Évènement exceptionnel, les attentats du 11 septembre ont marqué l'entrée de la politique mondiale dans l'ère de la crise du jihadisme international. Si l'apparition de la menace jihadiste est antérieure à 2001, l'attaque qaidiste perpétrée à l'encontre des États-Unis a en effet représenté un saut qualitatif d'envergure, en ce qu'elle a été synonyme d'agression commise par des acteurs privés aucœur de l'hyperpuissance d'après-Guerre froide, et en ce qu'elle a constitué le point de départ d'un essor considérable du péril jihadiste. De la destruction du World Trade Center aux attentats du 13 novembre, en passant par le rapt des lycéennes de Chibok ou l'érection de l'État islamique, le jihadisme en est ainsi arrivé à représenter un défi protéiforme et véritablement global. Ciblesprivilégiées des forces jihadistes, les démocraties libérales occidentales ont dès lors répondu à ce challenge en s'engageant dans une « guerre contre le terrorisme » aux facettes multiples (interventions armées, mesures antiterroristes, etc.). Si plusieurs intellectuels d'extrême gauche, inscrits dans une perspective de critique du libéralisme politique, ont considéré, en s'inspirant de la réflexion de Carl Schmitt, que les États occidentaux contemporains sont plongés dans un étatd'exception permanent, dont la lutte contre le jihadisme a constitué soit le déclencheur, soit le révélateur, nous estimons pour notre part, que cette thèse ne permet tout simplement pas de se faire une idée exacte des retombées juridico-politiques de l'anti-jihadisme post-11 septembre. D'où la nécessité de la discuter en procédant à l'étude approfondie des éléments contextuels et principiels auxquels elle renvoie. / Outstanding event, September 11 attacks marked the entrance of the world politics to the era of the threat of the international jihadism. If the appearance of this threat is previous in 2001, the qaidiste attack committed against the United States indeed represented a large-scale qualitative jump, in the fact that it was synonymic of aggression committed by private actors at the heart of the cold postwar hyperpower, and in the fact that it constitued the starting point of a considerable development of the jihadist danger. From the spectacular destruction of the World Trade Center to the attacks of November 13th, via the kidnapping of the high school students of Chibok or the erection of the Islamic State, the jihadism came to represent a really global challenge, in the forms as diverse asvaried. Privileged targets of the Jihadist strengths, the western liberal democracies have then answered this challenge by making a commitment in a multifaceted ''war against the terrorism'' (military interventions, antiterrorist measures, etc.). If several extreme left-wing intellectuals, registered in a perspective of critic of the political liberalism, considered, by being inspired by Carl Schmitt's reflection, that the contemporary western States are plunged into a permanent state of exception, which the fight against the jihadism constitued either the trigger, or the revelation, we consider for our part, that this thesis does not simply allow to be made an exact idea of the legal and political effects of the post-September 11's anti-jihadism. Where from the necessity of discussing it by proceeding to the in-depth study of the context and the principles to which refers.

