The United States is among one of the only democratic industrialized nations in the world that does not provide guaranteed access to civil representation in cases involving basic human need. This leaves indigent litigants who are at risk of losing their homes or their children left to seek counsel through insufficient pro-bono programs or limited scope legal self-help centers. This thesis provides a history of the struggle for the right to civil counsel, known as Civil Gideon, and explores a variety of proposed solutions to bridge the justice gap for indigent litigants. Despite considerable support for Civil Gideon among scholars and the legal community, the public is unaware of the justice gap- about 80% of Americans assume the right to civil counsel already exists. This thesis conducted two studies to understand possible reasons for this gap between public knowledge and reality and to identify the possibility of manipulating public knowledge through exposure to injustices. The findings from these studies are used to inform a network approach to shape public support for Civil Gideon so that the US court system can truly represent opportunity and equality for all citizens.

The liberal conception of the state is marked by an insistence upon the equal civil and political rights of each inhabitant. Recently, though, a number of writers have argued that this emphasis on uniform rights ignores the fact that the populations of most states are culturally diverse, and that their inhabitants have significant interests qua members of particular cultures. They argue that liberals should recognize special, group-based cultural rights as a necessary part of a theory of justice in multicultural societies. In this thesis I examine the idea of special cultural rights. In the first part (Chapters 1 to 4), I begin by setting out some of the different conceptions of culture and multiculturalism that are involved in the debate over cultural rights. I then discuss three claims made by supporters of special cultural rights: (1) that having culture is an essential part of individual autonomy; (2) that people have morally significant interests qua members of particular cultures; and (3) that these interests are inadequately protected by existing liberal conceptions of human rights. Although I conclude that (1) is correct, I argue that both (2) and (3) are mistaken. Among other things, I suggest that the version of culture relied upon by supporters of special cultural rights is an implausible one and I outline what I take to be a more plausible, cosmopolitan conception of culture. In the second part (Chapters 5 to 9), I begin by looking at specific instances of cultural rights-claims, and analyzing the concept of cultural rights qua rights. I consider the practical and conceptual difficulties with special cultural rights at great length. But the core of my thesis is that our interest in culture lies in its contribution of worthwhile goals and options, and that this interest lies in culture generally rather than in particular cultures. Hence, adopting a special or group-based distribution of any right to culture would seem to be inconsistent with liberal egalitarian principles. If there are such things as cultural rights, I argue, they are general rather than special rights. I conclude by offering a very preliminary account of what a cosmopolitan conception of cultural rights might involve in the case of the right to free association and language rights.

