Thesis (PhD) -- University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Philosophy has traditionally been concerned with the question of reason and rationality, as its central focus. From the perspective of the modern metaphysical tradition, this focus has developed around the theme of subjectivity in general, and the assumption of an ahistorical transcendental subject in particular. The idea of reason was thus foundational for the articulation and validation of the notions of truth and freedom. From the perspective of modernity, reason has thus been the condition of the possibility of enlightenment, freedom and moral progress. The debate between Habermas and the representatives of postmodern thinking represents the latest chapter regarding the question of reason, its limits, and its possibilities. What makes this debate particularly challenging is that Habermas, while he defends the idea of reason against its critique by the postmodernists, is actually in agreement with them in their dismissal of the tradition of metaphysical thinking. In view of his defense of the idea of reason, however, Habermas has invariably been accused of defending an outmoded and discredited form of philosophical thinking, while his opponents have generally been hailed as progressive thinkers who have succeeded in effecting a radical break with the conceptual legacy of the metaphysical tradition. In my dissertation I argue that the exact opposite position is the case, namely, that it is Habermas, and not his postmodern opponents, who has effected a radical break with metaphysical thinking. It is his ability to transform the idea of reason, from a transcendental into a postmetaphysical concept, in terms of which the question of reason and rationality, and the related ideas of truth and knowledge, are recast in fallibilistic terms, that, in my view, represents the overcoming of metaphysics. The postmodern turn, on the other hand, in view of its reluctance to consider the question of reason from an alternative model of rationality, finds itself still trapped within a form of transcendental thinking in which it seeks to enquire into the (im)possibility of reason, in the absence of a transcendental subject. In the final analysis, I argue that it is postmetaphysical rather than postmodern thinking, that offers us a practical alternative to the problematic conception of reason, bequeathed by the tradition of metaphysical thinking. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die fenomeen van die rede en die betekenis van rasionaliteit vorm tradisioneel 'n sentrale fokus van die filosofie. Vanuit die perspektief van die moderne metafisiese tradisie het hierdie fokus ontwikkel rondom die tema van subjektiwiteit in die algemeen, en die aanname van 'n a-historiese transendentele subjek in die besonder. Die rede was dus fundamenteel vir die artikulasie en legitimering van die konsepte van waarheid en vryheid. Vanuit die perspektief van moderniteit was die rede dus die voorwaarde vir die moontlikheid van verligting, vryheid, en morele vooruitgang. Die debat tussen Habermas en die verteenwoordigers van postmoderne denke verteenwoordig die mees onlangse hoofstuk van die verhaal van die vraag na rede en rasionaliteit - die beperkings daarvan, asook die moontlikhede daarvan. Hierdie debat bied besondere uitdagings omdat Habermas, terwyl hy die idee van rede verdedig teen die kritiek van die postmoderniste, eintlik met hulle saamstem vir sover hulle die tradisie van metafisiese denke verwerp. In die lig van sy verdediging van die idee van rede, is Habermas egter voortdurend daarvan beskuldig dat hy 'n uitgediende en gediskrediteerde vorm van filosofiese denke bly voorstaan, terwyl sy opponente in die algemeen voorgehou is as progressiewe denkers wat suksesvol 'n radikale breuk gemaak het met die konseptuele erfenis van die metafisiese tradisie. In my dissertasie beweer ek dat die teenoorgestelde inderwaarheid