published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration

published_or_final_version / Housing Management / Master / Master of Housing Management

published_or_final_version / Housing Management / Master / Master of Housing Management

published_or_final_version / abstract / Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration

No description available.

Thesis (M. Hous. M.)--University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 82-85).

Thesis (M.Hous.M.)--University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 82-85). Also available in print.

Puisqu’ils représentent l’ensemble des sources de valeur du client pour une entreprise, les comportements d’engagement attirent largement l’attention tant des managers que des académiciens. Cette thèse de doctorat propose d’étudier l’impact de la propriété légale de la firme par les clients sur leurs comportements d’engagement. Les résultats d’une première étude (N = 26 781) montrent que la Customer Lifetime Value des clients propriétaires de la firme est plus élevée et croît plus rapidement dans le temps, comparativement à celle des clients non propriétaires. Dans un même temps, les clients propriétaires sont plus enclins à recommander la firme (Customer Influencer Value). Une seconde étude terrain (N = 295) a été menée dans l’objectif de comprendre le mécanisme d’influence de la propriété légale sur les comportements d’engagement. Les résultats de cette étude introduisent le rôle de la propriété psychologique pour expliquer les effets de la propriété légale sur la Customer Knowledge Value (suggestions et réclamations). Les implications théoriques et managériales, ainsi que les limites et voies de recherche sont présentées par la suite. / Considering that they represent all the customers’ valuable behaviors, engagement behaviors gain particular interests from both managers and academicians. This doctoral dissertation studies the influence of customers’ formal ownership over the firm on their engagement behaviors. Results from Study 1 (N = 26 871) reveal that customers-owners’ Customer Lifetime Value is stronger and evolve more rapidly, compared to customers-non-owners’ one. Furthermore, customers-owners present a stronger intention to recommend the firm (Customer Influencer Value). We perform a second study (N = 295) to understand the underlying process through which formal ownership influences engagement behaviors. Results introduce the importance of the psychological ownership concept, to explain how formal ownership influences Customer Knowledge Value (suggestions and complaints). These findings have implications for theory, practice, and further research.

Cheung, Ka Shing. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 55-57). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Abstract (Chinese Version) --- p.ii / Acknowledgment --- p.iii / Table of Contents --- p.iv / List of Tables --- p.vi / List of Figures --- p.vi / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- HOS and the Comparable Private Housing Market --- p.4 / Chapter 2.1. --- History and Policies in Hong Kong Housing Market --- p.4 / Chapter 2.2. --- The Emerging Subsidized Housing Market --- p.6 / Chapter 2.3. --- The Comparable Private Housing Market --- p.7 / Chapter 2.4. --- "A Tale of the 85,000 Policy" --- p.11 / Chapter 3. --- Literature Review on the Model Choice --- p.12 / Chapter 4. --- The Model --- p.15 / Chapter 4.1. --- The Basic Setting --- p.15 / Chapter 4.2. --- Basic Assumptions of the Model Setup --- p.18 / Chapter 4.3. --- Deal or no deal on a house? --- p.18 / Chapter 5. --- Model in Long Run --- p.19 / Chapter 5.1. --- Assumptions of Model in the Long Run --- p.19 / Chapter 5.2. --- Value Function of Buyers --- p.21 / Chapter 5.3. --- What do the Pricing Functions pH and pL depend on? --- p.24 / Chapter 5.4. --- Sellers' Value Function in Public Market --- p.26 / Chapter 5.5. --- The Key of our Model - Market Tightness of both Markets --- p.27 / Chapter 5.6. --- Population Flow of the Model --- p.29 / Chapter 5.7. --- Procedure of Solving the Model --- p.30 / Chapter 5.8. --- Results of Comparative Static in Long Run --- p.34 / Chapter 5.9. --- Discussion of Long Run Model --- p.34 / Chapter 5.9.1. --- Change of Public Housing Supply --- p.35 / Chapter 5.9.2. --- Change of Population Inflow --- p.36 / Chapter 5.9.3. --- Change of Owners' Value --- p.37 / Chapter 5.9.4. --- Change of Sellers' Value in Private Market --- p.38 / Chapter 5.9.5. --- Change of Search Cost --- p.40 / Chapter 5.9.6. --- Change of Bargaining Power of Sellers --- p.41 / Chapter 6. --- Model in Short Run --- p.43 / Chapter 6.1. --- Assumptions of Model in the Short Run --- p.43 / Chapter 6.2. --- Results of Comparative Static in Short Run --- p.45 / Chapter 6.3. --- Discussions of the Model in Short Run --- p.46 / Chapter 6.3.1. --- Change of Numbers of Sellers --- p.47 / Chapter 6.3.2. --- Change of House Owners' Value --- p.48 / Chapter 6.3.3. --- Change of Search Cost --- p.49 / Chapter 6.3.4. --- Change of Bargaining Power of Sellers --- p.51 / Chapter 7. --- Discussions --- p.52 / Chapter 8. --- Concluding Remarks and Further Extensions --- p.54 / Chapter 9. --- References --- p.55 / Chapter 10. --- Appendix --- p.57 / Chapter 10.1. --- Various Subsidized Housing Scheme in Hong Kong --- p.57 / Chapter 10.1.1. --- The Tenant Purchasing Scheme (TPS) --- p.57 / Chapter 10.1.2. --- The Home Purchase Loan Scheme (HPLS) --- p.58 / Chapter 10.1.3. --- Eligibility of HOS scheme --- p.58 / Chapter 10.2. --- Nash Bargaining Solution --- p.62 / Chapter 10.3. --- The Pricing Function in the Private Housing Market pH --- p.64 / Chapter 10.4. --- The Pricing Function in the Public Market pL --- p.65 / Chapter 10.5. --- The Market Tightness of Private Market θH --- p.65 / Chapter 10.6. --- The Market Tightness of Public Housing Market θL --- p.66 / Chapter 10.7. --- The Comparative Statics in Long Run --- p.69 / Chapter 10.8. --- Comparative Statics in Short Run Equilibrium --- p.74 / Chapter 10.9. --- What the Relationship between pi and θi ? --- p.79 / Chapter 10.10. --- Flow Chart of the Interactions between Markets --- p.84 / Chapter 10.10.1. --- The Long Run Model --- p.84 / Chapter 10.10.2. --- The Short Run Model --- p.92