This thesis focuses on the establishment and operation of the latest regional Human Rights Court: The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. For the development of human rights protection mechanisms within regional organizations the governments of the member states are of special relevance. They pull the strings to either foster and develop a system or to disrupt it. Therefore, following a brief historical introduction, the first chapter gives an overview of the regional African organization, the former Organization of African Unity (OAU) and today's African Union (AU) which was instrumental in the establishment of the African Human Rights System and has now enhanced it by adding a judicial authority. However, it will become clear that is has taken a long time for the OAU to put human rights violations within the borders of its own member states on its agenda: Not until there was increasing international pressure due to never-ending excrescences of violence in the dictatorial regimes in Africa did the OAU carefully attend to this matter in the late 1970s. Its efforts culminated in the adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the eponymous Banjul Charter) which entered into force in 1981. The body for the protection created by the Charter was the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights which took up its function in 1987. Since the newly established African Court is not supposed to replace the Commission but rather to strengthen it, the Court operates in concert with the Commission. Therefore the old protection system will still be applicable which deems a portrayal of the system in the following chapter necessary. Here, it will be outlined, that the competences of the Commission remain very limited and that its judicial impact on the State parties involved in its protection procedures has been nearly nil up to this very day. Against this background the next chapter focuses on the Protocol to the Banjul-Charter establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. First, the historical-political background and the protocol's juridical formulation process are examined. Here it will be shown that the end of global bipolarity has had a remarkable impact on the political protagonists in Africa with the effect that the increasing demands for a human rights Court within the OAU no longer remained completely unheard. It will also be outlined that the path towards the adoption of the protocol has been long and difficult. After a short survey of the organisational structure of the Court it will become clear that the protocol follows to a large extend its Inter-American counterpart concerning the institutional embodiment. However, a remarkable and, in international comparison, a unique achievement has also been achieved by the institutional regulations by making gender equality has one of the key issues to encompass when it comes to the nomination and election of judges. The following chapters outline the jurisdiction of the Court and the judicial process before the Court. In this connection the admissibility criteria will be highlighted in which two remarkable regulations stand out: First, it will become clear that in contrast to other regional human rights courts individuals and NGOs alike are entitled to file a complaint with the African Court (even though initially with the help of the Commission, since the protocol makes the complaint authority of individuals and NGOs dependent of a special declaration of acceptance of the State Parties concerned). Moreover, also unique compared to international two-tier human rights procedures, the protocol does not include a provision according to which a complainant would be obliged to go through a prior Commission procedure before filing a complaint with the Court. Individual complainants rather have direct access to the Court once a declaration of acceptance has been submitted by a State Party to the protocol. Following short remarks on the competence of the Court to issue provisional measures which, among other things, reveal that these measures have, in contrast to those of the ECtHR, binding effect the procedural termination of a complaint comes into focus. Here, the possible contents of the rulings and the control mechanisms for their implementation are being contemplated in a detailed fashion. This last aspect most probably will have great influence on the fate of the Court since the Commission for its part had to a large extent no success due to the fact that it had no conventional implementation procedures to rely on. Therefore, in the vast majority of cases the findings of the Commission trailed off without any State Party concerned paying any attention to it. The drafters of the protocol establishing the Court obviously have learned this lesson since the protocol provides for a quite remarkable implementation mechanism that may be able to impose political and legal pressure alike on State Parties if the Court deems that they have not properly complied with a Court's ruling. Even sanctions within the African Union against a recusant State come into question from a legal point of view - a quantum leap regarding the legal situation under the Banjul Charter. The last chapter rehearses the main findings of the thesis and concludes with a positive outlook on the future development of the African human rights system.

The object of this thesis is to investigate the application of international law in municipal law, and more specifically to focus on international human rights law. A determination of the sources of international human rights law constitutes the point of departure. Treaties are the primary source of international human rights law, followed by customary law. Recent authority indicates that the formation of customary human rights law differs from that of customary international law in general. There are, however, also international documents on human rights not falling within the scope of the traditional sources as embodied in section 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Non-binding sources of law, or soft law - most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - are shown to play an important role in the formation of both treaties and custom and directly influence state practice. Theoretical explanations expounding the application of international law in the domestic law of states are examined, assessing their suitability for effective implementation of international human rights instruments. Since the application of international law in municipal law depends on, and is regulated by rules of domestic law, the relevant rules of legal systems which may, due to historical factors or regional proximity, impact on South Africa, are examined. State practice points to two primary methods of dealing with international law obligations in domestic law, namely transformation (associated with the dualist theory) or direct application (associated with the monist theory). The specific method of incorporation adopted by a state is often closely related to that state's constitutional system. The advantages and disadvantages associated with each particular method are related to the intricacies of individual legal systems. From an internationalist perspective the often misunderstood doctrine of direct application, has the advantage of making the intended protection afforded by human rights treaties to individuals directly enforceable by domestic courts with a minimum of state intervention. The position of international law in South Africa is assessed against this background. South Africa's constitutional history under British rule followed British law requiring legislative transformation of treaty obligations, but permitting customary law to be directly incorporated into common law. The position of international law became constitutionally regulated in South Africa with the introduction of a constitutional democracy. Drafting errors and practical difficulties experienced with the 1993 Constitution, were largely ironed out by the 1996 Constitution. The post-apartheid Constitutions introduced changes and new dimensions compared to the pre-1993 position of international law, including: the consideration of international law when interpreting the constitutionally protected human rights; the involvement of the legislature in the treaty-making process; and provisions for both transformation and direct application of treaties subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Customary international law is confirmed as forming part of South African law, and courts are obliged to interpret legislation in accordance with international law. An analysis of court decisions after 1993 reveals the following broad trends: (i) The impact of international law as part of South African law is still largely overlooked. (ii) The majority of references to international law by the courts are to international human rights agreements and decisions by international tribunals under section 39 of the Bill of Rights. (iii) The distinction between international law and comparable foreign case law, as directed by section 39, is often blurred. (iv) No distinction is made between international hard and soft law when deciding on human rights matters. (v) Courts have refrained from applying international human rights obligations which form part of South African law because they are self-executing or form part of customary international law. (vi) Binding international human rights obligations are only referred to for comparative purposes. (vii) The term "treaty" is interpreted in accordance with the definition of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The intention to create legally binding obligations is therefore implicit. It has been the policy of the post-apartheid South African government to ratify or accede to the major international human rights agreements as swiftly as possible. The execution of this policy has, however, met with numerous problems. As a result, South Africa has to date not become party to the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. Many treaties to which South Africa is a party have not yet been incorporated into South African law and compulsory reports on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are overdue. Despite the post-apartheid euphoria about the creation of a human rights culture in South Africa and the formal commitment by government to give effect to international human rights instruments, much remains to be done before South Africa can be regarded as formally complying with international human rights standards. / Law / LL. D. (Law)

