The thesis examines the undergoing peace process in Turkey between the Turkish state and the PKK organisation and seeks to assess how this development is affected by one of the principles of the Turkish national state: territorial integrity. Examining the preservation of territorial integrity as a factor shaping the pacification is crucial to understanding the dynamics of the current peace process and how distant the prospect of achieving a long lasting peace is. I investigate the PKK peace process using the works of scholars developing on conflict resolution and the specificities of Turkish politics and I address the relevance of their theories to the case of the PKK.

After the First World War, there was widespread support for U.S. intervention in the Near East to assist Christian minorities in the region, but the Wilson administration and the U.S. Senate took little action. The Armenian cause in particular was foremost in the minds of Americans. Many Americans felt the United States had a moral responsibility to help Near Eastern Christians. For many observers, American interest coupled with the opportunity for increased participation in Near Eastern affairs made it seem likely that the United States would emerge from the peace process as a major influence in the Area. However, this was not the case, and proposed initiatives that would increase American participation in the area were either ignored or rejected. There was broad interest in getting more involved in the Near East, but no consensus on how to do so. Some favored an American mandate over Armenia, while others wanted a larger American mandate over Armenia, Constantinople, and Anatolia, and others sought to avoid mandates altogether and instead preferred sending direct aid to Armenia and the Near East. By the time it seemed clear that American intervention in the Near East would only happen along the terms favored by those seeking to limit American costs and responsibility, the solidification of isolationist sentiment in the United States, antagonized by the long League of Nations debate, and changing circumstances in the Near East made a dramatic increase in U.S. influence in the region unlikely. The debate over American intervention in the Near East provides insight into larger discussions about American imperialism and its relationship to humanitarianism, American isolationism in the interwar years, and the partisan atmosphere of American postwar politics. / History

No / Throughout much of the 25-year Sri Lankan conflict, attention has focused on the confrontation between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils. The views of the country¿s Muslims, who are 8 per cent of the population and see themselves as a separate ethnic group, have largely been ignored. Understanding their role in the conflict and addressing their political aspirations are vital if there is to be a lasting peace settlement. Muslims need to be part of any renewed peace process but with both the government and LTTE intent on continuing the conflict, more immediate steps should be taken to ensure their security and political involvement. These include control of the Karuna faction, more responsive local and national government, improved human rights mechanisms and a serious political strategy that recognises minority concerns in the east. At least one third of Muslims live in the conflict-affected north and east and thus have a significant interest in the outcome of the war. They have often suffered serious hardship, particularly at the hands of the Tamil rebel group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Since 1990 Muslims have been the victims of ethnic cleansing, massacres and forced displacement by the insurgents. The 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA) was a disappointment to many Muslims. They had no independent representation at the peace talks, and many feared that any agreement that gave the LTTE exclusive control of the north and east, even in a federal arrangement, would be seriously detrimental to their own interests. Despite talks between Muslim leaders and the LTTE, they continued to suffer violent attacks. Since the resumption of large-scale military action in mid-2006, Muslims have again been caught up in the fighting in the east. Dozens have been killed and thousands displaced. They have also come into conflict with a new, pro-government Tamil paramilitary group, the Karuna faction. Memories of LTTE oppression are still fresh, and rancorous disputes with Tamils over land and resources remain potent in the east. Muslim political leaders have often been divided, representing different historical experiences and geographical realities as well as personal and political differences. Muslims in the east and north ¿ who have been fundamentally affected by the conflict ¿ often have very different views from those who live in the south among the Sinhalese. Nevertheless, there is consensus on some key issues and a desire to develop a more united approach to the conflict. Muslims have never resorted to armed rebellion to assert their political position, although some have worked with the security forces, and a few were members of early Tamil militant groups. Fears of an armed movement emerging among Muslims, perhaps with a facade of Islamist ideology, have been present since the early 1990s, but most have remained committed to channelling their frustrations through the political process and negotiating with the government and Tamil militants at different times. There is no guarantee that this commitment to non-violence will continue, particularly given the frustration noticeable among younger Muslims in the Eastern province. In some areas there are Muslim armed groups but they are small and not a major security threat. Fears of armed Islamist movements emerging seem to be exaggerated, often for political ends. Small gangs have been engaged in semi-criminal activities and intra-religious disputes, but there is a danger they will take on a role in inter-communal disputes if the conflict continues to impinge upon the security of co-religionists. There is increasing interest among some Muslims in more fundamentalist versions of Islam, and there have been violent clashes between ultra-orthodox and Sufi movements. This kind of violence remains limited and most Muslims show considerable tolerance to other sects and other faiths. Nevertheless, the conflict is at least partly responsible for some Muslims channelling their frustrations and identity issues into religious disputes. Muslim peace proposals have tended to be reactive, dependent on the politics of the major Tamil and Sinhalese parties. Muslim autonomous areas in the east are being pursued but seem unlikely to be accepted by the present government. Muslims are concerned about Colombo¿s plans for development and governance in the east, which have not involved meaningful consultation with ethnic minorities and do not seem to include significant devolution of powers to local communities. In the longer term, only a full political settlement of the conflict can allow historical injustices against the Muslims to be addressed and begin a process of reconciliation. The LTTE, in particular, needs to revisit the history of its dealings with the Muslims if it is to gain any credibility in a future peace process in which the Muslims are involved. Only an equitable settlement, in which Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim community concerns are adequately addressed, can really contain the growing disillusionment among a new generation of Sri Lankan Muslims.

