Since its inception, international aid has been premised on the existence of stable and sovereign recipient states. Official aid relies upon such states for its legitimacy and implementation, and aims to consolidate statehood. In the 1990s, this organising pillar of the international aid system was shaken. The ability of governments to fulfil the basic functions of a sovereign power is now widely questioned. The principle of sovereignty is no longer absolute; rather, it is increasingly contingent upon states' adherence to international, largely Western-defined, norms of behaviour. Where these norms are violated systematically, as in conflict-affected countries, sanctions including trade, political and military measures are deployed. In these 'quasi-states', where sovereignty is contested or weak empirically and juridically, development aid relations are usually suspended and relief the only form of aid available. However, the ability of relief aid to respond to these chronic political emergencies is increasingly questioned. There are increasing demands to make relief more developmental, and for aid to be used to address the cause of crisis - conflict. This thesis examines how aid has worked in a particular type of 'quasi-state': situations of 'post'-conflict transition, and asks whether the new demands on aid in these environments can be met. Examining the cases of rehabilitation assistance to the health sector in Cambodia, Ethiopia and Uganda, it draws three primary conclusions. First, the political meaning, objectives and instruments of relief and development aid are categorically distinct; linking them is ethically and technically problematic. Ethically it implies compromising principles of impartiality and neutrality. Technically, political conditions prevent the transition to more developmental aid instruments. Second, the empirical weakness and juridical ambiguity of statehood in these environments mean that there is no clearly accepted and competent authority to make public policy - no one and everyone owns it. This leads to highly fragmented aid investments that do not provide a basis for the development of public health systems. Third, the absolute scarcity of public resources means that the developmental goal of sustainability is not compatible with that of maximising coverage of health services, level of coverage summary, it suggests that conceptually and operationally the international aid system remains fundamentally ill-equipped to respond to the challenges of chronic political emergencies and their aftermath. 4

This thesis argues that neopatrimonialism is vital to understanding the power structure of the secessionist Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (TMR), and that neopatrimonial structures have been manipulated by Soviet-era elites to sustain the unrecognized separatist state's independence. The thesis also argues that neopatrimonialism is not a stable structure and its effectiveness in retaining support for the regime has changed over time. The paper provides an empirical analysis of the TMR in order to answer two questions: "To what extent does neopatrimonialism explain the regime endurance of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic?" and "What does the case of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic reveal about neopatrimonialism and regime endurance over time?" The analysis examines the TMR regime's use of Soviet-era industrial and bureaucratic structures, media, party networks, and worker committees to assert and maintain control, distribute patronage, maintain support for secession, and co-opt important interest groups. The paper concludes that although neopatrimonialism is only one of several elements that support the TMR regime's endurance, the analysis of neopatrimonial systems in states with significant neopatrimonialism provides a framework for examining disparate but interwoven elements of a state's political economy. / Master of Public and International Affairs

<p>The aim of this political scientist paper is to describe and analyze the quasi state Iraqi Kurdistan 1992-2006 using the theory of Kolstö about how and why quasi states develops and the theory of Pegg regarding how the international society deal with quasi states. A qualitative case method is used. In the study the two theories are combined. Iraqi Kurdistan is used as a case to study to confirm Kolstö’s and Pegg’s theories. It’s an interesting case as it’s included in one of the most sensitive geo political areas in the world. The Kuwait war 1990 and the Second Gulf war 1991 were the incentive to Iraqi Kurdistan as a quasi state and the US invasion of Iraq 2003 was the incentive to the end of it. In conclusion the case verify the theories and the theories promote the understanding of Iraqi Kurdistan’s period as a quasi state. The goal of the quasi state Iraqi Kurdistan was to become a federal state in a federal Iraq and it succeeded.</p>

The aim of this political scientist paper is to describe and analyze the quasi state Iraqi Kurdistan 1992-2006 using the theory of Kolstö about how and why quasi states develops and the theory of Pegg regarding how the international society deal with quasi states. A qualitative case method is used. In the study the two theories are combined. Iraqi Kurdistan is used as a case to study to confirm Kolstö’s and Pegg’s theories. It’s an interesting case as it’s included in one of the most sensitive geo political areas in the world. The Kuwait war 1990 and the Second Gulf war 1991 were the incentive to Iraqi Kurdistan as a quasi state and the US invasion of Iraq 2003 was the incentive to the end of it. In conclusion the case verify the theories and the theories promote the understanding of Iraqi Kurdistan’s period as a quasi state. The goal of the quasi state Iraqi Kurdistan was to become a federal state in a federal Iraq and it succeeded.