Wetgewing wat onbestaanbaar is met die bepalings van Wet 200 van 1993 as die hoogste reg is nietig tensy geoorloof volgens die maatstawwe van art 33 (1) 1 en die Konstitusionele Hof en die provinsiale en plaaslike afdelings van die Hooggeregshof is bevoeg om dit ongeldig te verklaar. Die beoordeling van die geldigheid van wetgewing waardeur inbreuk gemaak word op 'n Fundamentele Reg of Vryheid in Hoofstuk 3 verleen 1 vereis in eerste instansie die vertolking van die betrokke bepaling van die Hoofstuk. In die lig van die besondere karakter van 'n grondwet en die gebrek aan omlyning van die verleende regte en vryhede 1 moet die vertolking nie volgens geykte metodes geskied nie I maar wel doelgerig aan die hand van die waardes onderliggend tot die Handves as geheel. Waardes wat nie herleibaar is tot die grondwet self nie en die persoonlike filosofiee van die regters behoort die howe egter nie te beinvloed nie. / Legislation inconsistent with the provisions of Act 200 of 1993 as the supreme law is of no force and effect and the Constitutional Court and the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court may declare it invalid, unless it complies with the criteria of a permissible limitation under sec 33(1). Before the validity of legislation impinging upon a Fundamental Right or Freedom conferred in Chapter 3 can be considered, the relevant provision of the Chapter must first be interpreted. In view of the special nature of a constitution and the generality of the conferred rights and freedoms, the ordinary methods of interpretation should not be applied. Chapter 3 must be interpreted purposively taking into account the values underlying the Bill of Rights as a whole. Values not founded in the Constitution and the personal philosophies of the judges ought not to influence the courts. / Private Law / LL.M.