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Some peace processes are tainted by more violence than the actual conflict, sometimes worsened by spoilers. Although spoilers pose a threat to the writing or lasting of peace agreements, they do not always succeed, and instead, peace can flourish. Despite this, the effects of spoiling violence on society have not been thoroughly explored. Research suggests that criminal violence thrives in the post-war period, this paper aims to answer the research question: How do spoilers affect post-war criminal violence? As spoilers instil insecurity, the hypothesis is that post-war criminal violence will increase within a state if the peace agreements have experienced outside spoiling. To investigate this, a Structured Focused Comparison approach is employed, comparing two cases, El Salvador and Sierra Leone. However, this paper was unable to find support for the proposed causal relationship between outside spoiling and post-war criminal violence. Further research is needed to understand how spoilers affect both the peace process and criminal violence.

Discussions of the armed conflict in Colombia have gained international awareness over the past years. Current events neglect to note the complexities of the civil war conflict that has afflicted Colombia for many decades. The armed soldiers still have a presence in the country, though there have been vast improvements under the current Uribe administration. Since there are only a few existing written accounts of the revolutionary groups this study attempts to contribute to the scholarly discourse. The bulk of this research is dedicated to providing a history of the three dominant illegally armed groups in Colombia, The FARC, the ELN, and the AUC. This study will attempt to provide an accurate analysis of the conflict by describing the groups in their historical context. Conclusions to the Colombian crisis include points of view from all areas. Guerilla and paramilitary ideas include a national convention, government trust in leadership and increasing societal participation. Government actors seek progress in the peace process through the demobilization of the revolutionary groups. As well as defining the conflict, this study sheds light on various possibilities for conflict resolution.

Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo central a identificação e análise dos principais atores e temas envolvidos na internacionalização do conflito armado na Colômbia. Este estudo entende por internacionalização a participação de atores estrangeiros na formulação e/ou implementação das tentativas de resolução do referido conflito. O recorte temporal pertinente aos propósitos da pesquisa estende-se do Governo César Gaviria (1990-1994) ao final do primeiro governo de Álvaro Uribe (2002-2006), na medida em que, no período anterior, não era possível observar um envolvimento externo considerável nos processos de paz na Colômbia. Os atores selecionados para uma análise mais atenta foram: EUA e OEA, cujas agendas correspondem à proposta hemisférica predominante; e UE e ONU, as quais representam as iniciativas globais voltadas à resolução do conflito. A principal conclusão deste estudo incide sobre o agrupamento das propostas internacionais em torno desses dois pólos: hemisféricas (das quais os EUA constituem o principal expoente) e globais (que têm na UE o seu ponto focal). A primeira é dotada de vultosos recursos, apresenta um caráter marcadamente militar e encontra na erradicação das drogas e no confronto às guerrilhas as suas principais estratégias. Por outro lado, o traço preponderante da segunda é a ênfase nos direitos humanos, na ajuda humanitária e na negociação com as guerrilhas. A proposta emergente do pólo europeu não foi capaz de oferecer um contra-peso à intervenção estadunidense, tanto em termos de recursos financeiros, como de fatores geopolíticos. Assim, a principal conclusão desta pesquisa é que a internacionalização do conflito armado não se manifesta de forma homogênea: embora a participação dos atores estrangeiros tenha ocorrido no âmbito global, as iniciativas hemisféricas são predominantes, especialmente se analisarmos as preferências do governo colombiano. / This study aims to identify and analyze the main actors and themes related to the Colombian armed conflict internationalization. It understands internationalization as the participation of foreign players in the designing and implementation of programs regarding the resolution of the conflict. The period of interest to this study dates back to the government César Gaviria (1990-1994) until the end of the first Álvaro Uribe administration, since there was no considerable external participation on Colombia peace processes previously. The selected players for a more detailed approach were: US and OAS, whose agendas correspond to the predominant proposal in the hemisphere; and EU and UN, which represent the global initiatives towards the conflict resolution. The main conclusion of this study is related to the concentration of international proposals around these poles: hemispheric (whose main exponent is the US) and global (concentrated on EU). The first involves a huge amount of resources, presents a markedly military aspect and privileges the illicit crops eradication and confrontation against guerrillas as strategies. On the other hand, the dominant characteristic of the second is the emphasis on human rights, humanitarian aid and the negotiation with the guerrillas. The proposal that emerged from Europe was not able to offer compensation to American intervention in terms of financial resources and geopolitical factors. Therefore, the main conclusion of this study is that the internationalization of the armed conflict is not homogeneous throughout the world: the participation of external actors is global, but the hemispherical initiatives are predominant, especially if we consider Colombian governments preferences.