This study investigates the subject of Muslims’ citizenship in contemporary Western European societies from the viewpoint of John Rawls’s political liberalism, in particular in light of the ‘idea of public reason’ [see John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) and the 1997 essay “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” originally published in University of Chicago Law Review 64 (1997), 765-807 and now included in Political Liberalism, expanded edition, 440-490]. By its very nature, political liberalism does not prescribe a single model for being Muslim in contemporary Europe. Thus, one may wonder if it is too vague as a point of departure for the analysis. On the other hand, however, here I argue that political liberalism specifies a peculiar evaluative framework that allows citizens to answer questions such as “What is politically at stake when citizens of Muslim faith are publicly presented as permanent aliens in contemporary European societies?”, “On what grounds is such exclusion based?”, and “What requirements can European citizens be reasonably expected to meet?” in a distinctively political way and, ideally, to solve the political and social problems from which those questions spring. In this research, I claim that public reason provides a common discursive platform that establishes the ground for a public political identity and for shared standards for social and political criticism. Together, these two elements solve the two dimensions of the problem of ‘stability for the right reasons’ (in Rawls’s terms) in contemporary European societies, because they secure both the political inclusion of Muslims on an equal footing as citizens and civic assurance that they will remain committed to fair terms of social cooperation. A joint solution of these two apparently conflicting demands of stability for the right reasons (i.e. inclusion and mutual assurance) requires an effort in political reconciliation. After having compared public reason citizenship with two prominent normative alternatives, I will conclude that the former is an adequate ideal conception of citizenship for European societies. Finally, I will apply the justificatory evaluative methodological framework (whose requirements I will specify starting from the idea of public reason itself) to a conception of citizenship elaborated by one of the most renowned Muslim public intellectuals in Europe: Tariq Ramadan. (I justify the choice of this author in sections 2.3 and 6.1). Such an evaluation sheds light on one of the main insights of this research, that is, the idea that public reason makes a decompression of the public space possible: it frees the public space from those forces that would prevent citizens from the possibility of exercising effectively their two moral powers (once more in Rawls’s words, the ‘capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good’) as free equals. In this sense, public reason tries to reconcile ideal political consensus and the fact of reasonable pluralism on a public political ground. I believe that this is the deepest meaning of what Rawls calls ‘reconciliation through public reason’: its aspiration is to reabsorb reasonable pluralism politically without annihilating it.This research is structured in three parts: the first is methodological, the second is reconstructive, and the third is evaluative. Each part is composed of two chapters.In chapter one (“General Framework”), I begin from some empirical observations about the role of perceptions and identities in relation to the issue of Muslims’ citizenship in contemporary Europe. I claim that from this point of view Islam seems to “make problem” in a very specific sense. This does not mean that Islam is a problem, but that Islam is frequently publicly presented and perceived as a problem. This is the background problem from which my work starts. Thus, I explore some dimensions of such a problem (see 1.1). Subsequently, I provide a more specific formulation of the research problem and questions and of the aims of this study. Then, the main research question (Q) is stated in these terms: Which ideal conception of citizenship should provide the common normative perspective in contemporary Western European societies, which are characterised by both demands of inclusion of Muslims and the need for solving a ‘problem of mutual assurance’ [on which, see in particular Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)] concerning citizens’ commitment to shared terms of social cooperation, so that those societies can be stable for the right reasons? In order to answer this question, I also specify three sub-questions that I call respectively Q1, Q2, and Q3 (see 1.2).In chapter two (“Toward a Justificatory Evaluative Political Theory”), I firstly try to frame the problem of public justification within Rawls’s political liberalism (see 2.1). I then consider a