Bakgrund: Corporate Governance även kallad bolagsstyrning, är något som dagligen berör företag och utgör därmed en central del inom företagsorganisationer. Den teori som blivit mest uppmärksammad inom bolagsstyrning är agentteorin, som förklarar intressekonflikter mellan agent-principalen i ett bolag. Tidigare studier har visat på skillnader i länders bolagsstyrning, främst mellan de anglosaxiska och europeiska länderna gällande ägarstrukturen. För att motverka intressekonflikter som agentteorin uppmärksammar har olika riktlinjer för god bolagsstyrning, i form av koder, tillkommit som kompletterar lagstiftningen.   Syfte: Syftet med studien är att undersöka hur börsnoterade bolag på OMX30 Stockholmsbörsen förhåller sig till svensk kod för bolagsstyrning. Studien ämnar även att ta reda på om det finns något mönster mellan bolagens ägarstruktur och hur företagen väljer att följa Koden. Metod: För att kunna besvara studiens undersökningsfrågor avser studien att använda sig av en kvalitativ innehållsanalys med en deduktiv ansats. Undersökningen har genomförts genom att granska offentlig information i form av årsredovisningar, bolagsstyrningsrapporter samt företagshemsidor för studiens valda företag, som finns noterade på OMX30 Stockholmsbörsen mellan åren 2013-2017. Slutsatser: Den genomförda undersökningen visar på att samtliga bolag i studien väljer att följa svensk kod för bolagsstyrning utan avvikelser, där bolag med ett spritt ägande utgör en majoritet. Däremot visar undersökningen ingen signifikant trend på en minskad eller ökad avvikelse från Kodens riktlinjer från åren 2013–2017. Det finns ingen ägarstruktur som utgör en majoritet bland studiens undersökta bolag, utan fördelar sig någorlunda jämnt bland företagen. Studien visar även på att bolagen avviker mest från kodreglerna 2.4 och 9.2. / Background: Corporate Governance is something that concerns companies regularly and is forming a central part of corporate organizations. Agency-theory is the most attentive theory in Corporate Governance, which explains the differ goals and interests between the agents and principals in a company. Previous studies have shown differences between anglosaxisk and european countries, concerning the ownership structure.To prevent interest conflicts in companies several policies, presented as Codes have been presented in different countries.    Purpose: The purpose of this study is to analyze how companies on the OMX30 Stockholm Stock Exchange, apply the main principles of the Swedish Corporate Governance Code. The study also aims to review if there is any pattern regarding the companies ownership structure and how the companies choose to follow the Code. Method: In order to examine and answer the questions of this study, the study intends to use a qualitative content approach with a deductive approach. The study has been conducted by reviewing public information from annual reports, corporate governance reports and websites for the selected companies during the years 2013-2017. Conclusion: The findings of the study indicates that most of the companies apply the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance without any deviations, where companies with a dispersed ownership is a majority. The study does not show any significant trend of a decreased or increased deviation from the code during the years 2013-2017. There is no ownership structure constituting a majority of the study’s investigated companies. The most common deviations in this study are 2.4 and 9.2 from the Swedish Code.