en términos de la perspectiva de segunda persona, con la esperanza de abrir un horizonte conceptual que nos permita ir más allá de Donald Davidson. A tal efecto, el artículo tiene la siguiente estructura. En la primera parte presento su original respuesta al problema mente/cuerpo y reconstruyo su argumentación a favor de la tesis de la irreducibilidad de los conceptos mentales. En la segunda parte me ocupo del rasgo que, en su sistema, porta la peculiaridad de lo mental, a saber: la normatividad. En la tercera sección exploro y evalúo el tratamiento davidsoniano de las perspectivas de primera, segunda y tercera persona con vistas a precisar, finalmente, mi propuesta.

In this paper we propose to put in tension the approaches of Donald Davidson and Gilles Deleuze, belonging respectively to the analytical and continental philosophy. The aim is to remain in some of the tense areas arising around the question of to what extent language determines or is determined by the real. We propose to consider how both authors jointly address the condition of social and creative language, and thus offer us two ways to address dualistic thinking –from Davidson’s anomalous monism and Deleuze’s monism as synonymous with pluralism– and to promote democratization of language use. Two lines which, in our perception, have not yet been sufficiently worked out regarding their deep relations. / En esta ponencia nos proponemos poner en tensión los enfoques de Donald Davidson y Gilles Deleuze, pertenecientes respectivamente a la filosofía analítica y a la continental. El objetivo es detenernos en algunas zonas de tensión suscitadas alrededorde la pregunta sobre en qué medida el lenguaje determina o es determinado por loreal. Vamos a considerar cómo ambos autores abordan conjuntamente la condición desocial y de creativo del lenguaje, y de esta manera nos ofrecen dos vías para enfrentardesde el monismo anómalo davidsoniano y el monismo como sinónimo de pluralismode Deleuze al pensamiento dualista, así como para promover la democratización del uso del lenguaje. Dos líneas que, según nuestra percepción, no han sido aún losuficientemente trabajadas en sus profundas articulaciones.

Le droit de propriété est le fondement du système social occidental tant au niveau juridique qu'au niveau idéologique. Pourtant, la vénération de ce droit implique l'existence de la pensée binaire qui engendre une concurrence (pour ne pas dire confrontation) permanente : privé-public, individualisme-collectivisme, moi-autrui. C'est ainsi qu’il est difficile de comprendre l'existence d'une pensée sinisée dans laquelle la notion du droit de propriété fait défaut. Quand les règles du droit deviennent un support des règles du rite alors que le but du droit ne consiste plus en la recherche de la justice mais de l'harmonie, un autre mode de pensée est dès lors apparu. Ce mode de pensée, négligé pendant longtemps par les théoriciens attire néanmoins de plus en plus l’attention aujourd'hui. Mais en quoi consiste-t-il ? Quels effet pourrait-il donner au droit de propriété? Est-il possible de l'articuler avec la pensée binaire dans le domaine juridique ? Cette thèse essaye de traiter ces questions dans l’approche du droit comparé. / The property law is the foundation of Western social system both at the legal level and at the ideological level. However, the veneration of this category of law implies the existence of binary theories creating permanent competition (if not using the word "confrontation") : Private-public, individualism-collectivism, me-others... Thus, it is difficult to understand the existence of a Sinitic thought in which the concept of property is lacking. That is why when the regulation of law become a carrier of the rules of the rite, while the purpose of the law is no longer the pursuit of justice but of harmony, another way of thinking has therefore appeared. This way of thinking, long neglected by theorists, nevertheless attracts more and more attention today : But what does it consist of ? What effects it could give to the property rights ? Is it possible to articulate with binary thinking in the legal field ? This thesis attempts to address these issues in the approach of comparative law.

