Tendo como premissas teóricas o liberalismo político e os limites internos da atuação do Estado, este estudo pretende ser uma contribuição à crítica do paternalismo jurídico, na medida em que traz para o debate constitucional contemporâneo uma categoria pouco estudada no direito brasileiro. O paternalismo existe se um agente estatal exerce o poder sobre um indivíduo, por meio de uma ação governamental, com a finalidade de evitar que o indivíduo pratique ações privadas ou se omita de tal forma a causar danos, ou risco de danos, a si mesmo. A partir da Constituição de 1988, os direitos fundamentais, em especial a autonomia individual, voltaram a ser levados a sério. Pouco a pouco, as questões morais controvertidas ganham espaço na mídia e nos tribunais. Essas questões exigem dos intérpretes uma nova hermenêutica. A leitura moral da constituição é o método interpretativo que traz a moralidade política para o centro do direito constitucional. Como a Constituição Federal de 1988 está vazada numa linguagem jurídica extremamente abstrata, é preciso recorrer a princípios morais abstratos, usados como limites aos poderes do Estado. Essa leitura moral da Constituição consagra o princípio central contra o paternalismo: cada indivíduo é digno de igual consideração e respeito como sujeito autônomo de direitos. / Taking as theoretical premises the political liberalism and the inner bounds of state action, this study aims to be a contribution to the critics of legal paternalism, as it brings to the current constitutional debate a still barely studied category. Legal paternalism exists if a state official influences someone to practice or to avoid conducts that could cause harm to self through government actions. Since the Constitution of 1988, fundamental rights- especially autonomy- have been taken seriously again. Gradually, the controversial moral issues have reached both the media and the Courts, requiring from interpreters a new hermeneutics. The moral reading of the constitution is the interpretative method which brings political morality to the center of Constitutional Law. As the Constitution of 1988 is built upon a highly abstract language, it is necessary to resort to abstract moral principles, which are used as limits to the powers of State. In a word, it is necessary to develop a moral reading of the Constitution which consecrate the main principle against paternalism: the State owes to each and every person equal respect and concern as autonomous rightsholder.

Em 1993, John Rawls, notável filósofo e professor da distinta Harvard University, publicou seu Political Liberalism, um livro em que pela primeira vez sintetiza sistematicamente o conceito de razão pública, uma ideia chave de sua teoria da justiça como equidade (justice as fairness). Segundo Rawls, a razão pública consiste fundamentalmente no modo e conteúdo adequados ao debate e à fundamentação de escolhas essenciais de justiça no espaço público de uma democracia constitucional. Nesse sentido, Rawls advoga que o único meio razoável de justificação da coerção estatal reside no reconhecimento e/ou obtenção de consensos (overlapping consensus) em relação às escolhas essenciais de uma sociedade democrática, o que só é possível se atores públicos e privados se despojarem de suas respectivas doutrinas filosóficas ou morais abrangentes ao debater e decidir tais questões essenciais de justiça. A presente dissertação tem por objetivo analisar a proposta de razão pública de Rawls, dentro do contexto de sua teoria da justiça como equidade, propondo-se a verificar se o pensamento rawlsiano procede no contexto jurídico-filosófico da pós-modernidade e se a sua teoria pode ser concretamente aplicada aos ordenamentos jurídicos contemporâneos, em especial no que tange ao conteúdo e pleno exercício da liberdade religiosa pelos cidadãos de um estado constitucional democrático. / In 1993 John Rawls, a notable American philosopher and professor of the distinguished Harvard University, published his Political Liberalism, a book that presents for the first time Rawlss idea of public reason, a key concept of his theory of justice. To Rawls public reason is fundamentally the proper form and content of public debate, as well as the justification of essential decisions of basic justice in a constitutional democracy. In this sense, Rawls claim that the only reasonable justification for state coercion lays on an overlapping consensus regarding the essential choices of a democratic society, which is possible only if public and private actors surpass their own personal moral or philosophical comprehensive doctrines when engaging in public debate of such essential decisions of basic justice. This dissertation thesis aims to verify the rawlsian proposal of public reason in the context of justice as fairness, reflecting whether Rawls proposal fits a post-modern juridical and philosophical reality. The work also aims to analyze if Rawls theory can be effectively applied to modern constitutional states, especially regarding the content and exercise of religious freedom by the citizens of a democratic constitutional state.

