FundaÃÃo Cearense de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cientifico e TecnolÃgico / Esse trabalho tem como objetivo estudar o conceito de guerra justa, a partir de uma anÃlise da filosofia polÃtica internacional do filÃsofo americano John Rawls. Tomaremos como base à obra Direito dos Povos (2001), e retomaremos alguns conceitos bÃsicos das demais obras, em especial Uma Teoria da JustiÃa (1971) e Liberalismo PolÃtico (1993). O nosso objetivo nessa dissertaÃÃo à examinar duas questÃes, a saber: I) Segundo os princÃpios de justiÃa do direito internacional de Rawls, se pode justificar uma intervenÃÃo militar? II) Existem casos em que fazer uma guerra à moralmente legitimo? Partiremos do conceito geral de guerra e apresentaremos o pensamento de quatro autores paradigmÃticos que abordaram esse tema, sÃo eles: Voltaire e sua visÃo humanitÃria de bases Iluministas; Kant e seu projeto de paz perpÃtua; Clausewitz e a guerra como caso excepcional da polÃtica; e Carl Schmitt e o conceito do polÃtico e o binÃmio amigo â inimigo. Os conceitos que abordaremos em Rawls sÃo: a) o de liberalismo polÃtico e a idÃia de pluralismo e tolerÃncia a eles atrelados; b) A concepÃÃo de liberalismo abrangente e o porque esse se diferencia do seu liberalismo polÃtico; c) A idÃia de posiÃÃo original, noÃÃo essencial para entender como se darà à sociedade dos povos e por que a guerra sà à justa quando travada por essa sociedade especÃfica. Finalmente, investigaremos essas perguntas a partir da retomada que Rawls faz de dois conceitos, a saber, Jus ad Bellum, isto Ã, justiÃa do guerrear, e do Jus in Bello, que em uma traduÃÃo imediata significa justiÃa no guerrear, ou seja, qual o comportamento moral que o soldado deve adotar em luta. / This work intends to study the concept of just war from an analysis of the political international philosophy of the American philosopher John Rawls. We will take like base the work Law of People (2001), and will retake some basic concepts of too many works, in special A Theory of the Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993). Our objective in this dissertation is to examine two questions: I) How the principle of justice of the international right of Rawls, justify a military intervention? II) Are there cases in which to do a war it is morally legitimize? Our star point is from the general concept of war and will present the thought of four authors paradigmatic what boarded this subject, and they are: Voltaire and his humane vision of bases Illuminists; Kant and his project of perpetual peace; Clausewitz and the war as exceptional case of the politics; Carl Schmitt and the concept of political and binomial friend â enemy. The concepts what we will board in Rawls are: a)the concept of political liberalism and the idea of pluralism and tolerance what they are harnessed to him; b) The conception of traditional liberalism and the difference of his political liberalism; c) The idea of original position, essential notion to understand why the war is just when is only made of âsociety of the peopleâ. Finally, we will investigate the questions from the recovering that Rawls does from the concept of Jus ad Bellum, what in an immediate translation is it Justice of the war, and therefore, answers which motives of going away to war. And Jus in Bello, whose translation would be a justice in waging war, in other words, which moral behaviour what the soldier must adopt in struggle.

The liberal tradition has borne great fruits since the dawn of the modern era by emphasizing the value of equality and personal liberty, and by developing a theory of rights. Despite its incredible success, many authors have been pointing to fissures in the liberal structure, including practical and theoretical problems with state neutrality, with the state’s stance vis-à-vis different cultures, and with liberalism’s purported radical individualism. It is my belief that the gains of liberalism can be reconciled within a new theory that better answers to such critiques. Citizenship Beyond Liberal Neutrality begins with an analysis of contemporary debate between liberalism and its critics. This leads to a discussion of the state’s relationship toward cultural identities, and to a discussion of the meaning of citizenship within a liberal-democratic state. What we need, I argue, is a civic identity that is both capable of judging cultural practices, and capacious enough for a citizenry characterized by reasonable pluralism. This common identity, moreover, provides a locus for attachment that is often found wanting in contemporary liberal theory. I draw on relevant insights from virtue theories, constitutional patriotism, and an ‘analogical’ understanding of public reason to inform a new, liberal-like conception of citizenship. In order to exemplify this conception, and to bolster the case for it, I consider how such a philosophy could play out with respect to two public policy areas that are central to citizenship, namely education and immigration. Distilled to its simplest, I argue for a theory of citizenship that admits a conception of the good, that can promote virtue while respecting autonomy, and that can provide a basis for civic unity.