Denna essä är en ontologisk och epistemologisk undersökning av bland annat etiska och medvetandefilosofiska implikationer av en konsekvent fysikalistisk hållning. I detta kontrasteras mot en transcendentalistisk hållning, som den av T. M. Scanlon, den skeptiska empirismen av David Hume, reciprokt baserade moraliska system (e.g. J. L. Mackies självreferentiella altruism) samt en medvetandesyn i linje med Galen Strawsons kriterier för en realistisk fysikalism som i min mening löser alla så kallade psykofysiska problem. / This paper contains an ontological and epistemic analysis of the implication of a consistently physicalist view of reality. This in polemic contrast with transcendentalist positions as that of T. M. Scanlon. I follow along the lines of a sceptical empiricism that I ascribe to Hume and from which, I argue, consistently follows guidelines as set by for example J. L. Mackie and Galen Strawson on topics of self-referential altruism and realistic physicalism respectively.

Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2007. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: On entry to medical school, students are confronted with a worldview that can be typified as materialistic monism. The student progressively becomes a materialistic monist, not only because of the teaching, but also because medical schools fail to address the question of suffering. One would expect the biopsychosocial model to surmount the limitations of the biomedical model, but it in itself has to deal with both suffering and materialistic monism. Suffering cements the collapse into materialistic monism in the way the student practises medicine. What life strategies would transcend this materialistic monism? This thesis examines potential educational interventions that might help the student to analyse the philosophy of medical school and find ways of dealing with the question of suffering. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Met toelating tot mediese skool word studente gekonfronteer met ’n wêreldsiening wat as materialistiese monisme beskryf kan word. Die student verander progressief in ’n materialistiese monis, nie slegs as gevolg van die onderrig nie, maar ook omdat mediese skole nie daarin slaag om die kwessie van lyding aan te spreek nie. ’n Mens sou verwag dat die biopsigies-sosiale model die beperkinge van die biomediese model sou oorkom, maar instede moet dit self beide lyding en materialistiese monisme aanspreek. Lyding moedig die verval in materialistiese monisme in die wyse waarop die student geneeskunde beoefen aan. Watter soort lewensstrategieë is nodig om hierdie materialistiese monisme te transendeer? Hierdie tesis ondersoek die opvoedkundige intervensies wat die student kan help om die mediese skool se filosofie te analiseer en wyses te vind om die kwessie van lyding te hanteer.

Ce travail se propose d’analyser la philosophie de Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling à travers le prisme de la notion d’identité. Il s’agit de mesurer l’originalité de notre auteur, qui consiste, à notre sens, dans la volonté de penser l’identité autrement que comme une simple identité logique ou mathématique, sans pour autant inclure d’emblée la différence dans l’identité, ni dépasser la sphère de l’identité vers un autre domaine de problématicité. Une telle ambition semble commander de prendre en considération les œuvres de Schelling s’échelonnant entre 1801 et 1806 et constituant ce que les commentateurs ont caractérisé comme sa « philosophie de l’Identité ». Or c’est sur la période immédiatement antérieure, celle allant de 1794 à 1800, que nous avons décidé de porter notre attention. En effet, il apparaît que la préoccupation de Schelling pour une pensée de l’unité et de l’identité trouve son origine dans une réflexion portant sur le statut du sujet, tel qu’il se dégage de la pensée critique inaugurée par Kant et poursuivie par Fichte. C’est à la compréhension de cette articulation entre réflexion sur la subjectivité et ambition ontologique de type moniste qu’est consacrée notre thèse. La confrontation précise entre la pensée du jeune Schelling et celle de Kant nous est apparue comme cruciale pour comprendre comment une pensée de l’unité de la totalité pouvait se fonder sur la philosophie critique. En adoptant une méthode génétique, nous avons dégagé deux modèles de l’identité : l’identité-ipséité (première partie) et l’identité-harmonie (deuxième partie). Notre propos s’achève alors sur la possibilité d’une articulation systématique de ces deux modèles, afin de saisir l’originalité du monisme schellingien, et, ce faisant, la possibilité d’une pensée moniste intégrant en son sein la subjectivité. / The purpose of this work is to analyse Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling's philosophy through the prism of the notion of identity. The issue at stake is to gauge the originality of the author. It is our contention that such originality lies in his determination to perceive the notion of identity as something that cannot be reduced merely to logical and mathematical identity, without including the concept of difference right from the start in that of identity, and without going beyond the sphere of identity so as to reach another field of problematicity. With this purpose in mind, it appears clearly that it is compulsory to take into account those of Schelling's works published between 1801 and 1806, which form what commentators have called his « philosophy of Identity ». Now we have deliberately chosen to survey instead the period immediately prior to that one, that is to say the years from 1794 to 1800, for it seems to us that Schelling's focus on how to ponder unity and identity stems from his study of the status of the subject, as this status had already been analysed in Kant's critical theory, first, and afterwards in Fichte's works. Our doctoral dissertation is devoted to the analysis of the connection between subjectivity, on the one hand, and an ontological framework of the monist kind, on the other hand. Confronting young Schelling's thought to Kant's has seemed to us crucial in our quest to understand how a philosophical system based on unity could take Kant's criticist philosophy as its stepping stone. We have adopted a genetic approach so as to uncover two patterns of identity: identity as ipseity (first part of our dissertation) and identity as harmony (second part). As our dissertation comes to its close, it appears possible to see these two patterns as systematically interconnected. This allows us to fully grasp the originality of Schellingian monism and thereby, the possibility of a monist type of thought welcoming the idea of subjectivity.

