Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

La thèse s’attache à mettre au jour la manière dont Descartes envisage le rapport de sa philosophie avec le christianisme, en montrant que l’articulation cartésienne de la raison et de la foi trouve son sens dans une séparation non contradictoire qui aboutit à un accord. Descartes apparaît soucieux d’instaurer des principes philosophiques novateurs qui, tout en prenant le contre-pied de ceux d’Aristote promulgués par la scolastique, s’accordent avec le christianisme.La thèse retient deux champs d’investigation pour étudier le sens d’un tel accord et le rapport au christianisme qu’il implique. D’une part, la théorie eucharistique cartésienne : Descartes élabore, à l’aune de ses propres principes physiques, deux explications du sacrement central de la foi chrétienne. Supplantant le modèle scolastique basé sur les principes aristotélico-thomistes, les explications sont destinées à se conformer aux décrets du Magistère (le concile de Trente), tout en protégeant le dogme catholique des attaques protestantes, en lui apportant un gain de rationalité. D’autre part, la morale cartésienne, tenue généralement pour absente du corpus cartésien : la thèse s’emploie à la reconstruire, par le prisme de la Correspondance et des Passions de l’âme. Nommée une « morale du contentement », de par la recherche philosophique de la vie heureuse ici-bas, la morale cartésienne se partage en deux axes : le souverain bien, résidant dans le bon usage du libre arbitre par lequel l’homme porte l’image et la ressemblance de Dieu, et la maîtrise des passions, dont la clef de voûte réside dans la passion-vertu de la générosité. Or, la morale manifeste, à un autre niveau que l’eucharistie, un effort d’articulation avec le christianisme qui se cristallise notamment dans plusieurs points forts, analysés par la thèse : la conception cartésienne de la providence, dans sa dimension générale et particulière, qui engage la soumission libre et joyeuse du sujet, illustrant une expérience proprement religieuse ; l’étendue de l’univers qui révoque l’anthropocentrisme tout en célébrant la gloire de Dieu ; l’immortalité de l’âme, ouvrant vers une autre vie, tout en étant dirigée vers la valorisation de la vie ici-bas ; l’image de Dieu qui rayonne dans le bon usage du libre arbitre, seule source d’une juste estime de soi ; la passion vertu de la générosité qui, incitant à préférer les autres à soi dans un amour d’amitié, peut tenir lieu de transposition philosophique de la charité chrétienne.Ainsi eucharistie et morale traduisent-elles deux grandes significations de l’accord, reflétant deux modalités d’articulation entre la philosophie cartésienne et le christianisme : d’un côté, la recherche d’une conformité au dogme ; de l’autre, la philosophie, se faisant plus ambitieuse, donne une compréhension du christianisme à partir de la manière dont elle interprète, selon ses propres présupposés, certains éléments partagés par la raison et la foi (Dieu et ses attributs, immortalité de l’âme, rapport à l’autre). A ce titre, la thèse entend renouveler les études sur la « pensée religieuse » de Descartes : le grand mérite de la pensée cartésienne est de mettre en oeuvre, sur la base d’une séparation préalable entre raison et foi, un accord qui ne se joue pas dans le même sens, tout en veillant à ne jamais outrepasser son domaine, en n’envisageant ni le salut ni la grâce, laissés à la théologie. / The thesis brings into light the manner in which Descartes considers the relationship between his philosophy and Christianity through showing that the Cartesian articulation of reason and faith finds its meaning in a non-contradictory separation which leads to an agreement. When analysing his work, Descartes appears as a philosopher who looks after to establish new concepts which conciliate with Christianity.The thesis focuses two fields of investigation to study the meaning of such an agreement and the relationship to Christianity that it involves. On one hand, there is the Cartesian Eucharistic theory: Descartes elaborates, in the light of his own physical principles, two explanations of the central sacrament of the Christian faith. The thesis points out the original purpose of the explanations. In brief, they are not only intended to supplant the scholastic model based on the Aristotelian principles but also to conform to the decrees of the Magisterium (the Council of Trent), amid protecting the Catholic dogma from Protestant attacks, bringing it a gain of rationality. On the other hand, there