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1	The value of pleasure in Plato's Philebus and Aristotle's Ethics Aufderheide, Joachim January 2011 (has links) This thesis is a study of the theories of pleasure as proposed in Plato’s Philebus, Aristotle’s EN VII.11-14 and EN X.1-5, with particular emphasis on the value of pleasure. Focusing on the Philebus in Chapters 1 and 2, I argue that the account of pleasure as restorative process of a harmonious state in the soul is in tension with Plato’s claim that some pleasures are good in their own right. I show that there are in fact two ways in which pleasure (and other processes of the soul) can have value in the Philebus. The tension in Plato’s position arises because he focuses exclusively on only one way in which pleasure can have value. Chapter 3 deals with Aristotle’s response to Plato in EN VII.11-14. According to the standard interpretation only complete activities (such as thinking and seeing) can be pleasures in their own right, but not incomplete activities (such as eating and drinking). Since this interpretation attributes to Aristotle both an implausible view and a bad response to Plato, I offer a novel interpretation of EN VII.12 according to which the central contrast is not between complete and incomplete activities, but between states and their use. This interpretation is more faithful to Aristotle’s text and gives him a better response to Plato. In Chapter 4 I turn to the central claim of EN X.4-5 that pleasure perfects an activity. I argue that we cannot understand how pleasure functions unless we take into account the state whose activation is perfected by pleasure. In particular, the agent’s disposition of being a lover of a certain activity (an attitude which belongs to the activated state) is crucial for explaining why the agent takes pleasure in it. The focus on the agent’s attitude highlights that the value of pleasure does not depend solely on the value of the activity (as many interpreters assume). I suggest instead that pleasure is valuable when and because it is an appropriate response to a given situation. 100
2	The authority of pleasure and pain: moral psychology in Plato's Philebus Evans, Matthew Lyall 28 August 2008 (has links) Not available / text Plato--Philebus Plato Pleasure--Philosophy Pain--Philosophy Hedonism
3	Filebos : En nyckel till Platons tankar omDet goda livet, belyst genom grottliknelsen? Ringborg, Monika Margareta January 2015 (has links) The purpose of this essay is to read Philebus based on three central themes – The Soul dialectic, the esoteric elements and some ethical problems, as well as to seek a comprehensive interpretation, rather than investigating, analyzing and interpreting individual concepts. Some questions that the essay aims to follow up are: 1) how can the dialogue on desire and rational knowledge highlighting Plato's ideas about the good life? 2) What are Plato’s real messages in the exposition of the good life? 3) Why are ethical questions related to esoteric elements of Plato's dialogues, and in general? The method is a reading between the lines; a hermeneutic interpretation process. Some patterns and contradictions were discovered during the reading, which shows an overall seemingly contradiction between ethics and metaphysics, but which with the the perspective of the dialectics be possible to reconcile. The final interpretation focuses on three concepts from Plato's own ranking of the good; beauty, proportion and truth. Together they constitute the good life in which pain plays an important role. Furthermore, it is possible to reach in Philebus about the good life, and the messages that one should always be true to oneself and to live modestly and always weigh reason to desire and choose wisdom. The ethical problems are both hidden in the shadows and elusive in Plato's dialogues, which can be a result of caution, but also a fear of losing oneself. Plato´s thinking is consistently dialectic, which is in this essay best illustrated by the allegory of the Cave. Philebus Plato Allegory of the Cave dialectic the good life the soul beauty proportion truth pain ranking