Le corps moderne est à la fois l’objet de rêves et d’interdits, un lieu de conflits, d’inégalités et d’investissements, mais il représente avant tout la quête contemporaine de la beauté ainsi que le rêve scientifique de la jeunesse et de l’immortalité. Le corps en Californie tient une place tellement importante qu’il n’est pas exagéré de parler de religion. La religion du corps crée dans un premier temps un lien vers le Divin puisque le corps est soit opposé à l’esprit soit il constitue un moyen d’accéder à la divinité, comme chez les orientaux. De la conception grecque antique à la version orientale, sans oublier de parler de la place du corps dans l’histoire californienne et de sa relation à un Dieu, nous nous rendrons compte que le corps considéré comme lien vers le Divin cède petit à petit sa place à une appropriation personnelle poussée à la fois par le narcissisme des années soixante puis par des impératifs normatifs. Le californien est alors à la quête de nouvelles expériences dont le médium est le corps, tout en étant à la recherche d’une perfection physique. Cela a donné vie à un vaste marché, créant ainsi une compatibilité entre la religion du corps et son aspect mercantile. Ce lien ne s’arrête pas seulement aux produits, ni à l’industrie que génère un tel marché, car le corps est devenu un investissement à capitaliser. Comme dans toute religion, il y a une part de fanatisme et de dérive dont il faut mesurer l’impact. L’ultime question est celle du rôle de la science dans l’évolution du corps. Cette nouvelle religion du corps, remplace doucement le lien premier vers le Divin, amenant l’homme vers plus de maîtrise, de connaissance et de contrôle sur son destin. / The body’s new frontier is both an esthetic and scientific quest, with the wild dream of reaching an ideal beauty and immortality - or at least living better and longer. In California, the body and its cult are so important therefore we can safely say that it is a religion. This religion of the body is primarily linked to the Divine since in the classical point of view, the body is either linked to sin or is a way to reach God, as the oriental religions believe. From ancient Greece to the oriental influences, not forgetting how the body is perceived in California’s history and its relationship to the Divine, we will slowly become aware that this link is somehow being overshadowed by a personal appropriation of the body both triggered by the 1960’s narcissism and social norms. The typical californian seeks experiment and pushes boundaries using the body as a medium, while striving to reach physical perfection. Of course this cannot go without the growing of a massive market, hence the connexion between the religion of the body and its mercantile aspect. That link not only reflects the amount of products and services as well as the whole industry behind them, it also brings forward the fact that the body is considered as an object one has to invest in and capitalize on both the future and the present moment. As in all types of religion, there is a part of fanaticism and going astray. Its impact cannot be overlooked. The ultimate question is the role of science in the body’s evolution. What has become the new scientific religion of the body slowly replaces the initial link to the Divine, bringing mankind towards more knowledge, mastery, and control over its destiny.