specific approach to the question of Muslim citizenship in liberal democracies which can be adopted from a Rawlsian perspective: namely, reasoning from conjecture (see 2.2). Finally, I explain my own approach (which I call justificatory evaluative political theory) by means of comparison with the method of reasoning from conjecture (see 2.3). In presenting the evaluative framework specified from a political liberal standpoint, I point out three political liberal evaluative requirements: the reciprocity requirement (RR), the consistency requirement (CR), and the civility requirement (CiR).Chapter three (“What is Public Reason?”) deals with the history of the notion of public reason from Kant to Rawls and its enunciation within Rawls’s work (see 3.1 and 3.2 respectively). In doing so, I also identify three specifications for the three political liberal evaluative requirements considered in the second chapter. Furthermore, in chapter three I also unpack CR in three different dimensions (PR1, PR2, and PR3).Chapter four (“Public Reason and Religion. Reinterpreting the Duty of Civility”) completes the reconstructive stage by analysing Rawls’s ‘wide view’ of public reason and two major lines of objection to it (see 4.1). After having discussed such criticisms, I then introduce my own interpretation of the ‘proviso,’ which is structured around a two-level (or bifurcate) model of the ‘duty of civility’ (see 4.2).Chapter five (“Reconciliation through Public Reason: Justificatory Evaluative Political Theory between Modelling and Application”) bridges the second and the third part, that is, the reconstructive and the evaluative stage respectively. In the first section of the chapter, I summarise the political liberal evaluative requirements developed in the second part. In doing this, my purpose is to present my justificatory evaluative model of public reason citizenship (see 5.1). In the second section, I firstly argue that a conception of citizenship grounded in public reason is not only possible in existing European societies, but also preferable if compared with alternative conceptions (I consider liberal multiculturalism and Cécile Laborde’s critical republicanism [Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)]) with reference to the problem under scrutiny in this research. In conclusion, I show that public reason citizenship is able to solve the theoretical problem and the main research question mentioned above: Which ideal conception of citizenship should provide the common normative perspective in contemporary Western European societies, which are characterised by both demands of inclusion of Muslims and the need for solving a problem of mutual assurance concerning citizens’ commitment to shared terms of social cooperation, so that those societies can be stable for the right reasons? In the final part of chapter five, I try to demonstrate that public reason citizenship can both include Muslim citizens and solve the assurance problem because it provides both shared standards for political criticism and a common political identity on the basis of which citizens politically recognise one another as free equals. If my argument succeeds, then public reason citizenship not only could but also should be adopted as the ideal conception of citizenship in European societies (see 5.2).In the sixth chapter (“Tariq Ramadan’s European Muslims and Public Reason”) I apply the evaluative framework based on public reason to the conception of citizenship for Muslims in Europe developed by Tariq Ramadan. (According to a principle introduced in chapter two which I call the “plausibility principle” PP, I argue that Ramadan’s theory of citizenship can be plausibly presented as a “European Muslim” approach to the issue of citizenship, see 6.1). The purpose of such an evaluative work is twofold. Firstly, it aims at examining whether and how the idea of public reason accounts for a version of European citizenship for Muslims coming from Muslims themselves. Secondly, it aims at disclosing whether what such a Muslim conception of citizenship in Europe says about the two dimensions of ‘stability for the right reasons’ of the system of social cooperation (namely, inclusion and ‘mutual assurance’) is consistent with the provisions of public reason citizenship (see 6.2-6.5). / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / N.B. 1) Le lieu de défense de la thèse en cotutelle est ROME (Luiss Guido Carli)2) L'affiliation du co-promoteur de la thèse en cotutelle (Sebastiano Maffettone) est: LUISS Guido Carli / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

