This thesis aims to investigate why inclusion of civil society actors in peace processes leads to more durable peace in some cases while not in others. It argues that the influence, rather than inclusion, of civil society organizations (CSOs) explains this variation. It is hypothesized that when CSOs have influence in peace negotiations, peace is more likely to be durable, as well as when a wide range of CSOs have influence in peace negotiations, peace is more likely to be durable. This is explored through a structured focused comparison between the peace processes leading up to peace agreements in Sierra Leone in 1996, the DRC in 2002, the Ivory Coast in 2003 and Liberia in 2003. The empirical findings lend support to the hypotheses and point in the direction of influence of CSOs in peace processes being of importance for the durability of peace. Certain evidence suggesting legitimacy being the causal mechanism is found. However, the empirical analysis also points towards other factors being potential alternative explanations such as war fatigue and sequencing of the process. The suggestive findings and the potential alternative explanations should be investigated further in order to increase the chances of durable peace.

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Agradecemos a compreensão. on 2016-09-27T12:33:50Z (GMT) / Submitted by LUCIANA SAAB null (lcn.saab@gmail.com) on 2016-09-30T17:44:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO ANVERSO LUCIANA SAAB.pdf: 1484031 bytes, checksum: cd04f99fa27da37b352ad2b4437d3f25 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Paula Grisoto (grisotoana@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-09-30T19:46:39Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 saab_l_me_mar.pdf: 1484031 bytes, checksum: cd04f99fa27da37b352ad2b4437d3f25 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-09-30T19:46:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 saab_l_me_mar.pdf: 1484031 bytes, checksum: cd04f99fa27da37b352ad2b4437d3f25 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-08-26 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Este trabalho retoma a assinatura dos Acordos de Oslo entre israelenses e palestinos em setembro de 1993 a partir do entendimento de que os termos necessários para a resolução do conflito histórico não são discutidos no processo de paz. No decorrer da análise do texto do primeiro documento a ser assinado, a Declaração de Princípios (DOP), percebe-se que o conteúdo da proposta de paz e a fórmula de negociações bilaterais adotada não propõem uma alteração da assimetria de poder existente entre palestinos da OLP e o Estado de Israel, o que torna o processo desigual e extremamente favorável à continuação da ocupação militar israelense sobre os territórios da Faixa de Gaza e da Cisjordânia. O trabalho, portanto, foca sua análise no processo de negociação anterior à assinatura da DOP e no contexto político e econômico dos responsáveis por Oslo para estabelecer quais foram os interesses envolvidos em fechar um acordo e de que maneira eles influenciaram a redação dos termos da declaração. Durante a pesquisa, notamos que os Acordos de Oslo beneficiaram exclusivamente os atores envolvidos nas negociações secretas na Noruega, a OLP e israelenses do partido trabalhista, o que nos permite afirmar que o processo de paz não foi representativo dos diversos setores políticos palestinos e israelenses. O estudo também revela que a proposta de paz oferecida aos palestinos em Oslo é uma formulação israelense que remete ao início do processo de paz no Oriente Médio no ano de 1978, cujo principal objetivo foi a normalização das relações diplomáticas entre israelenses e os Estados árabes vizinhos. Assim, as condições negociadas na ocasião de Oslo partiram de um antigo pressuposto de que a paz regional não pressupõe a criação do Estado palestino, mas apenas o direito de autorrepresentação dos residentes dos territórios ocupados. Essas condições foram aceitas pela liderança de Yasser Arafat como estratégia para obter prestígio político e retornar ao território da Palestina. Concluímos, portanto, que o processo de paz de Oslo não se tratou de uma legítima iniciativa para estabelecer a paz de maneira justa e igualitária na região, conforme divulgado por Israel e pelos Estados Unidos, mas de um acordo entre o partido trabalhista e os palestinos da OLP, elaborado de uma maneira que possibilitou a expansão territorial israelense sobre Gaza e Cisjordânia, desconsiderou a questão dos refugiados e não reconheceu o direito à autodeterminação nacional palestina. / This paper refers to the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians in September 1993 from the understanding that the necessary terms in order to solve the historical conflict are not discussed in the peace process. The reading of the first document to be signed, the Declaration of Principles (DOP), reveals that the contents of the peace proposal and the bilateral negotiations formula do not alter the existing asymmetry of power between Palestinians from the PLO and the State of Israel, which makes the uneven process extremely favorable to the continuation of the Israeli military occupation over the territories of Gaza and the West Bank. The paper therefore focuses its analysis on the negotiation process previous to the signing of the DOP and the political and economic context of those responsible for Oslo, in order to establish what were the interests involved and how they influenced the drafting of the terms of the Declaration. During the research, it becomes clear that the Oslo agreements only benefited the actors involved in secret negotiations in Norway, namely the PLO and Israeli Labor Party, which allows us to state that the peace process was not representative of the various Palestinian and Israeli political sectors. The study also reveals that the peace proposal made to the Palestinians in Oslo is an Israeli formulation, that refers back to the beginning of the peace process in the Middle East in 1978, whose main goal was the normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab neighboring states . Thus, the conditions discussed in Oslo were based on an old assumption that regional peace does not imply in the creation of a Palestinian state, but only the right to self-representation of the Palestinian residents in the occupied territories. These conditions were accepted by Yasser Arafat as a strategy to gain political prestige and return to the territory of Palestine. We conclude therefore that the Oslo peace process was not a legitimate initiative to establish a fair and equal peace in the region, as claimed by Israel and the United States, but an agreement made between the Israeli Labour Party and the PLO, drafted to enabled the Israeli territorial expansion over the West Bank and Gaza, to dismiss the question of refugees and not recognize the Palestinian’s right to national self-determination.