No description available.

Ce mémoire explore la question des conséquences de l’interprétation rawlsienne du pluralisme éthique pour la légitimité de l’autonomie individuelle comme objectif d’éducation publique. Rawls (1993, 2003) soutient que seuls des objectifs éducatifs strictement politiques peuvent guider l’élaboration des politiques publiques en matière d’éducation obligatoire et justifier une intervention étatique dans l’éducation des enfants. Or, puisque Rawls définit l’autonomie individuelle comme un idéal éthique privé, il conclut qu’elle n’est pas un objectif légitime d’éducation publique. La thèse principale qui est défendue dans le cadre de ce mémoire est que Rawls est aveugle aux implications réelles de sa propre théorie politique en matière d’éducation commune, qui, contrairement à ce qu’il soutient, exigent précisément la promotion de l’autonomie individuelle comme idéal éthique (et non politique). Cette thèse remet en question le principe de neutralité de l’État envers toutes les doctrines éthiques, y compris l’idéal d’autonomie individuelle, qui caractérise et distingue la théorie rawlsienne des versions classiques du libéralisme. La deuxième partie de cette étude considère une stratégie possible pour sauver la neutralité du libéralisme politique, qui consiste à définir le concept d’autonomie individuelle de manière procédurale et éthiquement neutre. Ce chapitre montre que, indépendamment de la plausibilité strictement conceptuelle d’une telle caractérisation de l’autonomie individuelle, elle n’est pas appropriée au projet éducatif rawlsien, parce que celui-ci demande la valorisation de la pensée critique, et comporte donc un élément éthique incontournable. Enfin, la troisième partie de cette étude explore la problématique des moyens de promotion de l’autonomie individuelle et, plus spécifiquement, de la légitimité des écoles séparées religieuses. Elle soutient, d’un côté que l’école religieuse peut avoir une importante valeur instrumentale vis-à-vis du développement de l’autonomie individuelle, mais de l’autre côté, que l’école commune est nécessaire à un certain stade de développement. / This study explores the consequences of the rawlsian interpretation of ethical pluralism for the legitimacy of individual autonomy as a goal of public educational policies. Rawls (1993, 2003) affirms that the only educational goals that can legitimately justify public policies and the state’s intervention in children’s education are strictly political goals. Now, Rawls defines personal autonomy as a private ethical ideal. Therefore, he concludes that personal autonomy is not a legitimate goal of public education. The main thesis defended in this study is that Rawls fails to realize the implications of his own political theory for educational policies. His ideal of citizenship demands in fact a public promotion of individual autonomy. One effect of this thesis is to challenge the principle of the state’s neutrality towards all ethical doctrines, which characterizes and distinguishes Rawls’ theory from the classical versions of liberalism. The second part of the study considers an alternative strategy that aims at defending the principle of neutrality by redefining the very concept of personal autonomy in procedural and non-ethical terms. However, this study shows that, independently of its conceptual plausibility, a purely procedural notion of personal autonomy is not appropriate in the context of the rawlsian educational project. Rawls’ political theory demands in fact the valorization of the practice of autonomy and involves thereby an unavoidable ethical partiality for certain ways of life. Finally, the third part of this study explores the normative debate about the means needed for the promotion of personal autonomy in public education. More specifically, it focuses on the question of the legitimacy of religious schools. It argues, on the one hand, that religious schools can play an important instrumental role for the development of personal autonomy, but that, on the other hand, common schooling is, at the certain stage, necessary for a full development of children’s personal autonomy within a pluralistic society.

Ce mémoire de maitrise propose de faire une analyse féministe du concept de droit de la femme tel qu’il est conçu dans les théories des droits humains. Le paradigme libéral en théorie des droits humains sera critiqué parce qu’il contient des idéalisations inégalitaires. Cela mènera à aborder la question sous l’angle de droits humains spécifiques aux femmes. Cette investigation commencera par l’examen de la possibilité théorique de produire une théorie des droits de la femme plausible. L’importance de tenir compte des conditions non idéales du monde sera soulignée. Puis, une argumentation en faveur de droits socioéconomiques spécifiques sera faite. Enfin, cela mènera à une défense de l’approche des capabilités de Martha Nussbaum pour la protection des intérêts particuliers des femmes. / The purpose of this master thesis is to analyze the concept of women’s rights as human rights from a feminist perspective. The liberal paradigm of human rights theory will be criticised because it leads to idealizations that contribute to gender inequalities. We will address the issue by considering women’s rights as specific human rights. This inquiry will start with the possibility to produce a plausible theoretical account of women’s rights. In order to do this, non-ideal conditions will be emphasized. We will then defend social and economic rights as means to protect women’s interests. Lastly, we will favour Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as a theory able to protect the specific interests of women.