In recent decades we have seen an increase in peace processes aimed at solving armed conflicts through peaceful means. The often fragile characteristics of such processes and the settlements that they produce underline the essential importance of improving our understanding of the dynamics at play in transitions from war to peace. This thesis aims to contribute to this overarching objective by analysing ceasefire agreements in relation to peace processes in two protracted intrastate armed conflicts: Aceh, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. In the scholarly literature, ceasefire agreements are often assumed to create momentum due to their ability to pave the way to a peaceful solution. At the same time, it has also been suggested that ceasefires can influence conflict dynamics in negative ways. Although there are many unanswered questions about ceasefire agreements in contemporary peace processes, few studies have been devoted to systematic and in-depth analysis of how ceasefire agreements can be characterized and analysed in relation to peace processes in protracted intrastate conflicts. This thesis, which is based on written documents and on interviews conducted during four research trips to the region, contributes to filling this research gap by presenting comparative case studies of Aceh and Sri Lanka. The point of departure in the study is a process-oriented, conflict dynamics approach and a view that war-to-peace transitions require changes in the conflicting parties’ attitudes, behaviours and relationships. I analyse and compare ceasefire agreements by looking at their initiation, form and content, and by examining their implementation and the unfolding of the processes. I identify six key factors in the literature that can influence the conflicting parties’ attitudes, behaviours and relationships. I then use these factors to analyse ceasefire agreements in relation to the dynamics of the broader peace processes. In this thesis I show how these key factors – including issues of recognition, trust, whether the parties’ claims are met, international involvement, contextual changes and intra-party dynamics – have mattered. I also show that context is important for understanding how and why they have mattered. The results suggest that ceasefire agreements can facilitate war-topeace transitions; however, it also illuminates challenges and the risk that such agreements can be counter-productive in the context of intrastate conflicts. The study also shows that ceasefire agreements have a historical legacy, as illustrated by their impact on subsequent interactions and agreements, and it underlines the symbolic politics of ceasefires in asymmetrical intrastate conflicts. The thesis ends with a number of propositions, among others that ceasefire agreements tend to become more comprehensive over time and that power struggles and developments within the conflicting parties are important for understanding ceasefire agreements in relation to contemporary peace processes.

This thesis aims to analyze the development of the collective policies of the European Union towards the Middle East by focusing on the reasons behind the formulation of these policies, and the degree of success, failure and prospects of these policies. The general success of the European Community in the 1970s created a desire for European states to form a coordinated European foreign policy. Since the 1970s, the Community started to show willingness to shape international events and to strengthen its international role. The Middle East was one of the leading regions to which the Community turned in the early 1970s, an area, which, for historical and geographical reasons, is of vital interest to it. EU has been becoming a coherent and strategic actor in the Middle East since the 1990s. It has secured an important presence in the Middle East Peace Process and it has further strengthened its role in the Middle East through the adoption of a common, comprehensive regional strategy called the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and developed it with the initiation of the European Neighborhood Policy. However, the European Union&rsquo / s presence is still limited due to its institutional weaknesses, the lack of political unity among its member states, lack of political instruments and military capabilities.

This thesis analyzes the development of the settlement policies of Israel in the West Bank territory by focusing on the incentives of them with factors of change and continuity before and after the peace process. The Six-Day War of 1967 which initiated a new phase in the region with the Israeli occupation of territories in Jordan, Syria and Egypt became an important milestone in Middle East history. Although some of these territories were returned through bilateral talks, the main territory of the Palestinian people remained under occupation, being subjected to Jewish settlement activities. The settlement activities on the West Bank were expanded by all Israeli governments with different incentives until the peace process. The peace process which began in 1993 aimed to form an independent Palestinian state. Among the vital issues related to the final status talks the moratorium on future building of settlements and the Israeli withdrawal from the settlements were delayed. The Camp David Summit in 2000 was overshadowed by the ongoing activities of settlement. In addition to settlement activities, increasing security arrangements following the emergence of Al-Aqsa Intifada brought about the fragmentation of West Bank territories. This study aims to analyze the results of the settlement activities in the West Bank before and after the peace process in terms of an eroding factor for the mutual confidence between the Israelis and Palestinians. The settlement activities will be examined from the pre-state period of Israel within the framework of its unilateral policies until the end of 2005.