is the Cartesian morality, which is considered traditionally as absent of the Cartesian corpus. The thesis reconstructs the Cartesian moral theory using the Correspondence and Passions of the soul. Described as a "moral of contentment", due to the Philosophical research of “the happy life” here below, the Cartesian moral theory is divided into two axes. The first being the Sovereign Good, which consists in the right use of free will, and the second being the mastery of passions, where the keystone is the passion-virtue of generosity. The Cartesian moral theory manifests an effort to articulate with Christianity, which is illustrated in particular in several strong points which are analysed by the thesis: the Cartesian conception of providence in its general and particular dimension, and how it implies the free and joyful submission of the subject; the extent of the universe, which revokes anthropocentrism while celebrating the glory of God; the topic of the immortality of the soul, which opens up another life while valorising the current life; the image of God, which shines in the right use of free will, only source of the self-esteem; the passion of generosity, which incites one to prefer other people rather than the self in a love of friendship and can be a philosophical transposition of Christian charity.Thus Eucharist and moral translate two great meanings of the agreement, reflecting two modalitiesof articulation between Cartesian philosophy and Christianity. From one side, the search for conformity with dogma. From the other, philosophy, becoming more ambitious over time, gives an understanding of Christianity based on its own interpretation of some elements shared by reason and faith (God and his attributes, immortality of soul, relationship to other). For this reason, the thesis intends to renew the studies on the Descartes' religious thought: the great merit of Cartesian thought is to institute, on the basis of a prior separation between reason and faith, an agreement which has a variable meaning, while taking care not to go beyond his domain, Descartes giving up the salvation and the grace to theology.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / The history of Western civilisation is generally demarcated into three broad epochs: ancient, Christian and modern. These eras are usually defined in political terms, but they may also be differentiated in terms of fundamental differences in the nature of the organisations that constitute civil society in each age, how they defined the public good, and even what they consider philanthropic. In the nineteenth century, for instance, 'Scientific philanthropy' displaced 'Christian charity' as the dominant model for charitable giving; a development accompanied by a number of other secularising trends in Western civil society, generally understood as a broad cultural shift in conceptions of public good, from religious to scientific. From the fourth to the sixth century CE, by comparison, another broad cultural shift, from paganism to Christianity, also led to fundamental changes in the nature and composition of ancient civil society. A central premise of this dissertation is that fundamental historical transformations in Western civilisation – from pagan to Christian, to modern, to post-modern – may be traced to the influence of some of the most important philosophers in the Western philosophical tradition, among them: Protagoras, Socrates, Plato, Francis Bacon and Friedrich Nietzsche. Each of these philosophers may be seen to have promulgated their teachings in a consciously Promethean manner; as gifts of fire, understood as philosophical teachings intended to be promulgated for the wider benefit of humankind. In Greek myth, Prometheus, whose name is traditionally thought to have literally meant 'forethought', is the one who steals fire from the gods and gives it to humans. Prometheus is also the first figure in history to be described as "philanthropic" (Prometheus Bound, 11 & 28). Plato, Bacon and Nietzsche all employ significant variants of the Promethean mũthos in their philosophical works, and may be seen to personally identify with the figure of Prometheus, as an allegorical figure depicting the situation of the wise, particularly in relation to political power. This dissertation thus closely analyses the Promethean mũthos in order to cast light on the philosophical philanthrôpía and Promethean ambitions of Protagoras, Socrates and Plato, and to provide the basis for consideration of the same in Bacon and Nietzsche.