Tendo como premissas teóricas o liberalismo político e os limites internos da atuação do Estado, este estudo pretende ser uma contribuição à crítica do paternalismo jurídico, na medida em que traz para o debate constitucional contemporâneo uma categoria pouco estudada no direito brasileiro. O paternalismo existe se um agente estatal exerce o poder sobre um indivíduo, por meio de uma ação governamental, com a finalidade de evitar que o indivíduo pratique ações privadas ou se omita de tal forma a causar danos, ou risco de danos, a si mesmo. A partir da Constituição de 1988, os direitos fundamentais, em especial a autonomia individual, voltaram a ser levados a sério. Pouco a pouco, as questões morais controvertidas ganham espaço na mídia e nos tribunais. Essas questões exigem dos intérpretes uma nova hermenêutica. A leitura moral da constituição é o método interpretativo que traz a moralidade política para o centro do direito constitucional. Como a Constituição Federal de 1988 está vazada numa linguagem jurídica extremamente abstrata, é preciso recorrer a princípios morais abstratos, usados como limites aos poderes do Estado. Essa leitura moral da Constituição consagra o princípio central contra o paternalismo: cada indivíduo é digno de igual consideração e respeito como sujeito autônomo de direitos. / Taking as theoretical premises the political liberalism and the inner bounds of state action, this study aims to be a contribution to the critics of legal paternalism, as it brings to the current constitutional debate a still barely studied category. Legal paternalism exists if a state official influences someone to practice or to avoid conducts that could cause harm to self through government actions. Since the Constitution of 1988, fundamental rights- especially autonomy- have been taken seriously again. Gradually, the controversial moral issues have reached both the media and the Courts, requiring from interpreters a new hermeneutics. The moral reading of the constitution is the interpretative method which brings political morality to the center of Constitutional Law. As the Constitution of 1988 is built upon a highly abstract language, it is necessary to resort to abstract moral principles, which are used as limits to the powers of State. In a word, it is necessary to develop a moral reading of the Constitution which consecrate the main principle against paternalism: the State owes to each and every person equal respect and concern as autonomous rightsholder.

Em 1993, John Rawls, notável filósofo e professor da distinta Harvard University, publicou seu Political Liberalism, um livro em que pela primeira vez sintetiza sistematicamente o conceito de razão pública, uma ideia chave de sua teoria da justiça como equidade (justice as fairness). Segundo Rawls, a razão pública consiste fundamentalmente no modo e conteúdo adequados ao debate e à fundamentação de escolhas essenciais de justiça no espaço público de uma democracia constitucional. Nesse sentido, Rawls advoga que o único meio razoável de justificação da coerção estatal reside no reconhecimento e/ou obtenção de consensos (overlapping consensus) em relação às escolhas essenciais de uma sociedade democrática, o que só é possível se atores públicos e privados se despojarem de suas respectivas doutrinas filosóficas ou morais abrangentes ao debater e decidir tais questões essenciais de justiça. A presente dissertação tem por objetivo analisar a proposta de razão pública de Rawls, dentro do contexto de sua teoria da justiça como equidade, propondo-se a verificar se o pensamento rawlsiano procede no contexto jurídico-filosófico da pós-modernidade e se a sua teoria pode ser concretamente aplicada aos ordenamentos jurídicos contemporâneos, em especial no que tange ao conteúdo e pleno exercício da liberdade religiosa pelos cidadãos de um estado constitucional democrático. / In 1993 John Rawls, a notable American philosopher and professor of the distinguished Harvard University, published his Political Liberalism, a book that presents for the first time Rawlss idea of public reason, a key concept of his theory of justice. To Rawls public reason is fundamentally the proper form and content of public debate, as well as the justification of essential decisions of basic justice in a constitutional democracy. In this sense, Rawls claim that the only reasonable justification for state coercion lays on an overlapping consensus regarding the essential choices of a democratic society, which is possible only if public and private actors surpass their own personal moral or philosophical comprehensive doctrines when engaging in public debate of such essential decisions of basic justice. This dissertation thesis aims to verify the rawlsian proposal of public reason in the context of justice as fairness, reflecting whether Rawls proposal fits a post-modern juridical and philosophical reality. The work also aims to analyze if Rawls theory can be effectively applied to modern constitutional states, especially regarding the content and exercise of religious freedom by the citizens of a democratic constitutional state.