L’objectif principal de ce mémoire est de proposer un modèle d’intégration qui permettrait de concilier au Québec les deux impératifs que sont le besoin d’affirmation nationale et la reconnaissance du pluralisme. Nous croyons que le modèle interculturaliste développé au Québec et théorisé notamment par Gérard Bouchard constitue un bon point de départ, mais qu’il faut néanmoins ajuster le tir. L’approche de Bouchard est sociohistorique et culturelle. Or, c’est l’avenue politique qu’il faut selon nous emprunter. Pour que l’interculturalisme favorise le développement d’un nationalisme inclusif, il doit permettre de dégager un espace de citoyenneté spécifique au Québec. Puisque la nation québécoise est non souveraine, un tel espace de citoyenneté implique de reconnaître non seulement les individus, mais aussi le peuple. Il faut donc revoir les fondements philosophiques de l’interculturalisme pour que ce modèle soit en mesure de prendre en charge à la fois les droits individuels et les droits collectifs. Pour ce faire, nous devons nous tourner vers la conception de la reconnaissance des individus et des peuples développée par Michel Seymour. Le premier chapitre se veut une analyse et une synthèse de la conception de la reconnaissance de Seymour, qui s’inscrit dans le cadre du libéralisme politique développé par Rawls. Le deuxième chapitre vise à refonder l’interculturalisme dans les bases théoriques développées par Seymour. Nous commençons par défendre, avec Seymour, une conception sociopolitique de la nation québécoise, puis nous montrons que la possibilité d’un espace de citoyenneté spécifique au Québec est tributaire de la reconnaissance pleine et entière de la nation québécoise par l’État canadien englobant. Nous présentons ensuite l’interculturalisme dans sa version politique et examinons le modèle de laïcité développé par Seymour et Gosselin-Tapp en tant que cas de figure de ce modèle d’intégration. Refonder l’interculturalisme sur des bases politiques permet finalement de contribuer au débat opposant l’interculturalisme au multiculturalisme. L’interculturalisme se distingue du multiculturalisme en tant que modèle d’intégration permettant de dégager un espace de citoyenneté propre aux sociétés politiques non souveraines. Ce faisant, l’interculturalisme révèle un potentiel universel et se veut un modèle d’intégration fait sur mesure pour les nations sociopolitiques comme le Québec, l’Écosse ou la Catalogne. / The main objective of this essay is to propose a model for integration that could reconcile Québec’s two imperatives that are the need for national assertion and the recognition of pluralism. We believe that the interculturalism model, developed in Québec and theorized by Gérard Bouchard especially, constitutes a good starting point. However, we need to make adjustments. Bouchard’s approach is social, historical and cultural. Yet it is the political approach we need to engage into. In order to stimulate the development of an inclusive nationalism, interculturalism has to draw a citizenship space that is specific to Québec. Since the Québec nation isn’t sovereign, such a citizenship space entails the recognition not only of individuals but also of the nation itself. Hence it is necessary to review the philosophical roots of interculturalism in order for it to take into account not only individual rights, but also collective rights. To do so, we need to focus on Michel Seymour’s notion of recognition of individuals and nations. The first chapter analyzes and summarizes Seymour’s notion of recognition, which is developed in the framework of Rawl’s political liberalism. The second chapter aims to rebuild interculturalism on Seymour’s theoretical bases. We begin by defending, with Seymour, the Québec nation as a sociopolitical nation. We then defend that the possibility of a specific citizenship space for Québec depends on the Canadian State’s recognition of the Québec nation. The following step consists in elaborating the political version of interculturalism and then in examining the model of secularism developed by Seymour and Gosselin-Tapp as resulting from it. Finally, rebuilding interculturalism onto political bases enables to contribute to the debate between interculturalism and multiculturalism. Interculturalism distinguishes itself from multiculturalism as an integration model that draws specific citizenship spaces for non-sovereign political societies. In doing so, interculturalism reveals a universal potential in constituing a tailored approach for sociopolitical nations like Québec, Scotland or Catalonia.