Philosophy is the quest for wisdom and hence it may share a common end with religion. Not all philosophies are, however, concerned with this end, nor, again are all religions involved with a quest for wisdom. There may be different techniques and tools employed in the accomplishment of wisdom, but this dissertation is concerned only with the study of the nature and use of reason. In the philosophy of Plato reason is employed in diverse fields including mathematics, myths, and elaborate analogies, but when he turns to reason itself, then it becomes important to this analysis. Reason may be utilized in other systems of thought, say in Aristotelian, but when it is functioning as the sole or paramount vehicle to the Good--then it is the subject for this paper and its contents will be examined. In the works of Plato, the use of reason in this sense is termed dialectic. The terms "philosophy" and "dialectic" are, of course, derived from the Greek. It is equally clear that a radical change has occurred in the meanings of these terms from the original formulation in the Hellenic Age to the present day. The primary and original meanings of these terms have been nearly eclipsed by modern usages and there is a confusion as to the basic meanings and content of these terms. This problem is further complicated by the tacit agreement that whatever is modern, or of late origin, must be better than what preceded it. Hence there is today a general reluctance to examine basic origins and classic sources. Contrary to this belief is the concept that every real advance is a result of returning to the basic origins and sources and redefining problems from this perspective. This work will base itself on the latter concept. The final object will be to re-examine the grounds and the extent to which philosophy can be termed dialectical. It is a request to reconsider philosophy in the terms of dialectic. A return to origins, in this case, is a return to the Greeks and the terms philosophy and dialectic will be defined with reference to the classic philosopher and dialectician - Plato. The Platonic concept of dialectic is to be utilized as a standard and basis of judging other systems that have been termed dialectical. Further, the work intends to reply to the criticism that philosophy, including philosophy as dialectic, has been superseded by religion since religion rather than philosophy can better insure the object of philosophy-- wisdom. Such a rejection of philosophy and dialectic must of course presuppose a familiarity with the process of the Platonic dialectic as well as its scope. Thus, a rejection, to be considered, must demonstrate a knowledge of Plato and an understanding of the dialectic. A decline of philosophy and dialectic based upon a valid criticism would be justified. On the other hand, it is important to discern the mechanism implicit in a denial of philosophy, as well as dialectic, in order to discern the consequences that follow from such a denial. Different systems of thought have been termed dialectic and those chosen for analysis will be examined to determine whether they advance the concept of dialectic as defined in the thesis, and if they do not, to see if it is possible to assign a cause. The deficiencies and inadequacies of the Platonic concept of philosophy as dialectic will also be shown and an attempt to correct this will be made by recourse to other traditions of thought. In the succeeding chapters, the analysis will include Augustine, Vico, Kant, Hegel, and Jung, as well as Gaudapada, Sankara, Nagarjuna, Confucius, and Lao Tzu. These authors have been chosen because of their use of dialectic and/or because they can contribute to the concept of dialectic as a philosophy as noted in this thesis. There is no intention to review or appraise any part of their work, except as regards their use of dialectic in selected instances. The philosophers are chosen to support and to illustrate the thesis of this dissertation. Therefore the task will be to define dialectic within the philosophy of Plato, to account for its decline or rejection, analyze some private definitions of dialectic, and to correct any shortcomings or inadequacies of dialectic.

Spanish Republican philosophers in exile defended the Second Republic, legally proclaimed on April 14, 1931. They embraced the anti-fascist cause rising in the 1920s and the 1930s in Europe. During the Civil War, which lasted three years, they stood among the people. 1939 saw the victory of General Francisco Franco, supported by Nazi Germany and the Italy of Mussolini. Threatened with death, they had no choice but to escape from Spain. Some intellectuals experienced French concentration camps but, for the most part, they found refuge in Latin America, especially in Mexico and Venezuela. In exile, they swore to remain loyal to the Second Republic and to the spirit of the Spanish people. Moved by liberal views and humane ideals, these philosophers belonged to the vanquished, as those everywhere in Europe who rose against Fascist barbarity. As a result, their respective works are still widely unknown today – despite relentless efforts made to promote their thought to a larger audience for over half a century. In addition to the historical context of crisis during the interwar period, the situation of Spanish philosophy itself is suggestive. Indeed, Spanish philosophy was institutionalised at the beginning of the twentieth century only: the Schools of Madrid and Barcelona were created. These politics of cultural and intellectual renovation are first bestowed upon the generation of philosophers I study, born in the 1900s. When the Spanish War erupts, they had become professionals of international recognition. This shows the actual limits of academic philosophy, incapable of acknowledging unorthodox ways of philosophising. The experience of exile itself serves in my opinion as a catalyst: Spanish Republican philosophers in exile seek emancipation from academic conventions to philosophise freely; that is, in Spanish and according to the spirit of the people. No doubt “poetic reason” – the true invention of Spanish Republican exile – stems from this ideal of autonomous thinking.