In the first part of this article, the author discusses two types ofliberalism from the thoughts of prominent philosophers. On the one hand, sheanalyzes the ideas of Isaiah Berlin and Joseph Raz as examples of perfectionistliberalism and, on the other, those of John Rawls and Charles Larmore asexamples of political liberalism. It also identifies differences between Berlin’spluralism and Raz’s and between Rawls’ liberalism and Larmore’s. / En la primera parte del presente artículo, la autora discute dos tipos de liberalismo a partir del pensamiento de destacados filósofos. Por un lado, analiza las ideas de Isaiah Berlin y Joseph Raz como ejemplos del liberalismo perfeccionista y, por el otro, las de John Rawls y Charles Larmore como ejemplos del liberalismo político. Asimismo, identifica las diferencias entre el pluralismo de Berlin y el de Raz y entre el liberalismo de Rawls y Larmore.

THIS THESIS IS IN THE EXAMINATION PROCESS Christian Frederik Louis Leipoldt was born in on 28 December 1880 in the Rhenish House in Worcester, Cape Province, the fourth child of the Reverend Christian Friedrich Leipoldt and Anna Meta Christina Leipoldt (born Esselen). His father left the mission field to take up the position of the dominee in the Dutch Reformed Church in Clanwilliam where the Leipoldt family went to live, from 1884. Leipoldt received his education from his father at home, on a broad range of subjects, including several languages and also in the natural sciences. He became interested in writing from a very young age and sent pieces of his writing for publication when still a boy. When he was fifteen he began sending dried plant specimens to Professor McOwan in Cape Town, from Clanwilliam. It was through his interest in botany that Leipoldt met Dr Harry Bolus, a life-long friend. Leipoldt wrote the Civil Service examinations in 1897 after which he went to Cape Town to work as a journalist. Living in Cape Town he served on the staff of the pro-Boer newspaper, The South African News from 1898 until it was closed down by the British authorities in 1902, when he travelled to Britain to look for work as a journalist in London. Soon after arriving there he took up the offer from Bolus who would lend him money to study medicine at Guy’s Hospital. It was more or less at this time that some of his early literature on the South African War was written, for instance, his well-known poem, Oom Gert Vertel (published in 1911). After successfully obtaining his MRCS medical qualification in 1907, winning gold medals for medicine and surgery in the process, he briefly served as Acting House Surgeon at Guy’s until 1908 when he travelled to Europe to work in a number of hospitals to receive further training. Later the same year he took up a post as medical adviser to J D Pulitzer, the American newspaper owner. Thereafter he worked as a doctor in London except for the time he proceeded on a four month visit to the East in 1912, the experience of which he penned in a manuscript entitled ‘Visit to the East Indies.’In 1914 he returned to South Africa to take up a post as Medical Inspector of Schools with the Transvaal Education Department. During the First World War in South Africa, he was drafted into the army as the personal medical doctor to the Prime Minister at the time, Genl Louis Botha. He resigned from his post as Medical Inspector in 1923 to take up an offer from Dr F V Engelenburg to serve on the editorial staff of the pro-Smuts newspaper De Volkstem,. He worked there until 1925 when he and the newly appointed editor Gustav Preller did not see eye to eye and it was then that he decided to return to Cape Town. His second Cape Town period (1925 – 1947) was characterized by the most prolific writing, during which he published a great many works across a broad range of topics. Furthermore, though he never married, he adopted Jeffrey Leipoldt, and took in a number of boys as boarders in his home ‘Arbury’ in Kenilworth, Cape Town. At the same time as he wrote most prolifically for a wide range of publications including many novels, he taught pediatrics at the University of Cape Town Medical School and practised as a pediatrician in the city. C Louis Leipoldt was a versatile person who published across a wide range of fields, to include literature, medical studies, letters to friends and associates, the history of wine and cookery, and what few seem to be aware of, his three English historical novels that make up The Valley, written in English between 1928 and 1932. Whilst Leipoldt’s early work such as Oom Gert Vertel gave voice to the suffering of the Afrikaner people, in The Valley, his voice is one of protest against the isolationist policies of the National Party of the 1920s.</p/> Whilst Leipoldt will be known for his work as the inaugural medical inspector of schools of the Transvaal Education Department, the inaugural lecturer in pediatrics at the University of Cape Town and Cape Town’s first practising pediatrician, he will also be known for his wide oeuvre as a writer. For example, he served as the Medical Association of South Africa’s first editor of its South African Medical Journal, a post he held for 18 years. Leipoldt never married and died on 13 April 1947 in Cape Town. His ashes were scattered in the Pakhuis Pass near Clanwilliam, where there is a memorial to his life. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Historical and Heritage Studies / unrestricted

