Plus de dix ans après la mise en place du projet d’harmonisation du droit du commerce électronique, l’ASEAN, « The Association of Southeast Asian Nations » rassemblant dix États membres en Asie du Sud-est, n’arrive toujours pas à doter chacun de ses États membres d’une législation harmonisée en la matière. Dans cette optique, nous tenterons, pour contribuer à cette harmonisation, de démontrer la situation problématique relative au droit du commerce électronique dans six des dix États membres de l’ASEAN où, en plus de leur non-uniformité législative, les textes nationaux régissant le formalisme du contrat électronique demeurent difficiles à comprendre, à interpréter et donc à appliquer ; ce qui cause parfois des erreurs interprétatives voire l’oubli total de ces textes. Cette expérience n’est pas unique dans l’ASEAN, car l’on trouve également de similaires situations dans d’autres juridictions, telles que le Canada et les États-Unis. Pour pallier cette rupture entre la loi et la jurisprudence, nous proposons une quête d’une méthode d’interprétation comme une piste de solution qui nous semble la plus pertinente au regard de l’état des textes déjà en vigueur et de l’objectif de l’harmonisation du droit du commerce électronique dans l’ASEAN. Parmi les méthodes interprétatives très variées, nous arrivons à identifier la méthode contextuelle, aussi large soit-elle, comme la méthode la plus pertinente eu égard aux caractéristiques particulières du formalisme du contrat électronique, à savoir l’écrit et la signature électroniques. Nous proposons donc une grille d’analyse de cette méthode composée de contextes juridique, technique et social, qui aideront les juristes, surtout les juges, à mieux saisir le sens des textes et à leur donner « une meilleure interprétation » en faveur de l’objectif de l’harmonisation du droit dans l’ASEAN. / More than ten years after the implementation of the harmonization project of e-commerce law, ASEAN, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations" gathering ten Member States in Southeast Asia, is still not able to provide each of their Member States with a harmonized legislation in this respect. In this context, we try, in contribution to this harmonization, to demonstrate the problematic situation on e-commerce law in six of the ten ASEAN Member States where, in addition to their statutory non-uniformity, these national laws governing the formalism of electronic contract are difficult to understand, to interpret and therefore to apply; sometimes causing interpretative errors or total neglect of these texts. This experience is not unique to ASEAN, because there are also similar situations in other jurisdictions such as Canada and the United States. To address this disconnect between the law and jurisprudence, we propose a search for a method of interpretation as a possible solution that seems most relevant to the state of the texts already in place and to the objective of harmonizing of the electronic commerce law in ASEAN. Among the wide variety of interpretive methods, we are able to identify the contextual approach, as large as it is, as the most appropriate method regarding to the particular characteristics of the formalism of electronic contract, namely the electronic writing and electronic signature. We propose an analytical method that consists of legal, technical and social contexts that will help lawyers, especially judges, to better understand the meaning of the texts and to give them a "best interpretation" in favor of the objective of harmonization of law in ASEAN.