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Giovanni Boteros (1544-1617) treatise <i>The Reason of State</i> (1589) seemed somewhat uncharacteristic of sixteenth-century political thought, considering the pride of place given to economics in his text. The Age of Reformation constituted not only a period of new ideas on faith but also one of new political thinking, and as the research into the influences on Boteros economic thought progressed, I began to consider the period as one where economic thinking was becoming more common among theologians of the reforming churches and bureaucrats of the developing states. Having been trained in the schools of the Jesuits, Botero was exposed to one of the most potent and intellectually uniform of all the reforming movements of the period, and I argue it was here that he first considered economics as an aspect of moral philosophy. While it cannot be proven positively that Botero studied or even considered economics during his association with the Jesuits (roughly from 1559-1580), the fact that a number of those who shaped the Jesuit Order in its first few generations discussed economics in their own treatises leads one to a strong circumstantial conclusion that this is where the economic impulse first rose up in his thinking. Indeed, it was this background that readied Botero to consider economics as an important part of statecraft with his reading of Jean Bodins (1530-1596) <i>The Six Books of the Republic</i> (1576), in which economics is featured quite prominently. Bodins own economic theory was informed primarily by his experience as a bureaucrat in the Parlement of Paris, where questions on the value of the currency and on the kings ability to tax his subjects were in constant debate among the advocates. I argue further that, upon his reading of Bodins <i>Republic</i>, Botero saw how economics could be fused with politics, and he then set out to compose his own treatise on political economy (although he certainly would not have called it such). In <i>The Reason of State</i>, Botero brought his Jesuit conception of economic morality together with Bodins writings on political economy to create a work, neither wholly Jesuit nor wholly Bodinian, which in the end outlined an overall political and economic structure of society quite distinct from the sum of its parts.

Giovanni Boteros (1544-1617) treatise <i>The Reason of State</i> (1589) seemed somewhat uncharacteristic of sixteenth-century political thought, considering the pride of place given to economics in his text. The Age of Reformation constituted not only a period of new ideas on faith but also one of new political thinking, and as the research into the influences on Boteros economic thought progressed, I began to consider the period as one where economic thinking was becoming more common among theologians of the reforming churches and bureaucrats of the developing states. Having been trained in the schools of the Jesuits, Botero was exposed to one of the most potent and intellectually uniform of all the reforming movements of the period, and I argue it was here that he first considered economics as an aspect of moral philosophy. While it cannot be proven positively that Botero studied or even considered economics during his association with the Jesuits (roughly from 1559-1580), the fact that a number of those who shaped the Jesuit Order in its first few generations discussed economics in their own treatises leads one to a strong circumstantial conclusion that this is where the economic impulse first rose up in his thinking. Indeed, it was this background that readied Botero to consider economics as an important part of statecraft with his reading of Jean Bodins (1530-1596) <i>The Six Books of the Republic</i> (1576), in which economics is featured quite prominently. Bodins own economic theory was informed primarily by his experience as a bureaucrat in the Parlement of Paris, where questions on the value of the currency and on the kings ability to tax his subjects were in constant debate among the advocates. I argue further that, upon his reading of Bodins <i>Republic</i>, Botero saw how economics could be fused with politics, and he then set out to compose his own treatise on political economy (although he certainly would not have called it such). In <i>The Reason of State</i>, Botero brought his Jesuit conception of economic morality together with Bodins writings on political economy to create a work, neither wholly Jesuit nor wholly Bodinian, which in the end outlined an overall political and economic structure of society quite distinct from the sum of its parts.