The South African author C Louis Leipoldt is known as an Afrikaans poet and as one of the ‘Driemanskap’ with Celliers and Totius. Together with Eugene Marais, they wrote the first serious Afrikaans literary poetry in the early decades of the Twentieth Century. The ‘Driemanskap’, grouped together for its clear national(ist) thrust, is well-known as part of the Tweede Afrikaanse Taalbeweging not only for celebrating the universal effects of nature but also for extolling the virtues of forgiveness after the South African War. Apart from his extensive canon of Afrikaans literature and a sizable discourse in the culinary field, not much is known about The Valley, Leipoldt’s so-called ‘English’ novels written in the late 1920s and early 1930s in English, a language he was equally at home in. The titles of these novels making up The Valley trilogy are Gallows Gecko, Stormwrack and The Mask. Despite several efforts to have the novels published with leading publishing houses in both Britain and the United States of America, both during and after his lifetime, the three ‘English’ novels of C Louis Leipoldt remained unpublished for 69 years. It was in 2001 that for the first time they appeared unedited in a compendium volume. Prior to 2001, two of the novels were published −in 1980, the year of the centenary of Leipoldt’s birth, an abridged edition of Stormwrack appeared, edited by Stephen Gray and published by David Philip, Cape Town. It was re-published by Human&Rousseau in 2000. An abridged edition of Gallows Gecko appeared in 2001, under the title Chameleon on the Gallows which the editor Stephen Gray explains he changed for stylistic reasons. Leipoldt uses the form of historical fiction in his trilogy as a way of conveying historical meaning by relating the chronicle (1820 – 1930) of the place he calls the Valley, recognizable as Clanwilliam. Initially, the Valley is at peace and is sketched in its idyllic state. After the Jameson Raid of 1895, the prospects of the South African War become a reality for the inhabitants of the Cederberg as they are torn apart by their emotions, feelings and loyalties. The course of events drastically changes when war finally comes to the District. Discontinuity and change is a strong theme in the novels. Eventually the inhabitants ofthe Valley find that the former, respectful relations, based on tradition and tolerance, have given way to sectarian interests. This changes the social fibre of the once idyllic environment. The Valley is a lamentation of lost opportunities for a culturally unified South Africa. Its voice is one of moderateness and is inclusive for all South Africans, addressing race relations as a theme as well as decrying sectionalism. In the light of this, it is argued that Leipoldt is revealed as a political liberal and cultural pluralist. This can be heard through the voices of the characters in The Valley and seen by the way Leipoldt meant the events in his fiction to serve as an allegory for the way he saw South Africa emerging at the time. He was writing against the Nationalists, particularly against the narrative of Gustav S Preller, who spent his working life constructing a volksgeskiedenis that resulted in a significant public history that dominated Afrikaner historical thinking from circa 1905 to 1938. In this sense, it is argued, The Valley is an alternative history to the dominating Preller historiography, and because it is in the form of narrative/historical fiction, it can also be seen as an alternative form of history, to be read against certain theoretical texts, without in any way detracting from the voices of criticism against deconstructivist history. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Historical and Heritage Studies / unrestricted

No description available.