Notre thèse analyse la protection internationale des droits de l'homme dans des «zones grises», définies comme des zones géographiques où l’État, souverain sur son territoire, ne peut ou ne veut pas exercer un contrôle effectif. Or, une fois l’État n'a plus de contrôle sur une partie de son territoire, les mécanismes de contrôle des droits de l'homme deviennent paralysés. La question principale à laquelle notre étude vise à répondre est la question de savoir si et comment le droit international des droits de l'homme peut s'appliquer de façon effective dans des zones hors du contrôle effectif de l’État, premier garant des droits de l'homme dans son territoire. La Première Partie a pour objectif d'analyser la question de l'applicabilité du droit international des droits de l'homme et de répondre aux questions relatives à son applicabilité ratione loci, ratione materiae et ratione personae. Les conclusions clarifient si cette branche du droit international continue de s'appliquer dans les «zones grises» et quelles sont les obligations qui lient les États, notamment en répondant à la question, connexe, de savoir à quels autres sujets les obligations relatives aux droits de l'homme sont opposables. La Deuxième Partie examine les questions relatives à la mise en œuvre des normes du droit international des droits de l'homme, c'est-à-dire la question de la responsabilité internationale pour violations des droits de l'homme et le défi de l'engagement de la responsabilité dans les mécanismes de contrôle. Notre thèse soutient que le droit international des droits de l'homme est capable d'imposer son applicabilité et sa mise en œuvre dans une telle situation imparfaite. / The present thesis analyzes the international protection of human rights in "grey zones", defined as geographical areas where the State, sovereign of its territory, is unable or unwilling to exercise effective control. However, once the State has no more control over a part of its territory, human rights monitoring mechanisms become paralyzed. The main question to which the present study aims to answer is whether and how international human rights law can effectively apply in areas out of the effective control of the State, primary guarantor of human rights in its territory. The First Part aims to analyze the question of the applicability of international human rights law and to answer to the questions related to its applicability ratione loci, ratione materiae and ratione personae. The conclusions clarify whether this branch of international law continues to apply in the "grey zones" and which are the obligations binding States while answering to the related question to which other subjects human rights obligations are opposable. The Second Part examines the questions related to the implementation of the norms of international human rights law, i.e. the question of international responsibility for human rights violations and the challenge of the engagement of the responsibility in control mechanisms. The present thesis claims that international human rights law is able to impose its applicability and its implementation in such an imperfect situation.

Inspired by words of incarcerated and formerly incarcerated people in California and Denmark, this thesis critically analyzes the American criminal justice system and asks if critiques of the institution can be addressed and improved through the implementation of kindness and compassion within the walls of prison, itself.

Submitted by Morgana Silva (morgana_linhares@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-06-16T12:20:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1919980 bytes, checksum: aa03b296bb2b18e12b45124d49521d30 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-16T12:20:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1919980 bytes, checksum: aa03b296bb2b18e12b45124d49521d30 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-07-27 / The universalism vs. relativism dichotomy should not be perceived as a mere doctrinal issue. It means major obstacle to the effective protection of the human being in the international and internal orders. On one hand, the universal abstraction of human rights suffers severe critical, on the other hand, culture is dangerously positioned as an immutable element. It important to overcome this scenario and build the perception of common human rights. Even against this environment of disintegration, that rise of culture as an argument cannot put aside the protection of human life. The solution to the criticism of universalism and for strengthening the discourse of human rights relativism is the construction of a common core of human rights based on the prevalence of human rights. This research shows that it is so. Common is the space in which one of us are or wish to be part of. In the space of human rights, the common core was built by the main treaties of international law that form the so-called protection systems of the human being. It is very high level, because it goes beyond state borders. It was seat as essential assumptions the differential nature of the norms of international human rights law to ensure the international legal personality of the human person, beyond that, establishes the supremacy of international law over national law. Also, the foundation of the creation of the common core of human rights is in the primacy of human rights, defended as part of the ius cogens norm. The basis of the concept of common is the concept of policy in Hanna Arendt’s works. Therefore, the analysis of political activity in constructing common human rights toke place in international and domestic spaces. In international jurisdiction, the courts of human rights represent advances in constructing the hard core of human rights, although some structural aspects still deserve strong critics. In the Brazilian internal order, chaos around these matters is the main conclusion. Qualitative and quantitative methodologies were applied and, especially, the inductive, deductive, hypothetical-deductive methods of approach and typological method of procedure. / A dicotomia relativismo x universalismo não deve ser percebida como mera questão doutrinária. Ela significa grande obstáculo à efetiva proteção da pessoa humana na ordem internacional e nas ordens internas. Por um lado, a abstração universalista dos direitos humanos sofre severas críticas, por outro, a cultura se posiciona perigosamente como elemento imutável. É preciso superar esta questão e construir a percepção de direitos humanos comuns. Mesmo diante do ambiente de desintegração não se vislumbra argumento que consiga justificar a não proteção da vida humana. A solução para as críticas ao universalismo e para o fortalecimento do discurso de relativização dos direitos humanos está na construção de um núcleo comum de direitos humanos fundamentada na prevalência dos direitos humanos. É o que demonstra a pesquisa. O comum corresponde ao espaço no qual todos são parte ou desejam ser parte. No espaço dos direitos humanos, o núcleo comum foi construído pelos principais tratados de Direito Internacional que formam os denominados sistemas de proteção internacional da pessoa humana. Trata-se de graduação elevadíssima, porque ultrapassa as fronteiras estatais. Foram assentados como pressupostos essenciais o caráter diferenciado das normas de direito internacional dos direitos humanos que asseguram a personalidade jurídica internacional da pessoa humana, além disso, estabelece-se a primazia do direito internacional sobre os direitos nacionais. Além disso, o fundamento da criação do núcleo comum de direitos humanos está na primazia dos direitos humanos, defendida como norma componente do ius cogens. A base do conceito de comum está no conceito de política de Hanna Arendt. Portanto, a análise da atuação política de construção dos direitos humanos comuns foi feita no plano internacional e no plano interno. Na jurisdição internacional, as cortes de direitos humanos representam os avanços na construção do referido núcleo, embora alguns aspectos estruturais ainda mereçam fortes críticas. Na ordem interna brasileira, o caos em torno da matéria é a principal conclusão. Foram aplicadas as metodologias qualitativas e quantitativas, bem como, com destaque, os métodos de abordagem indutivo, dedutivo, hipotético-dedutivo e método de procedimento tipológico.