<p dir="ltr">In my dissertation, “Scanlonian Contractualism and Animals,” I take T.M. Scanlon’s ethical contractualism, convert it into a political theory, and apply it to deriving the duties of justice we owe to nonhuman animals. Here is the narrative structure of my dissertation. First, I argue in chapter 1 that nonhuman animals should be included within the scope of morality, or justice, as contractualism construes this notion. Animals are some of the “others” to whom we owe duties, particularly duties of justice. To this effect, I defend a revised version of the argument from marginal cases. </p><p dir="ltr">Second, I tell the reader how contractualism works in detail in chapters 2 and 3, making modifications and conversions into political philosophy along the way. Crucial for my discussion will be the debate between Derek Parfit and Scanlon over issues such as how to take numbers into account within contractualism. Scanlon’s considered view is that personal reasons should be added up to determine what we ought to do, but this is not the aggregation of impersonal value, for example, as in utilitarianism.</p><p dir="ltr">In chapter 4, a major step taken is the conversion of political contractualism into a form of Rawlsian political liberalism. Political liberalism takes the fact of reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines on life’s important questions as a permanent feature of liberal democracy. In order to address this pluralism, political liberalism seeks to provide a political conception of justice that can be endorsed by people who differ on fundamental ethical, philosophical, and religious matters. My version of animal rights contractualism adopts this framework, but it takes work to show how animal rights and political liberalism are compatible.</p><p dir="ltr">Third, in chapter 5, a neutral metric for the harm of death will be suggested, following the requirements of political liberalism to offer a political conception of various aspects of our theories. This needs to be done because the harm of death is a complex, contested philosophical issue. The contractors need this metric to figure out what burdens are imposed by death. A neutral metric is meant to be one that can be endorsed by adherents of different comprehensive philosophical viewpoints in an overlapping consensus.</p><p dir="ltr">Fourth, and finally, some of the specific political duties we have to nonhuman animals will be stated. I survey some of the most common topics that are usually explored here, such as factory-farming, medical research, and hunting. The hope is that at the end of the work, the reader will be convinced that contractualism provides a plausible account of what we owe to each animal.</p>

羅爾斯於一九九三年發表《政治自由主義》，試圖為多元社會的整合提供一套哲學基礎。羅爾斯認為價值的差異與分歧是當代社會的重要特徵，多元的宗教觀、哲學觀、道德觀、人生觀是一個既存的事實，然而合理的公民能夠形成「交疊共識」，支持一套政治性正義觀，作為規範社會基本結構的基礎。尤其在面對憲政核心爭議與基本正義問題時，合理的公民能夠擱置具爭議性的整全性學說，遵循公共理性的理念，根據同一套政治性正義觀所提供的政治價值與正義原則來解決爭議、凝聚共識、證成決策。不過，羅爾斯的公共理性論受到許多批評，其至少面臨「公共理性無法證成政治共識」、「公共理性不公平地排除整全性學說」、「公共理性是多種而非一種」、「公共理性將淪為膚淺的大眾理性」四種挑戰，此四種挑戰分別是對於公共理性之「完備性」、「公平性」、「單一性」、「公共性」的質疑。針對這些挑戰，羅爾斯對其理論進行了三項主要修正：第一，以「寬觀點公共理性」與「包含式公共理性」補充「排除式公共理性」。第二，公共理性的內容是由一整套「自由主義政治性正義觀之族系」所給定，「正義即公平」也只是諸多合理的政治性正義觀之一。第三，羅爾斯承認公共理性的侷限，然而在必要時，得以「基於公共理性的投票」做出決策。根據這些修正，筆者認為羅爾斯的公共理性論能夠回應「完備性」、「公平性」、「單一性」三方面的挑戰，但是仍無法完全解決「完備性」的問題。因此在本文中，筆者試圖以「寬觀點公共理性」與「廣泛的反思均衡」證成「羅爾斯式的審議理論」，以突破公共理性的限制。尤其是筆者認為，「羅爾斯式審議理論」具有「公共證成的審議模式」、「尊重民主文化」、「兼顧程序正義與實質正義」、「滿足『真誠要求』」、「強化公民意識」、「重視公共理由」等特質，體現了一種自由主義式的審議式民主理論。因此，當我們思索「多元社會的政治共識如何可能？」時，「羅爾斯式審議理論」是一項較合理的方案。 / This dissertation intends to explore John Rawls’s idea of public reason. Public reason is the core conception of Rawls’s political liberalism. Its subject is the public good concerning questions of fundamental political justice. Rawls argues that, though value diversity is the fact of a modern democratic society, reasonable citizens will follow a political conception of justice endorsed by the overlapping consensus between different kinds of comprehensive doctrines in order to resolve the deep conflicts. Especially, when the problems about constitutional essentials and basic justice occur, reasonable citizens will abide by the idea of public reason to deal with the problems. The idea of public reason is helpful for us to justify political consensus in a pluralistic society. However, some philosophers challenge the idea of public reason. They criticize that the idea of public reason cannot deal with the hard issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and affirmative action. Faced with these criticisms, Rawls revises his theory in three aspects. First, he revises the exclusive view of public reason by the inclusive view of public reason and the wide view of public reason. Secondly, he argues that the content of public reason is given by a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice. Thirdly, he asserts that we can make a political decision by voting in accordance with the idea of public reason if it is necessary. But, these revisions seems cannot completely overcome the shortcoming of the theory of public reason. Therefore, I want to justify Rawlsian deliberative theory based on the wide view of public reason and the wide reflective equilibrium to overcome the shortcoming of the idea of public reason. Owing to Rawlsian deliberative theory can reconcile liberalism and deliberative democracy, strengthen our civic friendship, and urge us to value public reasons more, I think it is a more plausible theory to justify political consensus in a modern pluralistic society.