La lex petrolea est l’ensemble des règles constituées au fil du temps par les acteurs impliqués dans l’exploration, le développement et l’exploitation des hydrocarbures. Consignée et régulièrement actualisée par la doctrine anglo-saxonne, elle forme le point d’Archimède à partir duquel les travaux universitaires déclinent ce qui devrait être considéré comme le droit des hydrocarbures. Toutefois, présentée comme une déclinaison de la lex mercatoria, ou ensemble des règles des marchands constituées de façon coutumière, la lex petrolea ne semble pas épuiser les caractéristiques véritables du droit des hydrocarbures, notamment en Afrique. Elle se décline davantage comme un ensemble de normes de sources plurielles (arbitrales,contractuelles, législatives), sans cohérence d’ensemble et surtout sans singularisation du rôle des acteurs qui ont pourtant des statuts juridiques et économiques différents. Les États, d’une part, sont certes mus par des intérêts patrimoniaux légitimes, mais aussi par des intérêts géoéconomiques, voire politiques. Les investisseurs énergétiques, d’autre part, sont exclusivement motivés par le gain du lucre, et cette relation génère un droit des hydrocarbures conséquent. Afin de renouveler la doctrine juridique relative à cette activité, il est proposé une approche nouvelle basée sur les théories respectives et complémentaires du monisme juridique, d’une part, et du relationnisme juridique, d’autre part. Les normes structurant la lex petrolea ne deviennent un droit des hydrocarbures que par la co-conception, l’application et la validation de celles-ci par l’État, en relation avec les investisseurs privés étrangers. Ces normes juridiques, aussitôt établies, sont plus ou moins appliquées, immergées qu’elles sont au sein de la relation particulière nouée entre les États et leurs cocontractants. Le lien contractuel débouche sur une relation juridique plus vaste, structurée autour de normes écrites, de pratiques des acteurs et tout simplement d’une relation génératrice d’un droit des hydrocarbures supérieur aux normes écrites identifiables. L’intervention systématique d’un tiers, soit l’administration sur plusieurs formes dans l’exécution des obligations des parties, soit l’arbitre en cas de contentieux, permet la construction, l’entretien et le maintien durable des relations juridiques entre les parties. Celles-ci aménagent ainsi un cadre symbolique de leurs relations, sous l’emprise et la maîtrise totale de l’État, en tant que propriétaire des ressources extractives. C’est ce que nous avons appelé, en conclusion de l’étude, le monisme relationniste du droit des hydrocarbures africain. / The lex petrolea is the set of rules established over time by actors involved in the exploration, development and exploitation of hydrocarbons. Recorded and regularly updated by Anglo-Saxon doctrine, it constitutes Archimedes' point from which academic work declines what should be considered hydrocarbon law. It is more likely to be interpreted as a set of norms of plural sources (arbitral, contractual, legislative), without any overall coherence and, above all, without distinguishing the role of actors who nevertheless have a different legal and economic status. On the one hand, States are certainly driven by legitimate patrimonial interests, but also by geo-economic and even political interests. Energy investors on the other hand are exclusively motivated by the gain of profit, and this relationship generates a significant hydrocarbon law. In order to renew the legal doctrine of this activity, a new approach is proposed based on the respective and complementary theories of legal monism on the one hand and legal relationalism on the other. Once legal norms are established, they are more or less applied, immersed in the special relationship between States and their contracting partners. The contractual relationship leads to a broader legal relationship structured around written standards, shareholder practices and simply around a relationship that generates a hydrocarbon law that goes beyond identifiable written standards. The systematic intervention of a third party, either the administration in several forms in the execution of the obligations of the parties, or the arbitrator in the event of litigation, allows the construction, upkeep and permanent maintenance of legal relations between the parties. They thus create a symbolic framework for their relations, under the influence and total control of the State, as the owner of the extractive resources. This is what we have called in conclusion to the study the relational monism of African hydrocarbon law.