Rape and other forms of sexual violence have been used against civilian populations since the advent of armed conflict. However, recent scholarship within the last few decades proves that rape is not a byproduct of war or a result of transgressions by a few “bad apples,” rather, rape and sexual violence are used as strategic, systematic, and calculated tools of war, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. Rape has also been used as a means of preventing future generations of children of “undesirable” groups from being born. Rape and sexual violence are also used with the purpose of intimidating women and their communities, destroying the social fabric and cohesion of specific groups, and even as a final act of humiliation before killing the victim. In each conflict that is examined in this thesis, sexual violence is used against civilian populations for the specific purpose of genocide.

Recently, the interaction between International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) has been significantly developed by the jurisprudence of the Inter- American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). This article analyzes this recent trend from the cases of the Santo Domingo Massacreand Afro communities displaced from the Cacarica River Basin (Operation Genesis) of this tribunal to assert its competence not only to use IHL to interpret the Inter-American human rights instruments but, at the same time, to approach a direct use of humanitarian standards, which creates a gray area between the interpretation and application of such area of Law. In doing so, the Court resorts to the lex specialis if the IHL norm is the most specialized for the case, and uses IHL to a limited extent, only to expand the content of human rights, but not to judge on possible violations of IHL, which results in a methodology of pick and choose of IHL provisions. / Recientemente, la interacción entre el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos (DIDH) y el Derecho Internacional Humanitario (DIH) ha sido desarrollada significativamente en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Corte IDH). Este artículo analiza la tendencia reciente de los casos Masacre de Santo Domingo y Comunidades Afrodescendientes desplazadas de la cuenca del río Cacarica (Operación Génesis) de este tribunal para afirmar su competencia no solo para utilizar el DIH al interpretar los instrumentos interamericanos de derechos humanos, pero, al mismo tiempo, para aproximarse a la utilización directa de las normas humanitarias, lo que genera una zona gris entre la interpretación y aplicación de esta área del Derecho. Al hacerlo, la Corte recurre a la lex specialis si la norma del DIH es la más especializada para el caso; y utiliza el DIH hasta cierto límite, solamente para expandir el contenido de los derechos humanos, pero no para juzgar posibles violaciones del DIH, lo que resulta en una metodología de pick and choose (selectiva) de las normas del DIH.