Pour de nombreux architectes du libéralisme politique contemporain, la neutralité constitue une caractéristique définitionnelle du libéralisme politique. Il est pourtant clair que ces nouvelles formulations du libéralisme ne sont pas exemptes de tout présupposé substantiel. Le libéralisme politique de Rawls, par exemple, accorde de la valeur aux notions de liberté, d'égalité et d'équité. Comment la présence de tels présupposés substantiels est-elle conciliable avec la prétention à la neutralité ? Tel est le problème qui est à l'origine de ce travail de recherche. Pour le résoudre, un vaste travail d'explicitation des présupposés du libéralisme, et plus particulièrement du libéralisme politique de John Rawls, ainsi qu'une étude critique du terme « neutralité » ont été réalisés. Avec Rawls, contre une conception procédurale de la neutralité, je défends la neutralité des justifications et démontre qu'elle constitue la conception de la neutralité la plus plausible. Une justification neutre est définie comme justification fondée sur des conceptions communes, c'est-à-dire partagées. Se pose alors la question de la justification de ces présupposés substantiels tenus pour communs. J'indique comment, chez Rawls, la question de la justification reçoit une réponse conceptuelle. Rawls résout cette question en soutenant une conception cohérentiste de la justification et en développant un certain nombre de concepts innovants, au premier rang desquels l'équilibre réfléchi, dont je défends une conception extensive. Si puissants que soient ces outils conceptuels, dans la mesure où les présupposés du libéralisme sont considérés comme étant implicites dans la culture politique publique, ces présupposés semblent néanmoins appeler une autre forme de justification : une justification herméneutique. Si les présupposés du libéralisme sont le résultat d'une interprétation, il faut être capable de rendre raison de cette interprétation. La deuxième partie de ce travail se met en quête d'une telle justification herméneutique, en se fondant sur l'hypothèse qu'elle est disponible dans les travaux que Rawls consacre à l'histoire de la philosophie : les Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy et les Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. Pour de nombreux architectes du libéralisme politique contemporain, la neutralité constitue une caractéristique définitionnelle du libéralisme politique. Il est pourtant clair que ces nouvelles formulations du libéralisme ne sont pas exemptes de tout présupposé substantiel. Le libéralisme politique de Rawls, par exemple, accorde de la valeur aux notions de liberté, d'égalité et d'équité. Comment la présence de tels présupposés substantiels est-elle conciliable avec la prétention à la neutralité ? Tel est le problème qui est à l'origine de ce travail de recherche. Pour le résoudre, un vaste travail d'explicitation des présupposés du libéralisme, et plus particulièrement du libéralisme politique de John Rawls, ainsi qu'une étude critique du terme « neutralité » ont été réalisés. Avec Rawls, contre une conception procédurale de la neutralité, je défends la neutralité des justifications et démontre qu'elle constitue la conception de la neutralité la plus plausible. Une justification neutre est définie comme justification fondée sur des conceptions communes, c'est-à-dire partagées. Se pose alors la question de la justification de ces présupposés substantiels tenus pour communs. J'indique comment, chez Rawls, la question de la justification reçoit une réponse conceptuelle. Rawls résout cette question en soutenant une conception cohérentiste de la justification et en développant un certain nombre de concepts innovants, au premier rang desquels l'équilibre réfléchi, dont je défends une conception extensive. Si puissants que soient ces outils conceptuels, dans la mesure où les présupposés / Many supporters of political liberalism consider that neutrality is part of the definition of liberalism. Yet, it is obvious that these new forms of liberalism are not free from substantive presuppositions. Rawls's political liberalism, as an example, values freedom, equality and fairness. But how can such substantive commitments be compatible with the claim for neutrality?This problem is the starting point of this thesis. To solve it, I work to make the presuppositions of liberalism explicit, especially those of Rawls's political liberalism, and I carry out a critical study of the word “neutrality”. With Rawls and against a procedural conception of neutrality, I support a conception of neutrality as justificatory neutrality, which I consider the most believable conception of neutrality. A neutral justification is defined as a justification which is based on shared conceptions. So, the question to be answered is the question of the justification of these substantive presuppositions, which are taken for shared. I study how Rawls gives a conceptual answer to the question of justification. Rawls answers this question supporting a coherentist conception of justification and developing innovative concepts, such as the concept of reflective equilibrium, of which I support an extensive conception. However convincing these concepts may be and because Rawls considers that the liberal presuppositions are implicit in the public political culture, it seems to me that these presuppositions call for another form of justification: a hermeneutic justification. If the presuppositions are the final result of an interpretation, this interpretation has to be justified. The second part of this thesis looks for such a hermeneutic justification. Its main assumption is that such a justification can be found in Rawls's works on the history of philosophy: the Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy and the Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy.