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:25:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2007-07-02Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:53:14Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 lima_of_me_mar.pdf: 846690 bytes, checksum: ed40e178108a6ffad7e27c7594d500fb (MD5) / Neste trabalho nos propomos a analisar a consciência a partir da perspectiva neurobiológica de Antonio Damásio. Para isso, sugerimos um percurso investigativo que se inicia com uma abordagem histórico-filosófica. Destacamos neste contexto, a noção cartesiana do dualismo substancial, caracterizada por se conceber mente e corpo como realmente distintos. Contrariamente a essa concepção, apresentamos o monismo naturalista de Espinosa, que procurou compreender a mente e o corpo como partes integrantes da natureza. Em seguida, procuramos apresentar uma possível aproximação entre o monismo naturalista de Espinosa e a abordagem neurobiológica de Damásio. Para Damásio (1996, 2000, 2004), a consciência emerge em uma rede neural integrada, a partir das interações entre cérebro, corpo e ambiente. Apesar de possuir suas bases biológicas, a consciência não se reduz a elas. Formas inovadoras e complexas vão surgindo, na medida em que os processos de interação com o ambiente se ampliam. Procuramos mostrar que a consciência, seja ela elementar (proto-self) ou complexa (consciência ampliada) tem por finalidade contribuir para a manutenção e preservação da vida. / In this work I analyze consciousness from the neurobiological perspective of Antonio Damásio. The investigation begins with a historical review of philosophical approaches to the mind-body problem. I focus on the Cartesian notion of substantial dualism, characterized for conceiving mind and body as really different and separated entities. Contrary to this conception, the naturalistic monism of Espinosa understands mind and body as parts of nature. After this review, I look for a possible approximation between the naturalistic monism of Espinosa and the neurobiological approach of Damásio. For Damásio (1996, 2000, 2004), consciousness emerges, in an integrated neural net, from the interaction of brain, body and environment. Although possessing a biological basis, consciousness cannot be reduced to biology. Innovative and complex forms appear in the processes of interaction of the brain with the body and environment. In my discussion of Damásio I suggest that consciousness, either elementary (proto-self) or complex (extended conscience), has the purpose of contributing to the maintenance and preservation of life.

Submitted by Viviane Lima da Cunha (viviane@biblioteca.ufpb.br) on 2016-07-26T15:35:01Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1826886 bytes, checksum: 258afa1d986c7ceb99150d6dfab14db8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-26T15:35:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1826886 bytes, checksum: 258afa1d986c7ceb99150d6dfab14db8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-05-28 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The metaphysical discussion over causality and identity of events, in the aim of the physicalism, emerges in the context of the collapse of behaviorism. Whilst the paradigms of logical positivism dominated philosophy, the behaviorism dominated psychology. The rupture with the positivism was marked by the work of Willard V. O. Quine. The critics from the two dogmas of empiricism and the proposal of a radical translation allowed emergence of the theses of indetermination of meaning and inscrutability of reference. As alternative to empiricism, Quine recurs to ontological simplification and holism about theory, but considering the primacy of experience, he proposes a shift towards pragmatism. However, Quine’s pragmatism was founded in a behavioristic perspective on the acquisition of linguistic competences, and behaviorism didn’t stood as paradigm for the explanation of mentalist vocabulary. Quine had a great influence in the work and life of Donald Davidson. The ontological economy and the holism of theory marked Davidson’s work in his choice of events as basic entities and his approach to meaning in Truth and Meaning through a theory of truth. While in articles as Action, Reason and Causes Davidson develops an approach to the causal role of events in intention and action, stating that reasons are causes, in The Logical Form of Action Sentences and Causal Relations, he searches for the adequate logical forms of describing events and singular causal statements in order to establish an identity of events. The following metaphysical positions support, in Individuation of Events, a causal individuation criterion for events, and in Events as Particulars and Eternal vs Ephemeral Events, Davidson defends that events are spatiotemporal and unrepeatable particulars, finalizing a metaphysical discussion over of events that will enable him to approach the problem of the mind-body relation, in the anomalous monism argument. Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism presented in Mental Events proposes the thesis of monism – identity between physical events and mental events –, and anomalism of the mental – events do not fall under strict causal laws. To support these theses Davidson formulates three principles, whose conjunction gives us a non-reductionist version of token physicalism and, therefore, permits us to conciliate the mentalist vocabulary with the structure of physicalist language. In this sense, anomalous monism supports a supervenience theory of the mental. Despite the critics made to anomalous monism, as the epiphenomenalism accusation, the theory only crumbles in its initial presuppositions that is that of a priori causality and identity. Thus, the frailest aspects of the argument consist in the difficulty of tracking and identify in experience neural events with mental events, and in the formulation of strict laws. Those questions depend, respectively, on the advancement of neurosciences and physics. The present work, by the name of “Identity, Differentiation and Metaphysics of Events”, consists on an approach to metaphysics of events, in the context of the physicalism of tokens, more specifically to the Donald Davidson’s argument of the anomalous monism that argues for the identity of physical events and mental events and the causal role of mental events. It pretends, therefore, to coordinate the metaphysical discussion of events with Davidson’s anomalous monism. / A discussão metafísica sobre a causalidade e a identidade de eventos, no âmbito do fisicalismo, surge no contexto do colapso do behaviorismo. Porquanto os paradigmas do positivismo-lógico dominaram a filosofia, o behaviorismo dominou a psicologia. A ruptura com o positivismo é marcada pela obra de Willard V. O. Quine: a crítica aos dois dogmas do empirismo e a proposta de uma tradução radical, permitiu erguer as teses da indetermi-nação do significado e inescrutabilidade da referência. Como alternativa ao empirismo, Quine recorre à simplificação ontológica e ao holismo da teoria, mas com a primazia da experiência, propondo assim uma guinada rumo ao pragmatismo. Contudo, o pragmatismo de Quine era fundamentado numa perspectiva behaviorista para a aquisição de competên-cias linguísticas, e o behaviorismo não se firmou como paradigma para a explicação da vocabulário mentalista. Quine teve grande influência no trabalho e vida de Donald Davidson. A economia ontológica e o holismo da teoria marcam a obra de Davidson através da escolha de eventos como entidades básicas e da proposta de problematização do significado, em Verdade e Significado, através de uma teoria da verdade. Enquanto que em artigos como Action, Reasons and Causes Davidson desenvolve uma abordagem ao papel causal de eventos na intenção e na ação, afirmando que razões são causas, em The Logical Form of Action Sentences e Causal Relations, ele explora as formas lógicas adequadas para descrever eventos e para declarações causais singulares e para estabelecer uma identidade de eventos. As posições metafísicas daqui decorrentes sustentam, em Individuation of Events, um critério de individuação causal de eventos e em Events as Particulars e Eternal vs Ephemeral Events, Davidson sustenta que eventos são particulares espaciotemporais irrepetíveis, finalizando uma discussão metafísica de eventos que lhe permitirá abordar o problema da relação corpo-mente, no argumento do monismo anômalo. O monismo anômalo de Davidson, apresentado em Mental Events propõe as teses do monismo – identidade entre eventos físicos e eventos mentais –, e do anomalismo do mental – eventos mentais falham em cair sob leis causais estritas. Para suportar essas teses, Davidson formula três princípios cuja conjunção nos dá uma versão não reducionista do fisicalismo de ocorrências, que, portanto, permite conciliar o vocabulário mentalista com a estrutura linguística fisicalista. Assim, o monismo anômalo suporta uma teoria da superveniência do mental. Apesar do monismo anômalo sofrer algumas críticas, como a acusação de epifenomenalismo, a teoria só sucumbe nos seus pressupostos iniciais, ou seja, a causalidade e a identidade a priori. Os aspetos mais frágeis do argumento consistem na dificuldade de rastrear e identificar, na experiência, eventos neurais com eventos mentais, e na formulação de leis estritas. Questões estas que dependem, respetivamente, do avanço das neurociências e desenvolvimento da física. O presente trabalho, pelo nome de “Identidade, Diferenciação e Metafísica de Eventos”, consiste numa abordagem à metafísica de eventos, no contexto do fisicalismo de ocorrências, mais especificamente do argumento do monismo anômalo de Davidson, que afirma a identidade entre eventos físicos e eventos mentais, assim como o papel causal de eventos mentais. Pretende, portanto, coordenar a discussão metafísica de eventos com o monismo anômalo de Davidson.