This article analyzes the different electoral reforms that have taken place since 1990 and the changes that have characterized the party system in Colombia, mainly in terms of fragmentation and volatility of preferences, with an emphasis on the competition that takes place at the national level and on the origin and dynamics of the new coalition government established by President Juan Manuel Santos in 2010. In addition, we observe the configuration created by the regional and local elections of October 2011 and we discuss on the relationship between electoral regulations and the post conflict scenary. In particular, we deal with questions about the future of Colombian representative institutions, especially rules that determine access to elected office and a possible political participation of demobilized guerrillas. In that sense, it is argued that while the objectives of previous reforms were to achieve higher levels of governance, this new context may put the discussion on the need to sacrifice governance for achieving greater representation back in the center of the debate. / El presente artículo analiza las diferentes reformas electorales que han tenido lugar desde 1990, y los cambios que ha sufrido el sistema de partidos, fundamentalmente en términos de fragmentación y volatilidad de las preferencias, con un énfasis en la competencia que tiene lugar en el nivel nacional y en el origen y las dinámicas de la coalición de gobierno creada por el presidente Juan Manuel Santos en 2010. Además, se observa la configuración que puso en evidencia el proceso electoral regional y local de octubre de 2011 y se problematiza la relación entre reglas electorales y postconflicto, especialmente, las reglas que determinan el acceso a los cargos de elección popular y una posible participación de los guerrilleros desmovilizados. En ese sentido, se arguye que, aunque al observar los objetivos de las reformas anteriores la apuesta había sido por lograr mayores niveles de gobernabilidad, este nuevo contexto vuelve a poner en debate la necesidad de sacrificar gobernabilidad por el logro de mayor representatividad.

[pt] A dissertação visa relatar e analisar o fracasso do processo de paz realizado na Colômbia, durante o governo do presidente Andrés Pastrana, entre os anos de 1998 e 2002. A realidade local constituía-se num drama humanitário cuja solução se mostrava contrária à sustentação de mitos como o de uma democracia política estável ou o da pobreza como a principal causa da violência. O firme desígnio de resolver pacificamente a luta armada exigia que se levasse em consideração a natureza complexa e instável do Estado, a identidade dos atores armados, a realidade do agravamento da crise social e a difícil conciliação entre os interesses internos e externos. O empreendimento conduzido pelo presidente Andrés Pastrana era objeto da área de estudos de resolução pacífica de conflitos, cujas lentes conceituais foram as escolhidas como ferramenta para leitura e interpretação dos fatos. Esta literatura lida com o contexto sócio-político no qual se desenvolvia o enfrentamento armado, abrangendo as várias características específicas deste contexto. Ela preconizava o reconhecimento mútuo e a flexibilização das exigências, para que a negociação apresentasse avanços. O colapso do processo de paz colombiano, entre outros aspectos, tornou evidentes os obstáculos para a transformação do conflito. Sequer conseguiu-se fazer que os dois lados presentes à negociação renunciassem ao uso das armas. Decorridos aproximadamente quatro anos de negociação entre o governo e as FARC, os esforços não lograram substituir uma histórica, vivaz e destrutiva experiência por outra, construtiva e benéfica, a qual poderia ter se sobressaído na eventual assinatura de um acordo de paz. / [en] This essay is an account and an analysis of the failure of the Colombian peace process that took place during the presidential mandate of Andrés Pastrana from 1998 through 2002. The local reality actually became an humanitarian crisis whose solution necessarily involved abandoning shattered myths such as that of a stable democracy or that of poverty as the main root of endemic violence. The strong will to solve the armed conflict in a peaceful way has lead to reflection on the complex and unstable nature of the Colombian state, the true character of the quarrelling actors, the deepening of the social crisis and the tricky conciliation between internal and external interests. President Pastrana´s initiative falls into the area of studies of peaceful conflict resolution. The reading and interpretation of the facts will therefore be undertaken through the lenses of the literature on peaceful conflict resolution. That literature deals with the issue of the socioeconomic context in which the armed struggles occur, including its specifics. It also recommends mutual political recognition among parties and increasingly flexible demands in order to spur the smooth advance of the negotiation. The ultimate collapse of the Colombian peace process exposed the multiple obstacles to a solution to the civil war. It was not even possible to persuade either party to drop weapons. After four years of negotiations between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia had passed, all these efforts were not enough to replace an ago-old, historical, and destructive social experience for a new, constructive, and beneficial experience. Such a new reality could have been possible if a peace accord had been reached.