Depuis 2004 et la résolution 1559 appelant au retrait syrien, le Liban est l’objet d’une action internationale extrêmement intense. En effet, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies (CSNU), face à la nouvelle configuration libanaise et levantine, a déployé des mécanismes issus de la sécurité collective afin de renforcer les attributs régaliens de l’État libanais. Le maintien de la paix, à travers le renforcement de la Force intérimaire des Nations unies au Liban (Finul), et la justice internationale, à travers la création du Tribunal spécial pour le Liban (TSL), sont les deux principaux outils visant à maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales par le prisme libanais. Dans les deux cas, la France, que ce soit militairement ou diplomatiquement, a été singulièrement active.Partant de ce constat, notre thèse vise, dans un premier temps, à déconstruire les mécanismes onusiens mis en oeuvre dans le cas libanais. Il s’agira, plus précisément,d’appréhender les différentes logiques qui sont constitutives de l’action du CSNU au Liban.Que ce soit en matière de maintien de la paix ou de justice internationale, les résolutions onusiennes et les organes qui en découlent font face à la souveraineté nationale et reflètent ainsi l’éternelle opposition entre les chapitres VI et VII de la Charte des Nations unies. Or,nous verrons que dans le cas libanais, le CSNU met en oeuvre une action hybride oscillant entre une logique coercitive et une logique consensuelle.Dans un second temps, notre thèse analysera la tension permanente de l’État libanais,qualifié de quasi-État, entre des dynamiques supra-étatiques traduites par les résolutions onusiennes et des dynamiques infra-étatiques incarnées par des acteurs communautaires et confessionnels, parfois transfrontaliers, et propres au système consociatif libanais. Nous tenterons alors de mesurer le degré de consolidation de deux des attributs régaliens du quasi-État libanais : la défense et la justice. Plus largement, il s’agira de s’interroger sur la possibilité pour l’action internationale, héritière du système westphalien, de remplir ses objectifs dans un environnement national et régional qui questionne plus que jamais la possibilité de maintenir et de conforter des États-nations.À l’aune de la régionalisation des conflits depuis 2004, et particulièrement depuis2011 au Levant, nous conclurons à la difficulté pour le CSNU de faire face à des États déliquescents ainsi qu’à des conflictualités d’interface qui non seulement sont en plein essor,mais qui sont par ailleurs de plus en plus liées les unes aux autres. / Since 2004 and Resolution 1559 demanding Syrian withdrawal, Lebanon has been subjected to an exceptionally intense international action. Facing a new configuration both in Lebanon and the Levant, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has indeed implemented mechanisms of collective security aimed at strengthening national sovereignty.Peace-keeping through United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil) enhancement and international justice through the creation of the Special tribunal for Lebanon (STL) are the main tools for maintaining international peace and security in a Lebanese perspective. In both cases, France has been particularly active, be it militarily or diplomatically. Setting out from this premise, our thesis, to begin with, will aim at deconstructing the UN mechanisms implemented in the Lebanese case. More precisely, we shall try to apprehend the constitutive logics of the Security Council’s action in Lebanon. Whether in peace-keeping or in international justice, UN resolutions and the bodies created by them are faced with national sovereignty and, therefore, reflect the eternal opposition between chapters VI andVII of the United Nations Charter. Nevertheless, it will be shown that, in the Lebanese case,the UNSC has developed a hybrid action, fluctuating between coercion and consensus.Then, our thesis will show how the Lebanese State, which we will describe as a “quasi-State”, has to face an ongoing tension between supra-State dynamics expressed by UN resolutions and sub-State dynamics embodied by communitarian and religious representatives, sometimes cross-border, which are specific to the Lebanese consociationalist system. We shall later determine the extent to which two of the Lebanese quasi-State’s attributes, defense and security, have been consolidated by international action. More broadly, we will wonder whether international action, as an heir to the Westphalian system,can achieve its goal in a national and regional environment that challenges, today more than ever, the possibility to maintain and support nation-States. In a context of regionalization of conflicts since 2004, and especially since 2011 in the Levant, we shall come to the conclusion that the Security Council still has problems indealing with deliquescent States and with what we will call “interface conflicts”, which not only are booming, but also are more and more inextricably connected to one another.