Plus de dix ans après la mise en place du projet d’harmonisation du droit du commerce électronique, l’ASEAN, « The Association of Southeast Asian Nations » rassemblant dix États membres en Asie du Sud-est, n’arrive toujours pas à doter chacun de ses États membres d’une législation harmonisée en la matière. Dans cette optique, nous tenterons, pour contribuer à cette harmonisation, de démontrer la situation problématique relative au droit du commerce électronique dans six des dix États membres de l’ASEAN où, en plus de leur non-uniformité législative, les textes nationaux régissant le formalisme du contrat électronique demeurent difficiles à comprendre, à interpréter et donc à appliquer ; ce qui cause parfois des erreurs interprétatives voire l’oubli total de ces textes. Cette expérience n’est pas unique dans l’ASEAN, car l’on trouve également de similaires situations dans d’autres juridictions, telles que le Canada et les États-Unis. Pour pallier cette rupture entre la loi et la jurisprudence, nous proposons une quête d’une méthode d’interprétation comme une piste de solution qui nous semble la plus pertinente au regard de l’état des textes déjà en vigueur et de l’objectif de l’harmonisation du droit du commerce électronique dans l’ASEAN. Parmi les méthodes interprétatives très variées, nous arrivons à identifier la méthode contextuelle, aussi large soit-elle, comme la méthode la plus pertinente eu égard aux caractéristiques particulières du formalisme du contrat électronique, à savoir l’écrit et la signature électroniques. Nous proposons donc une grille d’analyse de cette méthode composée de contextes juridique, technique et social, qui aideront les juristes, surtout les juges, à mieux saisir le sens des textes et à leur donner « une meilleure interprétation » en faveur de l’objectif de l’harmonisation du droit dans l’ASEAN. / More than ten years after the implementation of the harmonization project of e-commerce law, ASEAN, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations" gathering ten Member States in Southeast Asia, is still not able to provide each of their Member States with a harmonized legislation in this respect. In this context, we try, in contribution to this harmonization, to demonstrate the problematic situation on e-commerce law in six of the ten ASEAN Member States where, in addition to their statutory non-uniformity, these national laws governing the formalism of electronic contract are difficult to understand, to interpret and therefore to apply; sometimes causing interpretative errors or total neglect of these texts. This experience is not unique to ASEAN, because there are also similar situations in other jurisdictions such as Canada and the United States. To address this disconnect between the law and jurisprudence, we propose a search for a method of interpretation as a possible solution that seems most relevant to the state of the texts already in place and to the objective of harmonizing of the electronic commerce law in ASEAN. Among the wide variety of interpretive methods, we are able to identify the contextual approach, as large as it is, as the most appropriate method regarding to the particular characteristics of the formalism of electronic contract, namely the electronic writing and electronic signature. We propose an analytical method that consists of legal, technical and social contexts that will help lawyers, especially judges, to better understand the meaning of the texts and to give them a "best interpretation" in favor of the objective of harmonization of law in ASEAN. / Commentaires généraux du rapport externe (par Prof. Arthur Oulaï) : Il faut saluer la préoccupation du candidat pour l’apport d’un éclairage sur les textes qui régissent le contrat électronique afin de les rendre plus accessibles aux juges. L’élaboration d’une méthode d’interprétation de ces textes constitue, sans aucun doute, une contribution telle qu’attendue d’une thèse de doctorat en droit. Nous tenons à l’en féliciter. Nous recommandons donc la soutenance de sa thèse et lui accordons la mention « Très bonne ». 12 Déc. 2013 – Vincent Gautrais (Directeur de thèse) : Sambath Hel vient de se voir attribuer le doctorat en droit de l’Université de Montréal avec la mention selon laquelle sa thèse est jugée «Très bonne». En plus des félicitations qui lui ont été adressées lors de la soutenance, je puis aussi témoigner du grand plaisir que j’ai eu à l’accompagner durant ce long processus. Bravo Sambath!

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

Text in Afrikaans / Die sogenaamde vermoede van onskuld is via die Engelse Reg in ons reg oorgeneem en tot konstitusionele status verhoog met die daarstelling van artikel 25(3)(c) van die Grondwet, No. 200 van 1993. Hierdie reg om onskuldig geag te word en die gepaardgaande swygreg, wat hier kortliks aangeraak word, kan egter aan beperking onderhewig wees soos bepaal deur artikel 33 van die Grondwet. Die beginsels soos ontwikkel in Kanada en Amerika word ondersoek. Die slotsom waartoe geraak word is dat, alhoewel historiese en ander verskille deurgaans voor oe gehou sal moet word, die regspraak in genoemde jurisdiksies, en meer spesifiek Kanada, 'n groat rol sal speel by die inhoud wat die SuidA: frik:aanse howe, in die konteks van statutere vermoedens, aan die konstitusionele reg om onskuldig geag te word, sal gee. / The so-called presumption of innocence has been inherited from the English common law and awarded constitutional status by the introduction of section 25(3)(c) ofthe Constitution, Act 200 ofl993. This right to be presumed innocent and the accompanying right to remain silent, which is briefly touched upon, are however not absolute and can be subject to limitation as provided for by section 33 ofthe Constitution. The principles, as they have been developed in Canada and America, are investigated. The conclusion which is drawn is that, despite historical and other differences, it can be expected that foreign jurisprudence, particularly that of Canada, will play a major role in the content that will be given by the South African courts to the right to be presumed innocent in the context of statutory presumptions. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. M.

The issue of the vertical /or horizontal operation of the Bill of Rights (chapter 3) is a controversial one. The interim constitution deals with this controversy in a subtle way by avoiding direct horizontal operation of Chapter 3. Instead, it provides for the so-called 'seepage to horizontal relationships' in terms of section35{3). This apparently was a political compromise between the pro-vertical only and the pro-horizontal groups. The human rights history of this country justifies a Bill of Rights that would have both vertical and horizontal operation. However, in section 35 (3) there is potential for the values enshrined in the constitution and Chapter 3, and the spirit hereof, to permeate and filter through the entire legal system in all it's applications. It would seem, however, as demonstrated by the decision in De Klerk v Du Plessis, that the extent to which this filtering process will benefit individuals in their private relations, will depend on the interpretation given to section 35 (3) by the courts. If courts, as it happend in De Klerk's case fail to realise the full import of section 35 ( 3) aspects of the existing law which are unjust could remain and the process of creating a just, open and democratic society will be hampered. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.M.