This study was performed during the period March – May of 2007 in Kampala and Gulu district, Uganda, and it was made possible due to a scholarship from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). The main focus of the study is to examine and analyse the peace process taking place in Juba (the Juba talks), southern Sudan, with the goal to solve the 20 year old conflict in northern Uganda between the government of Uganda and the rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army. I am doing this by, first; identify the actors involved by using John Paul Lederach’s pyramid which includes three levels of actors, second; study different methods for peacebuilding and thereafter identify which methods have been used in the Ugandan case and third; discover to what extent the civil society and more specifically women’s organisations have contributed to this process. The data collected consist of qualitative literature studies, analyses of articles dealing with the peace talks and interviews with representatives from different levels of the Ugandan society. The analyse of the material shows that all levels of the society have been involved to some extent, but that the peace process is mainly characterized by the top-down approach to peacebuilding, with the top level leaders as the main actors. I also found that women’s organisations in Uganda want to engender the peace talks, for example by bringing women to the negotiation table and let them participate in high level decision-making. Finally, the civil society has in general contributed to a large extent to the negotiations in order to bring peace, yet with different results.

The thesis examines the practice of corruption in the Palestinian Authority (PA) from the period of its establishment until the death of Arafat. Palestinian elite formation from the late Ottoman period until the establishment of the PA was assessed in order to identify the elites that came into power in the PA and the political cultures they came to espouse. The two primary elite groups’ (Outsider elites and Insider counter-elites) conflicting political cultures were assessed in how they influenced the decision making process, the construction, and exhibited institutional behaviour of the PA. With the signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo Accords) on the 13th of September, 1993 between the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Government of Israel it established the Palestinian Authority as the government in transition for the Palestinians. The agreements conferred the governing power and leadership role to the PLO Outsider elites (under Arafat). Due to the secret nature and asymmetrical power relation by which the negotiations and agreements were conducted and signed between the PLO Outsider leadership and the Government of Israel, which excluded inputs from Palestinian Insider elites, the culminating PA structure came to exhibit institutional weakness with certain neo-patrimonial behaviour. The political framework by which the Oslo Accords constructed the PA and influenced by international actors warranted institutional-weakness. Moreover, as external actors’ demands for the PA to deal with the declining Peace Process, and address political and security issues increased, PA corruption behaviour became more apparent and proliferated which became indicative of its fundamental problem in that it lacked statehood, lacked authority and legitimacy, and thus resorted to neo-patrimonial and repressive methods to govern. This neo-patrimonial political culture of Arafat and his governing Outsider elites used corruption as a PA political tool for survival thus suppressing a nascent democratic political culture of the Insiders and consequently led to an institutionalisation of corruption in the PA.

This master thesis deals with past mediation attempts of Turkey to solve the Israeli- Palestinian conflict and with the potential of future Turkish mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been for several decades one of the biggest problems for the international security, therefore, analysing possible solutions is very important. Turkey is an actor with a special position, because it is a regional power with ties both to Islamic culture and to the West. That is why it has in theory a potential to play successful mediation role in this conflict. In this thesis, we will evaluate Turkey's existing role and after that, we will analyse the future potential with the help of the mediation conceptual framework that is described in the scholarly literature on conflict resolution and conflict management. Our research questions are: Can Turkey play a successful mediator role in the future? If yes, what conditions have to take place? Turkey tries to play a role in this conflict since the early 1990s and despite the fact that there has been a disruption of the diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey, it is very likely that in the future a normalization will occur. If that happes, can Turkey broker peace?