Submitted by Mariana Dornelles Vargas (marianadv) on 2015-05-25T13:13:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 limites_poder.pdf: 616577 bytes, checksum: e88198cf15501e8ecad229a062c084ff (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-25T13:13:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 limites_poder.pdf: 616577 bytes, checksum: e88198cf15501e8ecad229a062c084ff (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / Nenhuma / A partir de um caso ocorrido no ano de 2006, em um estabelecimento comercial denominado Bar Tuim, no centro da cidade de Porto Alegre, Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil, em que frequentadores entraram em disputa física com agentes da Prefeitura Municipal em torno da interpretação do alcance de uma lei de polícia administrativa, esta dissertação apresenta critérios para definição de limites do poder de polícia frente ao direito à liberdade individual inscrito na Constituição Federal. O caso concreto conduz a uma hipótese de fato, qual seja, a de que há um novo paradigma existencial na sociedade contemporânea, que se denominou paradigma existencial dos hábitos saudáveis, caracterizado como uma supervalorização dos cuidados com a saúde como modo de vida. O pressuposto deste trabalho é justamente o de que esse novo paradigma existencial vem pondo em marcha sucessivas e crescentes proibições no terreno atinente aos hábitos individuais, tendentes a limitar a liberdade individual das pessoas. O novo paradigma existencial é examinado à luz de várias teorias que procuram explicar a realidade contemporânea. Para definir critérios aptos a delinear limites ao instituto do poder de polícia, recorre-se à disciplina da filosofia política para, a partir de conceitos próprios desta, aportar elementos de conteúdo para construir critérios para a definição de limites. Esses elementos de conteúdo são elencados a partir da escola do liberalismo político europeu do século XIX, do liberalismo político contemporâneo e da filosofia política norte-americana. Partindo dessa hipótese de fato, procuraremos estabelecer critérios para a definição de limites à ação do Estado no que se refere a proibições relativas aos hábitos individuais. A presente dissertação é também uma contribuição à crítica a determinados aspectos do modo de vida contemporâneo, no que se refere à supervalorização dos hábitos saudáveis. / After an event held in the year of 2006, at Bar Tuim, a business premise, located at downtown of Porto Alegre, Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, in which customers disagreed with Porto Alegre Council employees about the interpretation of an administrative police law scope, this paper presents some criterion for the definition of the police power boundaries in what refers to the right of personal freedom in Brazil Federal constitution. The present case leds us to the hypothesis that there is a new existential paradigm in the contemporary society which refers to healthy habits and is characterized as an overvaluation of heath care as a way of life. This work assumption is exactly that this new existential paradigm is raising sucessive and growing prohibitions in the field of individual habits, which might limitate our individual freedom. We analyzed this new existential paradigm using many theories which intend to explain the contemporary reality. In order to define some criteria useful for drawing the boundaries of the police power institute, we have appealed to the discipline of political philophy so that we can through its concepts access some elements important to develop criteria for defining these boundaries. These content elements can be seen in the political liberalism from the European school of the nineteenth century, in the contemporary political liberalism, and in the North American political philosophy. Through this hypothesis we intend to establish some criteria in the definition of boundaries to the States actions in what refers to prohibitions related to individual habits. This paper also intends to be a contribution to the critic raised to several aspects in our contemporary way of live, as the overvaluation of healthy habits.