4	Plato on Pleasure, Intelligence and the Human Good: An Interpretation of the Philebus Fletcher, Emily 28 February 2013 (has links) The Philebus is devoted to the question what constitutes the good for a human being. Although Socrates initially favors a life of pure intelligence against the hedonist’s life of pure pleasure, he quickly concedes that some pleasures actually enhance the life of intelligence. In order to determine which pleasures deserve a place in the best life, Socrates undertakes a lengthy investigation into the nature of pleasure. Commentators have long been frustrated in their attempt to uncover a single, unified account that explains in a plausible way the extraordinary variety of pleasures analyzed in the dialogue. I argue that this search for a generic account of pleasure is misguided, because one of the main purposes of Socrates’ division of pleasure is to expose its essentially heterogeneous nature. Pleasures can be bodily or psychic, pure or mixed with pain, truth apt or not, healthy or diseased, and inherently measured or unmeasured, and there are no essential properties which all of these diverse phenomena share. The inclusion of some pleasures in the final ranking of the goods at the end of the Philebus represents a dramatic shift in Plato’s attitude towards certain pleasures, and so it is not surprising that many scholars misinterpret the force of this conclusion. Even in the Republic where the pleasures of reason are favorably compared to the pleasures of spirit and appetite, intellectual pleasures are judged to be more pleasant and real than other pleasures, but they are nowhere judged to be better or praised as genuine goods. In the Philebus, not only are some pleasures unambiguously ranked among the highest goods, but Socrates gives no indication that these pleasures are good only in some qualified or extrinsic way. Instead, certain pleasures make their own positive contribution to the goodness of the best human life, making the mixed life more valuable and choiceworthy than the unmixed life of intelligence. Plato Philebus Timaeus pleasure intelligence knowledge the human good the good life moral psychology cognition perception sensation intentionality consciousness aisthēsis phronēsis nous hēdonē health disease animals gods soul body desire expectation memory recollection false pleasure pain 0422 0289 0294
5	Plato on Pleasure, Intelligence and the Human Good: An Interpretation of the Philebus Fletcher, Emily 28 February 2013 (has links) The Philebus is devoted to the question what constitutes the good for a human being. Although Socrates initially favors a life of pure intelligence against the hedonist’s life of pure pleasure, he quickly concedes that some pleasures actually enhance the life of intelligence. In order to determine which pleasures deserve a place in the best life, Socrates undertakes a lengthy investigation into the nature of pleasure. Commentators have long been frustrated in their attempt to uncover a single, unified account that explains in a plausible way the extraordinary variety of pleasures analyzed in the dialogue. I argue that this search for a generic account of pleasure is misguided, because one of the main purposes of Socrates’ division of pleasure is to expose its essentially heterogeneous nature. Pleasures can be bodily or psychic, pure or mixed with pain, truth apt or not, healthy or diseased, and inherently measured or unmeasured, and there are no essential properties which all of these diverse phenomena share. The inclusion of some pleasures in the final ranking of the goods at the end of the Philebus represents a dramatic shift in Plato’s attitude towards certain pleasures, and so it is not surprising that many scholars misinterpret the force of this conclusion. Even in the Republic where the pleasures of reason are favorably compared to the pleasures of spirit and appetite, intellectual pleasures are judged to be more pleasant and real than other pleasures, but they are nowhere judged to be better or praised as genuine goods. In the Philebus, not only are some pleasures unambiguously ranked among the highest goods, but Socrates gives no indication that these pleasures are good only in some qualified or extrinsic way. Instead, certain pleasures make their own positive contribution to the goodness of the best human life, making the mixed life more valuable and choiceworthy than the unmixed life of intelligence. Plato Philebus Timaeus pleasure intelligence knowledge the human good the good life moral psychology cognition perception sensation intentionality consciousness aisthēsis phronēsis nous hēdonē health disease animals gods soul body desire expectation memory recollection false pleasure pain 0422 0289 0294