This research critically challenges the conventional understanding of terrorism, which is influenced by the views of states that label certain non-state actors as terrorists and their action as terrorism. The research demonstrates that there is a need to critically study the characteristics of every armed conflict constructed as terrorism. This is the case of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, which is constructed in the Turkish official discourse as a phenomenon of terrorism perpetrated by the PKK. In addition, the Turkish narrative of terrorism is not limited to the PKK, but it transcends to the Syrian Kurdish PYD and YPG, and other Kurdish movements and individuals. The findings of this research reveal that the Turkish official narrative of terrorism functions to achieve two main goals. The first goal is to delegitimize the PKK and the other Kurdish movements. The second goal is to legitimize the repressive policies of the Turkish authorities regarding these movements in particular and the Kurds in general. This is interconnected with the denial of the existence of the Kurdish question and framing it in the context of the narrative of terrorism. The research also reveals that the language and policy of peace and war could change according to the interests of states’ elites. This is the case of the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish question, which changed under the influence of the elections and voting agendas of Erdogan and AKP. The research found that during the peace process and before the June 2015 elections, the approach of Turkish authorities was pro-peace negotiations and non-military action. However, as the AKP was not able to secure the majority that it sought in the June elections, the AKP authorities abandoned the peace process and adopted a military campaign and repressive policies. The latter matched the appeal of the AKP leadership to the votes of nationalist Turks in the November 2015 elections and the April 2017 referendum. / The full text was made available after embargo; 28th August 2020

Le processus de paix ivoirien a débuté en 2002 et a fait intervenir divers acteurs. Dans le cadre de ce travail, nous nous sommes intéressés à un type d’acteurs en particulier : les organisations miliciennes. Pour ces acteurs armés non étatiques, il a été question de revenir sur leur inclusion et les mécanismes mis en place pour favoriser cette inclusion. Dans notre analyse, nous avançons que ces acteurs, en raison des dynamiques qui favorisent leur émergence et de leurs caractères dans le contexte Ivoirien, sont absents des négociations formelles. Toutefois, cette absence des négociations formelles ne signifie pas qu’ils sont totalement exclus du processus. Notre argument sert à montrer qu’ils ont été inclus au processus par le biais de mécanismes informels. Nous analysons cette inclusion informelle pour en faire ressortir les caractéristiques mais aussi les limites. / The Ivorian peace process began in 2002 and involved various actors. In this work, we are interested in one type of actor in particular: militia organizations. For these non-State armed actors, we wanted to understand their inclusion and the mechanisms put in place to promote this inclusion. In our analysis, we argue that these actors, because of the dynamics that favor their emergence and their characteristics in the Ivorian context, are absent from formal negotiations. However, this absence from formal negotiations does not mean that they are totally excluded from the process. Our argument shows that they were brought into the process through informal mechanisms. We analyze this informal inclusion to highlight its characteristics but also its limits.

<p dir="ltr">Colombia has endured the longest armed conflict in Latin America. In 2016, the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) signed a historic peace agreement. The reintegration of ex-combatants into society is one of the most challenging aspects of any peace process, particularly for women fighters who break traditional gender norms, often have lower socioeconomic status, and some belong to indigenous communities. This study examines their challenges, focusing on the intersections of gender, ethnicity, and class systemic oppressions. Using in-depth interviews with 30 former FARC-EP combatants, this research explores how gender norms influence reintegration, how intersectional stigma is navigated, and how resilience is enacted. The findings reveal that while some former women fighters defy traditional gender norms, others accept them, potentially contributing to higher unemployment rates. The study also uncovers the complex layers of intersectional stigma these women face, including gender-based discrimination, assumptions about their sexual behavior, and rejection from indigenous communities. To navigate this stigma, ex-combatants employ various strategies, such as choosing silence, hiding their identity, avoiding outsiders, ignoring stigma, or challenging stigma. The study illustrates how former women FARC-EP combatants demonstrate resilience through collective action by developing projects that benefit both ex-combatants and surrounding communities. Rooted in FARC-EP's revolutionary principles, this approach showcases their dedication to building a more equitable society and serves as a powerful response to intersectional oppression. The study makes three key theoretical contributions. First, it significantly advances feminist organizational communication by highlighting the connection between feminist resilience, collective action, and the pursuit of the common good. Second, it further develops the Stigma Management Communication (SMC) theory by showing how intersectional stigma is managed. Third, it integrates the concept of intersectional stigma experienced by ex-combatants into organizational communication literature, particularly within the context of peacebuilding efforts in Colombia. The findings can inform the design of more effective reintegration programs and policies for former women FARC-EP combatants in Colombia, addressing their unique challenges.</p>