This short dissertation deals with separation of powers and federalism in African constitutionalism through the South African case. It investigates the extent to which the new South Africa complies with these two principles. The separation of powers in the new South Africa gives rise to a sui generis parliamentary regime, which is borrowing both from the Westminster model and the presidential one. On the other hand, the principle of federalism has been taken into consideration seriously, but South Africa has not become a fully-fledged federation. The result is a well-matched marriage between semi-parliamentarism and quasifederalism, which is the South African contribution to constitutionalism and democracy required by the African Renaissance. The dissertation comes to the conclusion that all in all the new South Africa complies with the two constitutional principles under consideration. It is a constitutional state, one of the very few exceptions on a continent laboriously emerging from authoritarianism. / Law / Thesis (LL.M.)--University of South Africa, 1998. / LL. M. (Law)

Prior to 1994, South African taxpayers had little protection from fiscal legislation or the decisions, actions or conduct of the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) that violated their common law rights. Parliament reigned supreme and in tax matters, the strict and literal approach to the interpretation of statutes was employed, with the judiciary often quoting the mantra that there is “no equity about tax”. The Income Tax Act (Act No 58 of 1962) was littered with discriminatory and unfair provisions based on age, religion, sex and marital status. Even unreasonable decisions taken by SARS could not be reviewed by the judiciary as “unreasonableness” was not a ground for review of the exercise of a discretion by SARS. On 27 April 1994, the constitutional order changed. Parliamentary supremacy was replaced with constitutional supremacy and the rights to privacy, equality, human dignity, property and just administrative action were codified in a Bill of Rights. The codification of these fundamental rights has materially changed the nature and extent of the rights of South African taxpayers. The objective of this thesis, therefore, is to identify, analyse and discuss South African taxpayers’ rights from a constitutional perspective. The following major conclusions can be drawn from the research done: - the judiciary have been forced to reappraise their approach to the interpretation of statutes from a “strict and literal” to a “purposive” approach that is in accordance with the values underpinning the new constitutional order; - new legislation has amended some of the so-called “reverse” onus of proof provisions that were constitutionally unsound – this should result in greater fairness and consistency for affected taxpayers especially in the area of when penalties may be imposed; - the concept of clean hands and good facts can influence the judiciary when arguing that a taxpayer’s right to just administrative action has been violated; and - discriminatory and unfair legislation and conduct on the part of SARS may and should be attacked on a substantive law basis, especially where human dignity is at stake. The overall conclusion is that taxpayers’ rights are more far-reaching than prior to 1994 but still have some way to go before they are fully interpreted and developed. / Accounting Science / D.Compt.

Prior to 1994, South African taxpayers had little protection from fiscal legislation or the decisions, actions or conduct of the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) that violated their common law rights. Parliament reigned supreme and in tax matters, the strict and literal approach to the interpretation of statutes was employed, with the judiciary often quoting the mantra that there is “no equity about tax”. The Income Tax Act (Act No 58 of 1962) was littered with discriminatory and unfair provisions based on age, religion, sex and marital status. Even unreasonable decisions taken by SARS could not be reviewed by the judiciary as “unreasonableness” was not a ground for review of the exercise of a discretion by SARS. On 27 April 1994, the constitutional order changed. Parliamentary supremacy was replaced with constitutional supremacy and the rights to privacy, equality, human dignity, property and just administrative action were codified in a Bill of Rights. The codification of these fundamental rights has materially changed the nature and extent of the rights of South African taxpayers. The objective of this thesis, therefore, is to identify, analyse and discuss South African taxpayers’ rights from a constitutional perspective. The following major conclusions can be drawn from the research done: - the judiciary have been forced to reappraise their approach to the interpretation of statutes from a “strict and literal” to a “purposive” approach that is in accordance with the values underpinning the new constitutional order; - new legislation has amended some of the so-called “reverse” onus of proof provisions that were constitutionally unsound – this should result in greater fairness and consistency for affected taxpayers especially in the area of when penalties may be imposed; - the concept of clean hands and good facts can influence the judiciary when arguing that a taxpayer’s right to just administrative action has been violated; and - discriminatory and unfair legislation and conduct on the part of SARS may and should be attacked on a substantive law basis, especially where human dignity is at stake. The overall conclusion is that taxpayers’ rights are more far-reaching than prior to 1994 but still have some way to go before they are fully interpreted and developed. / Accounting Science / D.Compt.