<p>With an estimated 250 ethnic groups, Nigeria, no doubt, has been grappling with the problem of pluralism of ethnic nationalities. It is not news in Nigeria that extreme ethnic consciousness of its citizens has led to the victimization of one ethnic group by another. This victimization has come in the form of exclusions in the distribution of both wealth and power in the country.</p><p>Amidst all the exclusions, the unity of the country has been ironically regarded as sacrosanct, and should not be negotiated. It is often said that fate brought all the ethnic nationalities in order to form one great country. I subscribe to this belief that fate brought us together for the above purpose, especially now that several countries around the world are merging in one way or the other to form a formidable force to reckon with both politically and economically. Hence, “(ethnic integration) is the integration of capabilities. It develops the capabilities of the workforce… it offers opportunities for better synergy of skills”. However, it would be ethically unhealthy for the unity of the country not to be compromised under the present dispensation, which has been compromising in turn the basic moral principle of social justice. There cannot be any moral basis for the continued existence of a country like Nigeria, which as it were, has thrown equality of all citizens to the dogs.</p><p>Should the country remain united, it must do so by imbibing the culture of regarding all citizens, as well as, all ethnic nationalities as equal, and none should have more privileges than the others. Therefore, how can a plural society like Nigeria remain united as one indivisible country?</p><p>Rawls has offered some solutions to the problem of stability engendered by the pluralism of ethnic groups in Nigeria. His idea of ‘overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines’ in his Political Liberalism is capable of bringing back the country to the state of stability. There will be stability, if all forms of exclusion seize to exist in the Nigerian polity.</p>

With an estimated 250 ethnic groups, Nigeria, no doubt, has been grappling with the problem of pluralism of ethnic nationalities. It is not news in Nigeria that extreme ethnic consciousness of its citizens has led to the victimization of one ethnic group by another. This victimization has come in the form of exclusions in the distribution of both wealth and power in the country. Amidst all the exclusions, the unity of the country has been ironically regarded as sacrosanct, and should not be negotiated. It is often said that fate brought all the ethnic nationalities in order to form one great country. I subscribe to this belief that fate brought us together for the above purpose, especially now that several countries around the world are merging in one way or the other to form a formidable force to reckon with both politically and economically. Hence, “(ethnic integration) is the integration of capabilities. It develops the capabilities of the workforce… it offers opportunities for better synergy of skills”. However, it would be ethically unhealthy for the unity of the country not to be compromised under the present dispensation, which has been compromising in turn the basic moral principle of social justice. There cannot be any moral basis for the continued existence of a country like Nigeria, which as it were, has thrown equality of all citizens to the dogs. Should the country remain united, it must do so by imbibing the culture of regarding all citizens, as well as, all ethnic nationalities as equal, and none should have more privileges than the others. Therefore, how can a plural society like Nigeria remain united as one indivisible country? Rawls has offered some solutions to the problem of stability engendered by the pluralism of ethnic groups in Nigeria. His idea of ‘overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines’ in his Political Liberalism is capable of bringing back the country to the state of stability. There will be stability, if all forms of exclusion seize to exist in the Nigerian polity.

In this essay, I aim to elucidate a concept of public justification. I outline several challenges faced by political philosophers, including a desire to secure stability and treat people respectfully against a background of reasonable pluralism. I suggest that John Rawls‟ account of public reason provides a helpful starting point for accomplishing these goals. But critics have been both persistent and persuasive in their objections to public reason‟s central element of reasons all can accept. I explicate three dominant criticisms: incomprehensibility, attenuation and exclusion. First, some critics have argued that the very idea of reasons all can accept cannot be plausibly articulated. Second, critics maintain that the set of reasons all can accept is insufficiently robust to solve constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. Third, critics note that if public justification is constrained by reasons all can accept, then many informative and effective arguments must be excluded from the public sphere. In response to these criticisms, I argue for an interpretation of reasons all can accept which is sensitive to critics‟ reasonable demand for an explicit account of each element of the doctrine. My interpretation demonstrates the superfluity of what I call the sharability constraint—the thesis that only reasons acceptable to all can function as justifications in the public sphere. Once the sharability constraint is rejected, I argue that the problem of exclusion dissipates, but that substantive restrictions on acceptable reasons are still possible. I am optimistic that this approach is less attenuating than one constrained by sharability and that, at least under favourable empirical conditions, more problems can be resolved by this approach than by standard Rawlsian theory. I draw on actual convergence in the international realm to bolster this optimism. Finally, I relate this approach to the widespread influence of deliberative democracy. I argue that procedural apparatuses are insufficient for political legitimacy, but that deliberation may be an invaluable tool for uncovering reasons required by substantive justification. / Graduate