6	Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics Bader, Daniel 14 February 2011 (has links) Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics examines the Platonic theory of craft and shows its application to different ethical problems in medicine, both ancient and modern. I begin by elucidating the Platonic use of the term “craft” or “technē”, using especially the paradigmatic craft of medicine, and explicate a number of important principles inherent in his use of the term. I then show how Plato’s framework of crafts can be applied to two ancient debates. First, I show how Plato’s understanding of crafts is used in discussing the definition of medicine, and how he deals with the issue of “bivalence”, that medicine seems to be capable of generating disease as well as curing it. I follow this discussion into Aristotle, who, though he has a different interpretation of bivalence, has a solution in many ways similar to Plato’s. Second, I discuss the relevance of knowledge to persuasion and freedom. Rhetors like Gorgias challenge the traditional connections of persuasion to freedom and force to slavery by characterizing persuasion as a type of force. Plato addresses this be dividing persuasion between sorcerous and didactic persuasion, and sets knowledge as the new criterion for freedom. Finally, I discuss three modern issues in medical ethics using a Platonic understanding of crafts: paternalism, conclusions in meta-analyses and therapeutic misconceptions in research ethics. In discussing paternalism, I argue that tools with multiple excellences, like the body, should not be evaluated independently of the uses to which the patient intends to put them. In discussing meta-analyses, I show how the division of crafts into goal-oriented and causal parts in the Phaedrus exposes the confusion inherent in saying that practical conclusions can follow directly from statistical results. Finally, I argue that authors like Franklin G. Miller and Howard Brody fail to recognize the hierarchical relationship between medical research and medicine when they argue that medical research ethics should be autonomous from medical ethics per se. Plato Medical Ethics Aristotle Techne Craft Rhetoric Contraries Predication Autonomy Paternalism Research Ethics Therapeutic Misconception Meta-Analysis Gorgias Laws Euthydemus Eleutheria Episteme Hippocrates Persuasion Bia Peitho Health Disease Measurement Metaphysics Phaedrus Privation Franklin G. Miller Education Informed Consent Freedom Lysias Hippias Minor Philebus Statesman Sophist Charmides Republic Protagoras Kolakeia Flattery Arche Essence Definition Suppliant Maidens Heraclidae Philoctetes Slavery Competition 0422
7	Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics Bader, Daniel 14 February 2011 (has links) Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics examines the Platonic theory of craft and shows its application to different ethical problems in medicine, both ancient and modern. I begin by elucidating the Platonic use of the term “craft” or “technē”, using especially the paradigmatic craft of medicine, and explicate a number of important principles inherent in his use of the term. I then show how Plato’s framework of crafts can be applied to two ancient debates. First, I show how Plato’s understanding of crafts is used in discussing the definition of medicine, and how he deals with the issue of “bivalence”, that medicine seems to be capable of generating disease as well as curing it. I follow this discussion into Aristotle, who, though he has a different interpretation of bivalence, has a solution in many ways similar to Plato’s. Second, I discuss the relevance of knowledge to persuasion and freedom. Rhetors like Gorgias challenge the traditional connections of persuasion to freedom and force to slavery by characterizing persuasion as a type of force. Plato addresses this be dividing persuasion between sorcerous and didactic persuasion, and sets knowledge as the new criterion for freedom. Finally, I discuss three modern issues in medical ethics using a Platonic understanding of crafts: paternalism, conclusions in meta-analyses and therapeutic misconceptions in research ethics. In discussing paternalism, I argue that tools with multiple excellences, like the body, should not be evaluated independently of the uses to which the patient intends to put them. In discussing meta-analyses, I show how the division of crafts into goal-oriented and causal parts in the Phaedrus exposes the confusion inherent in saying that practical conclusions can follow directly from statistical results. Finally, I argue that authors like Franklin G. Miller and Howard Brody fail to recognize the hierarchical relationship between medical research and medicine when they argue that medical research ethics should be autonomous from medical ethics per se. Plato Medical Ethics Aristotle Techne Craft Rhetoric Contraries Predication Autonomy Paternalism Research Ethics Therapeutic Misconception Meta-Analysis Gorgias Laws Euthydemus Eleutheria Episteme Hippocrates Persuasion Bia Peitho Health Disease Measurement Metaphysics Phaedrus Privation Franklin G. Miller Education Informed Consent Freedom Lysias Hippias Minor Philebus Statesman Sophist Charmides Republic Protagoras Kolakeia Flattery Arche Essence Definition Suppliant Maidens Heraclidae Philoctetes Slavery Competition 0422

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