The environmental crisis threatens the fundamental values of the political liberal tradition. As the autonomy, the security and the prosperity of persons and peoples are jeopardized by political inaction, the legitimacy of the liberal constitutional order is compromised. Because of important collective action problems, the democratic processes are unfit to address the present crisis and protect adequately the natural environment. Two institutional solutions deemed capable of preserving the legitimacy of the functional domination at the heart of social order are analyzed. The first is the constitutionalization of a right to an adequate natural environment, which purports to circumvent the paralysis of legislative power. The second is the declaration of a limited state of emergency and the use of exceptional powers, which purports to circumvent the paralysis of both legislative and judiciary powers. Despite their legitimacy, the diligent application of these political solutions remains improbable. / La dégradation de l’environnement naturel menace les valeurs fondamentales de la tradition libérale que sont l’autonomie, la sécurité et la prospérité des personnes et des peuples. À ce titre, la légitimité morale de l’ordre constitutionnel libéral et la légitimité morale de l’autorité politique qui le représente sont toutes deux compromises. Or, les mécanismes démocratiques apparaissent pour de nombreuses raisons inaptes à assurer une protection suffisante de l’environnement naturel. Pour rétablir la légitimité des rapports de commandement et d’obéissance qui fondent l’ordre social, deux solutions institutionnelles sont analysées. La première consiste à constitutionnaliser un droit à un environnement naturel de qualité pour dépasser la paralysie du pouvoir législatif. La seconde consiste à déclarer un état d’urgence limité et à recourir aux pouvoirs d’exception, de manière à dépasser l’impotence législative et l’impotence judiciaire. En dépit de leur légitimité, la mise en œuvre de ces solutions politiques demeure improbable.

The environmental crisis threatens the fundamental values of the political liberal tradition. As the autonomy, the security and the prosperity of persons and peoples are jeopardized by political inaction, the legitimacy of the liberal constitutional order is compromised. Because of important collective action problems, the democratic processes are unfit to address the present crisis and protect adequately the natural environment. Two institutional solutions deemed capable of preserving the legitimacy of the functional domination at the heart of social order are analyzed. The first is the constitutionalization of a right to an adequate natural environment, which purports to circumvent the paralysis of legislative power. The second is the declaration of a limited state of emergency and the use of exceptional powers, which purports to circumvent the paralysis of both legislative and judiciary powers. Despite their legitimacy, the diligent application of these political solutions remains improbable. / La dégradation de l’environnement naturel menace les valeurs fondamentales de la tradition libérale que sont l’autonomie, la sécurité et la prospérité des personnes et des peuples. À ce titre, la légitimité morale de l’ordre constitutionnel libéral et la légitimité morale de l’autorité politique qui le représente sont toutes deux compromises. Or, les mécanismes démocratiques apparaissent pour de nombreuses raisons inaptes à assurer une protection suffisante de l’environnement naturel. Pour rétablir la légitimité des rapports de commandement et d’obéissance qui fondent l’ordre social, deux solutions institutionnelles sont analysées. La première consiste à constitutionnaliser un droit à un environnement naturel de qualité pour dépasser la paralysie du pouvoir législatif. La seconde consiste à déclarer un état d’urgence limité et à recourir aux pouvoirs d’exception, de manière à dépasser l’impotence législative et l’impotence judiciaire. En dépit de leur légitimité, la mise en œuvre de ces solutions politiques demeure improbable.