die geval is, naamlik dat dit Habermas, en nie sy postmoderne opponente nie, is wat hierdie radikale breuk met metafisiese denke suksesvol uitgevoer het. Dit is sy verrnoe om die idee van die rede te transformeer vanaf 'n transendentale na 'n post- metafisiese konsep, in terme waarvan die vraag na rede en rasionaliteit, en die verwante idees van waarheid en kennis, omskep is in fallibilistiese beg rippe, wat, soos ek aantoon, 'n (die!) suksesvolle transendering van die metafisika bewerkstellig. Die postmoderne wending, aan die ander kant, in die lig van die traagheid daarvan om 'n alternatiewe en verruimde konsepsie van rasionaliteit te ontwikkel, bly vasgevang in 'n vorm van transendentele denke waarin dit probeer om ondersoek in te stel na die (on)moontlikheid van die rede ten aansien van die afwesigheid van 'n transendentele subjek. Uiteindelik beweer ek dat dit die post-metafisiese eerder as die postmoderne denke is wat aan ons 'n praktiese alternatief bied vir die problematiese konsep van die rede, soos ons dit qeerf het by die tradisie van metafisiese denke.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T19:39:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 6109.pdf: 2660246 bytes, checksum: eb416a7d49f56c3dd4e296f7410ad6ce (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-03-11 / After identifying the interference of systemic mechanisms in education, reduced, in turn, to the utilitarian condition of simple means for the achievement of extrinsic ends, the dissertation presents the communicative praxis as a proposal of reflection and demarcation of the interests existing between system and culture. For this, it is taken into account the theoretical framework of Habermas, which guided by the paradigm of intersubjectivity, seeks to reintegrate a modern rationality and linguistically decentered (post-metaphysical), situated in the reality of procedural mode and based on the aspect dialogic performative of the interactions arising from the lived world. The communicative praxis, therefore, enables the enhancement of basic elements for democratic debate aiming the understanding , and then preventing the instrumental character of the unilateral coercions present in teaching procedures and, thus, to ensure learning that aims not only the logic of success, but also the experience of interactions permeated by cognitive, normative and aesthetic practices. / Após identificar a interferência dos mecanismos sistêmicos na educação, reduzida, por sua vez, a condição utilitarista de simples meio para a concretização de fins extrinsecos, a dissertação apresenta a praxis comunicativa como proposta de reflexão e delimitação dos interesses existentes entre sistema e cultura. Para tanto, leva-se em consideração o referencial teórico de Jurgen Habermas, que, orientado pelo paradigma da intersubjetividade, busca reintegrar uma racionalidade moderna e linguisticamente descentrada (pos-metafisica), situada na realidade de modo procedimental e baseada no aspecto dialogico-performativo das interações decorrentes do mundo vivido. A praxis comunicativa possibilita, portanto, a potencialização de elementos básicos para o debate democrático, com fim ao entendimento, de modo a impedir o caráter instrumental das coações unilaterais presentes nos procedimentos pedagógicos e, deste modo, assegurar aprendizagens que objetivam não apenas a lógica do sucesso, mas também a vivencia de interações permeadas por práticas cognitivas, normativas e estéticas.

理性概念所具備的統一性特徵在傳統的形上學背景之下表現為一種普遍的統一學說，然而這樣的論點在當代受到很大的挑戰，當代思想中很多都表現為一種多元主義的立場，對於理性統一性的論點多有批判。於是乎一場一與多之間的哲學辯論就此展開。哈伯馬斯對於理性統一性有其獨特的見解，重新考慮在多元之中理性統一性的可能性。基本上哈伯馬斯採取跳脫形上學立場，不在一與多兩者間的對立為任何一方進行辯護，而是提出一種新的見解，由後形上學的立場來談在多元中理性統一性的可能性。 哈伯馬斯認為現今存在著兩類針鋒相對的觀點，一種是有鑑於當代形上學統一性的喪失而努力回歸前康德時代的形上學，另一種則是以被壓制的多元性向統一性思想提出抗議。為了要釐清其中有關一與多之間的對立與關聯，哈伯馬斯對於傳統以來一與多之間的論點提出了個人的見解，同時也對當代反對統一性的相關論點做討論，進而提出自己的看法以求一條新的解決之道，試著調和一與多之間的對立性。本論文將透過對後形上學思想趨勢的討論，說明哈伯馬斯重建理性概念的進路及其對不同立場的學者所抱持的態度。